

# Approaches for the Modelling of Stabilisation Operations \*

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## ABSTRACT

The Stabilisation Study aims to analyse contemporary and future Military interventions and the resultant stabilisation operations in order to highlight the force structure implications of such operations. This will be achieved by developing a methodology to analyse said operations in the context of a wider, cross-government response, which will inform UK force structure planning. This paper aims to describe a high-level model for representing stabilisation operations currently in development, including the various strands of work which are being combined to provide insight and information to the design team.

## INTRODUCTION

The UK MoD remit to conduct a study into stabilisation operations reflects a heightened interest in the need to understand properly the military contribution to the success of a post-conflict stabilisation mission. This need appeared particularly acute in the light of perceived policy and operational failures by the Coalition forces in Iraq 2003-5. These were assumed to result from a combination of initial miscalculation, misdirected planning and inadequate preparation for the stabilisation phase of the overall campaign<sup>1</sup>.

It was apparent from the outset of the study that an effective response to the stabilisation question would require broad conceptual understanding of the concepts of Intervention, Instability and Stability before guidance could be offered on the detail of a military contribution to the problem. We were confronted by the magnitude of this multi-faceted security problem. Subjective judgement on the 'softer' human factors involved in measuring consent, for example, became mixed with objective analysis of military capability. 'Stabilisation Operations' for example, do not exist in UK doctrine, they are a US military concept. Thus a comparison and harmonisation of comparative doctrines became necessary. This required considerable US-UK liaison.

The perceived Coalition failures in Iraq led to a Study desire to represent accurately such requirements as close Civil-Military co-operation along with Coalition Commanders having to act on the reality that an indigenous population will not support a force that cannot protect it. We were surprised by the general unwillingness in UK organisations to accept the fundamental importance of the existence, or absence, of a 'safe and secure' environment to the success of a stabilisation mission. Ensuring the visible primacy of this concept became the basis of much of the research effort for the first year of the study.

The overall aims of the Stabilisation study were agreed and included the remit to:

- Develop a methodology to analyse contemporary and future military intervention and subsequent stabilisation operations within the context of a wider cross-government response, in order to inform UK future force structure planning.
- Test current force structures against a range of intervention and stabilisation operations.

The study was required, amongst other things, to develop a process model for the analysis of stabilisation operations and to exercise this methodology end-to-end for one chosen scenario. This report is a record of the fulfilment of this task.

This report details the work done by Dstl to produce a working model - the High Level Stabilisation Model (HLSM) - to represent the course of a stabilisation operation in a chosen scenario, using one force structure and for a prescribed period of 6 months. This summary concentrates on the philosophy and mechanics of the model, detailing some of the background insights that lie behind many of its assumptions.

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<sup>1</sup> For a credible recent exposition of this view see: Dobbins, James *Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War* (Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb. 2005)

The HLSM is not the only model that will be used to study stabilisation operations, but is part of a wider suite, including DIAMOND and an in-scenario concurrency tool. This will allow study of the deeper interactions and military implications of the tasks identified by users of this model.

## SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

The study concentrated on an examination of states subject to intervention and stabilisation by an external power and not, therefore, as a result of internal repression, internal security/policing or counter-insurgency type operations. To set a common baseline of understanding the following definitions were agreed:

- The study was concerned with “military intervention”, but arguably not “military invasion”.
- Cases of civil wars and counter-insurgency that remained entirely domestic affairs were excluded.
- Intervention was defined as “as any action that may help stop violence...improve the lot of people in conflict situations, [and] any action that could contain a conflict”.
- Stabilisation was defined as the process through which a nation changes from being “unstable” to stable”; the effect of successful stabilisation operations is stability.
- Stabilisation operations were defined as those intended to establish, re-establish or support a state and support its effective administration/control of its territory.
- Blue forces were defined as a force, either of one country or, more likely, a Coalition who have entered a country either at risk of, or suffering from, instability in order to remedy the situation.
- Green forces were defined as those indigenous groups in the country being studied who will co-operate and support the actions taken by Blue – for example, the loyal remnants of the armed forces, security services or police forces.
- Red forces were defined as those groups opposed to the presence of a stabilising force and who will take direct action.

## POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Whereas the military capabilities in COIN are relatively well understood, if difficult to implement, the representation of post-conflict reconstruction in any model suffers from a dearth of primary data. External consultant experience was used to begin to fill this gap

allowing us to understand the behaviour and capabilities of the vast range of UN agencies, NGO's and humanitarian organisations that integrate with, and contribute towards, the success of the Peace Support Force (PSF) in reconstruction-type activities. These other agencies are critical towards achieving overall mission success through the generation of a high level of consent.

