

Demographic Change, Pluralism, and Ethno-cultural Diversity: Implications for Civil-Military Co-operation¹

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ABSTRACT

The “war on terrorism” has “securitized” many visible-minority diasporas in advanced democracies. I make a case for inverting this paradigm. Rather than marginalizing them as security threats, I posit diasporas as a rich human-resource potential waiting to be tapped for the skills and talents it has to offer in support of peace, stability, and security operations. After some introductory remarks about demographic trends in advanced liberal-democracies and the relationship between these trends and regions on which the national-security interests of these countries converge, I advance some propositions as to why diasporas should be harnessed more systematically in support of the national interest and how this might be done. I then proceed to examine how to operationalize this proposition. What do we know about whether a member of a diaspora group is likely to make a successful contribution to a peace and stability operation? From a survey of the literature and research on diasporas, I extrapolate seven criteria according to which prospective candidates from diaspora groups may be assessed. In addition, I extrapolate three criteria according to which the group from which an individual is drawn may be evaluated. Finally, I distill three qualifications of overriding importance in determining just how effective a contribution an individual is likely to make to a peace and stability operation. The conclusion reflects on some of the further research that is needed to hone in on answers to these questions.

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INTRODUCTION

Among the main casualties of the “war on terrorism” in advanced liberal-democracies have been immigrant diasporas, especially those diasporas that originate in countries on which the national-security interests of liberal-democracies have been converging. My objective in this chapter is to argue that, instead of securitizing diasporas and alienating them from the institutions of the state – from the armed forces in particular – liberal democracies should be harnessing their diasporas in support of peace, stability, and security operations. What is more, the existing research on diasporas provides decent guidance on the way this sort of policy might be operationalized successfully.

The first section of this paper contrasts recent demographic trends in advanced liberal democracies with regional security threats. It hypothesizes that clear concentrations emerge, with different countries enjoying a critical mass among different diaspora groups. Since different countries have a comparative advantage what their diaspora human-resource potential is concerned, it follows that countries should be mining their diaspora human-resource potential in different ways. If this is done systematically, each country will be able to contribute unique skills and talents. I go on to show that national statistics are a vital tool in realizing this goal.

The second section of the paper contemplates why diasporas should be involved in the institutions of the state – and especially in as integral a pillar as the armed forces – in the first place. To begin with, their skills and talents are indispensable to the missions with which our armed forces are being tasked. Second, the institutions of the state are an important nation-building tool. The integration of diasporas will thus hasten their societal integration. Failing to integrate diasporas amounts to an internal contradiction. It violates the liberal-democratic premise of self-actualization while impeding the ability to transfer norms, notably freedom, equality, and justice. Third, if countries realize and harness their comparative advantage, they will enhance their sovereignty by virtue of being able to complement peace, stability, and security operations in a unique way. Finally, throughout liberal democracies Caucasian cohorts are in decline while visible-minority cohorts are growing. From a purely utilitarian perspective, therefore, failure to draw on a growing pool of talent will precipitate sub-optimal outcomes.

The third section examines the way diasporas may be utilized and how a policy of greater diaspora-representation may be operationalized. Although the body of literature on diasporas and peace, stability, and security operations is small, from the broader literature on diasporas some salient criteria for the evaluation of prospective diaspora-group members emerge, that is, there are criteria and qualifications that will help in selecting those individuals most likely to make a successful contribution to a task or mission.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT

About 3 percent of the world's population, some 175 million people, currently resides outside their country of birth. Sixty percent of the world's migrants reside in industrialized countries, 56 million in Europe, and 41 million in North America. Almost 1 person in 10 living in more developed regions is a migrant. Between 1995 and 2000, the world's more developed regions

gained over 12 million migrants. For the year 2002 alone, the figure stood at 2.3 million. Over half of the total was absorbed by North America.

Migratory trends are changing the make-up of Western countries' populations. Measured as a function of annual average net migration the top Western destinations for immigrants between 1995 and 2000 were the traditional British settler states, Australia, Canada, and the United States, followed at a considerable distance by Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.² Similarly, Australia had the greatest proportion of its population born abroad (24%), followed by Canada (18.9%); the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy – and most European countries, for that matter – fall between 12 and 3 percent.³ The European outliers are Switzerland (25.1%) and Luxembourg (37.3%).

Although the proportion of the foreign-born population has actually remained fairly stable in most Western countries, they have had a considerable impact on the composition of the national population. First, immigrant populations tend to be younger than the national average. Second, by virtue of being younger, relative to their small proportion of the national population they contain a disproportionate number of people of childbearing age. Third, they tend to have larger families. This aberration only peters out after a couple of generations. Fourth, the source countries have been changing. Prior to the 1960s, just about all migration to Western countries originated in other Western countries. Conversely, the proportion of immigrants from non-Western source countries was negligible. Starting in the 1970s, however, the proportion of non-Western immigrants started to exceed the proportion of immigrants from Western source countries. There are three reasons for this trend. First, labour markets throughout the West improved, thus reducing a primary “push” factor of migration. Second, fertility rates throughout the West started to decline, largely as a function of the rise of the welfare state which eliminated the need for children to ensure social security.⁴ Third, the legacy of the Holocaust had brought to the fore the horrors that overt discrimination according to race could precipitate. One of the unintended consequences of the Second World War, then, was the (gradual) de-racialization of immigration policies. So, while the proportion of immigrants from Western countries has been on the wane since the 1960s, the proportion of immigrants from non-Western countries has steadily been on the rise. This combination of factors has resulted in a disproportionately rapid growth of the non-Caucasian proportion among Western populations. Canada's visible-minority population, for instance, has burgeoned by half over the last decade, from 9.4 percent to 13.4 percent.

