

## Success Factors in CT/COIN Campaigns: Preliminary results arising from current research

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### ABSTRACT

This paper presents preliminary results from the initial phase of an ongoing research programme to better understand both the static and dynamic factors associated with the successful prosecution of Counter-Terrorist/Counter-Insurgency (CT/COIN) campaigns by states and their security forces.

In this initial phase of work, an interim sample of 18 historical and ongoing COIN campaigns have been analysed as static points to provisionally identify qualitative and quantitative factors that are statistically correlated with campaign outcome. A number of observations and minor results arising from this analysis are discussed, including some observations concerning the correlations between force measures and campaign success. In addition, a number of generic state and security forces’ success factors (attributes, capabilities, civil, military and legal strategies etc) that have been tested for association with campaign success are ranked according to the strength of their *current* correlations. Finally, the anticipated direction of the overall research programme over the next several years is described.

## INTRODUCTION

### THIS PAPER

This paper outlines work undertaken in 2004 by operational analysts in the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) of the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) to identify generic success factors for states and their (military, paramilitary and civilian) security forces when involved in military campaigns against irregular “terrorist” or “insurgent” forces. This work is intended to be the first phase of a multi-year research programme to better understand both the general mechanisms affecting success in Counter-Terrorist/Counter-Insurgency (CT/COIN) campaigns and the way in which these campaigns change and evolve over time.

### HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN UK MOD

Since 1983, both Policy and Capability Studies (PCS) Department Dstl and its predecessor organisations in UK MoD have undertaken operational analysis studies whose methodology has focused around the statistical analysis of data drawn from real-world engagements, operations, campaigns and conflicts. This “historical analysis” (HA) approach evolved out of a need to quantify previously intangible factors of tactical level conventional land warfare (see, for example, Rowland and Speight, 1999) but has since developed into a more generally applicable tool for providing both “reality checks” to the wider UK defence modelling and analysis communities and “evidence-based” support to policy formulation within MoD.

As previously noted (Hossack, 2005), historical analysis is not the same as academic historical research or attempts to draw “lessons learnt” from historical case studies. Rather, it is a type of operational analysis undertaken to provide advice for decision-makers and subject to the usual trade-offs between completeness and timeliness, and between accuracy and robustness. Although the original studies of tactical land warfare typically analysed purely historical samples derived from two-sided data, more recent studies of unconventional, asymmetric and irregular warfare (such as are reported here) have increasingly moved towards consideration of strategic/grand-strategic issues based on samples derived from one-sided data only and including recent as well as purely historical conflicts.

### BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH REPORTED IN THIS PAPER

The analysis reported upon in this paper, and the wider research programme expected to follow therefrom, builds upon a series of previous HA studies of asymmetric warfare undertaken by Dstl for UK MoD since 1999. These studies have included:

- An investigation between 1999 - 2001 of those tactical aspects of operations other than war (OOTW) that are warfighting-like in nature (i.e. patrols, ambushes, incidents etc). Eight post-WWII campaigns of a CT/COIN nature were researched in this study.

- An eighteen month analysis of c. 30 post-WWII counter-terrorist campaigns undertaken after September 11, 2001 to help inform MoD on issues relating to possible future UK involvement in “*counter-terrorism overseas*”. Hossack, 2005 reports, *inter alia*, on some of the findings of this work.
- An examination undertaken in Summer 2004 of which factors generally have the most significant impact upon the achievement of both “*mission*” and “*policy*” success for “*stabilisation operations*” undertaken by forces external to the state being stabilised<sup>1</sup>. 48 examples of external stabilisation operations were analysed in this study, which is reported in Irwin and Morley, 2005.

This paper owes some debt to each the studies listed above for either the provision of data or for the development of the scope, concept and method of analysis used. However, the most direct inheritance comes from the last two of these three studies.

### COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND STABILISATION

Superficially, the work on CT/COIN reported in this paper may appear to be not just influenced by, but a repetition of the similar analysis of stabilisation operations described above. However, there are a number of differences between the two studies as follows:

- Whilst all CT/COIN operations can arguably be regarded as examples of stabilisation operations, not all instability in a state is necessary violent or arising from the use of violence by factions within the state. Classic examples of (essentially) non-violent stabilisation operations include the Allied occupations and reconstructions of Germany and Japan after WWII and recent peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations such as in Bosnia and in Sierra Leone.
- The stabilisation study explicitly considered only scenarios where an *external* force has intervened within a third-party state in order to “*stabilise*”<sup>2</sup> it. Many CT/COIN campaigns are essentially internal conflicts *within* states<sup>3</sup> with involvement by external states limited to provision of advisors, money and materiel (to either combatant) only.
- Stabilisation is, conceptually, distinct from CT/COIN and thus differs subtly in the types of objective sought. Specifically, stabilisation has as its goal the achievement of a state of affairs within a country (“*stability*”) and an implicit requirement of this goal is that the desired state of affairs continues for at least some time after achievement<sup>4</sup>. Conversely, both counter-terrorism and

<sup>1</sup> In this study, stability was defined to be “*a condition pertaining to a state where it has effective control of and administration of its territory, population and resources*” and stabilisation operations were defined to be “*military operations primarily intended to increase the stability of a state*”. See Irwin and Morley, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Noting here that, depending upon point-of-view in any given situation, synonyms for *stabilisation* might include *administration, invasion, occupation, annexation*, etc.

<sup>3</sup> And thus, arguably, could be considered to be examples of “*self-stabilisation*” operations.

<sup>4</sup> That is, whilst the achievement of instantaneous (or point) stability is technically a successful end-state for a stabilisation operation, it is not generally a meaningful one.

counter-insurgency are concerned with the cessation of certain types of undesired behaviour (“*terrorism*”, “*insurgency*”) and, once this cessation is achieved, whatever comes after is strictly unrelated to the achieved cessation of the undesired behaviour<sup>5</sup>. Thus different, although analogous, output measures are appropriate to study of each type of operation.

- Finally, the different study requirements of the stabilisation study and the current research have meant that the earlier study considered fewer, more generic and less military-specific success factors than are considered in this paper for example. This distinction will become more apparent as the current research progresses – it is for example intended that a future stage of the research will examine terrorist/insurgent success factors to complement the study of state and security forces’ success factors discussed here.

## TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

### TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM ETC.

As noted in Hossack, 2005, terrorism is defined by the UK and NATO<sup>6,7</sup> as a tactic (or action) of irregular warfare - “*the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies*” - by which groups can choose to attempt to achieve “*political, religious or ideological*” objectives. From this it follows that a terrorist (group) can be sensibly considered to be any individual (group) that seeks to achieve “*political, religious or ideological*” objectives predominantly through the use of terrorism tactics.

