

“Stabilization and Reconstruction” and the Humanitarian-Military Dilemma

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Army War College and the Peacekeeping Institute. As a consultant for Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Dewey worked in civil-military exercises in Latin America, Europe and Asia. In 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell asked him to return to the Department of State as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), where he administered substantial US funding for refugees around the world. He left the State Department on 1 July 2005, and he continues his interests in military-humanitarian relations and comprehensive planning. Dewey currently heads a US Army Science Board project related to global terrorism.

ABSTRACT

Uneven planning and execution for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars continue to elicit controversy within the US Government, the US public and around the world. These two conflicts have also created a growing problematic relationship between the military and the world humanitarian community. Little known to the general public is that many of the planning and operational problems in Afghanistan and Iraq generated useful early introspection and analysis within the US Government, especially in the two federal agencies most directly concerned with its successful outcome, the Departments of Defense and State. The authors examine various current efforts to develop comprehensive planning structures that would avoid in the future the many mistakes that plague the operations known as “Operation Iraqi Freedom” (OIF) and “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) in Afghanistan. Despite serious high-level efforts to reconsider the interagency, multinational and humanitarian elements of coalition operations in the 21st century, many issues remain to be resolved, and the potential results are unclear. There is growing evidence that the politics of occupation and the stress of continued insurgency are having increasingly negative effects on the framework of international humanitarian assistance in those two operations. We look at the new doctrinal “reconstruction and stabilization” planning environment and question whether it can harmonize the disparate experiences, training and expertise of military, diplomatic and humanitarian participants in complex emergencies.

“Many humanitarians feel that the company they are required to keep with coalition forces and a new wave of opportunistic, less principled NGOs and commercial contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan is dangerously skewing their image as humane, impartial and independent protectors of victims of war.”

Hugo Slim (2004)

BACKGROUND

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to thunder in the background of public life in the nation’s capital and around the country. The two seemingly interminable conflicts are the subject of dozens of books and endless commentaries in the press and on the public tube. It is a little curious that the Pentagon, which spends millions to maintain its public image, has neglected to focus on the remarkable ability of the US military to assess faulty strategies and tactics and propose changes. Within a few months of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, instructions were given to examine the strategic and tactical failures that what had been sold

to the US public as a virtual cakewalk almost immediately turned into a catastrophic internecine conflict. The public will probably not hear much about the resulting “stabilization and reconstruction” doctrine. We do not intend to rake over the coals of the many planning mistakes and omissions that are now the historical record of the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, there remain some underlying issues that have not been clearly identified in the various critical studies pertaining to the Afghan and Iraq wars. These matters pertain to the relations between the military and humanitarian components of 21st century warfare.

In a recent article in the Joint Staff publication, *Joint Force Quarterly* (JFQ), Col. Joseph J. Collins, a professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations in 2001-2004, summarized the most serious planning shortcomings connected with Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as follows:

- Ineffective planning and preparation for stability operations;
- Inadequate forces to occupy and secure a country the size of California;
- Poor military reaction to rioting and looting in the immediate post-conflict environment;
- Slow civil and military reaction to a growing insurgency;
- Problematic funding and contracting mechanisms that slowed reconstruction;
- Failure to make effective use of former Iraqi military forces;
- Slow initial development of Iraqi security forces;
- Inability to provide enough trained civilian officials, diplomats, and aid workers to conduct effective stabilization and reconstruction activities; and
- Slow creation of an interim Iraqi authority that could have minimized the perception of occupation and enhanced the perception of liberation.

The author (Collins, 2006) goes on to note a number of actions that have been taken to ameliorate the very complicated situation created by the above planning shortcomings. There is a natural inclination on the part of professional military officers to focus on improving the delivery of destructive force; rarely do they emphasize the humanitarian consequences and the problems of agencies striving to deliver support to non-combatants. The assumption frequently made is that assistance agencies will appear when and where they are needed, and that they will follow the military’s advice when they get there. The reference in the above list to “trained civilian officials, diplomats and aid workers” is ambiguous and a little misleading: it is not the responsibility of the military “to provide” such personnel. It is the intrinsic responsibility of the military to provide the necessary security so that the civilians may bring their skills and experience to the scene in the wake of conflict and occupation. The kind of advice the civilians are looking for from the military is basically how to stay out of trouble.

There is now a vast literature on the strategic and tactical failings of the OIF and OEF operations. Significantly, except for publications originating within the international humanitarian community, matters of military-humanitarian planning and coordination rarely figure as issues for priority attention. The US military is more concerned about its effectiveness in working with the senior foreign policy arm of the US Government, i.e., the Department of State, than its sometimes problematic relations with humanitarians and related players on the modern battlefield. Arising from its early concerns in the Iraqi campaign, the US military devised a new framework for US interagency coordination. We will look at various planning studies and recommendations that have emerged within the US Government, the United Nations, regional institutions and the international humanitarian community as a consequence of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and make some judgments on their chances for success.

PLANNING TO PLAN

Wars have a way of changing things, and while the United States Government continues to search for proper formulae to bring the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to successful conclusions, a growing number of political and military leaders now recognize that overwhelming military power alone is not enough to secure victory. Operational success, in the Post-Cold War world, is judged not necessarily on how many mouths are fed or how many tons of supplies are transported, but on the political situation that rescuers leave behind. The absence of this consideration was one of the reasons for failure in Somalia and the subsequent reluctance to get involved in the Rwandan genocide. We believe that everyone implicitly recognizes that the deployment of a modern military force into a failed or failing state will have some consequences, but few recognize just how profoundly such a force affects the political chemistry of the weak and failing state.

Those out of power prior to invasion endeavor to have the new force fight their battles for them; those in power will either fight or attempt to neutralize the new foreign force. The newly-adopted war planning and termination concepts of the Pentagon go at least part of the way towards facing these issue when they specify that overwhelming force and “nation-building,” are complimentary skills that must be given equal weight in both training and execution. It is not coincidental, but as the year 2005 came to an end, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan continued to fester and frustrate, that military strategists and civilian planners around the world were working in generally parallel efforts to develop new strategies to achieve optimal results from multilateral and interagency and planning systems.