Owing to these developments, Western populations are becoming increasingly ethnoculturally, linguistically, and religiously diverse. This trend is not only irreversible, but it is also bound to continue. With the rise of domestic interethnic warfare subsequent to the end of the Cold War and the de-racialization of immigration policies in the West, Western countries are unlikely to re-racialize their immigration policies. And even if some populations in some countries might like to see their governments take a more discriminatory approach, low fertility rates throughout the West are steadily increasing the need for foreign labour, especially highly skilled labour.

Different countries enjoy a comparative advantage with certain ethnic groups. This advantage has two dimensions. First, the comparative advantage enjoyed by a country with

² United Nations International Migration Report, 2002

³ Ibid.

⁴ Richard A. Easterlin and Eileen A. Crimmins. *The fertility-revolution: a supply-demand analysis* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985).

regards to its diaspora communities may be political. Different governments treat immigrants differently. Proactive multiculturalism policies – as distinct from passive non-discrimination policies -- have created a wide range of ethnic organizations in countries such as Canada and Australia, including youth groups, which have been co-opted into the state and whose mandates are congruent with the country's national interests. Concomitantly, these organizations enjoy legitimacy within their own communities. As a consequence, the states with multiculturalism policies tend to enjoy better relations with communities of recent immigrants than do many other liberal democracies.

Second, the comparative advantage may be demographic. Economic “push-pull” theories of migration, for instance, suggest that migrants end up where they can maximize their economic benefit.⁵ The socio-geographic evidence, however, suggests otherwise.⁶ Migrants settle where they already have family or ethnic kin – with both variables usually coinciding.⁷ This accounts for differentials in countries' immigrant stock: Mexicans prefer to settle in the United States, Indians in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, North Africans (especially Algerians) in France, Kurds and Turks in Germany, and so forth. The differences reflect historic settlement patterns and networks of immigrant communities, which facilitate subsequent settlement.

This comparative demographic advantage matters for the purpose of national interests. The national interests of Western countries are not spread evenly throughout the world. They have been converging on certain parts of the world, notably Asia and especially the arc of Muslim countries stretching from Egypt to Pakistan. Other major disarmament, development, and reconstruction (DDR) efforts in recent history include Somalia, Haiti, the former Yugoslavia, and East Timor. Another way to evidence the convergence in national interest among Western countries is to review the lists of organizations Western liberal democracies have banned in recent years on the ground that they support terrorism or radicalism, and to look at the regions and countries in which these groups are based. In other words, the regions and countries on which Western national interests have been converging are largely inhabited by non-Caucasians.

THE CASE FOR GREATER DIVERSITY

Yet, a large proportion of the people deployed by the West in support of DDR operations are Caucasians, especially those deployed for security operations such as the military and police. Ergo, there exists a disconnect between the demographic reality of the countries where the West is deploying people in support of DDR and the demographic reality of the people being deployed. This rift is manifest not just in phenotype. It is also manifest in language, culture, religion, local knowledge, life experience, and so forth. And, for the most part, for most of

⁵ Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *The Age of Mass Migration: Causes and Economic Impact* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁶ Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 2nd ed. (New York: The Guilford Press, 1998 [1993]).

⁷ Alejandro Portes and Robert L. Bach, *Latin Journal: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

the people being deployed, physical fitness and reflexes are less important than maturity, intellect, patience, and linguistic and cultural knowledge.⁸

First, if we take it for granted that language, culture, religions, and so forth are increasingly important attributes for DDR missions, getting diasporas more involved in such operations is a matter of effectiveness.

Second, it is a question of nation-building. In order to enhance the integration of diasporas in Western countries, they need to feel that they belong and are accepted. One of the best ways of doing that is to ensure that they feel themselves part of the state apparatus. And few parts of the state apparatus are more sensitive than those that ensure security, that is, the military and police. So, by recruiting diasporas more actively into the institutions of the state, we are not only enhancing the effectiveness of these institutions during expeditionary DDR missions, we are also enhancing their nation-building mission proper.

Third, involving more diasporas is a matter of consistency and norms transfer. To begin with, if we are trying to propagate liberal-democratic norms abroad, these values need to be reflected in the people deployed in support of DDR missions. If one purpose of such missions is to spread values such as tolerance, compromise, self-actualization, and equality of opportunity, then showing up with an unrepresentative – i.e. Caucasian – sample of Western populations undermines the entire purpose of the mission. Foreign populations are well aware of the ethno-cultural diversity in Western countries. If that diversity is not actually reflected in the people selected for a mission, then local populations are likely to be less receptive to the mission because they will be able to discern the contradiction between what they see and what they know about the country of origin of those who are tasked with executing the mission. Moreover, a more diverse groups of emissaries allows Western countries to model – and practice -- what they are trying to preach. It is one thing to pontificate about tolerance, harmony, compromise, collaboration, and peaceful co-existence; it is quite another to show up with a diverse group of people and model all those ideals right there on the ground for everyone to see.

Finally, greater diversity is an economic imperative. A large proportion of funds flowing to DDR programs comes from the public purse. As a result, they should be spent with the same care and vigilance as any other tax dollars. Whereas the talent pool of Caucasian populations in Western countries is shallowing, the recruit pool of “non-traditional” populations is growing. In light of the changing ethnic composition of the populations of Western countries, there are only two policy options to attain the required participation rates: to recruit more diversely, or to recruit more intensively among groups that are in decline. While it may be cheaper to recruit at the margins for a while, eventually this approach will be self-defeating, from the standpoints of quantity, quality and cost. Recruiting more diversely may initially be a slow and costly process, but the efforts should prove more productive in the end. A socio-demographic approach to that gives weight to representational issues (the ethics of recruitment) but which focuses heavily on the areas of greatest recruiting potential (practical efficiency) is likely to be both the most fiscally sound and most ethically defensible alternative in a diverse, liberal-democratic society.⁹

⁸ Anna Simons, “The Changing Face of the SOF soldier: An Anthropological Perspective,” in *Force of Choice: Perspectives of Special Operations*, eds. Bernd Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon, and David Last (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), pp. 79-91.