In contrast, the NATO definitions of “*counter-terrorism*” and “*antiterrorism*” are instead descriptions of objectives to be achieved – “*the neutralisation of terrorism*” and the “*reduction of the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism*” respectively<sup>8</sup>. In accordance with vernacular usage, these last two definitions will generally be conflated in this study into a single concept — called counter-terrorism (CT) for convenience — that represents all the offensive, defensive and preventative measures undertaken by a (possibly de facto) state, its leadership (executive) and its various civil, military and paramilitary agencies<sup>9</sup> in order to end the employment of terrorist tactics<sup>10</sup> by some (non-state) terrorist group.

<sup>5</sup> That is, success (or failure) in a CT/COIN campaign is a meaningful end-state for that campaign, irrespective of what comes after through e.g. failure to address the underlying causes of the insurgency etc. In practice, of course, many “*internal security*” operations seek to *both* defeat terrorism/insurgency and stabilise the state experiencing the same. However, the frequent coincidence of these two distinct objectives does not make them identical.

<sup>6</sup> JWP 0-01.1: United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions.

<sup>7</sup> Allied Administrative Publication 6 (AAP-6): NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

<sup>8</sup> Specifically, counter-terrorism is seen to cover “*all offensive measures*” whilst antiterrorism covers “*all defensive and preventive measures*”.

<sup>9</sup> Note that these definitions do not explicitly assume that either counter-terrorism or antiterrorism are exclusively functions of the (possibly de facto) state and/or its security forces. Consider, for example, the use of private security contractors in Iraq at present to provide antiterrorism protection to clients and the

Finally, the terms “terrorist campaign” and “counter-terrorist campaign” have generally been used interchangeably in this study as synonyms<sup>11</sup> for any extended two-sided sequence of initiatives and counter-initiatives undertaken *both* by a state and its security forces (SyF) to counter some non-state terrorist group *and* by said terrorist group in attempting to achieve certain objectives against the will of the state.

## INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY ETC.

Although NATO considers an “*insurgency*” to be “*an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict*” (see Footnote 7), the term insurgent group has generally been used instead in this study both to avoid confusion between the vernacular usage of insurgency<sup>12</sup> and to provide consistency with the usage above of the terms “*terrorism*” and “*terrorist group*”. The NATO definition of counter-insurgency (COIN) — “*those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency*” — is comparable to that given above for counter-terrorism<sup>13</sup> and is therefore used without modification in this study. The terms insurgency campaign and counter-insurgency campaign again generally have been used synonymously for any extended two-sided sequence of initiatives and counter-initiatives undertaken *both* by a state and its security forces to counter some non-state insurgent group *and* by said insurgent group in attempting to overthrow the existing government of the state.

## CIVIL WAR

UK terminology defines civil war to be “*war conducted largely within the boundaries of a state in which a significant part of the population is associated with opposing sides*”, where war itself is “*characterised by intense, extensive and sustained combat, usually between states*”. Unfortunately, this definition is of limited practical value in trying to test analytically whether a sample point is genuinely an insurgency as opposed to a civil war<sup>14</sup> and this study has consequently instead adopted the qualitative criteria proposed in Robbs, 1988 that an internal conflict within a state be an actual (as opposed to nominal) civil war if, broadly:

- The non-state player in the internal conflict:
  - i. Occupies and controls *territory*<sup>15</sup>.
  - ii. Has a functioning government.

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counter-terrorist roles undertaken historically by non-state/private militias and/or “death squads” such as, respectively, the Croatian Ustashe in WWII and the FALANGE in El Salvador.

<sup>10</sup> Whether through the destruction (killing, disbandment) or elimination (imprisonment, exile) of said terrorist group, or by persuading the same to pursue its objectives through non-terrorist means.

<sup>11</sup> The terms may also be used non-synonymously to refer to each side’s sequence of initiatives and counter-initiatives within a conflict in isolation. This usage will be avoided in this study.

<sup>12</sup> I.e. As the act of attempting to “*overthrow a constituted government through [the] use of subversion and armed conflict*”.

<sup>13</sup> I.e. both definitions define classes of actions (tactics) *through* the objectives they are required to achieve.

<sup>14</sup> Because of the test criterion for civil war status being essentially some arbitrary unspecified “*significant*” proportion of the state population being associated with the non-state actor in the civil war.

<sup>15</sup> Note that this is not the same as either controlling the *population* or *denying* control of territory to one’s opponent – both of which are recognised insurgent strategies.

- iii. Has an organised army which:
  - Is commanded by a person responsible for its actions,
  - Carries its arms openly
  - Wears a distinctive uniform,
  - Conducts hostilities in accordance with the rules of war.
- Other states offer some type of recognition to both the conflict and the “*insurgent state*”<sup>16</sup>.
- A state of general hostilities accompanied by a military confrontation of a major proportion is taking place.

## SCOPE OF CT/COIN RESEARCH PROGRAMME

### THE SPECTRUM OF ASSYMETRIC CONFLICT

To understand the scope of this research, it is useful to consider the positions occupied by both CT and COIN campaigns within some version of the “*Spectrum of Conflict*” such as shown in Figure 1. The concept of the Spectrum of Conflict reflects a commonly-understood, instinctive ordering of different forms of military activity according to some (normally undefined) concept of “*conflict intensity*” or “*level of violence*”<sup>17</sup>. It can be seen from Figure 1 below that both UK and US commentators place CT and COIN campaigns (broadly<sup>18</sup>) adjacent to each other within the Spectrum of Conflict so that they form a hypothetical local “*Spectrum of Asymmetric Conflict*” bounded immediately below by non-conflict operations such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping<sup>19</sup> and bounded immediately above by (literal) civil war. This Spectrum of Asymmetric Conflict can be thought of as representing that part of the overall Spectrum where extensive, prolonged conflict exists but where the strategies, tactics, resources, organisation and status of the principal combatants are very different — i.e. where the conflicts are very asymmetric in nature<sup>20</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> Note that this need not be diplomatic recognition of the non-state player as a state (which would imply a war between states rather than a civil war within a state). The recognition required here is of the belligerent status of the non-state player.

<sup>17</sup> Unfortunately, whilst commonly-understood, most versions of the Spectrum of Conflict are useless as analytical taxonomies. Typical failings include lack of definition of components, lack of exclusivity in classes, lack of (demonstrable) exhaustivity and inconsistent dimensionality in class definitions.