According to the first of three studies prepared by the Defense Department Science Board, the US Government has been involved in an average of two peace and stabilization operations a year since the end of the Cold War in 1989 (see US Department of Defense, December 2004). None of these operations left a particularly good taste in the mouths of either participants or taxpayers, irrespective of comparative mission successes or failures. During that period, the U.S. military successfully made the transition from the heavy deterrent forces of the Cold War to a more mobile, highly disciplined, and lethal institution. But within the military there was, and remains, the notion that reassembling nations is not the proper responsibility of soldiers. There were no specific guidelines in military doctrine for the transition from open warfare to constructive peace operations. There were no particular accepted standards to train against while preparing for combined military/political/

humanitarian operations. Many generals find far greater comfort in designing overwhelming military campaigns and arranging logistics than focusing on issues of political mediation, alleviation of communities in distress, the starving, the sick and the fearful. Somewhat unrealistically, commanders assumed that the UN or some other agency would come along to put governments in order after hostilities ended; these attitudes were confirmed when instructions sometimes came from Washington “to stay away from the United Nations” (various training experiences of the authors in the 1990s).

The comprehensive planning concepts for “stabilization and reconstruction” (SR) now being developed in various agencies of the US Government, as well as in the United Nations, and elsewhere, are equally applicable to active war termination operations and non-conflict “failed and failing state” events, including the situations that we are now facing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

NATION-BUILDING NOW DESIGNATED AS A CORE MILITARY ACTIVITY

With characteristic urgency and decisiveness, the US military is now undertaking broad-based efforts to refocus its strategic planning processes to include both pre-conflict events and post-conflict situations. In a new Pentagon directive (number 3000.05), dated 28 November 2005, the US military is enjoined to work with other departments of the US Government (especially the State Department), international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector to establish order and to prepare for a just and viable future. We will discuss the operational planning implications of this new DoD directive below within the context of operational commands that must implement the new doctrine.

The significance of these documents goes beyond being a simple reversal of the notion that prevailed in the 1990s that the US military does not do “nation-building.” In fact, “nation-building” is now seen as a necessary consequence of the transformation in US military tactics: “information superiority, precision strike, and rapid maneuver on the battlefield” that have been employed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unfortunately, the US Armed Forces’ experience on these battlefields demonstrates that they these tactics are not adequate to “win.” The military forces “were not nearly as well-prepared to respond promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and attacks on coalition forces that followed the defeat of the Iraqi military.” (quotations in this paragraph from Binnendijk, xiii).

The United States military has been instructed to implement doctrine that it would have been considered heretical only a few years ago. After approximately 18-20 months of exceptional efforts, benefiting from lessons learned in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Pacific Tsunami and a proliferation of hurricanes that affected the U.S. in 2004-2005, Defense Directive 3000.05 establishes that:

“Stability operations are a core US military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises,

materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and planning.” (Defense Directive 3000.05, p. 2)

This is a very powerful endorsement of “nation-building,” a subject of frequent derision during the 1990's, especially in the wake of the debacle in Somalia and the frustrations of Haiti and the Balkans. It is to the immense credit of the US military that it was able to step aside from the partisan colloquies resulting from public frustrations in Iraq and Afghanistan to develop a new planning concept that explicitly rejects the tactics selected to kick off the “global war on terror,” (GWOT). It is confounding to both military scholars and war fighters, that while the US-led military coalitions demonstrated great ease and proficiency in defeating the conventional militaries of those rogue states, the coalition was unprepared for the political vacuum and spirited insurgency that followed. Implicitly, the authors of the new and dramatic doctrinal pronouncements seem to believe that the drawn-out and exhausting insurgencies that continue to plague operations in those two countries might have been avoided with the right planning and training systems.

FEARS OF POLITICAL VACUUM

The US was profoundly shocked by the traumatic costs, both human and economic, of the events that took place on 11 September 2001; the GWOT was declared and pursued to Afghanistan and Iraq and many other points between. Insurgencies arose, using terrorism to achieve their goals, but required different strategies. The US administration now believes that the US can no longer afford to ignore failed and failing states, breeding grounds for terrorism. As for the persistent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, prestige and political hubris is mixed with national security concerns to ensure that these states do not dissolve into permanent “failed” status. Having defeated two pernicious governments quickly, the US found itself obliged to restore order and to facilitate stability through economic and political actions on the ground. Unfortunately, there were no specific plans for post-war economic and political reconstruction activities in either Afghanistan or Iraq. It is confusing that the new US strategy calling for very close cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense, with State taking the lead in appropriate future situations, does not apply to either Afghanistan or Iraq.

The search within the US military for more comprehensive planning began with a memorandum dated 23 January 2004, in which the acting Under Secretary of Defense provided the Chairman of the Defense Science Board (DSB) with Terms of Reference for a summer study on “Transition to and From Hostilities” (see DoD, 23 January 2004). Six areas of serious failings in ongoing military operations were selected for special attention:

1. *Understanding and shaping the environment – better understanding of the battlespace through improved intelligence and analysis, with emphasis on cultures and languages.* The US military went to war in Iraq with very few qualified speakers of Arabic and little or no sensitivity to Islamic and Arab cultures.
2. *Force protection during transition.* How do you protect your force after the main battles are won? It may be recalled that the Secretary of Defense responded to the first uses of “improvised explosive devices” (IEDs) in Iraq in

April 2003, stating that the losses were not militarily significant. When the IED campaign continued, a major effort was directed at the IED problem, but so far the threat continues to proliferate and since early 2006, the tactic has been imported into the Afghan campaign.

3. *Disarmament and destruction of munitions stocks.* The fighting force that defeated Iraq's military was unable to secure the hundreds of weapons stockpiles left over from Saddam Hussein's regime, thereby providing the materiel necessary for the deadly campaign of IEDs which have provided the majority of coalition casualties in Iraq.
4. *Intelligence exploitation in the aftermath.* How to use the documents of the defeated adversary to your best interests? (Not enough translators either).
5. *Stabilizing the civilian population.* How do you handle the humanitarian requirements of the civilian population, "challenges" that DoD will "likely be charged with handling." The military is always going to be a "first-provider" after the termination of active hostilities. An even bigger problem is how to turn over such responsibilities to non-military experts when they appear on the scene.
6. *Re-establishing the rule of law.* The need for police and rules for handling former enemy combatants were manifest in Iraq at the time of the memorandum. The US military really does not wish to become ensnared in constabulary work.
7. *Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure.* As the inevitable "first provider" in a conflict situation, the military must be prepared to respond to the immediate humanitarian issues of the affected noncombatant population. As we have learned in Iraq, in the absence of security, it is very difficult and highly costly to facilitate the re-establishment of communications, power and potable water. This requirement presents a special challenge to the military planner who may have little experience in major civil engineering situations. Turning such efforts over to non-indigenous business leadership prior to the establishment of adequate security also proved unsuccessful. The new doctrine rightly assumes that revitalization of domestic enterprise should be given high priority, but it unrealistically assumes that honest government will result from the overthrow of dictatorship.

