

Introduction to Cornwallis XI: Analysis for Civil-Military Transitions

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INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Cornwallis Group was held at the Allenberry Hotel, Boiling Springs, Pennsylvania with the continued involvement of the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) and in association with the US Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). The call for papers invited the submission of abstracts of papers to the Program Committee on the general topic of *Analysis for Civil-Military Transitions*. The focus of this workshop is on the interfaces of an operation. These included: Transition from peace to conflict, Transition to an international military intervention, Transition from a military intervention to a civilian intervention, and most importantly,

Transition to sustainable peace and stability. There may be other transitions of equal importance, and these must be described and discussed as well.

The theme for Cornwallis XI was a natural progression from the previous themes of the Cornwallis workshops. The first workshop, in 1995, looked at *Analytic Approaches to the Study of Future Conflict*. Subsequent Cornwallis workshops have stressed the increasing complexity of the conflict environment. Continuing events in Darfur, Iraq, Afghanistan, Burma, Timor, Indonesia, Haiti, and elsewhere have shown the critical need to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the methods for intervention. The hypothesis of this workshop is that the interventions designed to deal with these conflicts are at their most fragile during the transitions from one phase (set of objectives and actors) to another phase. These ‘passages of lines’ from military to civilian and from civilian to local governments share one of the attributes of the more traditional military to military passage of lines – that is the vulnerabilities seen and the danger of the action. Papers that address the theory, operations, and analysis of these transitions were requested.

SESSION I: SESSION CHAIR – PROFESSOR ALEXANDER WOODCOCK, Ph.D.

The Welcoming Session of the Workshop was Chaired by Professor Alexander Woodcock and is summarized in this section. The section contains a Foreword by Ambassador Robert W. “Bill” Farrand, Introductory Comments by David Davis, the Founding Chair of the Cornwallis Group, and an Introduction to Cornwallis XI by Alexander Woodcock, Chair and proceedings Editor of the Cornwallis Group. Welcoming remarks on behalf of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) are made by Colonel John Agoglia. Welcoming remarks on behalf of the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre, are made by Colonel Pat Stogran, Vice President of the Centre. The First Cornwallis Keynote on *The Transition from Conflict to the Beginnings of Reconstruction*, was presented by Howard Roy Williams, President and CEO, Center for Humanitarian Cooperation.

A *Foreword* to this volume has been provided by Ambassador Robert W. “Bill” Farrand, former *Deputy High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Supervisor of the city of Brcko*. Farrand observes that as he browsed through this volume, he was struck anew by how greatly he would have benefited from the theoretical analyses contained in these research papers. He could not say they would necessarily have made him a better administrator, since so much depends on personality and the unique skill sets one brings to the table.

However, Farrand could attest without reservation to the overall calming effect they would have had on him. Simply to have been exposed, for example, to the ordered thinking that went into each paper — to know it was OK to be confused and unsure at times about how to proceed — would have provided him with a measure of comfort as he grappled with the myriad of issues on his plate. As several papers make abundantly clear, there is no silver bullet, no single textbook solution to the challenges one confronts without letup in these complex and stressful situations. . This alone will be vastly reassuring to practitioners who consult the Cornwallis series..

Professor David Davis, the Founding Chair of the Cornwallis Group, has provided some introductory comments about Cornwallis XI. Davis is Director of the Peace Operations

Policy Program, George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A. The *Introduction to Cornwallis XI: Analysis for Civil-Military Transitions* by Alexander Woodcock, Chair of The Cornwallis Group and Senior Editor of these proceedings, is presented below

Welcoming remarks on behalf of the *U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)* were made by Colonel John Agoglia, Director of the Institute. PKSOI performs a unique function in the Department of Defense and the US Government (USG) by providing a one-stop stability operations resource center. PKSOI desires to see the following end-states, which can only be achieved through many actors and agencies working together. As the result of a Chief of Staff of the Army decision, PKSOI will become a Field Operating Agency under the G-3 in January 2007. The staffing and concept plan allows for PKSOI to grow from 20 to 49 people. Upon expansion, PKSOI will consist of eight substantive functional areas: training and education; concepts and doctrine; civil military integration; security and governance; operational integration; policy, research and publications; lessons learned; and the PKSOI Director and special staff.

