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# The Evolving Role of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Operations in the 3D Approach<sup>i</sup>

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## INTRODUCTION

Governments are increasingly moving towards a 3-dimensional approach to international affairs, integrating defence, development, and diplomacy. This blurring of traditional spheres of influence has caused a certain degree of inter-agency tension. Military personnel are increasingly being called upon to provide both security-sector and developmental assistance in war-torn societies. This has caused considerable concern in the development community. The employment of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) personnel is of particular concern to the development community, who are apprehensive about the military encroachment into their traditional area of responsibility. This paper seeks to address some of the difficulties in integrating policy, focusing on how to improve the efficacy of CIMIC units and enhance the 3D approach.

## DEFINING CIMIC

CIMIC is an important but frequently misunderstood area of operations in both domestic and international missions. Many see CIMIC as the military equivalent of humanitarian organisations. This ill-conceived perception neglects the important military role CIMIC can and does play. It has become clear from recent international missions that the need for further discussion and analysis of the current CIMIC doctrine, which is still evolving, is required to help strengthen this significant operational tool. Indeed, when CIMIC activities are well orchestrated they become a combat multiplier and play an important role in the campaign to “win the hearts and minds” of the civilian population and enhance the efficacy of government action.

In terms of doctrine, CIMIC has often been regarded as an expostulation of the government's 3D approach to international affairs: it seems to exemplify the cohesion of defence, diplomacy and development policy under one umbrella<sup>ii</sup>. This approach is laudable for its potential in streamlining government activities and complementing the objectives of various government actors in areas such as Afghanistan. Of great concern, however, is the ubiquitous championing of the 3D approach at the strategic level whilst little guidance has been provided to the "on the ground" actors responsible for policy implementation. As the 3D policy evolves and is put into practice, clearer mandates and a specific delineation of responsibilities are needed. Here I would offer a suggestion for a more formalized definition of 3D operations, namely:

"3D operations refer to a complementary, cooperative, and unified approach – from planning through to execution—by diplomatic, defence, and development actors in order to create conditions for the successful reconstruction of failed states."

### **CIMIC AND THE MILITARY MISSION**

Unfortunately, the vision of the CIMIC operator as a humanitarian actor building schools and distributing much-needed supplies to those in need undermines the operational value of a CIMIC organisation in enhancing force protection. While these functions no doubt contribute to a mission and the overall government direction, it is important to frame the purpose of CIMIC through a military lens: each successive act of apparent benevolence is carefully orchestrated to bring about the maximum impact with the minimum expenditure of resources. In Afghanistan, CIMIC operators are striving to enhance force protection and guard the commander's centre of gravity: to win and maintain the support of the local population. In a country destroyed by 23 years of conflict, the needs of the local population can be safely described as total.

The question facing CIMIC is: where exactly can the limited resources allotted be best expended to achieve the maximum effect? Would it be better to construct a well in an area devoid of proper infrastructure, or next to the home of an influential figure in the local community? In a country whose educational infrastructure has been destroyed and where illiteracy is the norm, many citizens are unable to recognize signs, let alone national flags. Added to this is the multiple number of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), each with their own visual identity. While many Afghans recognize the symbol of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), it is not safe to assume a Canadian flag attached to a well will be interpreted any different than the logo of an NGO.

If the overriding principle for CIMIC projects is force protection, it is imperative credit be claimed for projects in the local community. Thus, difficult decisions may be required where force protection is better served by conducting projects in more prominent areas rather than where the needs of the population may be most pressing. Consequently, there is a great need for careful assessment of the terrain in any CIMIC operation to determine both the needs of the local populace, and the best mechanism for spreading information. CIMIC, after all, contributes significantly to the information operations campaign.

This is not to say that the humanitarian motive is sidelined or sacrificed to the military objectives; on the contrary, the doctrinal guidance points towards the need for harmonization of military activities with both the desires of the local government and the activities of the rest of the international community (IC). Indeed, military and humanitarian imperatives are rarely mutually exclusive, despite the apparent reticence of some organizations to cooperate with any military activity.

It should be noted that a military presence is not a panacea for needs of the local population, although it will likely be viewed as such. Particularly in early post-Taliban Afghanistan, a plethora of international organizations entered the country with visions of grandeur. Many promises were made, from the basic (repair of infrastructure) to the obscene (hotels and golf courses). Alas, as with many things, what began as a great vision soon revealed itself as a delusion, replete with broken promises, unfilled mandates, and relocation to other areas of reconstruction (most recently, Iraq). There is a veritable surplus of studies on everything from infrastructure to information-technology, but unfortunately most of the recommendations therein have not been implemented.

