
Analysing Stabilisation Operations

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ABSTRACT

This paper describes the origins and development of the UK MOD sponsored Peace Support Operations (PSO) Study and the associated PSO model as it existed in March 2006 and which was demonstrated at Cornwallis XI. PSOM is a multi-sided, turn based, stochastic, computer-aided war game that was intended to support the analysis of PSO and to provide guidance about the appropriate military force structures for a Peace Support Force (PSF). This paper discusses:

- The development of PSOM from initial aim into a model encompassing a comprehensive representation of all aspects of a post Intervention PSO.
- The problems of developing robust definitions of intervention, stability and instability that dominated the initial stages of the study.
- The key academic and doctrinal foundations for our understanding of PSO and the nature of a Comprehensive Approach.
- The key insights that emerged that define our perception of the PSO mission. These range from the need to understand the nation and the opposition, to recognition of the fundamental importance of the Rule of Law.
- The key concepts that form the pillars underlying the PSOM - Consent, Security and Stability (national functionality).

- The principal actors that are represented, namely Blue (coalition), Green (indigenous), Red (Spoiler¹), and White (agency) and their broad strategic aims.
- How ‘Victory’ in a PSO is a progression from intervention (imposed stability), through viable peace to self- sustaining peace.
- The assumptions, which are not exhaustive, on which PSOM has been built with reference to the supporting historical and academic data.

BACKGROUND

The Peace Support Operations model (PSOM) is a multi-sided, turn-based, stochastic, computer-aided war game that has been developed and built to support UK MOD analysis of the dynamics of PSO². It was initially designed to provide guidance on the appropriate military force structures for the Peace Support Force (PSF). In order to test both the effect and effectiveness of differing force structures it is necessary to accurately represent the dynamics of a wider Stabilisation Operation. This requires dynamic (human/interactive/iterative) representation of the relevant protagonists, their complex strategies and operational decision making and thus the model has evolved to encompass an appropriate representation of key aspects of a post Intervention PSO.

The study is aimed at providing analysis relevant to *21st Century* Stabilisation Operations. The characteristics of these, and hence the actors involved, are the subject of wide academic and doctrinal debate, both internationally and within the UK defence community. The model has been constructed around a framework that acknowledges current academic thinking, the latest iterations of UK and US doctrine and relevant lessons of history. This paper looks at the principal concepts that underpin the PSOM in order to provide insights into the underlying assumptions and rules in the model.

INTRODUCTION

Problems of definition dominated the initial analysis conducted by the study team as there are large differences of interpretation surrounding PSO that are driven primarily by a combination of distinct and culturally derived trans-Atlantic perspectives combined with a conceptual blurring of the divisions between Low Intensity Warfare (Counter Insurgency, COIN), and Stabilisation Operations³. The PSOM is based on the definitions presented below, and whilst these may be open to debate and revision in the rapidly evolving intellectual and doctrinal PSO environment they provided a sound basis for model

¹ ‘Spoiler’ is a term used to describe the range of obstructionist activity dedicated to resisting the efforts of Blue and Green to stabilise the country

² Within this paper the term PSO is interchangeable with Stabilisation Operations

³ It is not intended here to become involved in a doctrinal debate, other than to note that, at the time of writing, there is debate in UK military circles regarding the relative place of PSO and stability operations as part of wider military operations.

development. Historical research, academic and doctrinal survey and examination of existing tools formed the basis for understanding PSO and consequent development of a viable model.

The PSOM is currently focused on post Intervention Stabilisation missions. There are assumptions regarding these that influence the way in which the model functions, particularly in its representation of higher-level decision-making. Recent history suggests that Interventions are conducted for primarily geo-political reasons, notwithstanding the current humanitarian justification. The Study's working characterization of an Intervention is that it is an engagement in the domestic affairs of a state intended to change (or to preserve) the structure of power and authority within it. Those intervening may use political, economic or military instruments. It is, thus, a coercive act. There are many difficulties with this definition. What is the boundary between intervention and war? When does intervention become invasion? What is the difference, then, between permanent and 'temporary' occupation and annexation? In general 21st Century Interventions will exhibit the following broad characteristics:

- They are conducted under the mandate of an international or regional organisation – or, given the absence of this are consistent with the requirements of International Law.
- The resulting occupation is intended to be of a temporary nature.
- They can be 'invited' or 'invasive' according to the strategic context.
- They may be conducted for a range of geo-political or humanitarian motives.
- They are normally conducted by coalitions; these coalitions may have very different cultural and ideological backgrounds to the "occupied" nation.
- They must be prepared to provide a fully operational surrogate government for a considerable amount of time while creating indigenous government institutions.

Peace Support Operations are assumed to follow Interventions of the type described above. The PSOM, version 1, does not represent civil wars, internal insurrections, rebellions, colonial or post-colonial situations where no external actors are present. These are not considered to be directly relevant to the general strategic nature of 21st Century Stabilisation Operations, although some current Stabilisation Operations are exhibiting the characteristics of sectarian conflict⁴. PSO include the following main attributes:

- They are designed to facilitate nation building.
- They include the creation and maintenance of international and regional security/stability as key strategic aims.

⁴ It is planned to address sectarian conflict in PSOM version 2.