<sup>18</sup> Ignoring the class of “*strikes and raids*” activities that US doctrine places between CT and COIN upon the overall spectrum on the grounds that these are more properly a class of individual activities (operations) than a class of sequences of activities (campaigns, conflicts, wars).

<sup>19</sup> It is assumed here that any violence implied within the “enforcement” aspect of peace enforcement operations will be discrete, strictly limited and largely one-sided in nature on the pragmatic grounds that any interaction where this is not the case can probably more accurately be described as being some sort of “*war*” anyway.

<sup>20</sup> Essentially the combatant with significantly fewer resources (typically a non-state actor) chooses to prosecute the conflict in a way that as much as possible minimises or negates his opponent’s resource superiority – i.e. by organising and fighting as irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, terrorists, *Franc-tireurs* etc.).




Figure 1: Various Interpretations of the “Spectrum of Conflict.”

It is, however, misleading to think of CT and COIN campaigns as forming *distinct* adjacent regions within the Spectrum of Asymmetric Conflict (or the wider Spectrum of Conflict overall) as shown in Figure 1. In fact, there are good empirical reasons for choosing not to distinguish *a priori* between CT and COIN campaigns since the distinction between the two appears to be principally one of relative size of the non-state terrorist/insurgent actor<sup>21</sup> (see Hossack, 2005). This study has consequently followed the position set out in this earlier paper and considered the Spectrum of Asymmetric Conflict as being defined by a single, undifferentiated class of counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency (CT/COIN) campaigns rather than by distinct CT and COIN sub-classes.

## STUDY SCOPE

For the purposes of analysis, the scope of this study (and indeed, of the entire research programme), has been taken to be CT/COIN campaigns undertaken by some state actor (a possibly de facto state government and its associated security forces) against some non-state actor (group, movement) from within the state. Situations in which the state actor or its security forces have directed terrorism at sub-populations of the state (as with the *Tonton Macoutes* in Haiti) or in which non-state organisations have directed terrorism against sub-populations of the state (for example, anti-Nationalist Protestant paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland) were explicitly excluded from the scope of these studies.

In addition to this, small, urban, purely-terrorist campaigns undertaken by non-state actor groups of less than around 200 active members<sup>22</sup> have been arbitrarily excluded from the scope of this study on the grounds that CT campaigns against groups of this size have

<sup>21</sup> To be precise, terrorism tactics occur in most “insurgencies” as well as in “purely” terrorist campaigns, but insurgency tactics seem to occur only when the density of insurgents (and sympathisers) in the general population exceeds 0.1 per 1,000 (Hossack, 2005).

<sup>22</sup> Such as the Greek *November 17* or the West German *Rote Armee Fraktion (Baader-Meinhof Gang)*.

generally fallen predominantly within the civil rather than the military domain of resolution. Similarly, genuine civil wars as defined above have been excluded as examples of conventional, symmetric rather than unconventional, asymmetric warfare. CT/COIN campaigns that escalated into genuine civil wars were considered only up to the end of the phase of terrorism/insurgency.

## A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF CT/COIN CAMPAIGNS

For the purposes of analysis, a simple campaign-level template for a generic CT/COIN campaign has been developed. In accordance with both UK and NATO terminology and the study scope set out above, such a generic CT/COIN campaign is considered to be:

*...any extended, essentially two-sided, asymmetric conflict in which some non-state player largely within a (possibly de facto) state attempts to force some change in either the nature and/or leadership of said state predominantly through some mixture of terrorist and/or insurgent tactics.*

From this template, a high-level conceptual campaign model of a generic CT/COIN campaign has been developed to represent a range of very different historical and ongoing CT/COIN campaigns within a single, common framework for analysis. In this generic model, a CT/COIN campaign is considered to take place largely within the geographical boundaries of some state, called the State in Conflict (SiC)<sup>23</sup>. The regions<sup>24</sup> within the SiC in which the insurgency principally occurs is called the Area of Conflict Location (ACL) and a campaign is said to be **national** in character if the area of the ACL is the area of the SiC; otherwise it is said to be local or regional in nature. Within the ACL, some non-state Terrorist/Insurgent Group (TIG) engages in asymmetric conflict with the Security Forces (SyF) of the SiC and also, possibly, with troops deployed by some independent third-party External Intervening State (EIS) that is assisting the SiC as in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Conceptual Campaign Model of a Generic CT/COIN Campaign.

<sup>23</sup> The authors confess here to a degree of sloppiness in their terminology in failing to adequately distinguish here between the “state” as a political as opposed to geographical concept.

<sup>24</sup> Typically defined in terms of the principal administrative or geographic subdivisions of the state (province, division, department, oblast, island etc.).

In practice, of course, very few actual CT/COIN campaigns have been this neatly and simply structured. Consequently, when attempting to fit historical CT/COIN campaigns into this conceptual campaign model, a number of standard simplifying assumptions have been applied as follows:

- Where several external states have historically intervened together in a third-party CT/COIN campaign to assist the SiC, it has been generally assumed that these intervening states were all effectively part of some single coalition and, further, that one of the coalition members was sufficiently dominant over the others as to provide by itself a reasonable first-order approximation of the whole intervening coalition<sup>25</sup>.
- Where several TIGs have been active within a state at the same time, it has again been generally assumed that *either* these groups effectively formed a single, coalition entity *or* that one TIG was again sufficiently dominant over all the others that the minor groups could reasonably be ignored as a first-order approximation<sup>26</sup>.
- Conflicts that “spilt out” beyond the borders of the SiC<sup>27</sup> have generally been assumed to satisfy the “*largely within*” criterion of the generic campaign template provided that any extraterritorial aspects of the conflict were confined to the immediate transborder regions of any adjacent states (Figure 2).

This campaign model, when accompanied by the simplifying assumptions listed above, provides a flexible and adaptable framework for the abstraction of a wide and diverse range of asymmetric conflicts into a series of common structures as demonstrated in Table 1 below. The separation of ACL from SiC allows a distinction to be drawn (where relevant) between overall state size, population, resources, armed forces etc and those pertaining to the area of conflict; it also allows distinction to be made between states and secessionist provinces, or between occupied (annexed) territories and the states occupying (annexing) them. Similarly, the concept of the EIS allows not just Iraq-style interventions to be modelled but also cases of imperial “intervention into” a colonial possession in conflict such as in e.g. the Malayan or EOKA Emergencies.