The memorandum notably observes that the transition to and from hostilities requires a "wide range of capabilities that...are not integral to the Department of Defense." (DoD, 23 January 2004). Given the intrinsic "can-do" spirit of the modern American soldier, this statement may be one of the most difficult assertions in the new doctrine for career military leaders to accept.

The study urges that the capabilities and responsibilities of other US Government agencies, especially the State Department, be examined and appreciated in the 2004 DSB Summer Study.

THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

The DSB is composed of retired senior military officers, academics and industry experts of broad experience and distinction. They serve without pay at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense, but its members, in principle, are not constrained in their investigations by higher political authorities or current policy. The DSB “summer seminar” is an institution that goes back more than 40 years, and its reports have been vital in shaping the US armed services. Reportedly, 120 people were involved in the DSB 2004 study. The relatively great freedom of action in the DSB permits the DSB to explore freely outside the DoD corporate box. In a press report about their activities in the American Forces Information Service (AFIS), DSB members agreed that while the military “has a superb management structure” that is better than most US companies, its focus almost exclusively has been on the successful execution of combat operations. (Donna Miles, 25 January 2005). The DSB studies outline a much more ambitious planning environment.

From the premise that the US military must look more broadly at modern warfare, the 2004 Board produced two documents which are now required reading for all US civilian and military leaders. The studies challenge the professional military man and woman to reflect on how their country intends to project its power and influence in the world in the future. The first report, at 198 pages, contains a wealth of material covering each of the issues listed above, and based on these findings, it proposes challenging shifts in traditional military policies. The first report calls upon the US military establishment “to extend the same management discipline that it uses to prepare for combat operations to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction operation, and to intelligence – not only in DoD, but across the government.” (DoD, December 2004)

The 2004 summer study observes that certain fundamental capabilities are lacking in DoD that are critical to success in stabilization and reconstruction. These include “stabilization and reconstruction, strategic communication, and knowledge, understanding and intelligence for identifying and tracking asymmetrical warfare.” (DoD, December 2004)

Among the key recommendations of the December 2004 study are that:

“Stabilization and reconstruction missions must become a core competency of both the Departments of Defense and State. The military services need to reshape and rebalance their forces to provide a stabilization and reconstruction capability. Complementing these activities, the Department of State needs to develop, maintain, and execute a portfolio of plans and capabilities for the civilian roles in reconstruction operations. Both departments need substantially more resources, both people and funds, to fulfill their proper roles.”

In looking at the various instances of US military interventions, the board determined that these actions served US political goals, not “just military goals.” The board took an holistic approach to the six major military deployments in the post-Cold War period (Iraq I, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq II), observing that, in each, there was an observable continuum of activities, moving from peacetime to hostilities, to stabilization and then the reconstruction phase. The fact that “since the end of the cold war the United States has begun new stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18-24 months,” with such operations

lasting an average 5-8 years, calls for better planning, improved capabilities and a wider range of available skills. The 2004 report calls for the establishment of special study teams to follow events in potential hot spots. It reflects that “the knowledge required to be effective in conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations is different from the military knowledge required to prevail during hostilities, but no less important.” Combatant commanders are requested, on an urgent basis, to develop “intelligence campaign plans” to specify what knowledge they need to achieve command objectives. Helpfully, given the military’s passion for secrecy in most things, the combatant commands are enjoined to use open source information which “can provide much of the information needed to support peacetime needs and stabilization and reconstruction.”

This initiative is of particular importance to ensure that commands work with such open source repositories as the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs line (OCHA) website in Geneva, the incredibly rich <http://www.reliefweb.int> and the equally vital <http://www.interaction.com>, which is maintained by InterAction, a consortium of US-based non-governmental organizations. There are now several others that can be easily located on the internet. The US military operates in a totally classified and controlled environment, and the military continues to wrestle with how to facilitate the free flow of information between it and the outside world, including other governmental and humanitarian agencies that are its partners on the battlefield,

The report also calls for the establishment of a high-level entity to take charge of US “strategic communications,” or information program. It should be noted that the US Government has lacked such an organization dedicated to public diplomacy since the regrettable dissolution of United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999. The study calls for greater attention to fostering better understandings of foreign cultures and languages, not only as resources for civilian and military personnel working in those areas, but also to add vigor to our intelligence capabilities in identifying, locating and tracking our enemies. A separate chapter in the 2004 summer study is devoted to each of the various concerns noted above.

In addition to the rich catalogue of concerns and suggested solutions in the main 2004 summer study, the Defense Science Board also published a second volume of supporting papers (January 2005), with a number of case studies, including the Panama intervention (1998), Israel in Lebanon (1982-2000), the French in Algeria, the US experiences in Germany and Japan after World War II, the British presence in Iraq and the Middle East (1914-1922), the period of reconstruction after the US civil war, classical Rome at the peak of its far-flung empire and additionally provides some general observations from history.

2005 DSB TASK FORCE STUDY PREPARES DIRECTIVE

The results of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study were largely accepted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and instructions were given to the DSB to form a task force to work with those results and produce a directive to implement the findings. Out of the 2005 DSB task force came a new report on “Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD,” dated September 2005 (see US Department of Defense, September 2005). The task force defined “stability operations” in a broad fashion, “to include security, transition, counterinsurgency, peacemaking and the other operations needed to deal with irregular

security challenges.” The instructions arising from the 2004-2005 studies are reportedly already being used in SOUTHCOM exercises pertaining to Post-Fidel Cuba (Gurney and Krause).

There were, evidently, many hurdles in the DSB process. Although the 2005 task force accepted all but one minor point in the 2004 study, it was sparing in specifying organizational changes, which the task force believed would be “fractious and disruptive.” The task force was acutely conscious of the unclear and shifting line between combat and stability operations, but assumed that the military services could not afford two separate forces, one devoted to combat and another dedicated to stability operations. Therefore, they endorsed the basic concept of improving the training and non-lethal capabilities of the force while maintaining its fighting skills. The process of adapting the US military to these broad goals is expected to require 4-5 years to implement, with the Joint Forces Command (JFCom) in southern Virginia taking the lead.