⁹ Christian Leuprecht, “Demographics and Diversity Issues in Canadian Military Participation,” in *Gender & Diversity*. Ed. Franklin C. Pinch (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005).

What is more, current concerns about the role that diasporas can play reflect are indicative of a somewhat myopic attitude. Members of immigrant communities in Canada need not be recruited directly in support of an operation in order to add value. It may be sufficient to identify individuals among specific immigrant groups with knowledge or skills that may prove relevant in future missions. For example, recent immigrants may have valuable local knowledge of urban or rural geography. Being able to identify these individuals and gain their cooperation does not necessitate them being recruited, selected and trained.

Western countries would be well served by a pool of trusted members among strategic diasporas. A teacher, for instance, might be called in at short notice to provide language or cultural-sensitivity courses prior to deployment. Most countries have training facilities for their foreign service which could be used to provide intercultural learning.

A translation service run by a native speaker may serve as a stand-by source for timely translation of open-source documentation before, during, or after a mission. Through Internet and satellite connections, translators can work in the metropolis in support of operations in distant theatres. Reliable translators for potential theatres of operation may be few and, in a crisis, the translation capacities of security and intelligence agencies are likely to be stretched to capacity. When units cannot overcome language barriers, they cannot understand their environment, gather intelligence, or even protect themselves effectively. Be it military units, intelligence services, development agencies, or international policing, any agency operating in the global village needs language services, and would benefit from grooming a network of reliable translators available at short notice. Timely communication can be vital to a mission's success.

The Toronto Police Service, for instance, has translators for 140 languages on standby around the clock every day of the year. They can be brought into the field with community liaison officers, or regular constables, or patched into a three-way call between an operator and a caller. By incorporating recent immigrant populations, the Toronto Police can interact with and serve them effectively.

CANADEM provides another model for incorporating multicultural expertise. Funded by Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs, it maintains a national roster of over five thousand Canadian civilians with a broad range of knowledge and skills, including human rights monitoring, conduct of elections, democratization, administration and logistics, security, and post-conflict reconstruction. CANPOL is an affiliated agency that maintains a roster of policing expertise for international deployment. Both of these government-sponsored non-governmental organisations serve as a vehicle for rapid, nationally directed, response to international crises. They allow Canada to supply appropriately-qualified people for international missions sponsored by the UN, or other bodies. They can also be tapped by other non-governmental organisations. CANADEM, or another agency modeled on it, has the capacity to mobilize and catalogue immigrant expertise to serve the national interest.

Immigrants from a potential theatre may be a source of vital intelligence through contacts they still have in their place of origin. They may also have topographical and geostrategic insights. Despite all the cartographical information and intelligence available, arguably there is no better source of guidance than someone who knows the area intimately first hand, either accompanying the troops or available for consultation through radio contact. Since those who have left a conflict zone most recently may be the least forthcoming, naturalization and

immigration agencies might offer incentives to individuals with knowledge or skills urgently needed.¹⁰

Through their contacts, immigrants may also be able to enhance the success of a mission in other ways. Trusted family members abroad might be recruited to harbour operatives, to assist in communications, or to supply food or information. MI6's Special Operations Executive pioneered such tactics during the Second World War.¹¹ Friendly locals can extend strategic reach beyond the limits of military logistics, increase the longevity of missions, and provide for backup in case other arrangements fail. Detailed local knowledge and friendly forces in location may pay significant dividends, for development and diplomacy no less than for invasions such as those of the Second World War. Family ties to immigrants back in Canada will help to increase the reliability of such help.

DIASPORAS

Before embarking on a discussion of the way diasporas may be harnessed in support of peace, stability, and security operations, this brief section draws on Gabriel Sheffer's work to sketch some of the principal characteristics of diasporas. These characteristics are significant because they facilitate the formulation of hypotheses as to the groups from which countries are likely to be able to recruit more or less successfully for disarmament, development, and reconstruction missions. These hypotheses are subjected to empirical scrutiny below.

Diasporas have three distinguishing criteria. First, they share certain attributes which make them diasporas in the first place. Second, diasporas may be differentiated by time and place. Third, the variables determining a diaspora's characteristics vary but can be known.

In order to qualify as a diaspora, a group must meet four criteria. First, diasporas are the result of forced or voluntary *migration*. Second, they maintain contact with their homeland *and* with other individuals of the same background in other countries. Third, diasporas make a conscious decision to maintain a common identity. Fourth, they establish transnational networks.¹² Based on these observations, one may hypothesize that individuals with stronger links to their home country and to transnational networks may be better suited for DDR operations than individuals whose links are not as strong.

Diasporas may be broken down further by place and time. Diasporas may or may not have linkages with a state. Groups with a kin state tend to be more motivated than those that

¹⁰ In 1941, the US Navy was concerned about sabotage of shipping by the large Italian-American population in New York. It arranged for the release of the imprisoned gangster, "Lucky" Luciano to provide guarantees. Later, the embryonic Office of Strategic Services (OSS) recruited Mafia to help with the invasion of Sicily. Paul Elliott, *Brotherhoods of Fear: A History of Violent Organizations* (London: Cassell, 1998), 146.

¹¹ Nigel West, *MI6: British Intelligence Operations, 1909-1945* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983); Edward Spiro, *Inside S.O.E.: The story of special operations in Western Europe, 1940-1945* (London: Baker, 1966); David Stafford, *Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945: A survey of the Special Operations Executive, with documents* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).