Although not pertinent to the analysis reported in this paper, it may be wondered in passing why this conceptual CT/COIN Model chooses to explicitly represent an external player intervening in the conflict to support the state actor but does not have any parallel explicit representation of the provision by external state (or non-state) actors of support and/or sponsorship for the TIG. This is because although both the SiC and EIS perspectives are assumed to be of interest to UK MoD, the UK is unlikely at any time in the foreseeable future to be acting as a sponsor or supporter of insurgency campaigns in other countries<sup>28</sup> and that, consequently, there was no advantage to be gained from explicitly including a fourth

<sup>25</sup> Consider, for example, the current “*Coalition of the Willing*” in Iraq, where the US is contributing c. three-quarters of the coalition forces operating in Iraq.

<sup>26</sup> See Footnote 7 of Hossack, 2005.

<sup>27</sup> I.e. in cases where the TIG has established training camps or depots etc. just outside the borders of the SiC and where the SyF mount cross-border raids to destroy/disrupt them.

<sup>28</sup> Although UK/US support for the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and US support for the “*Contras*” in Nicaragua demonstrate that precedents for such situations do exist.

player in the generic campaign model. Where it becomes necessary in future analyses of Terrorist/Insurgent success factors, the existence or otherwise of such external support/sponsorship will instead be represented as an *attribute* of the TIG.

Years	External Intervening State	State in Conflict	Area of Conflict Location	Terrorist / Insurgent Group
1941 - 1945	None	German 3 <sup>rd</sup> Reich	Kingdom of Yugoslavia	Yugoslav Partisans
1955 - 1960	United Kingdom	Crown Colony of Cyprus	Crown Colony of Cyprus	EOKA
1954 - 1962	France	Department of Algeria <sup>29</sup>	Department of Algeria	ALN
1965 - 1972	USA	Republic of Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	Viet Cong
1969 - 1994	None	United Kingdom	Northern Ireland	PIRA
1975 - 1999	None	Indonesia	E Timor	FALANTIL

*Table 1:* Representations of Historical CT/COIN Campaigns in the Generic Campaign Model

## CONCEPT OF ANALYSIS

### THE PRINCIPAL ANALYTICAL CONCEPT

The principal intention of this initial phase of research is to determine whether any statistical evidence of association can be found between the presence or otherwise of various SyF attributes, capabilities, strategies and tactics in a CT/COIN campaign and the achievement of success in that campaign by the state and its security forces. This will be done by testing simple ordinal categorical measures of the degree of implementation/presence of each potential success factor for association with equally simple (and again ordinal categorical) measures of success in a series of 3 x 3 contingency tables.

The intention is to use Goodman-Kruskal's Gamma measure to quantify degree of association when the full data sample is available for analysis later in the year. However, for the interim analysis reported in this paper on a strictly limited sub-sample of the available data, Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient has been used instead as being simpler to implement.

<sup>29</sup> This is an interesting case; prior to independence French Algeria was an overseas Department of France and not, strictly, a colonial possession thereof. However, following the pragmatic rule of thumb that suggests that "*if it waddles like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck*", French Algeria will be treated as effectively a colonial possession in this study.

## POTENTIAL SECURITY FORCES' SUCCESS FACTORS

A list of potential generic success factors which have been pursued (in specific forms) by different security forces' in different campaigns has been compiled. These factors have, for convenience, been very loosely<sup>30</sup> categorised as state/SyF attributes, capabilities, strategies and tactics dependent on whether they describe, respectively:

- Fundamental aspects of the nature, within the context of the campaign, of the state and/or its Security Forces.
- Priorities for resource allocation to and within the Security Forces.
- Broad policies for attempting to win the campaign.
- Narrower methods that might be used, dependent on context, to achieve one or several of the strategies listed.

Field Title	Flexibility of SyF C2	Control of Population
Field Value		
-1	The SyF were <i>unresponsive</i> , inflexible and <i>incapable</i> of either achieving surprise in planned operations or of exploiting targets of opportunity.	<i>No controls</i> were applied on either the movement, location or activities of the general population
0	The SyF had <i>limited</i> responsiveness and flexibility and were <i>sometimes</i> able to act sufficiently rapidly to achieve surprise in planned operations or to exploit targets of opportunity	<i>Basic controls</i> (ID/ration cards, movement papers, checkpoints) were used to monitor and regulate the location and movement of the general population
1	The SyF were <i>responsive</i> , flexible, <i>capable</i> of planning innovatively and of <i>acting rapidly</i> to achieve tactical/operational surprise or to exploit targets of opportunity	<i>Significant controls</i> (relocation to "government villages", "concentration camps" etc) were used to monitor and control the location & movement of the general population

Table 2: Examples of Category Criteria for Two Candidate SyF Success Factors.

For each of the 38 separate candidate factors that have been identified, a set of generalised criteria have been written that define three ordered categories of usage/employment/presence of that success factor in a generic CT/COIN Campaign, generally ranging from some "not/poorly/infrequently used" category to a "widely/competently/consistently used" category via an intermediate "occasionally/inconsistently/incompetently used" category. Care has been taken to define criteria for each factor only in terms of the professionalism (quality) and extent (quantity) with which the generic factor could be applied rather than with any measure of campaign outcome, since this would introduce auto-correlation effects into the subsequent analyses. Table 2 gives examples of the categorical criteria defined for two potential success factors and Table 3 lists the 38 candidate factors currently identified<sup>31</sup> and used in this analysis.

<sup>30</sup> That is, no attempt has been made to make this typology robust since it plays no part in the following analysis.

<sup>31</sup> As preliminary data collection, coding and analysis has begun, it has already become apparent that the current set of candidate SyF success factors listed in Table 3 is incomplete and that, furthermore, several of