Other key observations of the 2005 DSB report include the following:

- The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Department of State is “not getting anywhere near the level of resources and authority needed.”
- “With regard to Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), the challenge is to establish trust and effective relationships with organizations that are disinclined to work closely with DoD.
- The task force is concerned about possible resistance to the necessary and significant changes that the recommendations would entail in the Department of Defense and suggested that the Secretary name an Executive Agent to serve as a high-level advocate for change. Somewhat tentatively, the task force suggests that the Secretary of the Army is “a possible choice” given the Army’s “dominant albeit not exclusive role” in stability operations. This suggestion was ultimately turned down by Secretary Rumsfeld, and there is no executive agent to drive the process of transformation in the US military. No reason was provided for this decision by the Defense Secretary.
- The task force emphasized the utility of facilitating the efforts of the “fifth provider,” the private sector. It states that Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) are generally uninformed about what to expect from “civil companies, universities, federally funded research and development centers, private consultants, NGOs, etc.” Acknowledging the tremendous role that military civil affairs officers already play in advancing stability operations, the task force recommends recruiting even more mid-career professionals “who have the skills and experience we need.”

Although the DSB is able to pursue independent paths when it comes to making recommendations, the approval process of its deliberations is clearly strewn with “turf protection” issues, and a number of compromises were necessary to secure the approval of the Secretary. Nonetheless, the DSB 2004-2005 studies represent a significant victory for those students and practitioners who look forward to greater cooperation and understanding between the US military and its potential domestic and international civilian partners on the

humanitarian battlefield. The bulk of the 2005 DSB summer task force report serves as a covering memorandum for what was then the proposed Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.

We will discuss in more detail the creation of the State Department Office for Coordination of Rehabilitation and Stabilization (S/CRS) immediately below. We will also reflect on the DSB task force’s observation on NGOs, including its hope that its recommendations will secure warmer NGO-military relations. There are some misconceptions about humanitarian rules and standards evidenced within the DSB reports, some of which may be particularly troublesome in the event that the international humanitarian community is invited to take part in actual operational planning.

S/CRS - THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S ENHANCED ROLE

The development of the State Department Office for the Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) probably did not arise as the result of a long and passionate campaign by Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) to become more involved in military post-conflict activities. Quite to the contrary, the culture of the State Department has traditionally been to leave the military to its own devices. Ambiguity is anathema to the military professional, but it is one of the fundamental tools of diplomacy. Planning is an intrinsic part of military discipline and command and control; the traditional US diplomatic attitude is that drawing up specific planning objectives may restrict freedom of action. The clever diplomat keeps his options open.

Viet Nam left its marks on the Foreign Service, and the capability of FSOs manning provincial administrations in that conflict to call in artillery and air strikes was not seen as the proper educational environment for future Ambassadors. On the broadest level, the US Foreign Service, since the termination of the military draft in 1974, has little experience in military life and tradition, and more importantly, little knowledge or appreciation of military planning procedures. The Foreign Service now benefits from a number of retired military officers and enlisted personnel who have made the Foreign Service a second career, but essentially their numbers are few, and they are often relegated to functions that have less exposure to senior policy making.

The State Department, of course, has a Bureau for Political-Military Affairs (PM), but the majority of positions in that bureau traditionally are manned by serving military personnel seconded from the Pentagon. The same situation was true, in general, in the State Department offices concerned with peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The authors’ efforts to get US overseas Embassies to send FSOs to observe or take part in host nation military exercises have been almost always unavailing, although the occasional exception turned out very well. The result is that most FSOs just don’t know enough about political-military affairs to provide useful advice when it is needed.

In recent years, there has been a gradual change in Foreign Service attitudes. Service in the various peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, and the heavy response to the request for volunteers to work in the mega-Embassy in Baghdad shows the determination of FSOs to take risky but challenging assignments in which they will work closely with the military. Recent pronouncements by Secretary of State Rice that service in dangerous, unhealthy or

isolated Foreign Service posts is a prerequisite for advancement will no doubt create an environment in which officers will attach higher priority to civil-military assignments in the field. The recent decision to station Special Forces operatives in selected diplomatic posts will increase contacts beyond the typical attaché and security assistance offices. Great mutual understanding is essential within the new stabilization and reconstruction environment.

The main agency interested in getting the State Department more directly involved in peace and humanitarian operations is, of course, the Department of Defense. Many military commanders have told the authors that they wish they had access to diplomatic advice before committing themselves and their personnel to potential fights in strange lands. The kinds of new military operational skills called for in Defense Directive 3000.05, including advanced political analytical ability, greater cultural sensitivity and improved linguistic skills, are, of course, intrinsic to nearly every FSO's toolbox.

In the mid-1990s, the Department of Defense pushed very hard for some kind of interagency vehicle to handle the planning for the mounting list of global contingencies. Each event generated requirements that involved several agencies. International civil police, for example, seem always needed in complex operations. There are some Congressional prohibitions on DoD training for civil police, and, of course, in the US, civilian police are functions reserved for states and local communities; we do not have a national police force. After a good deal of interagency discussion and negotiation, the NSC finally agreed to a planning tool that was signed by President Clinton on 20 May 1997 as Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD/NSC 56: "Managing Complex Contingency Operations). This multipurpose document had broad goals, but essentially it was a Washington, DC, interagency organization mechanism. It proved to have limited utility in the field. It evidently provided a useful checklist for interagency rehearsals inside the Beltway. It focused on US-only resources, and, therefore, had very limited utility in international multilateral operations.

In practice, PDD-56 had mixed results. It did not include post-combat situations as part of its planning mandate. Some of the procedures contained in PDD-56 were used to some avail in Haiti (Hamblet, Spring 2000, 96), but it did not work out so well in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Following Hurricane Mitch, the civilian agencies were unfamiliar with political-military planning, and the civilian task force set up by the NSC and OMB was unable to get the interagency mechanism to work. One of the results was that "no intent was defined, no end state was established, and no agency responsibilities were settled...major policy and doctrinal level issues were left unresolved, and guidance was not transmitted to the operational level." (Hofstetter Autumn 2000, 77).

The Clinton Administration document was cancelled on 7 December 2005 with the adoption of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44). It was not until the US became deeply engaged in "Operation Iraqi Freedom" that Congress decided that the State Department must become more directly involved in stability operations. Several bills were submitted to the House and Senate in 2004, the most significant one co-sponsored by Senators Lugar, Biden and Hagel. The bill, entitled "Emergency Fund for Complex Foreign Crises," would have provided \$100 million to the State Department to establish that capability. Another bill, by Representative Dreier, would have created an Undersecretary of State for Overseas Contingencies and Stabilization. The Lugar-Biden bill made it to conference but was eliminated, and the Dreier bill got nowhere. As a "start-up," fund, the State Department requested \$15 million in FY-05, but got only \$7.7 million. The FY06 budget request for S/CRS was for \$17.2 million for S/CRS operations, which would permit

an additional 54 positions and the creation of a 100-person ready response cadre in the State Department (See Serafino and Weiss, 25 June 2005).