- They assume that the indigenous (supported) government (Green)⁵ has, or will have, a popular (ideally democratic) mandate.
- They consider occupation by the Stabilisation Force to be temporary.
- They assume groups (national and/or international) are opposed to the occupation. The spectrum of affiliation and opposition has Green at one end, Brown in the middle and Red at the insurgent end. The degree of opposition will vary in a range between ‘Brown’ (those Spoilers with temporary grievances who may be ‘turned’ to support the legitimate government) and hardened and irreconcilable Red.
- They assume that a coalition will promote democratic values and respect for human rights.
- They assume free market conditions are the preferred economic condition.

This assessment of the environment in which a modern PSO occurs and its main attributes influenced the way in which PSOM was designed.

KEY DEFINITIONS

In order to understand PSO it is necessary to define what is meant by the terms stability, stabilisation, unstable and the Comprehensive Approach.

STABILITY

Stability is defined as the property of a state that reflects its ability to administer and control effectively its territory, resources, and population. It is considered to be the desired strategic aim of a state, although it should be noted that from a modern western perspective ‘stability’ of the types seen in Iraq 1991-2003, or North Korea 1951 to present are not necessarily just, ethical or in the long term interests of the subject populations.

The concept and goal of stability are compatible with the conclusions reached by the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit’s “Countries at Risk of Instability Study”⁶ which describes stability in terms of the “resilience” of a nation to internal and external shocks pressures.

⁵ However, the current and historical examples highlight the fact that it may not be immediately apparent who “Green” is or might be. A glance at Iraq, Nepal and Somalia in 2006 demonstrates the difficulty of defining the changing affiliations of national elites and population groups.

⁶ “The Countries at Risk of Instability Study”, February 2005, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit (http://www.strategy.gov.uk/work_areas/countries_at_risk/index.asp).

STABILISATION

This study defines stabilisation as the process through which a nation changes from being “unstable” to “stable”, i.e. nation building; the effect of successful stabilisation operations is, or should be, stability. Stabilisation Operations are therefore defined as those intended to establish, re-establish or support a state in the effective administration/control of its territory.

UNSTABLE

The opposite terms for Stability/Stabilisation/Stable can be inferred by not meeting the positive criteria. Thus Unstable describes any nation or component thereof that is not considered to be stable. Unstable states or components are described in terms of Instability. An unstable nation does not effectively control its territory, resources, citizens etc. Unstable nations manifest characteristics such as civil disorder, violence, endemic corruption, rapid changes in political elites, etc. Unstable nations are generally perceived to pose a threat to regional or international security, for example, they often become a haven for international crime and terrorist activity.

THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The Comprehensive Approach is defined as one that coordinates objectives and activities of Government Departments in identifying, analysing, planning and executing national (and by extension international) responses to complex situations. Post operational analysis of situations and crises at home and abroad has demonstrated the value and effectiveness of a joined-up multi-agency approach to achieve lasting and desirable outcomes.

KEY CONCEPTS

PSOM UNDERLYING PILLARS

The PSOM is based on the measurement of three key pillars Security, Consent and Stability. UK PSO Doctrine⁷ was used as the basis for deriving the pillars of Security and Consent, while the Stability pillar was derived from a wide range of sources. The following provides a description of each of the pillars.

SECURITY

Security, and the PSF's role in providing security is described thus:

⁷ The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, JWP 3-50, Second Edition.

“Typically UK Armed Forces are given responsibility for preventing or suppressing any conflicts so that others can undertake activities that will alleviate the immediate symptoms of a conflict and/or a fragile state...the application of military force to create the right conditions for overall success, e.g. a safe and secure environment, is a key foundation”⁸.

Security is thus the establishment of a safe and secure environment through the application of military force and military/civil policing to create the conditions for overall success. This is a key enabler for other activity; i.e. sufficient security is required to enable the day-to-day functioning of a society and to allow capacity building⁹ (regeneration activity) to take place. While security is a key enabler it is not normally achievable solely through superior force ratios, attrition and military dominance. Security achieved through coercion without consent tends to be transient and may be either irrelevant or unproductive or both in the longer term.

From Historical Analysis¹⁰ there is a weak correlation between higher force ratios and success and lower force ratios and failure. That said the historical evidence would appear to also indicate that PSO cannot be “won”, in the long term, by overwhelming firepower, technology, connectivity or force ratios. There is also significant evidence to show that while attrition does affect the effectiveness of insurgencies they can, for various reasons, be quite resilient to high levels of loss for a considerable period of time.

In summary, sufficient security is a key enabler for almost all other regeneration activity. However, security alone is insufficient to address the underlying causes of tension, discontent and conflict.

CONSENT

Consent affects and is itself affected by all other activity in a PSO. It is defined as the extent to which factions of the indigenous population co-operate or hinder activities of wider PSO. It comprises:

- Perceived legitimacy of the international mandate and freedom of action of PSO executors – ‘campaign authority’.¹¹
- Degree of voluntary indigenous subjugation to local administration and supporting PSO, rather than to non-government actors or elites.

⁸ Ibid., JWP 3-50 The Military Contribution to PSO, para 101.

⁹ Capacity Building is the term used to describe all those activities that contribute to the more efficient functioning of a nation such as Judicial System and Rule of law, Economy, Infrastructure etc. It is a term widely used in academic circles and was specifically taken from “The Countries at Risk of Instability Study”, February 2005, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit.