The Afghan government is desperate to realize its own plan of action, but many of the NGOs are untrusting, and have gone around the local authorities with their own independent agendas. The result is a country full of micro projects but no central organization or database of activities. The donor community seems to trust the NGOs more than the transitional authority. Both channels too frequently permit funds to be siphoned off without a central tracing mechanism and their combined efforts lack a clear, over-arching vision. Some have argued Afghanistan remains a forgotten war, but this belies the potential impact for the 3D approach, especially in areas where NGOs may not operate because of operational security reasons. In Afghanistan, the majority of NGO activities appeared to be clustered around urban areas such as downtown Kabul, where NATO soldiers are assisting Afghan authorities in providing security.

Outside of Kabul, however, where there is a lack of NATO activity, many NGOs operate under restricted conditions or not at all. By consolidating defence, developmental, and diplomatic efforts, Canada can better foster a more secure environment by working in concert with the local authorities to both secure the area in question and begin the arduous task of reconstruction. By taking the lead through a 3D framework, defence actors hope to establish the security conditions necessary for other, more experienced development and diplomatic actors to conduct their equally important work.

This interdependence is one of the reasons CIMIC teams are often deployed as a component of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, and why Civilian-Affairs personnel are invariably meshed with Special Forces by the United States. Indeed, all US Army Civilian Affairs personnel come under the jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM)<sup>iii</sup>. Some criticize this approach as locals are unable to distinguish between military and humanitarian actors<sup>iv</sup>. This is a legitimate concern; however, in many areas, humanitarian actors are not able to provide support, and the choice becomes simple: assistance from the military or no assistance at all.

In terms of doctrine, CIMIC also involves respecting the needs of other civilian organizations operating within an Area of Operations (AOO). In many cases, civilian agencies may be able to provide similar services to locals with lower overhead costs, while leaving projects dealing with security, disarmament and the protection of human rights for

military organizations and their respective areas of expertise<sup>v</sup>. This can help to protect against mission creep and harmonize military efforts with the international community, thereby reducing the possibility of competition and duplication of efforts. One of the greatest opportunities to enhance the 3D approach is the utilization of defence personnel to build bridges with the local population. Because of their continued contacts with the local community, CIMIC operators are often party to a great deal of information regarding the needs and wants of communities beyond the security mandate of the defence element. Thus the need for coordination where the military might have information but lack sufficient resources to act – information can and should be passed along to other governmental departments (OGDs) as well as IGO/NGOs who might be better equipped to offer assistance. This would not impede the military objectives; moreover, it could allow for some degree of credit-claiming and a better coordination of interests through economy of effort.

By the same token, in the context of Afghanistan, a great deal of respect is given to those in uniform. In many cases, it may be beneficial to have military personnel involved in negotiations regarding developmental issues because of cultural perceptions. Afghani officials may be more willing to speak with military personnel than the more traditional development actors. The military can use this clout in dealing with key figures to help create an arms-length arrangement with the donor community without having to forge full-blown partnerships.

### **BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS**

CIMIC acts as a significant force multiplier, especially in theatres of Peace-Support Operations such as with ISAF in Afghanistan. As such, it is paramount that sufficient funds be allocated for CIMIC operations. At present, Canadian CIMIC doctrine provides for the “establishment of funding arrangements between the Department of National Defence (DND) and OGDs for specified CIMIC tasks in CF international operations”<sup>vi</sup>. Currently, a certain amount of funds is earmarked through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to target specific projects in line with both DND and CIDA objectives. In terms of force protection, however, this alignment may not always be present. As such, funds ought to be allotted for CIMIC operations under a “force protection” umbrella.

Force protection is defined as “comprising all measures taken to contribute to mission success by preserving freedom of action and operational effectiveness through managing risks and minimizing vulnerabilities to personnel, information, materiel, facilities and activities from all threats<sup>vii</sup>.” As those who are familiar with Afghanistan’s history can attest, foreigners have never been particularly welcome, making our job all the more challenging but equally important. While projects are not and should not be the focus of military operations, negotiations are often best facilitated through a give and take process. There is a need to equip soldiers with both carrots and sticks – a small-scale project can often do wonders in improving relations with locals and reassuring them of our role as keepers of the peace rather than an occupation force. In turn, this allows us to more effectively influence behaviour and shape the environment in our favour. In sum, while there is scope for considerable cooperation, military objectives can sometimes supersede the humanitarian agenda. For a proper CIMIC organisation to operate effectively, it requires its own realistic and self-contained funding apparatus in addition to any cross-governmental arrangements. This is

especially important, given the role CIMIC plays in wartime, where 3D-esque arrangements will likely not be possible.