Welcoming remarks on behalf of the *Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre*, commonly known as the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) were made by Colonel Pat Stogran, Vice President of the Centre. The PPC was founded in 1994 in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, Canada. Its role is to support the Government of Canada's commitment to international peace and security through research, education, training and institutional capacity building. With a world-wide reputation in the field of peace operations, the centre has conducted a wide variety of courses at its campus in Nova Scotia. The subject matter of these courses has ranged from the core competencies required by military personnel, police and civilians who deploy to peace operations, to such highly specialized subjects such as Early Warning – Early Response, Human Rights, and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

In his Keynote Presentation: *The Transition from Conflict to the Beginnings of Reconstruction*, Howard Roy Williams, President and CEO, Center for Humanitarian Cooperation points out that use of the word “transition” has become frequent in political discussion. The context has usually been situations in Iraq or Afghanistan, and the term has a variety of interpretations. Though there is general agreement that transition is a stage between conflict and reconstruction requiring its own approach, there's an apparent lack of consensus on what constitutes the elements of the transition stage. Williams stated that his observations on transition are based primarily, but not exclusively, on the perspective of working with a non-governmental organization (NGO). These comments are not a statement of any prevailing doctrine, as NGOs are little driven by doctrinal issues, but are meant to present a perspective on the nature of transition and for whom and under what circumstances this information is significant.

SESSION II: SESSION CHAIR — PAUL CHOUINARD, Ph.D.

Session II was chaired by Paul Chouinard, Ph.D. and consisted of presentations by Guntram Fritz Albin Werther, Ph.D., Richard Hill and Laura Bowman, and J. Matthew Leatherman.

In his presentation on *Transition Dreams, Human Realities: Military-Civil Transitions as Humane Enterprises* Guntram Werther observes that the primary focus of military-civil

transitions should be on the change process and not final end states. The twin grounds are that almost all modern countries are unintended blends of complex, endless dispute resolution processes between the state and the “other” — none are remotely pure outcomes, nor is the “other” usually eliminated — and that a dance of disputing yields indeterminate outcomes better understood as a shift in harmonies than a change in states. A ‘best case’ outcome is to achieve a synchronous harmony of process rather than any end state.

Werther further observes that a *humane* transition, seen in the Enlightenment sense of that term as meaning efforts comporting with a real, practical, and wise sense of how humans truly act, is far to be preferred over simplistic ideological guideposts about preferred outcomes and desired realities. Indeed, initiating change is usually a huge risk with unknown consequents. The complex — as in “a” complex — nature of change suggests a change profiling approach supporting analyses of a holistic, dynamically integrative type built upon a socio-psychological grounding over math modeling approaches; or indeed, over any approach that does not centrally place “thinking within bias” — differing bias systems and how they act. Consequently, qualitatively dynamic ‘solutions’ showing synchronous harmony or asynchronous disharmony occur: not states or firm outcomes.

In their paper titled: *Police Reform Programs: Links to Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Social Stability in Violent and Fragile States*, Richard Hill and Laura Bowman observe that ineffective conventional public security is the hallmark of post-conflict societies. In nearly every post-conflict situation in recent memory, the reaction to this lack of security has been to focus on broad reconstruction of the security sector by demobilizing armed forces, establishing police forces, resurrecting and often reforming the legal code, reconstructing judicial and penal institutions and developing enough qualified personnel for these systems. Unfortunately, the international community and the country in crisis rarely manages to push forward these reconstruction elements in a synchronized, culturally sensitive, and speedy fashion.

Over the span of the last five to ten years, Hill and Bowman further observe that the international community has increasingly refined top-down security sector reform approaches. These typically include construction or reconstruction of institutional actors such as military forces, police forces, the judiciary and penal systems. However, even today, examples of programs which promote the development of physical security at the local level are rare. Increasing attention should be paid to the development of programs that build genuine responsiveness to local leaders and local concerns if transition from post-conflict settings to long term, legitimate security settings is to be successful.

J. Matthew Leatherman in his paper titled: *Democracy as a Tool for Stabilizing Peace: The Case of Kosovo*, observes that the international community cannot take for granted that Kosovo’s impending transition will lead to sustainable and stable peace. It is equally likely that it will transition back into low intensity conflict, or into state failure. Wielding democracy for peace in Kosovo will require resolve, most of all. Lacking committed attention to the details of Kosovo’s development, even well-intentioned strategies and programs may undermine the ultimate objective: bringing the last active conflict in the former Yugoslavia to a peaceful, democratic conclusion.

If the international community musters the resolve, Leatherman suggests that success is at hand in Kosovo. Polarization can be a force for democracy when rival Serb and Albanian organizations become convinced that the political, economic, and social costs of continuing

conflict are prohibitive. Political institutions in the region – provisional in Kosovo, and permanent in Serbia proper – facilitate democracy for countries experiencing internal war or collapse. It is the ambiguity of final status that diminishes the expected peace dividend, and negotiations to settle this point are ongoing. Although the voices labeling Mitrovica's natural resources as Kosovo's panacea are occasionally shriller, activities on the ground steadily lay the groundwork for a free and integrated market. If this can be maintained, he suggests then Kosovo will benefit greatly from its proximity to affluent Western European countries.