In July 2004, the President created the S/CRS and named Ambassador Carlos Pascual as its coordinator. The office was provided wide powers to develop policy options for failed and failing states situations. Its staff was drawn from State, USAID, the Defense Department, CIA, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Joint Forces Command and the Treasury Department. Its wiring chart (see Buss, July 2005), 1) shows a direct line from the Secretary of State to the S/CRS coordinator, with solid lines to a military liaison/public affairs office and four divisions (Monitoring and Planning; Humanitarian Reconstruction and Economic Stabilization; Transitional Security, Civil Administration and Governance; and Resource Management). The inability of State to persuade the Congress to provide the monies necessary to establish the S/CRS firmly within the interagency planning system, however, was a continuing frustration to its staff, but also to the Pentagon.

Designing the new S/CRS office involved a number of bureaus within the Department, including the Director General, who chaired the organization, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), the Executive Secretariat, the Under Secretary of Political Affairs, USAID and various other State bureaus that would be required to coordinate with S/CRS in natural and man-made disasters. Despite the obvious need to develop close coordination between State and Defense and other Federal agencies, it remains pretty clear that DoD is driving the train. Although State/PRM pressed hard to develop a more squarely multilateral dimension to S/CRS responsibilities, it was not particularly successful, and this issue will continue to plague the development of S/CRS legitimate role in planning for post-conflict nation-building.

DOES S/CRS NOW QUALIFY AS A DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CONTRATOR?

The US Department of Defense is a gigantic agency; its annual budget exceeds the total of all other countries' defense budgets around the world. By comparison, the State Department's budget, including funding to the UN and other international agencies, is tiny, less than five percent of the national budget. In order to get S/CRS off the ground, DoD put together a package in 2005 which it submitted to Congress. The package included an authority long-desired by the Department of Defense -- the ability to provide funds directly to foreign militaries; historically, these funds were channeled through the State Department to ensure that such operations conform to national policy. DoD would be authorized to use \$100 million for direct aid to foreign militaries. In exchange, DoD would transfer \$200 million to State for use in setting up S/CRS. Many members of Congress were uncertain about accepting this deal, fearing confusion caused by parallel military assistance programs, as State would still have a large budget to administer. However, Secretary of State Rice supported Secretary Rumsfeld on this funding matter, sending a letter to the Congress affirming this in the summer of 2005. In the supporting arguments, both State and Defense suggested that DoD needed more flexibility in fighting terrorism and facilitating overseas stability.

The State-DoD package deal was made public in January 2006. Congress provided \$100 million to DoD for direct application to overseas emergencies, but required it to transfer the funds through State "subject to the limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act" (Graham

Bradley, 29 January 2006). The deal met with some criticism from within the retired State Department community noting that “This secretary of state seems unconcerned about military inroads into foreign policy.” (Berlind, 2006, p 3). Under a separate provision of the same legislation, the Pentagon was allowed to transfer \$200 million from its accounts to the State Department for S/CRS. The US Congress is loath to permit agencies to transfer funds, feeling that it is the unique responsibility of Congress to allocate funds to Federal agencies. However, the deed was done, and S/CRS is now involved in a number of trial programs to develop joint operational experience with DoD. The US Joint Forces Command issued a 60-page “pamphlet” for use by S/CRS in December 2005 to provide templates for joint planning. Heavily dependent upon Microsoft PowerPoint matrices and military style, the document no doubt provides a valuable introduction to FSOs on how the professional military communicates and develops operations. One hopes that, now a virtual DoD contractor, the State Department will find wider support on Capital Hill.

It should be noted that the establishment of the S/CRS still receives criticism from outside the halls of Congress. The influential libertarian CATO Institute recently published a critique of the concept that failed states represent a security danger to the United States, one of the main rationales for the creation of the S/CRS and several new bases established by the Pentagon in Africa and elsewhere. The authors assert that “most nation-building missions are far removed U.S. national security interests” and call upon Congress to deny additional funding for the office (Longan and Preble, 11 January 2006).

PARALLEL SR EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

At the September 2005 World Summit in New York, with the leadership of over 170 countries present, the matter of transitions from conflict to peace was a central matter of interest. There are dozens of countries, particularly in Africa, which have not prospered, or even found much stability, after the UN, or African regional forces, intervened to bring domestic strife and violent disagreement to a halt. The possibility of putting together a multinational UN-based civil-military organization capable of terminating conflict and initiating stability gained much support. In the final document, the countries called upon the UN to bring such an institution to life prior to 31 December 2005. As the consequence of pressure from the US and other members of the Security Council, and with greater speed than usually seen in UN deliberations, a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was established by concurrent resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on 20 December 2005.

In his explanation of vote, US Permanent Representative John Bolton provided the US administration’s view on the functions of the new UN commission:

“The United States was pleased to support the concurrent resolutions in the Security Council and the General Assembly...Our common imperative is to create a cost-effective, efficient advisory institution, capable of ensuring the successful transition from peacekeeping operations into peacebuilding, providing important advice but not duplicating work. The PBC can most effectively help nations from sliding back into conflict by ensuring that the Security Council is aware of all the elements that are essential to achieving

sustainable peace in a given country...” (Press advisory, US Mission, USUN NY, 20 December 2005)

The statement by US Permanent Representative Bolton indicates that the US looks upon the PBC as having a role on the sidelines offering constructive advice to participants and advising the Security Council on events but not actively engaged in the SR process. Significantly, none of the recent documents produced by the US Government on stability and transition provide for significant implementation roles for the UN or its international humanitarian agencies (see Arnas, Barry, and Oakley, August 2005). The UN is an historic institution supported financially and politically by the US government when it is useful to our interests, but it is provided only a marginal role to play in the “war on terror” that is now the center point of US foreign policy. It is disappointing that there appears to be so little literacy about the United Nations within the upper levels of the US Government.