¹² Gabriel Sheffler, *Diaspora Politics at Home and Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 8. Although Sheffler is aware of the literature's three competing explanations as to why people maintain an identity – primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism – he leans towards primordialism as the explanation with the most traction (Ibid, p. 17).

do not have their own state.¹³ And they may be either ancient – or classical¹⁴ (Sheffer 2003) – modern, or incipient. Modern diasporas have quantitative and qualitative distinctions. Quantitatively, they may be distinguished by variables such as the time of their migration, the host country's policies towards naturalization, their organizational membership, and remittances. Qualitatively, one can distinguish between ascriptive identity, that is, the way the group defines itself, and its descriptive identity, that is, the way the group is perceived by outsiders.¹⁵ One may thus hypothesize that individuals who migrated more recently, feel more readily accepted into their new country, are more active in diaspora organizations, and remit may be better suited for DDR than individuals who have been in a country longer, feel less loyal to that country but are also less active in organizations and do not remit.

Finally, there are six determinants of a diaspora's characteristics.¹⁶ First, the factors affecting the decision to migrate are key. Second, conditions in the home country vary. Third, some countries want to maintain links with their diasporas while others do not. Whereas Hungary disavows Hungarian gypsies abroad, for instance, it makes great strides to maintain close ties to Romania's Hungarian diaspora in Transylvania. Fourth, individuals have different reasons for joining diasporas but these are always related to their personal experience. Fifth, the lingering degrees of attachment to a homeland vary. Sixth, in a globalizing world, access to media from the home country is crucial to ensuring the diaspora's vitality. Yet, access varies.¹⁷ Diasporas' integration into a host society is greatest when the diaspora itself is open to the host country and feels ambivalent about its homeland. One may thus hypothesize that individuals who migrated voluntarily from their country of origin but who maintain a degree of healthy, neutral distance from it may make better participants in DDR.

DIASPORAS IN DDR

In an attempt to falsify these hypothesis, we shall start with the small literature on diasporas in peace and security operations. Four studies fall into this category, all of which identify a trade-off between cultural affinity and professional experience.

Marcel-Eugene LeBeuf has carried out two brief studies on Canadian police officers deployed to Haiti using semi-structured interviews.¹⁸ Both studies highlight awareness of the local culture as a key to success because police work is so social by nature. Officers who understood Creole, for instance – as at least one officer in one of the studies did – were found to integrate more readily and suffer less culture shock than those who did not. Experience emerges as an equally pivotal a factor. This finding is significant for it suggests that, at least in so far as policing is concerned, diasporas cannot be tapped on short notice. Another study goes as far as suggesting that members of diasporas should be carefully screened before they

¹³ Gabriel Sheffer, *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 216.

¹⁴ Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2003).

¹⁵ *Idem.* p. 82.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-146.

¹⁸ Marcel-Eugene Lebeuf, *The Royal Canadian Mounted Police as Civilian Police Officers in the United Nations Peace Missions Assessment and Perspectives. Final Report* (Ottawa: Canadian Police College, 1994) and *Canadian Provincial and Municipal Police Forces on United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti* (Ottawa: Canadian Police College, 1997).

are called upon to participate in a mission to see whether they actually have the requisite experience.¹⁹

A report by Donna Winslow lays out this tension.²⁰ On the one hand, members of a diaspora are likely able to integrate better with the community, especially if they have maintained ties with their homeland. On the other hand, they may not be able to maintain neutrality. However, if they can overcome their biases, then they can serve as examples to their homeland kin. Moreover, the problem of neutrality is not incumbent upon diasporas alone. Winslow's report documents the Canadian peacekeepers who had developed close ties with the local community were prone to losing their neutrality. Diasporas, then, may possibly be more prone to biases than groups with no relationship to the conflict but diasporas should not be ruled out for peacekeeping missions on grounds of neutrality for perspectivism is an attribute of human nature. Moreover, neutrality may be enhanced by experience.

From the literature one may thus conclude that diasporas' participation in policing missions overseas hinges on a concerted effort by federal, provincial, and municipal forces to recruit and train members belonging to diaspora groups. Regardless, experience and standardized criteria of selection that would normally be applied to any candidate for a policing job should be neither disregarded nor lowered to increase the minority-participation rate. At the same time, one must guard against presuming that members of a particular diaspora will necessarily be able to integrate more readily on a peacebuilding mission in their country of origin. Their degree of culture shock may be even greater than that of a person with no cultural affinity to the conflict because of the degree to which that person's perception of her/his home country diverges from reality.

HARNESSING DIASPORAS

Despite reservations about diasporas' capacity to operate effectively in peacebuilding missions, they have the potential to contribute a variety of important assets that are likely to be pivotal to a mission's success. These reasons include their close ties to their community, their interest in the conflict in their homeland, and their ability to liaise between the diaspora and citizens in the home country. There are also several different measurable factors that determine a diaspora groups' efficacy in being agents of change in conflicts in their homelands.

Ivana Djuric has investigated the use of a neutral Croatian diasporic newspaper, *The Fraternalist* in mobilizing support within the diaspora for a variety of causes, such as language, religion, culture, history, and politics.²¹ In all cases – especially in having an arms embargo lifted -- the paper proved to be the main conduit for mobilizing support or criticism of a specific policy in Croatia or in the North American diaspora. Similar observations have

¹⁹ Monique Gignac, *Understanding the Peacekeeping Process: Methodology and Selected Findings From a Study of Canadian Peacekeepers* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, Ministry of National Defence, 1998), p. 20.

²⁰ Donna Winslow, *Canadian Warriors in Peacekeeping: Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters* (Ottawa: Canadian Forces College, Ministry of National Defence, 1999).