¹⁰ For further details see: C Irwin, A S Morley, 2005. *Drawing lessons from the past. A historical analysis of stabilization operations*. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal, Vol. 150 No. 1, February 2005, pp. 49 – 53.

¹¹ For a comprehensive definition see JWP 3-50, The Military Contribution to PSO, para 231.

- Degree of sympathy which indigenous population has with (potential) insurgents (US - ‘Spoilers’) expressed as level of support given to insurgents.

The most important lesson as far as consent and long term success in PSOs is to accept the Clausewitzian understanding that “military effort is inextricably entangled with the political and psychological”. In the long term, the success of every PSO will depend on the level to which the people decide, or are persuaded, to co-operate with the PSF and indigenous forces and support any interim and subsequent government.¹²

STABILITY

The third pillar of the PSOM is that of Stability. While sufficient consent and security are required to enable a ‘Viable Peace’¹³ they often do not address the underlying causes and thus achieve ‘Self-sustaining Peace’. The components of instability will lie in one or more differing areas of the key constituents unique to each scenario - the PSO strategy will be driven by which elements are broken and to what extent. Achieving stability requires a Comprehensive Approach to PSO across Government departments and in concert with Coalition Government, non-Government, UN and international agencies. The PSOM has the ability to represent a Comprehensive Approach undertaken by the stabilising nation or coalition.

In order to represent the progress made towards stability the PSOM has a ‘Stability Index’ which is a numerical representation of the varying levels of stability across a nation. The measurement of stability through a stability index or similar construct is essential for PSO in that it represents the only meaningful measure of progress towards “victory”, where victory is defined as a stable nation enjoying a self-sustaining peace – i.e. the end of the majority of peace-keeping operations and withdrawal of the majority of external military forces, except perhaps cadre military training teams, and other agencies.

In summary sufficient consent and security enable a Comprehensive Approach to national reconstruction which, if successful, results in a lasting self-sustaining peace and a stable nation. It is the processes towards the stable end state that the PSOM attempts to represent.

¹² Note that there may however, be cases such as Cyprus today, whereby the people have decided that none of the proffered solutions and reconciliation options are acceptable and that the solution which is considered to be good enough, even in the long term, is a minimal UN peace keeping presence. Also the Khmer Rouge guerrillas in Cambodia had no chance of toppling the Vietnamese-installed régime, but they did succeed in keeping Cambodia in a permanent state of insecurity; they raised the cost to Vietnam of its large military presence in the country; and backed by China, they offered a persistent obstacle to the coalescence of a Hanoi-dominated Indochinese federation.

¹³ Derived from “The Quest for Viable Peace”, Covey et al, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2005. The ideas and concepts within this book have gained considerable ground in the US. From the UK perspective it is probably most useful to view a “Viable Peace” as the desired end-state, or interim steady state, of most peace enforcement operations. Similarly there is a prequel state of “Imposed Peace” which is broadly parallel with the end of major conventional combat operations and beginning of peace enforcement and a sequel state of self-sustaining peace which normally marks the end of significant peace-keeping operations.

PSOM CONCEPTUAL CONSTRUCT

The PSOM has been built around three central guidelines:

1. Firstly, it has been designed to be able to represent the widest range of PSO, at the Operational and Strategic levels, ranging from Peace Enforcement (PE) to Peace Keeping (PK) and the other possible constituent parts of a PSO¹⁴. The model is designed to be able to represent Peace Building, Conflict Prevention and Humanitarian Assistance at one end of the PSO spectrum through to Low Intensity Combat and COIN operations at the other.
2. Secondly, the model aspires to reflect the reality of operations and requirements for force agility/flexibility where elements of a force may be simultaneously engaged in activities ranging from COIN to humanitarian assistance. This is an acknowledgement that military forces must be capable of undertaking the 'three block war' at the Operational and Strategic levels.
3. Thirdly, the model assumes a hostile or adversarial rather than benign environment. This is because historical research highlighted the fact that long term or political success in non-benign scenarios is far more difficult to achieve. Therefore it was imperative that the model reflects the factors which lead to policy and long term success in hostile environments¹⁵ because it is long term, rather than "military", success which is the most important measure for these operations. Any military success which is limited in time, scope and area, may be inconsequential if there is a subsequent policy or long-term failure that may lead to significant subsequent Intervention at greater long-term cost to all involved

Thus the PSOM is not a model that focuses on the military elimination of insurgent groups as a route to stability. It is not a COIN model, although it could be used as high-level representation of the dynamics of an insurgency, to counter any perception that the primary role of the military in stability operations is to inflict attrition on an enemy and secondly, that 'military success'¹⁶ is the most appropriate measure of effectiveness in such scenarios. It is a fundamental conclusion of the PSO Study that long-term stability¹⁷ is the only true measure of success for stability operations and thus the PSOM has developed from initially being

¹⁴ For example the simultaneous conduct of PE and PK activities or peace building, conflict prevention, humanitarian or similar activities.

¹⁵ Countries at Risk of Instability, March 2005, Prime Minister's Strategy Unit. Research shows that countries which are "stabilised" but which have a history of conflict and instability have a 50% chance of descending back into chaos within 5 years.