## SECURITY AND CONSENT

The achievement and maintenance of a secure and stable environment is the key enabler for almost all other nation-building and rebuilding activity. Achieving it should take priority over other civil and military objectives. Without security it is difficult for sustained transitional activity to take place and a poor and/or deteriorating security situation tends to drive out all but the most robust NGO.<sup>2</sup>

The doctrinal concept of “campaign authority”, which expresses the broad legitimacy of the stabilising force, is less important than the concept of “consent”. Consent expresses the degree of contentment and willingness of the indigenous people to co-operate with or hinder activities the stabilising force. The level of consent is derived from the following<sup>3</sup>:

- Perceived legitimacy of international mandate.
- Perceived legitimacy of freedom of action of PSO executors.
- Degree of factional and local subjugation to PSO (co-operation & consent).
- Degree to which PSO and Govt executors meet security, humanitarian and reconstruction expectations (delivery).
- Minimising degree of sympathy which indigenous population has with (potential) insurgents or ‘spoilers’.
- Minimisation of animosity caused by direct military action.

## STANCES

Military activity in stabilisation operations can be readily broken into specific task sets. Analysis of UK, US and NATO doctrine concluded that tasks could be grouped into three or four stances which would reflect a range of activities that would be undertaken by military units. These stances, Enforce, Stabilise, and Transition, are derived from the UK Doctrinal Manual for Peace Support Operations – JWP 3-50. The stance of Reserve was added to reflect current operational reality. The stances reflect the “3 Block War” concept and allow complex interaction and unit agility/flexibility in the HLSM. The stances do not yet include critical enabling functions such as logistics, but it is anticipated that the logistic “cost” of

<sup>2</sup> “Typically UK Armed Forces are given responsibility for preventing or suppressing any conflict...so that others can undertake activities that will alleviate the immediate symptoms of a conflict and/or a fragile state. The application of military force to create the right conditions for overall success, e.g. a safe and secure environment, is a key foundation” UK PSO Doctrine JWP 3-50, para 101.

<sup>3</sup> Adapted from JWP 3-50 campaign authority.

maintaining different unit types in theatre will be included in the advanced version of the HLSM to be developed in year 2. A summary of the stances as described in JWP 3-50 is as follows:

- Enforcement: In the enforcement stance, the PSF is used to secure and/or implement cease-fire or settlement, including the use of a credible coercive or deterrent force.
- Stabilisation: “Following an agreement or cease-fire and the emergence of a generally permissive environment PSF acts...to reduce tension and increase Campaign Authority”. The force is normally used in self-defence only, but may require use of deterrent or coercive effects. PSF used to monitor and identify causes of tension and take timely action to prevent escalation or resumption of hostilities.
- Transition: This stance still demands a credible coercive and deterrent force. The PSF is used to address indigenous military reform, re-integration, training, reconstruction, securing and/or implement cease-fire or settlement. Priority is given to planning and execution of training and handover of security responsibilities to suitably trained, equipped and effective indigenous force.
- Reserve: Reflects both theatre reserve and local reserve status. Reserve units may be used to counter enemy attacks.

The stances, as translated into the HLSM are very similar, but not identical, to those described above. The HLSM stances have clear boundaries reflecting emphasis on the core types of activity in each stance. Thus Enforcement is very much the continual use of troops in counter-insurgency and conventional combat operations, while Transition reflects all the nation- and institution-building activity prevalent in an anticipated benign security environment. A survey of the various historical campaigns enabled a characterization of insurgent activity into similar but contrary stances as follows:

- Attack: Conduct attacks, usually ‘hit-and-run’, on Coalition or indigenous security forces.
- Disrupt: Conduct attacks on softer targets such as civilians, media, and infrastructure.
- Control: Attempt to exert full control over a given area and stand and fight any coalition or indigenous security forces.
- Hide: The force may be found by Coalition forces. If not, elements are able to regenerate their strength.
- Move: The unit may move to another area of the country, again with a chance of interception by security forces.