The first operational action of the UN Peacebuilding Commission on the international scene came at its inaugural meeting 23 June 2006, when UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appealed for funds for the commission to help Burundi and Sierra Leone make the transition from war to peace. Annan noted that the commission could help avoid the dilemmas that have emerged in East Timor. According to a news report of the meeting, “the commission’s role will be to supplement UN peacekeeping operations and provide a means for regional players, donor nations, troop contributors and international monetary organizations to coordinate their efforts.” (Aziakou, 2006). According to one of the *rapporteurs* (Guicherd December 2005), the US Government was not formally represented at the inaugural meeting of the PCB, although a representative of the S/CRS spoke at the official luncheon).

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW SUPPORTS THE SR PROCESS

As one would expect, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released on 3 February 2006, supports the vision of a highly-proficient military, deadly in war and imaginative in peace, the goals of the transformation process required by Defense Department Directive 3000.05. Specifically, the document notes the following innovations and departures which reflect the military view of the new stabilization and rehabilitation doctrine:

“The ability to wage irregular and unconventional warfare and the skills needed for counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction, “military diplomacy” and complex interagency coalition operations are essential...” (p. 83)

“Supporting the rule of law and building civil societies where they do not exist today, or where they are in their infancy, is fundamental to winning the long war...the United States needs to develop new concepts and methods for interagency and international cooperation.” (p. 84)

“Authorities, procedures and practices must permit the seamless integration of Federal, state and local capabilities at home and among allies, partners and non-governmental organizations abroad.” (p. 84)

These comments occur in a QDR subchapter entitled “Achieving Unity of Effort,” which is a continuing theme and overriding goal in US military doctrine. It should be quite clear that in any multinational, mixed civil-military effort that takes place in a troubled environment that different techniques, training, resources, languages, cultures and overall competence will prevent total, or even substantial, unity of effort from happening. We believe that most military personnel realize that unity of effort is a goal that should motivate the partners on the battlefield but is unattainable. Unfortunately, the pursuit of unified effort leads to diffidence and resentment on the part of many US partners. An excellent military officer recently returned from Iraq told one of the authors that “because everyone knows that US military officers are impatient, they excuse us for it,” and he added, “in any case, they know that we are going to do what we want, anyway...” We would submit that this is not an attitude that lends itself to genuine “unity of effort” with friends and allies.

HUMANITARIAN MISGIVINGS

“...Many in the humanitarian community remain wary of policy coherence, and fear that the pursuit of wider political and strategic objectives threatens the humanitarian imperative to save lives and relieve suffering, and to do so impartially...” (Wheeler and Harmer, March 2006, p. 5)

Over the past hundred years or so, the main agencies involved in international humanitarian response have been civilian agencies. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the pioneer non-governmental organization (NGO), with its origins in the mid-19th century Franco-Prussian wars, but its efforts have been joined over the years by thousands of agencies that handle everything from pre-natal care to de-mining. Big and small, these agencies of humanitarian concern have proliferated throughout the world; in a sense, they represent international civil society.

Most of these non-governmental agencies are heavily dependent upon donations, and their overhead expenses tend to be relatively modest. By the very nature of their traditions, they view themselves as non-political; ideally, this means that they help victims of natural and man-made disasters according to their needs and without regard for their nationality, ethnic association, religious affiliation or political bent. Many of the larger NGOs have substantial staffs and are working around the world in a number of countries. Some of the smaller ones tend to spring into action only when special circumstances call for their services.

These various agencies strongly subscribe to international humanitarian doctrine which revolves around impartiality, neutrality and independence. These rules require that they minister assistance to people on the basis of need, and issues of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and national origin are irrelevant. Their relations with the militaries of the world are often tenuous at best, and they attempt to avoid identification with military operations because they do not want to be associated with any warring faction. They see their contributions as lasting beyond any particular conflict, and when the fighting is over, they want to be able to stay on to complete their efforts.

Unfortunately, in the 21st century, the nature of war, traditionally between states and armies, has changed. Wars are now being fought against hidden enemies who resent all

outsiders, uniformed or not. The death toll among humanitarian workers continues to mount, and even the neutrality of the ICRC is sometimes questioned by one or another belligerent.

Both domestic and international humanitarian agencies are troubled by current US intervention policy. In a recent report, US strategy is strongly criticized: "...the division of the world into those 'for' or 'against' the U.S. has constricted the room available for neutral and independent humanitarian action. The principle that people have a right to humanitarian assistance irrespective of location or political affiliation has come under increasing pressure..." (Feinstein Center, 49).

HUMANITARIAN SPACE ABUSED BY THE MILITARY

There are other serious changes in the nature of modern conflict that affect profoundly the roles and missions of the world humanitarian community. In the two major ongoing wars, Iraq and Afghanistan, the incoming forces did not succeed in creating secure environments in significant zones of their responsibility. By definition, this means that the ideal of developing "humanitarian space" in which relief workers can perform their specialized labors without fear for their lives has not been accomplished. With coalition armed forces stretched to the limit in both Iraq and Afghanistan, they are no longer able to provide security for all, or even most, humanitarian operations. The humanitarian community believes that the military should focus on security, where it has a substantial comparative advantage, and leave humanitarian work to them.

Further complicating their missions, certain free-wheeling military units, especially in Afghanistan, decided that humanitarian operations would assist them in winning the "hearts and minds" of the local populations. By letting their beards grow and "dressing down" to partial military uniforms or to traditional Afghan men's gowns, they were able to lower their silhouettes to blend in better, or to collect intelligence. All of these techniques are anathema to the humanitarian community which believes that their own security and integrity are compromised any time that the separate responsibilities of humanitarians and military personnel become ambiguous. The assistance community protested vigorously about these activities, and it appears most abuses were phased out by 2004.

Worse yet, the humanitarian community abhors the idea of conditionality on assistance. International humanitarian standards require that aid be accorded on the basis of need and not as a reward. According to a recent study, "In most cases, military involvement in humanitarian activities is partial, as it is inevitably used towards a military, political or security-oriented aim...In some extreme instances, the provision of aid is positioned as an openly partial and conditional exercise...the delivery of aid by the US-led coalition in Zabul province was accompanied by leaflets distributed to civilians that called upon them to provide intelligence information or face losing aid altogether. Following protests from the humanitarian community, the leaflets were withdrawn and an apology made." (McHugh and Gostelow, p. 39-40).

Objectively, there are undeniable cost-benefit issues involved in the allocation of military personnel to standard humanitarian operations. It costs approximately \$215,000 annually to maintain a US soldier in the field. Civilian humanitarian workers are maintained in foreign operations for about one-tenth of that sum.