²¹ Ivana Djuric, "The Croatian Diaspora in North America: Identity: Ethnicity, Solidarity, and the formation of a Transnational Community," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Solidarity* 17(1): 113-130.

been made about the Haitian diaspora's use of newspapers.²² Djuric's study thus evidences the value of diasporas as lobby groups and as a means of building identity and ties with the homeland. For the purpose of a potential peacebuilding mission, the communication and ties it engenders are pivotal because they are likely to facilitate the integration of someone from a diaspora group in her/his homeland as part of that mission.

These ties are a double-edged sword, though, for the same ties that facilitate integration may also aggravate a conflict. Toronto's Tamil diaspora, for instance – the city's largest Southeast Asian diaspora – is the Sri Lankan conflict's primary international catalyst.²³ The same holds true for the Sikh diaspora in the United Kingdom which has been a pivotal source of financial support for the Punjab's "freedom fighters." Due to close contact, regular visits, and remittances, Sikhs in the diaspora had a vested interest in resolving that situation. Analogous to Sri Lanka's attitude towards the Tamil insurgents, the Sikh diaspora's alienation from India was exacerbated by the government's refusal to find a negotiated solution to the "Punjab problem."²⁴

These observations intimate that a diaspora's efficacy is a function of its size, organization, and strength, irrespective of the cause in support of which it may be rallying. Greek organizations, for instance, have been found to be much better organized and financed than their Macedonian counterparts.²⁵ This is partially attributable to the Greek government's financial support for its diaspora, especially its support of groups, festivals, and publications. Macedonia, by contrast, is a frail state unable to take on a leadership or financial role in support of its diaspora. Moreover, Macedonians are not culturally homogeneous (since a substantial minority of Macedonian citizens are ethnically Albanian). By the same token, the Macedonian ethnic group is not territorially concentrated in one state the way the Greek nation is but territorially dispersed over Macedonia, Greece, and Bulgaria. Pan-Macedonian organizations (and the pan-Macedonian world convention) thus have to be more self-reliant and are constrained in ways Greek diaspora organizations are not.

The more democratic a host country, the greater the influence a diaspora can have.²⁶ Diaspora lobbying has proven particularly successful when the homeland is weak but soliciting the assistance of the host country. Also of importance is the congruence between the interests of a diaspora's homeland and the interests of the diaspora as brought to bear on the diaspora's homeland. The political and social nature of the kin state, for instance, often runs afoul of the diasporas' interests for the homeland.²⁷ Yet, interests should not be over-essentialized. The interests of groups within a diaspora in any one country and among communities of diasporas among different countries vary depending on circumstances.²⁸ These circumstances include a host country's hospitality to a given diaspora, including a country's

²² Michel Laguerre, "The Role of the Diaspora in Haitian Politics." In *Haiti Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects* (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1997), p. 174.

²³ K.M. DeSilva, "Sri Lanka's Prolonged Ethnic Conflict: Negotiating a Settlement," *International Negotiation* 6 2001: 437-469.

²⁴ Pashaura Singh and N. Gerald Barrier, *The Transmission of Sikh Heritage in the Diaspora* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), p. 236. See also Brian Axel, *The Nation's Tortured Body: Violence, Representation, and the formation of the Sikh Diaspora* (Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).

²⁵ Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 90, 95, 97, 102, 104.

²⁶ Yossi Shain and A. Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 57(3): 465.

²⁷ Yossi Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution," *SAIS Review* 22(2): 118-125.

²⁸ Paul Brodwin, "Marginality and Subjectivity in the Haitian Diaspora," *Anthropological Quarterly* 76(3): 383-410.

effective encouragement of multiculturalism policies and access to communication technology. On the one hand, multiculturalism policies facilitate home countries' involvement in a diaspora's educational and religious activities. On the other hand, countries with active multiculturalism policies tend to be more sensitive to diasporic lobby efforts.²⁹

In sum, a given diaspora group's potential to make a meaningful contribution to a peacebuilding operation in its home country is a function of the attitudes of members as well as of the relative strength of the groups and their ability to mobilize and contribute to specific conflicts.

INDIVIDUALS

This section will focus on the particular contributions individual members of diasporas may be able to make. The two key studies on this topic find that the closer the contact immigrants maintain with their homeland, the easier a time they have re-integrating upon their return. The conclusion, however, is tempered by certain reservations.

The most comprehensive inductive investigation of individual members of diaspora groups is Nicholas Van Hear's *New Diasporas*.³⁰ It presents the results of a survey of returnees and their capacity to integrate upon their return to their home country. The book posits culture shock suffered by prospective contributors to peace and stability operations as a function of their capacity to re-integrate into their homeland.

The results of Van Hear's survey of Jordanian Palestinians returning from Kuwait point to the salience of family and kin networks to facilitate the re-integration of returnees.³¹ These networks, however, can also give rise to tensions if the returnee is unable to secure a good income in her/his home country for s/he thus becomes dependant on remittances. Remittances tend to remain constant or even decline once an individual returns. If that individual subsequently becomes dependant on remittances, less foreign money is available to be spread across the family and kin network because the same amount of funds remitted from abroad must now sustain an additional person. Remittances have also been found to be a source of bias as members of the diaspora have been found to leverage remittances to influence the vote of family in their home country.³²

Attempts by members of the diaspora to steer the vote in their home country are obviously contingent upon the diaspora's resources. Education tends to be one of the main determinants to this end. A study of immigrants to Israel found a correlation between the level of education of European and American immigrants and their successful integration into the Israeli workforce.³³ Immigrants from Asia and North Africa, by contrast, experienced greater difficulty adjusting to the Israeli economy. Similarly, the level of involvement by members of the Haitian diaspora in campaign politics has been shown to be a function of

²⁹ Danforth, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

³⁰ Nicholas Van Hear, *New Diasporas* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998).