SyF Attributes	Notes/Description	SyF Strategies	Notes/Description
Legitimacy of SiC	<i>International and internal; <u>not</u> the same as popular support</i>	Legal Status of Campaign	<i>E.g. Civil Law, State of Emergency, Martial Law</i>
SyF Resource Availability	<i>Were operations constrained by resources?</i>	SyF Rules of Engagement / Campaign Violence	<i>Rules of Engagement from Tight to Loose to None</i>
Flexibility of SyF C2	<i>Level of decision-making; speed of decision/reaction loop</i>	SyF Strategic Posture	<i>From defensive/reactive through to assertive/proactive</i>
Integration of SyF C2	<i>Internal vs. external, police vs. paramilitary vs. military SyF elts.</i>	SyF Targeting of TIG Leadership	<i>Either to kill, capture, imprison etc</i>
SyF Doctrine	<i>Possessing an appropriate doctrine for the Campaign</i>	SyF Marginalisation of TIG	<i>Channelling TIG support into non-violent alternatives</i>
Coherence of SyF Strategy	<i>Pursuing coherent, complementary strategies</i>	SyF Political Engagement with TIG	<i>Direct (possibly covert) negotiations</i>
Level of SyF Training	<i>General &amp; CT/COIN specific training</i>	SyF Isolation of TIG	<i>Isolation from international support, sympathy</i>
Level of SyF Experience	<i>Previous institutional &amp;/or individual experience of CT/COIN</i>	Winning Population “Hearts & Minds”	<i>Includes both empathising &amp; alienating attitudes, behaviours</i>
Popular Support for SyF in ACL	<i>Popular support <u>within the ACL</u> for SyF <u>actions</u></i>	Degradation of TIG Materiel/Log Infrastructure	<i>Including interdiction, seizure etc of flow of men, munitions, money etc</i>
Popular Support for Conflict in SIC	<i>Popular support <u>across SiC</u> for fighting the <u>campaign</u></i>	Military Attrition of TIG	<i>Direct military action to kill/capture/expel TIG</i>
Popular Support for Conflict in EIS	<i>Popular Support across EIS for fighting the campaign</i>	Military Attrition of TIG Sympathisers	<i>Direct military action to kill/expel the population the TIG recruits from<sup>32</sup></i>
SyF Intelligence Overall	<i>Overall quality of SyF intelligence of TIG intentions, organisation etc</i>	Collective Punishment for Incidents	<i>Includes reprisals, execution of hostages, destruction of homes etc.</i>
SyF Capabilities	<i>Notes/Description</i>	SyF Tactics	<i>Notes/Description</i>
SyF Counter-Intelligence	<i>Ability to deny TIG Int on SyF actions, officials, plans etc</i>	SyF Control of Population	<i>Includes “Strategic Hamlets”, “Government Villages” etc</i>
SyF Infiltration/ Co-option (HUMINT)	<i>Informants in local population; agents within TIG</i>	SyF Control of Borders	<i>Extent to which movement across borders is regulated</i>
SyF Eavesdropping (COMINT/SIGINT)	<i>Wiretaps/mail interception in urban campaigns</i>	SyF Use of Internment	<i>From none through indiscriminate to selective</i>
SyF Surveillance (IMINT/ELINT)	<i>Typically aerial recce; could include secret police</i>	SyF Organisation of Local Militias	<i>Local “Home Guard”, self-defence militias</i>
SyF Deployment across ACL	<i>Dispersed or concentrated in urban garrisons?</i>	SyF Rehabilitation of former TIs	<i>Deliberate programme used to encourage surrenders?</i>
SyF Mobility	<i>Ability to deploy into any terrain in ACL</i>	SyF Use of SF	<i>Extent employed</i>

the criteria definitions need revision to resolve issues of ambiguity or conflation not adequately anticipated during the formulation stage. Hopefully, it will be possible to address these shortcomings in future research.

<sup>32</sup> This also includes the sponsorship, organisation or unofficial toleration by the SyF of non-state militias and/or “death squads” (as discussed in Footnote 9).

SyF Firepower	<i>From Light Role Infantry up to MBTs &amp; Strike Aircraft</i>	SyF Use of Free-Fire Zones	<i>Extent employed</i>
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Table 3: The Candidate SyF Success Factors Considered In This Analysis.

## MEASURES OF CAMPAIGN SUCCESS

Two separate types of campaign output measure have been selected for use in this study, military success and political success. Military success is assumed *a priori* to be a zero-sum trade-off between SyF and TIG whilst political success is judged independently for each actor (SiC, EIS, TIG) present in a campaign. Each success measure is assessed on a three-point ordinal scale analogous to those used for the candidate success factors (above) with military success determined by possession or otherwise of an effective monopoly of violence at or immediately after the end of the conflict<sup>33</sup> and with political success judged in terms of the extent to which each player's reported initial strategic political/military objectives were met at the end of the campaign<sup>34</sup>.

## RESOLUTION OF DATA

In this initial stage of the overall research programme, each CT/COIN campaign included in the analysis sample has been considered as a single "whole-campaign" data point and coded as such. This approach, which is adopted for simplicity, effectively homogenises each campaign by requiring possibly highly variable patterns of presence and absence of any given success factor at different times during the campaign (or in different regions) to be aggregated together into a single "averaged" value. Moreover, at this time, no attempt has been made to distinguish between the degree of presence or absence of a factor in the early stages of the campaign and the degree of presence or absence at the end of the campaign.

There are two principal analytical disadvantages to undertaking analysis at this "*whole campaign*" level of resolution: firstly, it may obscure the importance of any very context-specific success factors (such as the "tactics" and "strategies" listed above) and secondly, it may accord undue weight, from the SyF perspective, to the early, (by definition) unsuccessful phases of a campaign relative to the later (possibly successful) phases<sup>35</sup>. Moreover, it makes the analysis a purely static one that fails to capture any of the dynamics of the combatants' interactions except at the level of the overall campaign outcomes. The reason for adopting

<sup>33</sup> That is, the criteria for SyF (TIG) military success is that the SyF (TIG) possess an effective monopoly on any capacity to resume violence in future immediately after the end of the campaign (and any associated withdrawal, expulsion or demobilisation etc). Situations where both sides retain a capacity for violence are coded as partial military successes for both sides.

<sup>34</sup> Achievement of all or most of a player's initial objectives is classed as *full* political success; Achievement of some of these objectives is classed as *partial* success and achievement of few or none of these objectives is classed as political *failure*.

<sup>35</sup> For example, if a given success factor is strongly associated with SyF success when effective, but also necessarily takes time to build to effectiveness, then the current method of determining aggregate presence across the whole campaign may misrepresent the true degree of association between the factor and campaign success. Such an effect *may* be causing an "underscoring" of Overall SyF Intelligence in the current analysis.

this approach in this initial phase of the overall research programme is to avoid overcomplicating what should properly be regarded as an initial exploratory analysis liable for future revision once the overall problem space is better understood. It is intended that once the static one-sided analyses of SyF and then TIG success factors are completed in around March 2006, a dynamic analysis will be undertaken in which at least some of these CT/COIN campaigns will be broken down into discrete, genuinely homogeneous phases. This should afford greater resolution of the contexts within which success factors are effective as well as providing an understanding of how CT/COIN campaigns begin, evolve and end.

## DATA COLLECTION AND CODING

### SAMPLE SELECTION

A list of twentieth century asymmetric conflicts potentially suitable for inclusion in this analysis has been compiled from a literature review and from master lists generated for other studies. Cases for research were selected from this master list principally by stratified sampling on region of world occurring, with a subsidiary bias towards cases researched in previous HA studies and for which data was thus already held. Consequently, the sample can not be said to be strictly random in composition, but any biases that may exist should not have any obvious *a priori* effect on the analysis subsequently undertaken. Furthermore, the selection of which of the collected cases to code for immediate analysis in this preliminary research has been effectively, if not formally, random.