## STANCES AS SETS OF TASKS

The stances described do not reflect a time period in a given conflict. Rather they are a description of a series of tasks or missions that may be undertaken by a given unit over a certain time period. Some tasks/missions are unique to each stance. Other tasks, for example, info ops or patrol (if an Army unit), will be required by almost all units in all stances. The stances reflect the main weight of effort by a particular military unit for that certain period of time. The ability to change stances over time in the HLSM reflects the doctrinal need for force stance agility. The tasks/missions are derived from UK Doctrine, Mission Essential Task List (METL), and the Generic Strategic Campaign Plan plus other smaller contributions from US and NATO doctrine.

It should be noted that whilst some of the tasks/activities may be similar across the stances, the ‘posture’ of the forces doing them will be different, i.e. ‘foot patrolling’ as a task may use identical drills across stances, but be conducted for different reasons.

## ASSUMPTIONS

The following statements lie as central assumptions in the HLSM. The on-going research is focused on finding examples which underpin or contradict the following relative value statements on the stances for friendly (Blue and Green) forces:

- Successful or on-going enforce (combat) operations will increase security, but usually decrease consent.
- Successful or on-going stabilisation tasks will usually increase security and may have some positive effect on consent.
- Successful or on-going transition tasks will increase consent.

For enemy (Red) forces:

- Successful or on-going attacks on security forces will decrease Blue security, but may increase Blue consent.
- Successful or on-going disruption missions will halt or reverse reconstruction and will usually decrease Blue consent.
- Successful or on-going control missions will significantly decrease Blue security and will usually decrease Blue consent.
- Moving significant forces from one area to another may expose Red forces to attack depending on Blue intelligence/ISTAR and levels of consent in areas moved through.

A single scenario sub-campaign has been run using the HLSM. From a win/lose perspective the design team decided that campaigns may be considered successful or otherwise if specified levels of security and consent are met within the time anticipated in the

campaign plan being tested, in order to enable either smooth roulement or implement a planned exit strategy – the specified levels assume that security can confidently be handed to indigenous security forces; the level of support for the Government is sufficient and growing; and that the underlying causes of instability have been recognised and measures are in place to address them.

## HLSM OUTLINE

The HLSM is a multiplayer, turn-based system, similar in philosophy to a traditional war-game. It has a high level of abstraction, with battalion-sized units being the norm (company sized units may be created by adding one-third strength battalions). In order to fully represent the complexities of stabilisation operations, the model allows the inclusion of multiple ‘red’ and ‘green’ players, representing different factions who may have differing aims, objectives and CONOPS. The maximum number of players is currently:

- 1 Blue player, controlling the Peace Support Force.
- 10 Green players, controlling various factions or bodies of the indigenous security forces.
- 10 Red players, controlling various insurgent or terrorist groups.
- 1 Other Agencies player, controlling reconstruction teams from NGOs and OGDs.

## MODEL SETUP

### REQUIREMENTS

For a given scenario, the HLSM requires credible initial inputs. These include:

- The landform of the Area of Responsibility being studied.
- ORBATS for all protagonists.
- Strategic Guidance for all players.

The importance of each type of information and the means of generation is explained below.

### LANDFORM

The landform, principally geography and demographics, is important to the model. In order to maintain a high level of abstraction, the landform of the JOA is simplified. The area is split

into squares, typically 30nm (~50km) in breadth. Each square is assigned a terrain type depending on the major feature of the assigned area. The terrain types are as follows:

- Water.
- Land Outside JOA.
- Urban/Suburban.
- Open/Desert.
- Wooded/Mountainous.

This area is broken up into 30nm x 30nm squares as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Example terrain broken into cells.

This area is translated into the landform representation of the model, to give the outcome shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Example terrain in HLSM format.

In addition to the information on the landform, the model requires further information on each cell:

- An optional name for the cell<sup>4</sup>.
- Initial measures of security and consent.
- Population Density.
- Percentage of up to three ethnic groups present in the cell<sup>5</sup>.
- Initial measures of consent for each ethnic group<sup>5</sup>.

The HLSM features a dynamic map that can display this information in an easy to understand format.

The population density of a cell can be difficult to derive. It is often necessary to find the average density of the province in which a cell is positioned and use this figure, as it is unlikely that a city with a listed density will be large enough to fill an entire square. Accurate and up-to-date figures for some countries can be difficult to obtain.

Population density is critical to the model, as it represents the number of people that are being affected by the actions of the protagonists. As the consent level in the population has a defining impact on the success of failure of stabilisation missions, it is important to recognise this fact in the model – it is no use stabilising 90% of the land of the country if 90% of the population live in the other 10%.

## STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

As the model requires human input for all protagonists, the commanders/representatives must use their units in a manner that reflects the intentions of the faction in the local strategic environment. Each “player” should benefit from the strategic aims and objectives for his/her force, which should guide the area and manner in which their forces operate. It may become necessary for players using the model to be ‘indoctrinated’ with the mindset of the faction they are playing. It is probable that any military advisor or experienced analyst can act as the Blue player, but the Red factions may require the player to be familiar with asymmetric warfare and to think as an insurgent or terrorist in order to get realistic results.

## UNITS

Military units in the model all have a number of properties that contain all the information necessary for their use. These include:

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<sup>4</sup> This is useful in identifying particular important cells, for instance major cities.

<sup>5</sup> Ethnic Groups are currently not implemented in the model, but placeholder data is required – this can currently be random.

- Unique ID.
- Unit Name (e.g. 1UKArmd Div\_7ArmdBde\_1ArmdRegt).
- Unit Nationality (for use with Nationality Factors).
- Unit Type (e.g. Armour (MBT)).
- Unit Combat Effectiveness (a percentage).
- Current unit Map Location.
- Current unit Stance.

This information is stored in a separate ORBAT spreadsheet for each category of protagonist (Red, Blue and Green). Each unit type has characteristics attached to it, consisting of the ability of the unit to conduct the missions associated with the stances, across the terrain types, and their use as an ISTAR asset.

## THE PROCESS

### STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS

Figure 3 shows the principal steps taken by the HLSM (the order in which the player turns are taken may vary with the possession of the ‘intelligence initiative,’ as discussed further below).




Figure 3: Example Process diagram of the HLSM.

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## A PLAYER TURN

A turn for each player consists of decisions on the location and stance of their units. Currently, the effect of most units is limited to one map cell at a time (the current exception is long-range ISTAR, as described below).

The stances that can be chosen vary with the player. Blue, Green and Red players may choose from the stances listed above, whilst the Other Agencies player is limited to the Transition stance only.

The players choose their moves based both on their strategic aims and objectives and on the current situation in the JOA, including the use of the intelligence product.

## INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence has been identified in the study as a particularly important factor in the success or failure of a stabilisation mission. Consequently, a representation of intelligence is included in the HLSM.

The most significant method of intelligence gathering in a COIN environment is HUMINT and this reality is represented in the model. The impact of HUMINT is based on the current level of consent in each cell of the map. The higher the consent, the more chance the Blue and Green players (who share an intelligence picture) have of identifying a red unit and its intentions. The opposite applies for the red players.

Thus, a red unit operating in a sector with a consent value of 10 has a high chance of being reported by Blue HUMINT. Blue forces can boost the breadth and accuracy of their intelligence with the use of ISTAR assets. These may be included in the Blue ORBAT, and act as a bonus to the consent-driven HUMINT in the cells they are focused on.

Assets can either act on a certain range on the map (such as Watchkeeper/Predator), or can be theatre-wide assets (Nimrod-R, ASTOR/JSTARS etc). As the turn lasts for a full month, theatre wide assets act on all cells on the map simultaneously, representing their flexibility. Each asset has a particular value for its ISTAR ability in relation to its use in uncovering insurgent cells, rather than its utility against massed battlefield targets. This Blue ISTAR process is still in the early stages, and will require further development, validation and military review<sup>6</sup>.

It is important to note that the order in which players take their move is dynamic and alters with conditions in the JOA. As such, the *'intelligence initiative'* determines the order in which the forces carry out their turns, and is based on the overall level of consent, and thus level of HUMINT received, in the JOA.

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<sup>6</sup> There are indications from recent US DoD statements that there may be a reassessment of the use of technical ISTAR in counter-insurgency operations against a capable opponent

## CALCULATIONS

Once all forces have taken their turns and stances have been declared, the model must calculate the success and failure of each attempt, the effect they have on the security and consent of each cell on the map, and the casualties suffered as a result.

For each cell, the model totals the ability of each unit based in the cell to do its assigned task, modified by the combat effectiveness (i.e. the percentage strength) and the nationality factor of the unit. This results in values for each stance for each cell. These values are then compared in decreasing order of violence, from enforce vs. control down to transition vs. disrupt. The details of these comparisons are relatively immature and are subject to continuous review as the model development progresses.

As the moves progress, the casualties to both friendly and insurgent forces are calculated and applied to units. Currently, the same casualties are applied to all units in a cell taking part in an assigned mission – for example, a failed Control<sup>7</sup> mission will result in 33% casualties to all Red units taking part in that Control.