One of the lessons-learned throughout rotations in Afghanistan has been the need for expedited project implementation over the spectrum of deployment, and not just at the end of a given rotation. This is acute to situations where CIMIC teams seek CIDA funding. The reality on the ground is that the period between project identification and implementation can be considerably drawn out due to the lengthy administrative oversight required to utilize CIDA funds. Projects identified at the start of a six-month tour were implemented (at best) by the third and fourth month, whereas projects under the force protection umbrella were completed in a much shorter time span. While the government's 3D approach stresses coordination, it does not imply subservience of one branch to another. Cooperation with CIDA is beneficial where interests align, but the military requires its own tools without having to rely exclusively on external partners.

At all times, the military mission must retain primacy. There is an unfortunate tendency in some personnel to "go native", especially given the natural human desire to alleviate suffering when confronted by scenes of extreme poverty and suffering<sup>viii</sup>. However, we must avoid becoming maligned. In the words of US Army Lt-Col Jacobs, "to cross the line between civil and military operations is to cease providing support to the military commander."<sup>ix</sup> Given the implied importance of CIMIC to any international operation, specific funding must be earmarked and readily available for both planned and unplanned situations from the start and throughout any deployment. Ultimately, the important role CIMIC plays to support the military commander will help the defence element build conditions where the donor community can assume roles to alleviate human suffering over the medium and long term.

## INTEGRATION ON THE GROUND

This highlights the importance of CIMIC as a command responsibility. Indeed, it is not only those who are qualified "CIMIC operators" who undertake Civil-Military Operations (CMO); rather, it is every soldier on the ground that communicates with the local populace and governing authorities. As such, it is important that CIMIC training or at least awareness be made available to commanders at all levels to enhance the effects of CIMIC activities. It is very optimistic and extremely imprudent to rely solely on the CIMIC element attached to a formation to deal with the local population, as often every member of a patrol will come into contact with the host nation on a regular basis. It behoves commanders to be "as familiar with employing CIMIC assets as they are with employing engineers or fire support<sup>x</sup>".

As such, it is absolutely essential that CIMIC personnel be involved in the planning phases of a given operation. Unfortunately, there is a tendency to work with CIMIC as an afterthought rather than an integral element. Furthermore, given the 3D approach, there must be a more collective and inclusive approach to training involving defence, development and diplomatic actors, especially in the pre-deployment phase. Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) and CIDA personnel ought to be involved in military training to both gain a better understanding of the role of the defence community and to evaluate where opportunities exist for cooperation. Furthermore, it behoves all actors to clearly define their mandate to the donor

community, a process that can be facilitated by inviting NGO participation in CIMIC training, as has been done in the past.

This sort of collaboration and stakeholder engagement could help alleviate some of the more traditional cultural tensions between these government departments; FAC/CIDA might come to see CIMIC as more than the Hollywood military stereotype whilst the military would hopefully shun the image of FAC/CIDA personnel as overly idealistic tree-huggers. Integration costs money; however, and budgetary issues often breed tension amongst agencies. A potential solution is through the creation of a supra-agency coordinating body to manage integrated international missions utilizing the 3D approach. A unified budget for international operations could allow for an easier transfer of funds from traditionally large agencies (such as the military) to support smaller but equally important technical experts (such as in the field of development).

### **CHALLENGES FACING CIMIC TODAY**

With CIMIC currently a forerunner in the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) as a task destined for the Reserve Force, we must carefully evaluate the desire to move away from the “ad hoc” arrangements governing CIMIC formations<sup>xi</sup>. While it is indeed commendable that Land Force Quebec Area (LFQA) is moving in the direction of a permanent CIMIC company which will train and deploy as a unit, there are certain benefits to be gleaned from the merger of skills and knowledge of both regular and reserve force personnel in a CIMIC setting.

While there is some truth to the myth that reservists bring important project management and civilian interaction skills to the table, it is equally important to include personnel used to working within an operational environment, who have a well-established ability to work and persuade those regular force personnel in command positions. This allows for the diffusion of potential ostracizing of reserve force personnel and increased efficiency and performance from the CIMIC organization. There is a need for diversification of CIMIC personnel without sacrificing competency in an operational environment. As such, whilst remaining within the combat arms, any CIMIC organization should attempt to involve, for example, some degree of engineering assets, be they from the combat engineers, or a reservist with civilian qualifications and experience.