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

³² Laguerre, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

³³ Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohlinger. *Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants: Germany, Israel and Post-Soviet Successor States in Comparative Perspective* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 300-301.

training, technical and political skill, resources, and time to spare.³⁴ The education and work experience members of a diaspora gain while abroad is not to be underestimated as a determinant of the individual's capacity to (re-)integrate. This bolsters the earlier deduction that liberal democracies ought to be making a concerted effort to attract members of diasporas to the sort of professions on which it may be drawing for future peacekeeping missions.

From his survey of Yemeni returnees from Saudi Arabia, Van Hear concludes that frequent visits and remittances are the two main determinants of the capacity to re-integrate. By contrast, Yemeni returnees who had spent a long time abroad and had not remitted funds ended up having only loose connections with their homeland and little grasp of the changing reality of Yemeni society.³⁵ These findings are consistent for Yemenese, Ghanaian, and Jordanian expatriates.³⁶ They are further confirmed by a study of the Haitian diaspora in the United States.³⁷ These findings are significant in that they reinforce LeBeuf's findings regarding the difficulty experienced by Haitian expatriates when called upon to partake in Canada's UN policing mission to Haiti.

Van Hear also identifies allegiance as a determinant of an expatriate's capacity to reintegrate.³⁸ Allegiance is a function of the length of an individual's stay abroad, her/his nationality, socio-economic status, and the individual's degree of transaction in her/his place or origin. A comparison of Haitian expatriates in New York City and Miami, for instance, linked their emotional proximity with Haiti to relative deprivation. In New York City, by contrast, Haitians became a constituent ethnic community which attracted funding from the mayor's office. Such recognition spurred more Haitians to settle in New York City and caused them to become more integrated into the city.³⁹ At the same time, however, recognition turned out to correlate with transnational ties. As the local identity of Haitians in New York City became politicized and recognized, the community's ties with family and kin in the network were reinforced. This finding is echoed by Münz and Ohlinger who find that the propensity to keep in contact with the homeland and the Jewish diaspora was stronger in countries that encourage such transnationalism, notably Canada, than in countries with more assimilationist policies, notably France.⁴⁰ Münz and Ohlinger's conclusion thus reinforces the earlier claim that countries with proactive multiculturalist policies enjoy a competitive advantage in harnessing their growing ethno-demographic diversity in support of future peacekeeping operations.

In other words, assimilationist policies alienate new immigrants from their host society which spurs strong feelings of loyalty to their home country. Yet, such policies obviously make it more difficult for the host state to harness its ethno-demographic potential in support of the state's national interest. Official multiculturalism, by contrast, fosters the formation of diasporas. At the same time, it raises a controversy: Does multiculturalism actually hasten an immigrant's integration into the new society or, to the contrary, does it prolong integration? Under Canada's "mosaic" model, for instance, immigrants are thought to retain a strong

³⁴ Idem, p. 172. For elaborate socio-statistical data on the Haitian diaspora in the United States see Anthony V. Catanese, *Haitians: Migration and Diaspora* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), ch. 8., pp. 94-116.

³⁵ Van Hear, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 168.

³⁷ L.E. Guarnizo and M.P. Smith. *Transnationalism from Below*. Vol. 6. Comparative Urban and Community Research (New York: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p. 16.

³⁸ Idem, p. 244.

³⁹ Guarnizo et al., *op. cit.*, p. 142.

⁴⁰ Munz et al., *op. cit.*, p. 371.

sense of ethnic identity. But a stronger sense of ethnic identity is not to be confused with the retention of elements of the culture of origin. Just because an identity is stronger does not mean immigrants are necessarily more conversant in their original language, well-versed in their original religion, more likely to marry within the group, or more likely to want to live within an ethnic neighbourhood. On the contrary, on many of these criteria immigrants to Canada quickly relinquish links with their ancestral culture.⁴¹ So, while fostering the emergence of vibrant diaspora communities, multiculturalism also undermines the cultural vernacular that has the potential to mitigate possible culture shock were an individual from that community courted for a peacebuilding mission.

The results of Van Hear's survey also identify the nature and state of society, the links maintained while abroad, the presence of family abroad, the provision or short- and long-term assistance, and access to assets and capital as determinants of (re-)integration. Patterns of accommodation, investment, and employment also turn out to be relevant.⁴² Critical, however, is the presence or absence of migrant networks in the form of other diaspora groups in general and especially in the form of the presence of pre-established migrants from the same diaspora group.⁴³

In sum, the degree of an individual's contact with his/her homeland is a key determinant of the individual's capacity to re-integrate and a host country's policies can have a significant influence on the maintenance of transnational links. Yet, much of this contact is due to remittances. As a result, people may not be prone to leaving their host country because that may compromise their ability to secure support for their family and kin abroad. Their participation in peacekeeping missions would thus be ideal because they would be able to return to their home country without having to relinquish the income that forms the basis of their remittances.

Affluence, however, may prove problematic. Even if an expatriate maintains close ties to their home country, her/his compatriots may be jealous upon her/his return which will, in turn, hinder the process of re-integration. This pattern recurs in several the case studies. Among Haitians, for instance, social standing is of considerable cultural importance. Returning expatriates were widely perceived as opportunists and made to feel unwelcome because they were able to harness their diaspora connections to receive special training or government employment.⁴⁴ Integration is further complicated by the negative attitudes towards the military and the police in countries where peacekeeping missions might be deployed for these are frequently the most visible institutions of state oppression. As a result, even members of the diaspora who might assist peacebuilding operations may be deemed to have compromised themselves by virtue of working with the military or police, even if they are operating under the auspices of the United Nations.⁴⁵ These findings are consistent with those of the controversial Sterling project. While the difference with the Sterling project was that members of the experiment were part of the community – as opposed to a diaspora -- the

⁴¹ Jeffrey G. Reitz and Raymond Breton, *The Illusion of Difference: Realities of Ethnicity in Canada and the United States* (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1994); Irene Bloemraad, "Is Multiculturalism Assimilatory? Structure Mobilization and the Political Incorporation of Refugees and Immigrants in the US and Canada," Working Paper (2004).