## UNIT RECUPERATION AND GENERATION

It is inevitable that units of the Blue, Green, and Red factions will suffer casualties at some point. As such, the HLSM contains a mechanism to provide the recuperation and regeneration under certain conditions.

If a Blue force suffers casualties which bring its combat effectiveness down to 90%, it will automatically enter a reserve state in order to reinforce its strength back to full effectiveness (for instance, by transporting in replacement troops from home base), as long as it is not used on any stance other than Reserve during that month's operations. Green forces regeneration will occur with regard to the ability of the country and the supporting Coalition forces to train and equip the indigenous security forces effectively.

Red units regenerate their effectiveness by entering the Hide stance. However, this alone is not sufficient for a reasonable level of 'repair', as Red must get its forces from sympathetic members of the population. Thus, the level of recuperation of a Red unit depends on the level of consent in the cell in which it is hiding, with a lower consent giving a higher level of recuperation.

If the situation in the JOA is not improved by the presence of the Coalition and indigenous security forces, the number of Red forces active may increase. As such, new Red units are generated in a cell, depending on such factors as if:

- Consent and security in the cell are low.

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<sup>7</sup> Control missions are akin to insurgent actions in Fallujah in 2004, where Red decides to stand and fight the security force head to head. These encounters result in high levels of collateral damage, high insurgent casualty rates and a possible lowering of the overall level of consent in the population.

- Red has been successful in some of its missions across the JOA.
- Casualties have been caused to Blue and Green across the JOA.

Manipulation of these factors gives a percentage chance of a new Red unit being created in that cell. This chance is repeated depending on the population density of a cell – for instance a cell with a density of 1300 people/km<sup>2</sup> will get 13 chances to create cells, whereas a more sparsely populated cell with 200 people/km<sup>2</sup> will only get 2 chances. A simple random number generated ‘dice roll’ determines whether that chance is successful and the unit is created.

### END CONDITIONS

Conditions can be set that allow the definition of a Blue or Red win. These consist of one or more of average security level, average consent level and number of turns progressed. Thus, it can be stated, for example, that Blue must raise the average consent level to 7 and the average security level to 6, by the end of turn 6 (i.e. 6 months) for the operation to succeed. This flexibility allows the differing political contexts of a diverse range of scenarios to be represented.

### CONCLUSIONS

The model has been put through its initial run based on one scenario and one chosen force structure. The course of the run is described at Annex A. The number of insights that follow indicate the magnitude of the work required for the second year of this study, and are not intended as a statement of modelling inadequacy. It should be remembered that the approach to representing stabilisation in this study is not mirrored in other research we have had access to. Nonetheless, the following indicates a few of the likely improvements that have been highlighted by runs of the model and which will need to be incorporated for an increasingly valid representation of stabilisation:

- There needs to be a mechanism for Blue to intercept Red moves from square to square. The longer the move, the higher the chance of intercept. This would also be modified by employment of ISTAR assets and terrain.
- The mechanism for determining stance interaction outcomes should likewise contain a stochastic element determined by the relative force levels.
- Air mobile and AH units should be able to react to events up to 2 map sectors away.
- Artillery units may contribute to enforce operations in 3 contiguous adjacent squares.

- Security levels are less influenced by the density of population than consent. The study, however, intends to investigate the need for a weighting of security according to demographic environment.
- The effect of the presence of differing ethnic groups in a map cell will be incorporated. This will include a separate measure of consent for each group, who may have different views towards the PSF (for example, Sunni Arab and Kurds in Iraq).
- The representation of ISTAR needs improvement.
- The representation of casualties suffered will be improved to take into account the level of overmatch between forces (casualties depend not just on the success or failure of the mission, but also the ratio of forces and the capability of them).
- The rule set will be proved and improved accordingly.

The research conducted by the team has dramatically increased our understanding of the factors involved in stabilisation operations. Obviously, with less than 1 year's actual development of the model, work is not completed, but it is felt by both the team and the customer that the approach taken by the team has merit and warrants further investigation and funding. It is aimed to begin using an early form of the model for force development studies in May 2006.

### **ANNEX A: INITIAL RESULTS – AN HYPOTHETICAL 6-MONTH MULTI-NATIONAL STABILISATION CAMPAIGN.**

The following is a general, non-detailed summary of the course of one run (of several) in the model conducted based on an illustrative situation. It should not be confused with any contingency planning scenarios, nor with any campaign plans currently under development. This run was completed prior to the inclusion of the recuperation and generation of Red forces, and as such the scenario ends more quickly than it might otherwise do so.