Another problem is that we must find a method of quantifying the successes and failures of both CIMIC and 3D operations. While it is easy to give a metric for the number of projects completed, it is much more difficult to quantify the benefits associated with increased force protection. Nevertheless, there have been several credible instances of where CIMIC personnel acted as a conduit for locals to approach military forces with information about possible threats. Notwithstanding the difficulty of valuing soldiers’ lives, the overall benefits of CIMIC are believed to outweigh the costs, and are conducted with the desire to provide a positive humanitarian benefit to the local population.

Working within established CIDA guidelines, CIMIC activities and planning should attempt, wherever possible, to utilize the results-based management (RBM) framework. The RBM requires measurable factors in the short, middle, and long term for the release of CIDA funds. This could be anything from the amount of children receiving school supplies to the overall improvement to public health caused by improvements to a village’s water

infrastructure. Furthermore, the RBM prescribes a detailed framework for the follow-up of projects, to ensure their implementation is in line with the original expectations. Because of the complexity of such evaluation, and the desire for coordination over duplication of efforts, any system measuring the efficacy of 3D activities would be greatly facilitated by the close integration of actors on the ground, rather than having separate methodologies and studies conducted by each department.

### **THE MOVE TOWARDS PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN: HOW CAN THE 3D APPROACH BE MADE TO WORK?**

There is both scope and opportunity to strengthen Canada's 3D approach in Afghanistan. Given the current proposal to expand Canada's involvement beyond Kabul and likely towards a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), the 3D approach takes on particular significance. To begin with, the role of force protection is absolutely vital for mission success given the general lawlessness that pervades much of Afghanistan beyond the capital region. As such, the role of CIMIC will be particularly important in establishing and maintaining the support of the local population. Indeed, U.S. PRTs are built around Civil Affairs teams, charged with dispensing reconstruction and development funds as well as providing "islands of security" for NGOs to operate safely<sup>xii</sup>. This is not to imply a PRT does not require a credible force behind it, but serves to highlight the importance of utilizing highly specialized personnel from the defence, development and diplomatic communities at the forefront of such an operation.

As the 3D approach continues to evolve, there will be an increasing need for harmonization beyond the strategic level and down as far as the tactical operations of military personnel. Consequently, CIMIC activities stand to gain from the integration of CIDA and/or FAC personnel to better smooth the channels between agencies and facilitate activities under the 3D umbrella. Critics point out the problem of integrating civilians into an operational military setting where they are not necessarily part of the chain-of-command; however, this has worked in the past within U.S. and UK PRTs, with civilian representation coming from the State Department/USAID and the FCO/DFID, respectively. Were such personnel to be directly integrated in a Canadian PRT, for example, project identification could be accomplished by soldiers operating on the ground, who could then feed their assessment back to CIDA personnel for decisions in a more rapid manner, significantly reducing the current project implementation cycle. Furthermore, CIDA personnel are more familiar with cross-checking assessment data, and accommodating the needs of otherwise underrepresented groups and can thus help to ensure the future sustainability of projects. Concurrently, FAC personnel could assist in assuring activities are in line with the Afghan Transitional Authority's (ATAs) objectives and assist in negotiations with local government leaders.

Currently, transaction costs are high in terms of cooperation between government departments. Here transaction costs refer to the costs of getting into a negotiation, defining a contract and monitoring its implementation. For example, the Canadian Forces/DND has access to their own intranet which is not directly linked to FAC<sup>xiii</sup>. In terms of documentation, because of the lack of a secure means for transmission at lower levels, and because of the sensitive nature of information in an operational environment, documents are usually required to be in hard copy and personally ferried between offices (in Kabul, for example, between Camp Julien and the Canadian Embassy). This exacerbates existing problems of information

asymmetry amongst agencies and effectively lengthens the project cycle. Furthermore, transaction costs can arise when assigned agents gain discretion and pursue their own objectives. This is likely done without any harm intended, but can significantly increase costs and hamper cooperation between agencies, especially in sensitive areas such as budgetary resources. For example, of the \$250 million budget for CIDA in 2004, approximately \$250,000 went to Canadian CIMIC units whilst an additional \$250,000 was given to ISAF. Personnel ratios should also be targeted for improvement. Currently, there are only a handful of FAC and CIDA officers stationed in Afghanistan, in sharp contrast to the large numbers of military personnel. Whilst the costs of deploying additional personnel require careful scrutiny, it is not unfeasible to add additional personnel to enhance the 3D approach. Close integration of “on the ground” government actors, to the point of collocation, could help to alleviate these problems and lower transaction costs. In addition to cooperation between government departments, the presence of un-uniformed civilians familiar working with NGOs could serve to strengthen communications and information-sharing, thus further reducing transaction costs and avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts by the broader assistance community.