## DATA COLLECTION AND CODING

Data collection for this initial phase of analysis has been undertaken by up to six contracted historian/researchers, working in parallel against quite tight absolute time constraints. For each campaign researched, data has been collected as best as possible in the time allocated on the overall campaign context, chronology, contemporary geography and demographics, civilian casualties etc. In addition, details of the objectives, outcomes, strengths, weaknesses, strategies, tactics, manpower, deaths and other attributes of both the state and its SyF and of the TIG have also been collected.

Unfortunately, the average effort required to research the large number of data fields specified for each campaign was severely underestimated during the study design phase. Consequently, it has frequently been necessary to supplement the external data collection with internal (internet) research and, in addition, the continual modifications made to the collection template in an attempt to balance the data requirement to the resources available mean that no two datasheets are entirely identical.

This discrepancy between planned and required resources has also affected the data coding process. Initially, data collection was separated from data coding to provide a transparent audit trail. However, this was found to lead to both a lack of positive reportage of factors *absent* from a campaign and also to a tendency to not consider the full range (Table 3)

of potential success factors in the data collection. Consequently, as collection progressed, the researchers were instructed to make their own assessments of the degree of presence or absence exhibited by each success factor in each campaign. This has saved effort but increased the likelihood of miscomprehension of the factors' categorisation criteria.

Information has been collected for 34 CT/COIN campaigns up to February 2005 (Table 4 above) and it is hoped that data on a further 11 campaigns will be available for the final analyses of SyF Success Factors due in June 2005. Data coding, however, has currently only been undertaken on 18 of these 34 campaigns, shown in bold text in Table 4. It is this subset of 13 completed and 5 ongoing campaigns (as of December 2004) that form the sample used for the preliminary analyses reported in this paper.

Start Date	Campaign Identification	Start Date	Campaign Identification
1919	Irish War of Independence	<b>1965</b>	<b>Basque Conflict</b> †
<b>1920</b>	<b>Great Iraqi Revolution</b>	1968	Communist Insurgency, Philippines
<b>1921</b>	<b>Kurdish Revolts in Iraq</b>	1969	"The Troubles" in Northern Ireland
<b>1941</b>	<b>German Occupation of Yugoslavia</b>	<b>1972</b>	<b>Rhodesian Civil War</b>
<b>1946</b>	<b>Indonesian War of Independence</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>Indonesian Occupation of East Timor</b>
<b>1946</b>	<b>French Indo-China War</b>	<b>1976</b>	<b>Aceh Insurgency, Indonesia</b> †
1946	Huk Rebellion	<b>1980</b>	<b>Shining Path Insurgency, Peru</b> †
1948	Malayan Emergency	<b>1980</b>	<b>El Salvador Civil War</b>
1952	Mau-Mau Emergency	1980*	Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
1956	26 July Movement, Cuba	<b>1981</b>	<b>"Contras" Insurgency, Nicaragua</b>
1954	Algerian War of Independence	1983	"Tamil Tigers" Insurgency, Sri Lanka †
<b>1955</b>	<b>EOKA Emergency</b>	<b>1984</b>	<b>PKK Insurgency, Turkey</b>
1961	ANC "Armed Struggle"	1989	The Kashmir Conflict †
1963	The Aden Emergency	1971	MILF Islamic Insurgency, Philippines †
<b>1964</b>	<b>Colombian Civil War</b> †	1992	AIS / GIA Islamic Insurgency, Algeria †
1964	Dhofar Insurgency, Oman	<b>1994</b>	<b>Chechnya I</b>
<b>1964</b>	<b>Mozambican War of Independence</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>Maoist Insurgency, Nepal</b> †

(\*) Start Dates indicate start of researched campaign segment, not overall conflict  
**Bolded** Campaigns are those coded and analysed as of February 2005  
(†) Ongoing campaign as of December 2004

Table 4: CT/COIN Campaigns Collected and/or Considered in This Analysis.

## PRELIMINARY RESULTS

### CAMPAIGN OUTCOMES

EIS political success agrees with SIC political success in 6 of the 7 campaigns where such an EIS was present<sup>36</sup>. Consequently, it is broadly possible to talk of "Overall SyF Political Success" without needing to specify *whose* success is being considered. CT/COIN campaigns behave broadly like "Zero-Sum" (or "Win-Lose") systems as regards their political outcomes, with four-fifths (10 of 13) of the completed campaigns matching SyF political success with TIG political failure and vice-versa. The remaining campaigns all display "Lose-Lose"

<sup>36</sup> The (apparent) exception is the Great Iraqi Revolution against British military administration in 1920, and it is possible that this "exception" may be an artefact of the data research & coding process.

political outcomes in which both sides fail to achieve the majority of their political/strategic objectives (Table 5).

Completed Campaigns		TIG Political Success		
		Failure	Partial	Success
SyF Pol Success	Success	Iraq I, Iraq II, Contras	-	-
	Partial	PKK	EOKA; El Salvador	-
	Failure	-	Viet Minh, Chechnya I	Dutch East Indies, Rhodesia, Mozambique, E Timor, Yugoslavia

Table 5: Distribution of CT/COIN Campaign Political Outcome States

Military Success for the SyF is significantly associated with SyF political success at better than 99% confidence, and acts as an upper bound for political success (that is, the greatest SyF political success state achieved by either Internal or External state actors for completed campaigns has never exceeded the military success state).

## MECHANISMS AND CAUSES FOR CAMPAIGN TERMINATION

In 9 of the 13 completed CT/COIN campaigns considered, the principal *mechanism* by which the fighting ended was through negotiation rather than through direct military activity such as military destruction or expulsion of the defeated player. That is, the defeated player still existed as a force capable of undertaking violence at the cessation of the fighting but chose (or was coerced) into ending the struggle with the “victorious” player. Examples of negotiation-type termination mechanisms include the 1999 Indonesian referendum that eventually led to withdrawal from East Timor, the 1980 Lancaster House Conference in London that ended the Rhodesian Civil War, and the 1954 Geneva Accords for the French withdrawal from Indo-China that were agreed *following* Dien Bien Phu.

By contrast, the limited examples in the current sample of outright military defeat/destruction-type termination mechanisms include the expulsion of German forces from Yugoslav territory by Tito’s Partisans in 1945 and the British military defeat of the “Great Iraqi Revolution” in 1920. It is also noted in passing that three of the four cases of termination through military destruction predate the 1950s and it is speculated that earlier as opposed to later<sup>37</sup> CT/COIN campaigns may experience different contexts for campaign success and thus, possibly possess different generic success factors. This hypothesis has not been investigated.