¹⁶ "Military Success" may be narrowly defined as the military force succeeding in the tactical or operational level task which the military was set. It is a term that should be treated with utmost caution in PSO and Stabilisation Ops. There can be difficulties when defining success and failure; for example most historians agree that, in a narrow sense, the French military succeeded in Algeria, but the outcome that mattered was one of both a political and long term failure with serious repercussions for both France and Algeria. Although it is acknowledged that colonial and political considerations greatly influenced the strategic aim of the campaign.

¹⁷ Long-term stability is defined as that property of a state which possesses sufficient capacity to achieve self-sustaining nation building.

largely military-centric to a more comprehensive representation that acknowledges and represents the full range of complex issues and dynamics that determine the stability of nations.

The model is not predictive or scripted, seeking to reward commanders for certain combinations of actions in certain situations from the outset. Nor does it take a view on any one “correct” way to conduct a PSO – every one will be different. That said the model is based on the assumption that adoption of a Comprehensive Approach will be more effective than an attritional approach when seeking a long term solution.¹⁸

PRINCIPLE ACTORS IN A PSO

The following are the key principle actors in any PSO and are represented within the PSOM:

- The Peace Support Force – Blue.
- The Indigenous Security Forces – Green.
- The actual or potential ‘Spoiler’ groups – Red.
- The conglomerate of OGDs, NGOs and international organisations – White.
- The indigenous population – represented through the Consent level.

The Blue forces can comprise of either a single nation or coalitions with wide disparities in capabilities of, and constraints placed upon, individual nations. Similarly, Green forces may be of different types ranging from standard military formations to para-military and gendarmerie forces¹⁹.

By far the most difficult actors to understand and thus accurately represent are Red who are obstructing the peace and referred to as ‘Spoilers’. These may be groups defined by ethnicity, religion, tribalism, politics, resource control, crime or a combination of some or all of these. The diversity of the many potential ‘Spoiler’ groups is also recognition of both the different types of potential insurgencies²⁰ and the key role played by ‘elites’²¹ in the process of stabilisation.

¹⁸ The “outcomes” are the results of interactions between combinations of coalition, indigenous security force and insurgent combat and non-combat activity as well as wider agency and military reconstruction and humanitarian activity.

¹⁹ The role and capability of Private Security (or Military) Companies who may be performing some roles that are similar or identical to the Blue or Green forces is presently represented abstractly.

²⁰ See John McKinley “Globalisation and Insurgency”, Adelphi Paper 352. See also “Defeating Complex Insurgency”, RUSI, Whitehall Papers Series, 2005. For example the nationwide rioting and car-burning seen in France during late 2005 is an example of a popular movement motivated by vague but deep-seated deprivation/social/religious/equality issues but was without a discernable political focus or leader.

²¹ See “The Countries at Risk of Instability Study”, February 2005, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, Vol 2, Investing in Prevention, Chapter 5. Aligning Incentives for Stability, incl Understanding elites.

Simply put, elite personalities or groups of people may lead/control/influence different types of potential ‘Spoiler’ groups. The latter may range from sympathetic²² to hostile militias which may or may not engage in criminal/mafia/opportunist activity, may or may not be motivated by religious or political ideals, have global sympathisers and reach, or may be simply spontaneous²³, or popular movements of dissatisfaction without a focused or articulated political agenda.

White forces represent the many IOs, OGDs, NGOs and Agencies that may be in theatre of operations. The minimum distinction, for representing them, is to whether they are Governmental or Independent and whether their primary competency and expertise lies in humanitarian mission, infrastructure repair and reconstruction or human capital building.

The most critical group of actors in any PSO are the indigenous population because it is the support of the population that Blue / Green require as a prerequisite for long-term stability. Thus the support of the people is measured as a fundamental part of the PSOM.

ACHIEVING ‘SUCCESS’ IN A PSO

The Study Team’s view, derived from academic and doctrinal survey, historical research, presentation and national and international peer review is that success is determined fundamentally by the capability and capacity of the Green (indigenous) agencies and institutions to achieve a self-sustaining peace. The progression towards this goal is marked with many smaller successes (i.e. self-sustaining, sufficient, independent, indigenous capacity and capability in all of the areas which make up key national constituents – rule of law, economy, security, politics, information, humanitarian, health, social, infrastructure etc). Because the process is stepped it is unlikely that a clean and comprehensive withdrawal will be achieved. There will, rather, be multiple exit points; a sequenced removal of aspects of the PSF as independent capacity is achieved in each area. Success can therefore only come once sufficient of the underlying tensions and instabilities have been addressed.

This view is in line with the view of Covey *et al.* in the book “The Quest for Viable Peace”²⁴. In essence there are two key themes: Firstly there is an identifiable ‘sequence to success’ that can be expressed as:

- Imposed stability (initial stabilisation by the PSF).
- Viable Peace (where indigenous institutions overcome Spoiler capability).
- Sustainable Peace (strengthening those institutions to the point where rapid economic growth and sustained social development can take place).

Secondly, the following are significant to the achievement of victory:

²² Such as the Northern Alliance groupings post the successful conclusion of the 2001/02 campaign to oust the Taliban Government in Afghanistan.

²³ See “Globalisation and Insurgency” Adelphi Paper 352, John McKinley, IISS, 2002

²⁴ “The Quest for Viable Peace” (QVP) sub-titled “International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation”, Edited by Covey, Dziedzic and Hawley, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 2005.