Another area for intense dissatisfaction on the part of the humanitarian community concerns contracting for humanitarian services. According to Human Rights Watch (May 2004) "...Concerns are emerging regarding the practice of using private contractors in a military mission. Although not a new practice, in the case of the USA, core military activities are increasingly being contracted out to private agencies – be it private contracting companies, private intelligence agencies, or private security companies. In addition to being slighted by the military, NGOs question to whom "these private contractors are accountable, and how this accountability is measured – by speed of delivery; value for money; saving lives; or other criteria" (McHugh and Gostelow, p. 40). While a large segment of contracting funds have been allocated to large projects in the water and power fields, in which the humanitarian community clearly has no comparative advantage, the humanitarian community protests strongly about such funding in the health and education sectors, where they have very positive records of achievement (Feinstein Center, 68).

In the increasingly chaotic first year of the coalition occupation of Iraq, extraordinary sums of money were thrown into a very wide range of projects in an effort to improve living conditions for the domestic population and to repair damages caused by allied air strikes and the rioting and looting that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein. Rather than engage international humanitarian agencies and non-governmental agencies directly, the outside civilian and military authorities contracted with non-Iraqi private businesses to perform services traditionally handled by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In many cases, these foreign firms then subcontracted with NGOs to perform the services, pocketing substantial sums for their astuteness.

Of course, for every private business, international humanitarian agency, and NGO involved in the reconstruction of Iraq, a substantial amount of the money allocated to projects had to be spent on the services of private security companies. Life for average Iraqis has not improved significantly since they were saved from the cruel Saddam dictatorship. The growing strength of the Taliban in Afghanistan raises questions about the survivability of the extraordinary efforts to revive that state.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRTS)

We look at the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept for several reasons. It is an interesting subject for multidisciplinary learning, training, and execution. In principle, a PRT provides a framework for projecting influence and assistance in areas where humanitarians might be unable to work. The PRT concept in Afghanistan and recently in Iraq has become the center of a significant debate which may further estrange the military-humanitarian relationship. Whatever the motivations may be, the various militaries involved in Afghanistan have largely adopted the PRT formula. Despite the strong misgivings of the humanitarian community, it is also now being introduced in Iraq. Importantly, a senior Pentagon official working in the area recently deemed that "PRTs have the potential to become a model for future stabilization and reconstruction operations" (McNerney, p. 32). Another Afghan hand proclaims that the PRT is the way to go for post-conflict reconstruction and development (Borders, 5).

One of the big differences between the background to the Afghanistan operation and the later Iraq invasion was that the humanitarian community was already in operation. The

Taliban had no interest in human services, and it seemed pleased to have UN agencies take it off their hands. Following the collapse of the Taliban regime, the UN set up the UNAMA operation in March 2002 under the leadership of one of its most experienced and capable administrators, Lakhdar Brahimi. Under the direction of his deputy, Nigel Fisher, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General for Relief and Reconstruction, all of the UN agencies working in Afghanistan (UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNHCR, UNDP and others) were drawn into Kabul (most had been located in surrounding countries during the Taliban years), where a Program Secretariat immediately set to work coordinating humanitarian relief while the provisional government was being established, with the goal of turning over their duties to the Afghan government when it was established (Dewey, 2). These agencies had been represented in Afghanistan during the Taliban years; the Taliban had no interest in human services and did not object. The overall UN operation had been faithful to a “small footprint” approach and was able to operate under the radar of Taliban xenophobia. The Program Secretariat approach also provided on-the-job training for fledgling ministers and staffs by twinning UN agencies delivering human services with those selected to perform those services, thereby demonstrating professional planning, budgeting, administration, program management, evaluation, monitoring and audit. Gene Dewey, who visited Afghanistan during this period as Assistant Secretary of State/PRM, recommended this UN-led low-key approach to Afghan transition to Washington, where it was well-received in State and by the President who was briefed personally by Dewey after his return.

While the mopping up operations against the Taliban continued, the US-led coalition fielded military civil affairs teams and Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) to support humanitarian assistance, relief, and reconstruction efforts wherever possible. As the dust settled, CENTCOM developed a plan to accelerate reconstruction in the country. The command proposed “Joint Regional Teams” (JRTs), which would focus the US Interagency civil-military effort throughout the country. From the time he took office in December 2002, Hamid Karzai, interim president of the Afghan transitional authority, saw the potential in these teams to extend the writ of the new government. He asked only that the name be changed to “Provisional Reconstruction Teams” (PRTs) to indicate that it was the central government providing support, not the local and regional warlords (Dziedzic and Seidl, 3).

The PRTs consist of 60-100 military personnel, primarily for protection, and representatives of various interested foreign agencies, such as USAID, representative UN humanitarian agencies, as well as Afghan governmental bodies, including the Ministry of Interior that acts as the senior Afghan director. The first PRT was established in Gardez in November 2002, and as of September 2006, there are 24 PRTs in Afghanistan. The outposts are selected for political purposes, and are assisted by some private NGOs. For the international humanitarian community, the PRTs are quite controversial. Among the complaints cited in McHugh and Gostelow (pp. 26-36) are:

- The PRTs place much greater emphasis on intelligence from local warlords over other sources, including the NGOs;
- The PRTs tend to use local militia to publicize events, despite the fact that these groups are feared by the local populations.
- Some NGOs argue that dependence on a visible PRT presence undermines government authority because in several cases, the PRT’s are seen to be tolerating warlords.

- NGOs also complain that military forces lack the expertise to effectively assess needs of populations, and lack experience in designing and implementing sustainable projects that can provide long-term benefits to the population.

UN and NGO liaison officers at CENTCOM convinced Gen Franks that he could push back when the Pentagon asked him to do humanitarian/reconstruction work – UN agencies and NGOs could do it better, at 1/10th the cost – relieving Franks to do the war-fighting. Unfortunately, when the planning began for the operation in Iraq, lessons learned from Afghanistan proved to be inappropriate to the campaign preferred by the President and his chief advisors.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT INITIAL ROLE IN IRAQ

The State Department tried to assert the lead for post-conflict planning. It developed the post-conflict architecture, based on a modification of the Afghan transition support architecture. The State Department built elaborate humanitarian plans, immediately became engaged with, and mobilized, the UN; it acted as the link between NGOs/UN agencies and CENTCOM planners to develop the range of tasks the military could be called upon to provide in support of the civilian nation-building effort; established a civil-military collaboration model and precedent.