### **CIMIC AND DEVELOPMENT**

Problems can arise where traditional lines of responsibility become blurred, as when CIMIC units undertake projects with development and humanitarian implications. This is always done with the greater good in mind; that is, the protection of our soldiers on the ground. Furthermore, this ought to be conducted in concert with local authorities for both their input, approval, and eventual responsibility for completed projects. More often than not, CIMIC activities will have a positive humanitarian benefit although there will be times when this may not be the overriding imperative. Thus, the push in certain sectors for increased civilian control over a 3D environment<sup>xiv</sup>. This is a laudable goal in areas of relative stability; however, where the 3D approach can likely have the most impact is in areas of peace-support operations (PSO) that may be significantly unstable, such as Afghanistan (particularly outside of Kabul).

To overcome this apparent point of tension, we should accept that in cases such as Afghanistan, defence and security override the development/humanitarian imperative in the short term. Indeed, PRTs are premised on the basic assumption that development cannot proceed without security – as such, CIMIC has been established as an effective security tool that complements and enhances military operations. Because of the primacy of security concerns, in cases such as Afghanistan, integration at the operational and tactical level (such as PRTs), should be managed under the auspices of DND/CF with a view to eventual operational control under a civilian lead<sup>xv</sup>.

What are the implications of emphasizing defence compared to development? As a policy goal for failed states, it would appear as though the case of Afghanistan points towards the need for ensuring defence and security as a prerequisite for development. Development cannot take place in the absence of a safe and secure environment. This is not to say the two cannot and should not be combined. Security-sector reform, especially activities in reforming, equipping, and retraining police forces, is a task that can and should be embraced by military personnel. The current problem lies with such reforms and assistance being outside the traditional realm of CIDA funding. In one telling example, Canadian CIMIC personnel were

able to fund a communications project through an agreement with the US Army, after CIDA and Force Protection funding were ruled out. Establishing clear mandates in this situation could aid all parties by encouraging a focus on the respective areas of expertise, i.e. security sector reform for the military and more traditional developmental activities for CIDA.

Critics contend military activities aim for ‘quick-fix’ solutions to garner psychological benefits only, without due regard for the local population. According to one report: “military ‘humanitarian’ projects ... are partial activities intended to ensure the success of the military operation. They are not humanitarian and should never be confused with impartial, principled humanitarian assistance based on community needs and priorities.”<sup>xvi</sup> In practice, CIMIC teams undertook extensive effort to implement short-term, high impact projects involving local leaders at all stages. Whereas actors in the NGO community had been perceived as breaking promises, CIMIC teams adopted the starting position of: promise nothing but work towards a solution. In most cases, the most precious commodity was the security provided by military personnel. We should thus avoid the mislabeling of CIMIC activities and enshrine them as what they really are: military activities.

Government aid, in general, is not necessarily impartial. Humanitarian assistance can be used as a tool of diplomacy and foreign policy in areas of strategic importance. So long as this position is clearly and carefully elucidated, the 3D approach (specifically, the defence element) should not impede on the activities of other donors in a given area. Moreover, as stated previously, CIMIC personnel should attempt to be as impartial and principled in the delivery of aid and should continue to work with the local community in forging project partnerships. Given the current world order, a recent CIDA statement noted: “it is broadly recognized that innovative methods of preventing and resolving conflicts are needed in the current international context.”<sup>xvii</sup>

## CIMIC AND DIPLOMACY

Similarly to earlier contentions, any application of the 3D approach requires the following items to ensure success: a clearly elucidated military mandate, in which CIMIC activities are considered from planning to implementation, a specific and separate CIMIC budget, and an appropriate cross-section of personnel. The paper has largely focused on the need for coordination between defence and development actors in CIMIC activities, and would be remiss if it did not mention the important role to be played by the diplomatic community. Although most diplomatic activity goes beyond the scope of smaller-unit CIMIC activities, the presence and support of the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan has been a vital component to the success of the 3D approach. Ambassador Christopher Alexander has sought out military personnel through activities such as impromptu meetings and participation in patrols as well as taking an active role in several CIMIC activities and their successful implementation, especially where CIDA funding has been used<sup>xviii</sup>.