- ‘Spoiler’ activity evolves, thus corresponding evolution in the coalition strategy and also possibly in the strategic aim must be anticipated and will affect the conditions for achieving victory. The goal of a PSO may alter during the course of a campaign. Thus a force structure designed for the original Intervention may be insufficient to ensure long term success.
- Interim strategic solutions to a PSO that might, potentially, last decades, could be preferable to an indigenous population and thus manageable at a smaller scale by the coalition nations rather than attempting to achieve a shorter term result with a larger force. (e.g. Cyprus, where the ongoing PSO has achieved a ‘good enough’ solution).
- ‘Spoilers’ must be drawn into the political process as soon as possible. There is a need to demonstrate that ‘Peace Pays’. The PSF can impose stability, but cannot solely create the environment that leads to the achievement of the ‘viable peace’ stage.²⁵
- Political elections do not necessarily mark turning points nor represent real progress.
- It is hypothesised that Military occupations generally succeed when they are lengthy. The reason for this is that it can take a considerable amount of time for the stabilising elements to identify and resolve underlying tensions and causes of conflict. There is, however, a risk of long occupations eliciting nationalist reactions that may impede success. Additionally, a prolonged stay can result in a lessening of homeland political support- potentially forcing withdrawal.
- Successful occupations are characterised by the indigenous population perceiving the need for reconstruction, the perception of a common external threat and the guarantee (and transmission of this) of eventual withdrawal.

THE PSOM UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS (‘RULES OF THE GAME’)

INTRODUCTION

The PSOM development began with a number of intuitive assumptions. Many of these, for example “causing excessive collateral damage has a negative effect on the popularity of the coalition”, are axiomatic. However, the effects of other actions, such as “the use of overwhelming force, both firepower and manpower, will maximise enemy and minimise friendly casualties” may have more subtle and diverse range of outcomes in PSO. These assumptions can be described as the “rules of the game”. Once these rules are established it may be

²⁵ Ibid., p51. The third of The Quest for Viable Peace’s “Ten Building Blocks for Successful Intervention” is that of aiming for and gaining an “Achievable Political Solution”. It is acknowledged that it may be unwise to be over-precise as far as desired political end-state is concerned since those who perceive themselves to be “losers” in the process are ultimately far more likely to return to conflict as a way of preserving their power.

possible to assign values and place them in the model, albeit with an accepted degree of uncertainty of any given value in any particular circumstance.

Size limitations dictate a limited description of the supporting evidence in this paper. Also, most of the scenarios analysed from WW2 to the present have an emphasis on COIN rather than the arguably more recent understanding of stabilisation and the Comprehensive Approach. This means that it is difficult to draw neat dividing lines or define clear characteristics of PSO. It remains valid nevertheless to draw inferences from operations of similar types, even when they could be seen as not being typical or not falling exactly within one or another set of defined parameters. For example, it may be that 21st century Interventions, such as Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, in which Blue forces enable comprehensive national reconstruction and nation-building are essentially different from their post-colonial and post-Cold War predecessors, but that is not certain. What is certain is that all of the conflicts studied tended to have at least one unique feature or unusual dynamic so broad “rules of the game” must be drawn carefully. Where there is uncertainty this is reflected in the model through “die rolling” in the ranges and types of possible outcomes.

ASSUMPTIONS.

The following list describes the some of the main high-level hypothesis that lie behind the model²⁶.

INSURGENCIES CANNOT BE BEATEN THROUGH ATTRITION

This assumes that in many PSO there will be ‘Spoilers’ who will resort to armed action (becoming insurgents) in order to meet their local and strategic aims. One response to this is attritional warfare, but the effect of superior attrition rates on insurgencies is less than clear. It is contended that suffering high casualties does have some effect on insurgents, but may not affect their willingness to continue the struggle – arguably the real measure of success of a Comprehensive Approach to PSO - for years.

HIGH FORCE RATIOS AND OVER-WHELMING USE OF FORCE ARE NOT CRITICAL TO SUCCESS IN PSO.

High positive force ratios are not critical to success. Overwhelming or unlimited use of force can be counter-productive. Although intuitively it would be reasonable to assume that higher force ratios and military freedom of action should result in greater levels of mission success, this is not necessarily the case. There is evidence that minimum use of force is more effective. That said there is also evidence to suggest that too few forces, or too low force ratios, can be equally debilitating.

²⁶ These assumptions are backed up by a number of historical examples the details of which have not been included in the interests of space.

There is a case for factoring in ‘minimum use of force’, and although this is viewed as a British strength²⁷, it is possible that further investigation may show that this was because the British generally lacked the resources to adopt any other approach and/or that this may not, in some instances, have been the best option. Using overwhelming force – ‘sledgehammers to crack nuts’ - and causing excessive collateral damage usually alienates the local population. The underlying principles of PSOM recognise the principle of minimum necessary force while acknowledging the pitfalls in applying both inadequate and excessive force.

DIFFERENT COALITION MEMBERS MAY HAVE MANY DIFFERENT FACTORS CONSTRAINING THE ACTIVITY AND THEREFORE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR FORCES IN THEATRE

These factors can range from legacy limitations such as Japanese troops limited to performing non-combat operations, to differing interpretations within a coalition as to the precise role of the military force and aim of the PSO. For example, there may be constraints placed on any coalition troops on performing different tasks within the same area of a PSO such as those placed on the Dutch troops in Iraq who were not allowed to conduct search operations. Most often such constraints are placed because of the influence of Homeland Consent (HC).