However, Leatherman points out that these opportunities are as tenuous as they are real. Building confidence and legitimacy in Kosovo, politically and economically, is a direct outgrowth of the reliability of security and the rule of law. Furthermore, capitalizing on Kosovo's democratic opportunities identified by the quantitative model will be a function of the international community's commitment over the long-term, and this commitment will be measured by the day-to-day resolve shown by the security forces. Preventing armed conflict is no longer sufficient; tactics must focus on laying a firm, democratic foundation for peace. This requires a change in mindset, particularly in Mitrovica. If reinvigorated, these proactive security and rule of law strategies will culminate in a democratic transition from military occupation to civil peace in Kosovo, and set a more constructive precedent for international stability and reconstruction operations globally.

SESSION III: SESSION CHAIR — COLONEL JOHN AGOGLIA

Session III was chaired by Colonel John Agoglia, Director of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). The Session included a Keynote presentation by Walter S. Clarke and Arthur "Gene" Dewey and presentations by Colonel Christopher Holshek and Mike Neighbour.

In their Keynote Presentation: "*Stabilization and Reconstruction*" and the *Humanitarian-Military Dilemma*, Walter Clarke and Gene Dewey observe that the uneven planning and execution for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars continue to elicit controversy within the US Government, the US public and around the world. These two conflicts have also created a growing problematic relationship between the military and the world humanitarian community. They point out that little known to the general public is that many of the planning and operational problems in Afghanistan and Iraq generated useful early introspection and analysis within the US Government, especially in the two federal agencies most directly concerned with its successful outcome, the Departments of Defense and State.

Clarke and Dewey examine various current efforts to develop comprehensive planning structures that would avoid in the future the many mistakes that plague the operations known as "Operation Iraqi Freedom" (OIF) and "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF) in Afghanistan. Despite serious high-level efforts to reconsider the interagency, multinational and humanitarian elements of coalition operations in the 21st century, many issues remain to be resolved, and the potential results are unclear. There is growing evidence that the politics of occupation and the stress of continued insurgency are having increasingly negative effects on the framework of international humanitarian assistance in those two operations. We look at the new doctrinal "reconstruction and stabilization" planning environment and question whether it can harmonize the disparate experiences, training and expertise of military, diplomatic and humanitarian participants in complex emergencies.

In his paper *The Scroll and the Sword: Synergizing Civil-Military Power*, Colonel Christopher Holshek observes that greater integration of all elements of national power is now indispensable to national and international security. This is driven by two strategic imperatives: one, the evolving non-state social-cultural strategic and operational environments of the 21st century; and two, the challenge to America's ability to continue to afford its longstanding predilection for ambitiously applied hard power as strategic resources become increasingly scarce.

Holshek states that failure to comprehend these imperatives, at many decision-making levels, can not only cost many lives. It can also cost immense amounts of political and economic capital, threatening to undermine long-term U.S. grand strategy. Recent policy initiatives reflect a nascent appreciation of the need to leverage softer, civil elements of national power, reposed in the interagency process and the private sector. However, a unifying concept to coalesce civil and military power has yet to find full articulation.

Furthermore, Holshek points out that many of the principles for this concept may be grounded, among other places, in the inherently strategic concepts of civil affairs/civil-military operations (CAO/CMO) as ways and strategic capabilities like civil affairs (CA) as a means – the only true operating concepts and capability the U.S. Government has to synergize civil-military power. At all levels and across the full range of operations, evolving CAO/CMO and CA are at the forefront of stability, transition to peace, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations. Meanwhile, He states that demand for CA, itself in a state of dynamic change, has exhausted supply.

Indeed, as the strategic and operational value of CAO/CMO and CA becomes more apparent, Joint and Army doctrines struggle to address environmental challenges and place CAO/CMO and CA in appropriate context, while the CA force may already be broken. This study looks to identify that strategic context, a conceptual hierarchy, principles for synergizing civil and military elements of power, and specific recommendations with regard to civil-military ways and means.

In his paper *Operational Analysis in Afghanistan* (sub-titled: The ramblings of an analyst in Afghanistan) Mike Neighbour states that during the period from May 2005 to February 2006 the author had provided Operational Analysis support to the British-lead Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) based in the North of Afghanistan at Masar-el-Sharif. This paper is an account of that work.