For the Iraq operation, State, through its Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) attempted to educate Jay Garner, the President's first personal envoy to Iraq. These efforts began in Washington, when PRM tried to bring a touch of reality to, and influence, General Garner's pre-deployment "Rock Drill" at NDU. It provided last minute talking points before Garner's pre-deployment meeting with NSC advisor Rice on what constituted huge issues and potential show-stoppers. PRM also fed back to NSC and top State levels those potential show-stoppers, show-delayers coming from a meeting with General Franks on the eve of the war.

It was pretty clear that humanitarian issues were considered a side issue when, several weeks before the attack on Iraq, civilian and military humanitarian planners were "sent forward" to Kuwait to plan separately from the military planning cells in Tampa and Qatar. The chief State Department Iraq planner was denied contact with either Garner or the Pentagon. All of the efforts of the State Department were ultimately swept off the table by the Pentagon. The White House believed that "Operation Iraqi Freedom" deserved the single focus of a US-UK coalition, gave the Pentagon the lead in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Pentagon consigned a marginal role to the UN in Iraq, resulting in several unintended consequences. By taking the UN out of the lead role it played in Afghanistan, the effect was to portray the UN as tool of the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority. This put the UN in an extraordinarily vulnerable light, and arguably contributed to the bombing of UN Headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 and eventual departure of most UN elements.

In place of the expert twinning with indigenous ministries that the UN accomplished in Afghanistan, national advisors, largely U.S., took over. Few had the experience or cultural sensitivities to do it. As representatives of the occupying power, this also set them apart as

the enemy. In playing the occupying power role, the U.S. failed to realize that it is too big and, in today's environment, too hated to be an occupier. The U.S. doesn't know how to be an occupier. It lacks the competencies to advise most fledgling government ministries; it lacks the experience and stature to provide effective government services in the majority of hostile environments where transition support is required today. The U.S. lacks the preparedness, competence, and commitment to provide the first and most vital element of transition support operations – policing and justice for public safety.

The State Department should assign itself the role of protecting international humanitarian law and developing a new framework for humanitarian-military cooperation. The failures to establish and/or maintain secure humanitarian space in Iraq and Afghanistan is weighing heavily on the international humanitarian community. Using the military or contractors to provide humanitarian skills is a dreadful misallocation of scarce resources. It would be a terrible thing if the GWOT would lead to a deterioration of the humanitarian instinct. The humanitarian instinct should be nurtured; it is a basic human value, and it is certainly a fundamental US value.

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR S/CRS

The background to the State Department Office of Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization lies in reactions in the Congress and parts of the Administration to the desperate situation in Iraq: “Never Again Can We Be So Unprepared!” Congress mandated a civilian, State Department transition support lead. The Defense Department initially applauded and supported. State established the Office of Post Conflict Stability and Reconstruction (S/CRS). Efforts were made by State/PRM to shape it with lessons from operations that were working fairly well, such as Afghanistan, and to avoid practices that are not working in Iraq. These efforts should include:

- Don't attempt to replicate in S/CRS all the competencies of governance needed to support transitions in failed and failing states.
- Instead, catalogue those competencies that exist, and have succeeded in the UN and elsewhere in agencies outside the U.S. Don't try to duplicate them in S/CRS.
- Develop a literacy and competence to extract similar productivity out of the UN as was proven in Afghanistan.
- Identify competency gaps that no UN agency or other country is adequately equipped to fill, i.e. public safety.
- In place of National Service Modules of the kind (that were so thoroughly discredited in the response to the July 1994 million person march of Hutus from Rwanda to Goma, Zaire) that are also not working in Afghanistan (e.g., Germany for Police; Italy for Justice; UK for Poppy), look first to getting productivity out of international organizations mandated with these sectoral and service responsibilities.

We worry that the Pentagon, rather than following the sense of Defense Science Board, may in effect take the post-conflict planning responsibility back to Defense, putting, as the DSB reports state, transition support on a level with combat operations. This will ensure failure to the SR initiative because the political competence needed for nation-building is an unnatural competence for Defense. Washington is unlikely to provide Defense (combatant commanders in the field) with the political guidance that would give them a fighting chance to handle such transition support operations (as proved in the perils of implementing PDD-56)

As hard as combatant commanders try, it is unlikely many, if any, of them can come up on their own with the political-military plan they will meet all the needs. We recommend that a logical way forward could include going back to the drawing board to get the right architecture and concept of operations to ensure that S/CRS develops the multilateral, total force literacy and competence to lead in strategic planning. The Departments of State and Defense must get serious about developing a comprehensive campaign plan that covers the life cycle of U.S. engagement in transition support operations

WHAT OVERALL LESSONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE MISSIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN?

From a practitioner's perspective, success is more likely:

- When the U.S. goes in with a substantially large and willing international coalition. As many military professionals and civilian defense observers now admit, the premature drawdown of US forces in Afghanistan, and the insufficient size of the occupying force in Iraq, gave time for opposition to develop, enormously increased the number of casualties and stunted the humanitarian effort, causing the human and financial costs of these operations to rise to staggering heights.
- When major reliance is placed on the UN and other international organizations to perform the services of government initially, then train indigenous ministries on the fundamentals of governance – to get them to do it on their own.
- When competent civilian authority is in overall charge (meaning, in the U.S., the State Department, not necessarily the Defense Department.) Guns are not particularly helpful devices to persuade people to engage in useful dialogue and strategic changes.
- When the State Department is permitted to identify and support a meaningful and potentially winning strategy, as in Afghanistan with the “Program Secretariat” approach to transition support operations.
- “Stabilization and reconstruction” is likely to be a viable concept if the military is trained and empowered to act as enablers rather than executors of humanitarian projects. While its mobility and availability will never take away from its responsibilities as a “first responder,” it must be prepared to step

aside when there is a national (preferably) or international civilian agency able to take on the job. There is absolutely no reason for any military to perceive a need to compete with a skilled civilian voluntary agency in a foreign complex humanitarian emergency.

Failure is very likely, and in some cases virtually assured, when:

- The U.S. goes in alone, or with a small, hesitant coalition.
- When the UN and other parts of the international multilateral system are substantively excluded.
- When military civilians are in charge in the U.S. (i.e., Defense Department civilians in charge) Examples include Iraq and Haiti, where US domestic political considerations blinded senior policymakers from ground truth, and the military imagined it could figure out solutions for civilian issues on the fly.
- When the lessons of the past are excluded and there is uncertainty about the means to achieve unrealistic goals. Improvisation is very expensive in human lives and national treasure.

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