THE MAINTENANCE OF HC IS CRITICAL TO ACHIEVING SUCCESS IN A PSO

Since the Vietnam War it is clear that public opinion can play a significant role in the both the conduct of forces and the will of the Government to continue. It has been suggested that there may well be a “tipping point” that is defined as the moment in time at which the general public demands that the government addresses their concerns. It is a useful concept to represent the link between public confidence and support for the government, directly affecting their chances of re-election, and various foreign policy initiatives including, but not limited to PSO. Casualties at home and abroad can cause policy changes for example the high casualty rates seem to have swung public opinion against operations in both Aden and Vietnam. Loss of HC, manifested principally in a collapse of public support, can lead to the complete withdrawal of the national contribution to a coalition. Conversely, a rise in HC can result in an increased commitment to ‘see the job through’. In summary HC will affect:

1. The integrity of the alliance or coalition.
2. The maintenance of National presence in the PSO.
3. The strength of the long term commitment to the mission.
4. The actual level of military effort.
5. The duration of the commitment

²⁷ Historical Origins of the British Army’s Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorist Techniques. Dr Rod Thornton, King’s College and UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, London, 2002

COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES INVARIABLY REDUCE CONSENT

Overwhelming force including the use of air power and artillery causes additional civilian casualties which have a negative impact on consent. The avoidance of civilian casualties and excessive collateral damage is critical to the success of operations, primarily because they alienate the indigenous population (reduce consent), they adversely affect homeland consent²⁸ and it hinders and adds to any reconstruction activity.

CHANGES IN CONSENT AND SECURITY ARE INTER-DEPENDENT

Consent and Security are linked. If one rises so will the other and vice-versa in the longer-term, though in the short-term they can potentially diverge, for example increased security through imposition of a curfew or 'heavy-handed' action can lead to a loss in consent. The most important concept in the model is that of gaining the consent of the local population. From positive consent there are many direct benefits such as the provision of human intelligence; from negative consent these are denied and additional negative factors are produced. The relationship between security and consent is best expressed as:

“You cannot win the war without the help of the population, and you cannot get the support of the population without at least beginning to win the war”²⁹

STABILISATION AND TRANSITION ACTIVITY SHOULD NORMALLY INCREASE CONSENT

Normally, transition activity (e.g. current UK rebuilding activity in Iraq, Italians and Germans in Afghanistan) will have a positive effect but some of the time, because of a variety of factors, it may have a neutral or negative effect. A positive increase in consent achieved by the PSF would appear to be by restoring the most basic services. However the military forces, and any other agency, can probably only make a start in rebuilding infrastructure – a process which took (and is taking) years in Cambodia, Bosnia, Afghanistan etc. There is also a natural tendency for the military and other agencies to prefer low-risk, high-profile, short-term projects rather than those that may matter more in terms of long-term nation-building.

The transition and stability missions undertaken by the US 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad while under the command of Lt Gen Peter Chiarelli during 2004 demonstrate the direct and positive impact that transition operations can have even in a very hostile environment. The Associated Press report³⁰ describes Chiarelli's methods as “maverick” and notes the “favouring [of] smaller-scale, more easily completed projects such as wells and

²⁸ The effects of events in theatre on homeland consent and homeland consent on events in theatre is the subject of ongoing work.

²⁹ Sir Oliver Lyttelton – Colonial Secretary for Malaya, quoted in “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife”, a comparative study of British operations in Malaya and US operations in South Vietnam, John A. Nagl. Praeger Publishers, Westport CT, 2002.

³⁰ Associated Press Report, Washington Post, Jim Krane 31 Jan 2006.

sewage — are being seen as prescient, dovetailing with a rethinking in Washington of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy”.

Contrasting the “Bush administration’s preference for expensive capital rebuilding schemes such as large power stations that have largely been scuttled by insurgent attacks and whose benefits have often not trickled down to Iraqis,” the report continues, “In Baghdad’s Shiite Muslim slum of Sadr City in 2004, Chiarelli’s troops fought street battles with heavily armed insurgents while escorting plumbers and sewage contractors to streets nearby, where they upgraded squalid living conditions. This tactic led to grass-roots pressure on the Shiite rebels to end their resistance and give the Americans a chance to make good on their promises”.

HUMINT IS ONE OF THE KEYS TO A SUCCESS IN PSO

Sensor, information and command fusion, through Networked Enabled Capability can play a critical role in fixing and striking elusive enemies. Good reliable HUMINT is the key to a successful PSO. It is far more important than the other electronic and technical elements of ISTAR. Good HUMINT, aside from Special-Forces derived HUMINT, is a direct consequence of high levels of consent.

NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN DOCTRINE, TRAINING AND CAPABILITY FOR PSO CAN BE VERY LARGE AND SHOULD BE APPLIED WHEREVER PRACTICABLE.