SESSION IV: SESSION CHAIR — PROFESSOR DAVID DAVIS

Session IV was chaired by Professor David Davis and consisted of papers by Alexandra Hall and Jaques de Vasselot, Michael Pryce, Pauline Baker, Martin Lidy, and Gene Visco.

In their paper titled: *Strategy in High Places: The Civil-Military Interface in Theory and Practice*, Hall and de Vasselot examine the civil-military interface at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, in theory and in practice. The context for their paper was work undertaken for NATO C3 Agency (NC3A) in the area of force determination. NATO undertakes every two years a comprehensive Defence Requirements Review (DRR) and part of the methodology used by NC3A is to determine the force requirements to satisfy a range

of tasks within a number of different mission types, scenarios and planning situations. The contracted work was to improve the representation of Command and Control (C2) in the force determination rules, i.e. the requirements for HQs, especially the types and numbers of trained personnel for NATO-led intervention operations.

Part of the work described by Hall and de Vasselot involved examining contemporary military doctrine for C2 and from this determining key 'norms' for establishing HQs. The doctrine was complete in many respects. However, an HQ requirement that has come increasingly to the fore has been the need to establish and maintain military-civilian interfaces at a number of different levels which has significant implications for force determination due to the requirement for trained liaison personnel. They observe that here there seemed to be no military doctrine so the research team stepped back and examined the civil / military interfaces at the grand strategic, strategic, operational and tactical levels, drawing on International Relations theory, to determine 'what should be' and then researched a real operation (in this case IFOR) to see 'what was' and how much the theory was borne out by practice. A distillation of both should provide robust recommendations for the force determination rules.

Hall and de Vasselot's paper provides an overview of the principal actors and agencies that may be active both in theatre and at a remove and aims to offer a snapshot of the kinds of liaison links that are required to be established and maintained between these organisations. It identifies the kinds of mechanisms and infrastructure that should be in place whenever civil and military actors come into contact with one another. The paper draws attention to the benefits to be derived from communication and co-operation and illustrates the risks associated with failure to co-ordinate and de-conflict.

In his paper titled: *Improving S/CRS Planning Framework from a Geographic Combatant Command's Perspective*, Pryce states that with the establishment of the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS) in August 2004, increasing attention and resources have been devoted to the topic of stability planning. The "US Government Draft Planning Framework for Stabilization, Reconstruction and Conflict Transformation" (referred to throughout this paper as the Planning Framework) was published in December 2005 to serve as the vehicle by which S/CRS proposes to meet its Presidential mandate to bring all elements of the US government into active planning. The Planning Framework focuses on post-conflict reconstruction rather than pre-conflict prevention. It is also reactive rather than proactive in nature, meaning the planning process is not initiated until a trip-wire event occurs.

Pryce further points out, by contrast, that the US European Command's (USEUCOM) Stability Planning Branch in the Strategy, Policy and Assessments Directorate focuses on stability planning from the standpoint of conflict prevention. We are exploring the concept of applying a preventative "stability calculus" across our Area of Responsibility (AOR), working within the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) strategy and Department of Defense Security Cooperation Guidance.

The purpose of the paper by Pryce was to examine the areas in which these two approaches overlap, and to explore means by which the military's long-established planning expertise and USEUCOM's current focus on conflict prevention can be used to strengthen and enhance the Planning Framework. This integrated strategy would encourage a degree of interagency influence absent from current TSC strategies and avoid re-inventing the wheel by

taking advantage of established planning and cooperation programs that are already funded within each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). Pryce further observes that utilizing specific tools and strengths of TSC Regional Strategies, such as established evaluation methods and resource allocation, lends utility and accountability to the planning process and improves the US government's ability to achieve National Security Objectives.

In her paper titled: *From Failed State to Civil War: The Lebanization of Iraq 2003-2006, An Analysis for Civil-Military Transitions* Baker observes that many excellent assessments have been made of civil-military transitions in peace and stability operations, in countries ranging from Haiti to East Timor. Most of them are after-action reports conducted by the military, case studies written by scholars or journalists, or comparative studies of various peacekeeping operations and their operational effectiveness. Baker points out, however, that these studies tend to be country specific, limited in scope and do not employ a rigorous social science methodology that can track the major social, economic and political/military trends on the ground, and measure whether, and why, stabilization strategies were succeeding or failing in fostering sustainable security.

Baker further states that policymakers and military commanders involved in counter-insurgency operations or state-building (or nation-building, as post-conflict operations are often called) need a tool with effects-based metrics that can assess whether strategies and tactics are having the intended outcomes. Only then can they make informed decisions about operational and tactical moves, anticipate future challenges, evaluate whether policies have misfired, and adjust existing policies to avoid irreversible damage.