⁴² Van Hear, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 257. For more on the social geography of migrant networks see the pioneering work of Alejandro Portes and Robert L. Bach, *Latin Journal: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

⁴⁴ Guarnizo et al., *op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁴⁵ Laguerre, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

experiment identified as the main problem the community's loss of trust in returnees.⁴⁶ This led to the returnees' marginalization and ineffectiveness in their efforts to mediate a solution to the conflict. The mistrust culminated in some returnees' deaths.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research was to ascertain factors that determine how effective members of a specific diaspora might be in a peace and stability operation in their country of origin. No definitive set of factors emerges from the current body of research. Certain factors may prove more relevant than others but, in the end, each situation is unique. Still, three areas needing further research crystallize: The type of person best suited relative to a problem's cause, the role of organizations in the diaspora, and the determinants of an immigrant's relationship with her/his homeland.

LeBeuf's research and Canada's UN policing experience in Haiti point to local relations as key to a mission's success. Culture shock is a serious impediment for returning expatriates. For the purpose of accomplishing a mission, an effective officer will be someone who is (1) able to acclimatize rapidly to the new environment, (2) integrate into society as quickly and seamlessly as possible, (3) has ample experience in his *métier* and, ideally, with similar UN missions, and (4) is able to remain neutral *vis-à-vis* warring factions. Fulfilling all criteria may prove difficult, especially if the pool of prospective candidates is restricted solely to members of a certain diaspora. Although training can compensate for inexperience to some degree, the research shows that a mission's best officers were those with ample experience, not just training. Culture shock can be minimized by opting for members of the diaspora who have kept regular contact with their home society; they adapt more readily upon returning. Regular contact, however, may also reinforce bias in a conflict.

The information on the potential effect continuous contact with the homeland might have on a mission is insufficient to draw any preliminary conclusions. While the literature intimates that re-integration should be easier for these members, no study thus far has controlled for this variable. This sort of study would need to interview participants in the mission to ascertain the extent of contact with their home prior to the mission, how that contact influence their perception of their home country, and how that factored into their performance during the mission.

Diaspora organizations tend to be highly involved with their communities in the host country, usually with an eye to maintaining contact with the home country as well as with kin diasporas in other countries. They distribute literature, mobilize citizens for various causes, and rally their respective communities. And as the aforementioned examples of the Croatian and Haitian diaspora evidence, there is an intense desire among diasporas to assist with conflict resolution. To capitalize on this motivation and organizations' domestic, international, and transnational connections, diaspora organizations are an obvious means through which to select potential candidates for missions and, in line with the Brahimi report on the future of UN peacekeeping, for compiling stand-by lists – modeled on CANADEM -- of individuals with specific skills who could be mobilized for a mission on short notice. Three caveats, however, ought to be kept in mind.

⁴⁶ G.H. Boehringer et al., "Stirling: The Destructive Application of Group Techniques to a Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 18(2): 257-275.

First, not all diaspora organizations lend themselves equally well to this task. Clearly, the membership of groups with an eye to resolving the conflict is better suited to a peacebuilding mission than the membership of groups, such as the aforementioned Tamil and Sikh groups, whose objective is the conflict's perpetuation. Even if they are bent on solving a conflict, a group's inherent bias needs to be taken into account. The above-cited literature on Haitian groups, for instance, reveals that the Haitian diaspora's organizations tended to be explicitly for or against Haiti's then-president Aristide. Bias of this sort is likely to taint the organization's membership and risks undermining peace and stability efforts.

Second, the comparison of the Greek and Macedonian diasporas shows that a group's ability to mobilize the diaspora will depend on the group's own organization. Funding, size, and assistance from the home state will affect not only the capacity to mobilize but also the quality of the relationship these groups maintain with their home state. For purely instrumental reasons, a diaspora subject to support from its kin state, such as the Greeks, has a greater incentive to maintain closer bilateral ties with that state than the Macedonian diaspora which has to rely more on multilateral ties with other Macedonians than with its kin state.

Third, the formation, maintenance, and orientation of diaspora organizations are shaped by the nature of the host country. Groups in countries and cities with multicultural policies, such as Canada and New York, are more conducive to the diasporas' flourishing while concomitantly maintaining good relations between the diaspora and the host country as well as between the diaspora and its home country, than countries with more assimilationist tendencies, such as France.

Indeed, individuals in multicultural societies are more prone to becoming involved with groups in their host as well as home country. Yet, they also integrate more readily into their host society, thus undermining their homeland connections which, in turn, may complicate their re-integration. The converse, however, holds as well. In countries and cities with more assimilationist approaches, such as France and Miami, immigrants seem to be more drawn towards their home country. This may lessen the culture shock which they may be prone to suffering upon their return. At the same time, assimilationist policies discourage the formation of strong diasporic organizations. Expatriates are thus deprived of many of the organizational and communicational benefits these groups afford.