Historical analysis has indicated that having good (PSO) doctrine (more accurately not having bad doctrine), and the way that doctrine is applied by sound or inspired leadership, could be a significant factor in the effectiveness of forces. What is clear from a survey of historical examples is that often the appropriate doctrine may be available but may be simply ignored; may not fully understood at every level by those who use it; may be applied/interpreted differently by different leaders even in the same theatre. For example, the US in Vietnam would arguably have been better prepared for battle had they used their own USMC Small Wars Manual rather than the Army’s Field Manual of Operations. Out of the former grew the ‘ink-spot’ or gradual pacification strategy whereas the latter, perfected for operations in WW2, advocated offensive operations and a find, fix, strike strategy. In a similar vein, even with the right doctrine, inappropriate or poor training can lead to poor capability.

UNDERSTAND THE REQUIREMENT FOR “SUCCESS” AND ADOPT A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH.

Success in PSO is only possible through a Comprehensive Approach and that this is the only approach to self-sustaining peace in a complex PSO. Moreover, the thorough rebuilding of infrastructure and human capacity, essential features of “success” may take decades to achieve. Progress in all areas can be measured and tracked through a “Stability Index”. The evidence from countries with a decade or more of conflict (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Somalia) is that, true reconstruction, especially those of infrastructure, non-corrupt institutions and economies takes many years. The study sees the adoption of a

Comprehensive Approach as inextricably linked to long-term success in PSO. If anything other than this is adopted then any victory, especially an enduring one characterised by self-sustaining peace, may be unobtainable.

The contention is that the end is inextricably linked with the beginning of PSO. This conclusion is directly in line with emerging UK doctrinal thought that presents the Comprehensive Approach as a framework for the Cabinet Office-led approach to coordinating the objectives and activities of Government Departments in identifying, analysing, planning and executing national responses to complex situations. Emerging doctrine goes on to say that post-operational analysis of situations and crises at home and abroad has demonstrated the value and effectiveness of a joined-up and cross-discipline approach if lasting and desirable outcomes are to be identified and achieved.

RECOGNISE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW (ROL)

The study recognises that there is a clear difference between criminality and insurgency. ‘Spoilers’ can and do however, engage in both activities. Criminal activity can be as debilitating to stability as a politically motivated insurgency. Colombia provides an extreme example of the power of criminality and the absence of ROL. Drug trafficking barons are protected by ‘insurgents’ who are better armed, trained and paid than government forces. It is probable that any PSO that does not have a solution based around the primacy of the ROL, in all areas of the national fabric, is far more likely to fail – Haiti and Kosovo are cases in point.

The primacy of the ROL is expounded in ‘The Quest for Viable Peace’³¹ as “safeguarding a viable peace” which describes the clear requirements for building capacity in the police forces, judiciary and penal system and it concludes “...peace becomes viable when violence-prone power structures have receded and a balance of power has been constituted in favour of legitimate institutions of government.

A strategy for institutionalising the rule of law contributes to this outcome by creating a supportive context that is able to sustain the rule of law by reducing the impunity of Spoilers while simultaneously nurturing the capacity of the domestic legal system.”³². The training of indigenous police forces and a functioning and effective judiciary and penal system seems to be a universally accepted strategy that promotes both peace and stability. However, an effective police force and truly independent judiciary may take years to achieve given a cultural background of ethnic or religious conflict or bias, endemic corruption and political manipulation.

PSOM DESIGN

The PSOM is a multi-player, time-stepped (each turn represents one month) political-military ‘war’ game that has been built to represent the realities of a PSO. It acknowledges the

³¹ Op cit Quest for Viable Peace, chapter 7.

³² Ibid., p194

concepts previously discussed by assigning values to the variables and using game mechanics to express the relationships between them. The following paragraphs provide a summary of the main design features.

GAME PLAYERS

The PSOM represents the role of civilian political authority and higher level military leadership. The game is played simultaneously on two levels; the higher level is the international political strategic level which represents the interactions between national governments and the use of the levers of power, the lower level is the theatre-strategic level where the operation is actually taking place. The higher level players specifically represent Coalition Governments, Provisional Indigenous Authorities, the UN and world-wide Governments, ‘Spoiler’ Political Authority and the International Media.

SCENARIO SET UP

The scenario area, usually based on all or part of a specific country, is divided into 50km x 50km squares. Each square is classified as Water, Urban/Suburban, Wooded / Mountainous or Open/Desert. Squares are assigned a population density. This is based, where applicable, on the actual population density, in terms of people per square kilometre, averaged out across the square. For example, a city which has a population density of 5000 but which only takes up half the square would give a density of 2500 for the square as a whole.

Each square is assigned an initial value for consent on a 1-10 scale. This represents the level of support amongst the civilian population for the coalition (Blue) and the national government / security forces. Each square is also assigned an initial value for security on a 1-10 scale. This represents how dangerous the environment is, or is perceived to be, by the civilian population where 1 for example is Anarchy and violence is endemic and 10 represents a stable country. Although security and consent are related they can have different values – it is possible, for example, for a heavy-handed approach to produce high levels of security but low values of consent.

Each square is assigned values for current infrastructure. There are three different types – domestic, economic and transport. Domestic infrastructure is the level of urbanisation in a square and is assessed on a 1-10 scale. Economic infrastructure represents the presence of industry and natural resource processing (for example, oil wells / refineries). It is also assessed on a 1-10 scale. Finally, transport is an assessment of the level of road, rail, port and airport infrastructure in the square, also on 1-10 scale. These values are relative across the country. Each square has an assessed desired value for each type of infrastructure. This represents the level of infrastructure a square of that type should³³ have. For example, a large town may be assessed as having target values of 9, 9, 9 but following a period of civil war, damage and a lack of maintenance the current values may be assessed as 5, 6, 5.