By acting as a force protection multiplier, CIMIC units can serve to strengthen the important areas of development and diplomacy without encroaching upon their well-established mandates. Where interests coalesce, there ought to be detailed cooperation based around a lead-agency. For example, as has been argued, security-sector issues should be driven by defence personnel while development projects should be driven by CIDA. CIMIC units should continue the practice of consultation with local leaders throughout the entire

process of any projects. CIDA/FAC should stay appraised of such activities, and lend their expertise where requested; however, there will be instances, especially in the case of a PRT-type operation, where CIMIC personnel will have incentive to engage in the more traditional areas of development assistance, such as the provision of medical and school supplies, the construction of water infrastructure and other basic needs. The 3D approach should be flexible enough to allow for this type of assistance under the broader mandate of force protection and security – the military should not be held to the same development standards as traditional aid, although CIMIC personnel should attempt to engage local leaders and ensure project sustainability throughout. This can be greatly assisted through closer on-the-ground integration of DND, FAC, and CIDA personnel working towards the common goals of safety, security, and support to the local authorities.

### CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Enhancing CIMIC activities is in keeping with the doctrinal shift towards manoeuvre warfare. As this doctrine continues to evolve, careful attention should be given to the potential benefits from CIMIC activities in international operations. Equally, every effort should be made to better complement the activities of actors involved in defence, development and diplomacy to lower transaction costs and improve efficiency/effectiveness. As stated earlier, CIMIC is not a cure-all, but rather a force multiplier, providing another means for the commander to achieve his end state. In the truest sense, CIMIC exemplifies the manoeuvre warfare approach of entering into an opposing force's decision cycle and disrupting their operations. It lowers animosity and increases force protection. It should be treated as any other military asset in that CIMIC activities in international operations require a clear and defined military mandate, a proper (but not disproportionate) budget, and a mix of both regular and reserve force personnel. As the doctrine is still emerging, this article has sought to offer some suggestions to fine-tune the current CIMIC mechanism. In cases where the centre of gravity is that intangible element of local support, CIMIC is a vital task (within the 3D approach) in bolstering force protection that deserves further discussion and analysis.

### FOOTNOTES

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- <sup>i</sup> Note: an earlier version of this article appeared in The Canadian Forces' Army Bulletin v.11, issue 1.
- <sup>ii</sup> For a good overview of this policy in Afghanistan, see <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/menu-en.asp>
- <sup>iii</sup> US Marine Corps, MAGTF Civil-Military Operations, Coordinating Draft 01-21-01, pp. 31
- <sup>iv</sup> Gannon, K. "Afghanistan Unbound" in *Foreign Affairs* May/June 2004
- <sup>v</sup> Walter, J. "Security and Keeping the Peace" in *Afghanistan: Crosslines essential field guides to humanitarian and conflict zones* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), Geneva: 2004.
- <sup>vi</sup> Canadian Draft CF Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Policy – 14 Apr 04
- <sup>vii</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>viii</sup> Canadian Forces Publication AJP-01A, Chapter 20: Civil-Military Cooperation.
- <sup>ix</sup> Jacobs, J. "Civil Affairs in Peace Operations" *Military Review*. July-August 1998.
- <sup>x</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xi</sup> Canadian Forces Publication B-GL-300/005/FP-001 "Information Operations: Chapter 8 – Civil-Military Cooperation", pp. 103
- <sup>xii</sup> Goodson, L. "Canada's Security Options in Afghanistan" p. 5 available from: <http://www.asiapacificresearch.ca/caprn/afghan%5Fproject/>

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- <sup>xiii</sup> See, for example, Babcock, S. “Policy Challenges in the Development of Integrated Network Enabled Operations in Canada” for a discussion of how to overcome this problem.
- <sup>xiv</sup> Sedra, M. “Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan: The Provincial Reconstruction Team Debate” available from: <http://www.asiapacificresearch.ca/caprn/afghan%5Fproject/>
- <sup>xv</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10
- <sup>xvi</sup> Barry, J. and Jefferys, A. “A bridge too far: aid agencies and the military in humanitarian response” *Humanitarian Practice Network* 2002.
- <sup>xvii</sup> Thorne, S. “New foreign policy adopts 3-D approach” *Canadian Press* 24 December 2004
- <sup>xviii</sup> See, for example, CBC’s in depth profile available from: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/world/alexander.html>