Yet, the maintenance of ties is a double-edged sword in and of itself. Media, phone and Internet, remittances, and the presence of close family in the country of origin bolsters ties with the home country. This can be beneficial in that it stands to hasten re-integration upon return. Close contact with family at home, however, may increase bias among members of a diaspora, especially in the case of bifurcated internal conflicts. The individual's neutrality may thus be called into question. The individual's perspective may be skewed by one-sided information or emotional affinity. Notwithstanding an individual's capacity to distance her/himself from a conflict, by virtue of her/his connections the individual may nonetheless be perceived as biased by people on the ground. Equally problematic is the propensity of close connections for the propagation of violence as exemplified by Tamils and Sikhs.

A comparable dynamic plays itself out with regard to remittances. Those who support family through remittances not only keep in close contact with the home country and thus are less prone to culture shock, but they also demonstrate a genuine concern for family and compatriots. They may predispose the individual to lending a hand in peacebuilding efforts

and increase the individual's chances of re-integrating successfully. But those who remit are also more reluctant to leave the host country as that may mean depriving their family in the home country of much needed income. Those in the home country may also be jealous of compatriots who return with money and/or employment, especially in developing countries where social status is a function of wealth. Income and employment may thus compromise the individual's capacity to re-integrate. While there is no single set of factors that might predict how suitable a candidate from a diaspora may be for any particular peace and stability operation, seven factors emerge as potentially salient.

First, the length of time that has passed since immigration appears to matter. On the one hand, ties to the home country loosen over time. On the other hand, as more time passes, the cultural disconnect with the home society widens, thus heightening the potential extent of culture shock suffered upon re-integration. This suggests that, depending on the amount of time that has passed since immigration, there may be decreasing returns on recruiting diaspora members for peacebuilding purposes. On the other hand, very recent immigrants may not be ideal either. Neither have they had a chance to establish any affinity with the host country and its state institutions nor have they been socialized into its norms and values. It follows that, if plotted on a graph, the optimal time for recruiting members from a diaspora for their cultural, linguistic, and religious aptitude runs along a curve. Without more data, however, it is impossible to ascertain the shape of that curve.

Second, individuals who communicate with their home country, visit, or remit, may be more likely candidates for peace, stability, and security operations because of the cultural proximity thus sustained. If so, though, it will be important to know the nature of the relations with the homeland in order to ascertain the presence of possible biases.

Third, an individual's political affiliations in the home country are also indicative of possible favouritism in a conflict.

Fourth, it will be valuable to know whether an individual is an active member of a diaspora organization. An individual may communicate, visit, remit but not be a member of an organization. Since organizational membership is indicative of a desire to connect with one's diaspora and minimizes transaction costs involved in touching base with the home country, active members of diaspora organizations may make more suitable candidates for peace and stability operations.

Fifth, the characteristics and activities of said organization will be instructive. Members of organizations working towards a negotiated resolution of a conflict are likely to be better contributors to peacebuilding than individuals who support or endorse organizations that fuel the conflict or condone violence.

Sixth, it may be relevant to know whether a prospective candidate has mobilized to assist her/his homeland in any other manner. An individual may neither communicate, visit, or remit nor join or support a diaspora organization but the individual may, for instance, be active in a peace organization, another association that works to preserve the individual's vernacular, or may conduct research on or write about a conflict in her/his home country. However, reaching such individuals may be difficult if they are not also involved in diaspora organizations that can be tapped to identify potential candidates.

Seventh, an individual's economic status in the host country may indicate how likely an individual is to participate in a peacebuilding mission. People who remit will not want to forego income. At the same time, people who either were wealthy when they left or moved up on the socio-economic ladder while abroad may not be well received upon return.

Based on the current body of research, there is thus a case to be made for the plausible relevance of each of these factors in selecting prospective candidates from diaspora groups. Still, there is insufficient research to establish whether they are relevant, how these factors are to be weighted, and which combination of factors may increase the chances of success once the individual is deployed overseas. The research, however, is unequivocal about the importance of work experience in the *métier* in which an individual is to serve and support a peace and stability operation. Based on the available body of knowledge, therefore, the best way to proceed may be for governments to collaborate with organizations offering the skills that are likely to be needed overseas. They may, for instance, want to increase the proportion of police officers, among the diasporas on which the government is most likely to draw. Since a stand-by list of experienced police officers who might be called upon in support of a UN mission already exists, one would only need to add such characteristics as country of origin, ethnicity, and religion (candidates' linguistic skills are already profiled in the CANPOL database). The government would then need to complement CANPOL with a comprehensive research scheme that ensures that members of diasporas who are deployed overseas, especially if they are deployed in their country of origin, are surveyed about the aforementioned variables prior to departure and upon their return. This sort of systematic and sustained approach would allow governments to gather the data needed to raise the participation quota of diasporas in peacebuilding missions and to ensure that such participation leads to desirable and successful outcomes.

As a matter of fact, greater diaspora participation promises to be a positive-sum game that will enhance the success and effectiveness of such missions. In light of the growing proportion of visible minorities among the national population in the West, this sort of research is indispensable for Western countries intent on sustaining their peacebuilding commitments over the long-term. It is also indispensable to accelerate the integration of diasporas into the institutions of the host state. Greater participation on the part of diasporas in peacebuilding missions is thus essential for the purpose of making effective use of peacebuilding missions not only as a nation-building tool abroad but also as a nation-building tool back home. In addition to doubling the nation-building function of peacebuilding missions, greater diaspora participation in such operations also stands to enhance national sovereignty because it would allow countries to contribute unique ethno-cultural assets to such missions. By honing the participation of skilled and experienced members of critical diasporas, such as Canada's Haitian diaspora, countries stand to position themselves strategically among their international allies. By making their participation and leadership in such missions increasingly indispensable, they enhance their national sovereignty and leverage in the international community. In the end, a systematic, sustained, and comprehensive approach to raising the participation quota of diasporas in peace and stability missions is good for peacebuilding, good for a nation's social cohesion, and good national sovereignty.