³³ Note that this assessment is country specific; the value a square should have in an African country is likely to differ from the value a square should have in a European country.

UNIT REPRESENTATION

- Blue is represented as a coalition force with the ability for different players to represent different national forces, allowing national differences in doctrine or concepts to be represented.
- Green and Red may have up to 10 actors/factions. For example, Green factions could include regular forces, paramilitary organisations and different types of police. Red could consist of a variety of groups, driven by, for example, religious, ideological or political motives. Such groups could compete as well as co-operate.
- Blue and Green units can be represented at Brigade, Battalion or Company level. Each unit has a defined type (for example, Armoured Infantry).
- Red units represent a group of 50-150 insurgent / activists. The composition of all Red units is the same.
- White units represent a 'cell' of an OGD/NGO.

UNIT STANCES

Units are assigned stances, which represent the main type of activity that unit is carrying out in the month-long period represented by a game turn. The stances are as follows, with brief descriptions of the kinds of tasks units would conduct in that stance:

BLUE / GREEN STANCES:

- Enforce: The use of force through combat operations, aggressive patrolling, raids. Examples would be the retaking of Fallujah in Iraq or the operations in the southern Afghan mountains against the Taliban.
- Stabilise: Patrolling, force protection, cordon and search activities (note: not higher tempo combat operations). Examples would be current (Spring 2006) operations in Basra or the SFOR phase of operations in Bosnia.
- Transition: Some patrolling (at a lower tempo), but primarily 'hearts and minds' activities, such as rebuilding infrastructure or providing humanitarian aid. Examples would be current (Spring 2006) operations in Kosovo or EU operations in Afghanistan.
- Reserve: Rest and recuperation or being held ready as a quick reaction force.
- Recon: Reconnaissance activities and only applies to information-gathering assets.

RED STANCES

- Control: Attempting to dominate ground and/or control the populace. An example would be the PLO in Beirut.
- Attack: Attempting to inflict maximum casualties on Blue/Green. An example would be the resistance activities against the Russians in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
- Disrupt (Economic): Attacking economic infrastructure targets such as transport links or oil and gas supply facilities pipelines.
- Disrupt (Urban): Attacking urban infrastructure targets such as bridges, electricity substations, sewerage plants etc.
- Hide: Rest, rebuild, develop / maintain logistic and administrative support networks.
- Move: Make a long distance move.

WHITE STANCE

- Transition: White does not conduct any combat-related operations, focusing purely on the humanitarian aid and infrastructure rebuilding aspects of Transition.

UNIT MOVES

For each turn, all players determine which stance each of their units will adopt and which square it will operate in. Blue, Green and White units can be moved to any square in each turn without detriment. This can be modified if necessary to represent scenario-specific limitations. Red units may move one square in any direction with no detrimental effects. Moves of more than one square require the specific Move stance to be used for that turn.

BASE UNIT EFFECTIVENESS VALUES

Drawing on the results of a military judgement panel, Blue and Green units have been assigned a base effectiveness value for each stance in each terrain. This reflects the different capabilities that different types of unit have and the effect of terrain on those capabilities.

GAME PLAY

The following is a broad outline of the game play for each turn:

- Higher Level Players give guidance to their relevant commanders.
- The commanders decide on the location and stances for all units under their command.
- The Model calculates success of Coalition & Indigenous security activity and all Red activity.
- Changes are made to local levels of *consent* and *security*.
- Changes are made to national levels of *consent* and *security*.
- The Model then assesses the success of all *transition* and *peace building* activities, modified by the levels of violence and also corruption (subjectively assessed), and provides change to local and national values for *infrastructure* and *human capital*.
- The changes to the levels of *consent*, *security*, *infrastructure* and *human capital* are provided to all players to provide indication of how successful their activities have been towards achieving their objectives.

CONCLUSION

The PSOM's approach to understanding and modelling PSO is based on three key pillars; consent, security and stability. The PSOM concept recognises that without the consent of the people, a secure environment and sufficient nation building to enable a self-sustaining peace and a stable nation, the PSO is likely to fail and that the nation is likely to revert to the status quo ante or become a failing nation. The PSO Study and the PSOM are necessarily based on independent definitions of what Interventions operations are, what 21st Century PSO are likely to comprise, and what key areas of understanding are required in order to plan for and execute PSO.

The PSOM has been built on a combination of intuitive understanding, historical examples and insights at all levels from the tactical to the grand strategic of varying validity, extensive national and international peer review, comment and revision. The lessons and insights have been used to justify the design and dynamic processes within the PSOM.

The PSOM acknowledges the requirement for a Comprehensive Approach to PSO, and the need to represent the principal actors required by such an approach from coalition members to multiple indigenous force types to militias and potential Spoilers, to elite interests and all non-military agency activity - with their widely varying and often changing, aims, aspirations, affiliations, capabilities and complexity.

The PSOM is a tool initially designed to analyse military force structures for a PSF but has now developed into a tool that also, potentially, offers the ability to support scenario analysis, contingency planning, staff officer and wider and cross government training, preparation and analysis. Perhaps most importantly the PSOM can be used at the start of any real world scenario as part of the Comprehensive Approach.