#### **SITUATION**

The campaign area represents an unspecified large coastal nation that consists of an isolated region 200x400km in size, divided into thirty-two 50km<sup>2</sup> sectors. The northern border is sea while the southern and east/west borders comprise desert or mountain.

The country topology is a hilly/mountainous yet largely urbanised northern half of the country with good transport infrastructure, and a sparsely populated but flatter and less fertile southern half.




Figure 4: Terrain of JOA in HLSM format.

## INITIAL FORCES

Red Forces had a unified command and 36 active cells, representing around 3600 active insurgents. Blue Forces comprised a very large multi-national division, comprising British, French, US, Italian, Dutch and Multi-national brigades. Green forces consisted of 10 indigenous infantry brigades.

## SET-UP

Blue Forces deployed evenly across the country and were tasked primarily with Stabilisation missions since intelligence indicated a brewing insurgency. National Consent and Security levels were set at 5 (out of 10).



Figure 5: Initial Security and Consent.

## MOVE 1

The Red commander focused efforts on the national capital (sector 2) in attacks on the British forces in that sector (Figures 6 and 7). Heavy attacks were also ordered in sector 4, at medium strength in sector 9 and light attacks in 3, 6 and 12. The heavy attacks were in all cases backed up by disruption operations aimed at reducing consent through attacks on reconstruction and transition efforts. No attacks took place in the south of the country.

- Outcome of Move 1: Consent: 4.88, Security: 5.33, Blue was successful in most of the country, principally because Red was largely absent. Consent is reduced because of Red's success in the more dense urban areas, using sufficient force to attack Blue successfully and to disrupt transition operations.




Figure 6: Security following Move 1.



Figure 7: Consent following Move 1.

## MOVE 2

Blue decides to remain reactive and refuses to be hurried into panic moves of men and equipment. It makes only minor adjustment to forces. Red decides to reinforce success, particularly in the capital (Figures 8 and 9).

- Outcome of Move 2: Consent: 4.5, Security: 5.55. Again, this was a fairly good move for Blue except in the main urban areas. Blue succeeds in 2/3<sup>rd</sup> of its missions, but consent is reduced due to Red success in the urban areas.




Figure 8: Security following Move 2.




Figure 9: Consent following Move 2.

### MOVE 3

Blue begins with some 7 units vs. 7 Reds in sector 1 (Figures 10 and 11). Red now shifts almost 50% of his total effort to sector 2, the capital, where there are now 17 Red units operating against 8 Blue battalions. The other significant concentration by Red is with 10 units vs. 5 Blue in sector 4. Red scores attack and disruption successes in Sectors 2 and 4 and disruption success in 9. Red attacks in sector 1 were less successful, with heavy losses suffered.

- Outcome of Move 3: *Consent*: 4.18, *Security*: 5.8.




Figure 10: Security following Move 3.




Figure 11: Consent following Move 3.

### MOVE 4

Red abandons sector 1 and focuses attacks on the French force in adjacent sector 9 (Figures 12 and 13). The high level of attacks is maintained in sector 2 and medium weight effort switched from sector 4 to 5. Red is successful in 2 and 5 only and takes quite a beating in 9. The levels of security and consent in the capital are, however, low enough to cause concern.

- Outcome of Move 4: *Consent*: 4.07, *Security*: 6.14




Figure 12: Security following Move 4.




Figure 13: Consent following Move 4.

### MOVE 5

Blue is forced to address the security and consent in the capital and accordingly mounts a major effort, with Dutch and US Brigades joining the British in a major effort at restoring campaign authority and turning around the failing consent (Figures 14 and 15). Blue is forced to largely abandon its presence in the south of the country and leave much of the southern edge of the more densely populated area (sectors 6-13) to indigenous forces, except for French-controlled sector 9.

Red intelligence is sufficient to detect the major shift of emphasis by Blue and in the face of such overwhelming force decides to abandon the capital and focus its remaining forces on the adjacent coastal areas of 1, 4 and 5. Red, with its strength now down at less than 50%, suffers a significant reverse against the Italians in sector 1, and is only successful in Sectors 4 and 5.

- Outcome of Move 5: Consent: 4.34, Security: 6.40. Following this defeat, Red considers itself too weak to continue a coherent or worthwhile campaign and, with Blue now firmly in control of the capital, and consent and security on the rise concedes defeat




Figure 14: Security following Move 5.




Figure 15: Consent following Move 5.

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