However, as the example of the French withdrawal from Indo-China cited above demonstrates, even if the *mechanism* by which the campaign ended has been negotiation more often than outright military destruction, this does not mean that the *causes* of campaign termination have not been military in nature. In fact, 5 broad categories of termination cause have been identified to date, as follows:

<sup>37</sup> Or possibly, *colonial* as opposed to *post-colonial* campaigns or campaigns experiencing only *localised* reportage as opposed to those under the spotlight of *global* reportage.

- Mutual exhaustion / military stalemate (1 or 2 cases<sup>38</sup>).
- Change in the nature, identity or composition of the key leadership of one or more players (3 or 4 cases).
- (Crushing) military defeat (4 cases).
- Externally-initiated negotiations, “peace talks” etc (3 cases).
- External political/economic pressure (1 case).

Interestingly, each of the three unambiguous examples of leadership change as principal cause of conflict termination refers to a different player in the conceptual CT/COIN campaign model. For TIG leadership, the example is the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya in 1999; for the SiC, it is the resignation of President Suharto of Indonesia in 1998, which led in 1999 to the previously mentioned referendum on withdrawal from East Timor. Finally, the Portuguese Armed Forces’ coup in 1974 provided the change in EIS leadership that led to the abandonment of fighting to retain their colonial possessions in Mozambique and elsewhere.

#### EFFECT OF STATE GOVERNMENT TYPE

Previous HA studies have found evidence that “*democracies*” are both better than “*dictatorships*” at winning CT campaigns (Hossack, 2005) and easier to stabilise than the latter (Irwin and Morley, 2005). These results have been tested again in this preliminary analysis, using a typology of government types developed from that used by Irwin and Morley but using criteria taken from both prior studies. The five government types used for analytical purposes are set out in Table 6 following together with a simple indication of some of the apparent dimensionalities that underpin them.

In contrast to the results referred to above, the available evidence from the 13 completed campaigns in the current sample suggests that, in fact, “(full) democracies” are no better at winning CT/COIN campaigns than are “dictatorships” (i.e. Authoritarian and Totalitarian states). This result is presumably an artefact of the small sub-sample sizes – if cases of partial success are excluded, there are only two cases of either outright military success or failure achieved by democracies present in the current sample<sup>39</sup>. A similar result also holds (on the current data) if political success is considered instead.

<sup>38</sup> It is unclear to the authors, on the information currently available to them, whether the crucial event causing the end of the first Chechen War was the death of Chechen President Dudayev in 1996 or Russian President Yeltsin’s need to extricate himself from a stalemated conflict prior to the 1997 presidential elections.

<sup>39</sup> It might however be genuine – and even possibly meaningful – since different definitions and measures of success, democracy and even campaign apply in each of the three studies discussed. However, since each study’s definition can be reasonably expected a priori to be an abstraction of essentially the same (or very similar) concepts, this result has to be regarded as surprising and requiring of further investigation.

Govt Type <sup>40</sup>	Study Definition	Criteria			
		Universal Franchise	Leadership Change	Population Consultation	Individual Freedom
Fully Democratic	A legal & effective mechanism exists for changing the highest leadership of the state <sup>41</sup> with participation open to all members of the state	YES	YES	YES	YES
Partially Democratic	A legal & effective mechanism exists for changing the highest leadership of the state but with participation limited to only some members of the state	PARTIAL	YES	YES	YES
Representative	No legal & effective mechanism exists for changing the highest leadership of the state but said leadership seeks consultation with and endorsement from (factions representing) the members of the state	NO	NO	YES	YES
Autocratic	No legal & effective mechanism exists for changing the highest leadership of state but individual freedom is allowed for members in every-day matters	NO	NO	NO	YES
Totalitarian	No legal & effective mechanism exists for changing the highest leadership and the state exercises considerable control over members' every-day lives	NO	NO	NO	NO

Table 6: State Government Types Considered in this Study.

## FORCE DENSITY

A Jonckheere test for correlation between military success and SyF force density (defined as SyF manpower numbers (police, troops etc) per thousand population) undertaken on the 13 completed campaigns listed in Table 5 above has found no statistical evidence for any correlation at 90% confidence. A similar lack of correlation between force density and *mission* success has been established independently by Irwin and Morley, 2005 for stabilisation operations. However, Quinlivan, 2003 has observed that “...successful strategies for population security and control have required force ratios either as large as or larger than 20 security personnel (troops and police combined) per thousand inhabitants” in nation-building operations. This apparent contradiction in findings merits further investigation

<sup>40</sup> In Hossack 2005, Full Democracy was labelled “*Pluralist, Universal Franchise*”, Limited Democracy was “*Pluralist, Limited Franchise*”, Authoritarianism was “*Monopolistic, Limited Freedom*” and Totalitarianism was as used here. The class of Representative government was introduced by Morley in Irwin and Morley, 2005.

<sup>41</sup> The “highest leadership of the state” is taken to refer to that level of the state executive that makes the decisions about war, taxation and foreign policy for the “state”. This highest leadership may reside outside the state itself if the state is a colonial or other dependent territory.

## FORCE RATIO

There *may* be a marginal correlation for generic CT/COIN campaigns between military success and the “force ratio” of SyF to TIG strength. A Jonckheere test undertaken on the current sample of 18 campaigns just fails to be significant at 90% confidence using a surrogate approximation of force ratio defined as the ratio of median annual forces (RMAF) for both SyF and TIG strength<sup>42</sup>. Given the small size of the current sample, the known difficulty of estimating TIG numbers with any accuracy and the fact that a significant analogous correlation has been found for stabilisation operations, it therefore seems reasonable to state that *there is no current evidence* for a force ratio correlation to outcome but that *such a correlation may well be found* when the larger sample is analysed.

## SECURITY FORCES’ SUCCESS FACTORS

Eight generic SyF attributes, one generic SyF Capability and one generic SyF Strategy currently display a statistically significant association (correlation) with SyF military success at 90% confidence (or above), irrespective of whether only completed or both ongoing and completed campaigns are considered. In decreasing strength of their statistical significance, these preliminary factors are, in everyday-language:

- At 99% Confidence:
  - *SyF Doctrine:* Having the “right” SyF doctrine for the campaign being fought;
  - *Flexibility of SyF C2:* Having responsive, flexible and innovative SyF C2 that can act rapidly to achieve surprise when required and can exploit possibly fleeting contacts and targets of opportunity.
  - *SyF Counter-Intelligence:* Having good Counter-Intelligence, presumably to limit the quality of TIG Intelligence.
  - *SyF Training:* Having SyF appropriately trained for CT/COIN ops & duties.
- At 97.5% Confidence:
  - *Popular Support for Conflict:* Having popular support within the state as a whole for the conflict.
  - *Overall SyF intelligence:* Having good overall intelligence of TI activity, structure, ops etc.

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<sup>42</sup> That is, the median annual SyF strength taken over the duration of the entire campaign divided by the median annual TIG strength taken over the same period. In practice, these strength estimates were only ever available as a series of isolated (and often non-coincident) spot estimates of strength for each side.

- At 95% Confidence:
  - *Popular Support for SyF*: Having popular support for the SyF within the conflict region<sup>43</sup>.
  - *SiC Legitimacy*: Being recognised internally and externally as the legitimate state authority.
  - *Winning Population “Hearts and Minds”*: Consistently pursuing emphasising behaviours and avoiding alienating behaviours.
- At 90% Confidence:
  - *Integration of SyF C2 (Completed campaigns only)*: Having an integrated C2 chain to co-ordinate different SyF elements (internal/external, police/ paramilitary/military etc.) to achieve *common* strategic objectives and policy goals.

In addition to this, the systematic Targeting of TIG Leadership *may* be inversely correlated with military success at 90% confidence, although it currently tests as significant for completed campaigns only. *If* a genuine correlation, it might be because of some or all of the following hypotheses:

- Removal of the established TIG leadership can disrupt overall SyF levels of Intelligence (“*better the devil you know*”).
- Removal of the current generation of TIG leadership can often lead to replacement by more extreme successors<sup>44</sup>.
- Given the suspected importance of negotiation as a mechanism for ending CT/COIN campaigns, an extant TIG leadership may be necessary for the SyF to negotiate *with*.

There *may* also be another marginal inverse correlation between the imposition of Collective Punishments by SyF for TIG incidents and military success. With the current data, this SyF strategy just fails to be significant at 90% confidence when tested against a non-directional (2-tailed) alternative hypothesis. Had the test for this candidate Success Factor been 1-tailed (against an *a priori* directional alternative hypothesis), it would have been significant at the 90% threshold of confidence<sup>45</sup>.

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<sup>43</sup> The distinction between *Popular Support for the Conflict in the SiC* and *Popular Support for the SyF in the ACL* can best be clarified by reference to “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland. The former factor refers to the extent to which public opinion in the UK as a whole supported the campaign against PIRA etc. The latter factor, by contrast refers to the degree of popular support experienced by the SyF within Northern Ireland itself.

<sup>44</sup> Informal comments made to the authors indicate that precisely these first two mechanisms have been observed by police amongst organised crime groupings following the arrest of *their* principal leaders.

<sup>45</sup> As a general rule, the majority of the potential SyF Success Factors have been tested against directional hypotheses for the existence of correlation. This is because of the implicit directionality built into the categorisation criteria used for most of the candidate success factors. However, some factors, mostly strategies and tactics, were tested non-directionally, the decision so-to-do being made on a case-by-case basis.

The success factors provisionally identified here are generic SyF success factors for generic CT/COIN campaigns. The reason why so few SyF strategies and tactics appear to be associated with military success in this generic context may be that these lower level factors may by definition only be associated with outcome in specific contexts which are not apparent at the whole-campaign level of resolution used here. This is another reason for intending in future phases of the overall research programme to break CT/COIN campaigns down into series of homogenous campaign phases. Beyond this, the Spearman Correlation Coefficient is suspected of having relatively low effective power and could be generating a significant number of false negative results. This is another reason for choosing not to use Spearman when the full sample of campaigns is analysed later this year.

Finally, although no general attempt has yet been made to investigate the inter-correlations that undoubtedly exist between different success factors, correlations have been undertaken for Overall SyF Intelligence with the three Intelligence capabilities of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) etc. and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) etc. Overall SyF Intelligence is very strongly correlated with possession of good HUMINT capability (at 99.9% confidence) and may also be marginally associated with possession of good IMINT capability as well (significant at 90% confidence).

### LOCALISATION OF CONFLICT

There is some evidence at this time to suggest that it is easier for TIGs to win purely localised CT/COIN campaigns as opposed to national CT/COIN campaigns. TIG military success occurred in 70% or 5 of 7 cases of campaigns where  $ACL < SiC$  and in 17% or 1 of 6 cases of campaigns where  $ACL = SiC$ . Despite the small sample these results are statistically significant at 95% confidence and, if repeated in the full sample (once coded), might be explicable in terms of one of the following hypotheses about localised campaigns:

- That they are more likely to be fought in uniformly adverse terrain (jungles, mountains) than are national campaigns.
- That they are more likely to occur in areas with strong separatist identities or support.
- That they tend to be fought for less absolutist objectives than national campaigns and therefore are less necessary for states to win.

### POPULATION RELOCATION

There is evidence of a separation in the current sample between CT/COIN campaigns based upon the amount of displacement/relocation experienced by the civilian population in the ACL. Of the 16 completed and ongoing campaigns for which population relocation can currently be assessed, 12 had overall estimated population displacement/relocation rates (either internally or externally) within the ACL of between 0% - 5%; 3 of the remaining 4 campaigns had displacement/relocation rates in excess of 25% - 32%. Unsurprisingly, these last are all campaigns where it is at least arguable that some form of de facto ethnic cleansing

or other deliberate military attrition of the TIG sympathiser population may have taken place – El Salvador, East Timor and Chechnya I.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

This preliminary investigation of potential campaign-level SyF Success Factors has already identified a series of strong generic correlations with military success, as well as highlighting a number of issues – some expected, some not – concerning level of resolution and potential existence of context-specific factors. It has also demonstrated the feasibility of this analysis method for future study of both TIG Success Factors and external, environmental factors that encompass the interaction between SyF and TIG. These are extremely positive auguries for the future analysis intended in this area by Dstl.

## **PLANS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

It has been stated at several points in this paper that the work reported here represents preliminary investigations on an incomplete data sample to identify SyF campaign-level Success Factors for generic CT/COIN campaigns. It has also been stated that this static analysis is but the first phase of a planned 2 year (or more) research programme to investigate success factors and internal dynamics of CT/COIN campaigns. The current intention is that this later research programme will (to the extent that resources allow) include stages to:

- Complete the coding of data collected & run final analyses (expected by July 2005).
- Refine techniques, criteria definitions, coding schemes.
- Investigate TIG & “contextual” success factors.
- Undertake dynamic by-campaign-phase breakdown of data.
- Look for groupings of campaigns (or campaign-phases).
- Look for structure in campaign evolution.
- Repeat success factors analysis at campaign-phase level.

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