In his paper titled: *Evolving U.S. Government Interagency Transformational Diplomacy Doctrine*, Lidy observes that one of the major objectives of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America is to transform the U.S. Government's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century. The paper identifies recent institutional reforms that have been implemented by various departments and agencies in response to this strategic objective. These reforms, however, are taking place within department and agency stovepipes without an interagency doctrine to integrate the processes and organizations or to link them to the other national security objectives.

The paper by Lidy proposes how these reforms might be incorporated into an interagency doctrine that can improve existing capabilities that de-conflict and coordinate department and agency activities into a capability that provides government-wide coherence to planning and execution of what the Secretary of State has termed *transformational diplomacy*: "To work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system."

In his evening session titled: *Perhaps More Than You Ever Wanted to Know About The World is Flat* that was held in the lounge-bar of the Allenberry Inn. Approximately 20 participants of the Cornwallis meeting sat in on the discussion. Considerable freedom of interchange ensued. Unfortunately, no detailed record of the discussion was made so a useful analysis of the session cannot be provided. Some general comments, based on the best recollections at this time, are made in conjunction with a listing of the principal contents of the book. Some brief attention was paid to the work of Jared Diamond, *Collapse. How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, in the sense that, while Friedman's argument is optimistic, Diamond's is potentially pessimistic.

SESSION V: SESSION CHAIR — GEORGE ROSE, Ph.D.

Session V was chaired by George Rose, Ph.D., and consisted of one paper by Colonel Dan O'Donohue and another by Alok Chaturvedi, Rashmi Chaturvedi, Midh Mulpuri, and Steve Mellema as well as a Special Gaming session that is reported on by Howard Body.

In their paper titled: *Modeling Stability and Reconstruction Operation Using SEAS* Chaturvedi, Chaturvedi, Mulpuri, and Mellema observe that Humanitarian aid and assistance is considered a critical tool for development and reconstruction. Challenges are posed by recurring disasters such as armed conflicts; droughts, hurricanes, and earthquakes; high numbers of internally displaced persons and returning refugee-contested terrains; and competing regional and international influences. In this paper the authors present a computational model for simulating the dynamic interplay between humanitarian and developmental aid and its linkages to the nation building process in a war ravaged region of the world, namely, Afghanistan.

Chaturvedi *et al.* use the SEAS-VIS platform to construct a Virtual Afghanistan (represented by a physical landscape), and autonomous, adaptive and cognitive agents consisting of individuals, organizations, institutions, and infrastructure. Chaturvedi *et al.* use VA to analyze the robustness of policy choices under different scenarios. Their results indicate that in the presence of moderate levels of criminal and terrorist activities, a Minimalist Approach to Stability and Reconstruction Operation may provide a better return on investment than a Maximalist Approach.

The paper *Fighting Fallujah* by Colonel Dan O'Donohue, examines the divided command, poor planning, ignorance of local power politics, crippled negotiations and miscalculations that drove decisions about Fallujah. Overseas interventions demand complete unity of effort between political and military actions at every level--from the tactical to the strategic. That unity of effort is achieved by forward-looking strategic direction and a campaign plan that is informed by an understanding of local realities. O'Donohue states that a clear chain of responsibility is essential. None of this was present in Fallujah in April 2004. On 31 March 2004, four American contract security guards wandered blindly into the Sunni city of Fallujah and were brutally butchered in its streets.

He observes that this relatively minor action was magnified by lurid telecasts of Iraqis desecrating the body parts. For sympathetic viewers of al-Jazeera the atrocities were a rallying cry. In America, there was deep revulsion and passionate cries for action. In a precipitous response, two strategic decisions were made of lasting consequence. The first was to order the Marines, over their protest, to attack Fallujah immediately on the enemy's terms. The second was to back off in the midst of the successful attack and order a "unilateral cessation of offensive operations. Together these decisions resulted in a major political defeat and a turning point in the insurgency.

O'Donohue states that the decisions to attack and then halt mid-stride undermined U.S. credibility and emboldened the rising insurgency. The Marine long term counter-insurgency plans were scrapped for immediate action. Additionally, these flawed decisions led to a strategic blind alley that left the United States with no feasible options for resolving the Fallujah crisis. With the cessation of offensive operations, thousands of Marines, while under insurgent fire, were unable to either attack or withdraw from the partially occupied city.

Beyond that, strategic progress in all of Iraq became dependent on ill-defined negotiations with the Fallujah insurgent's representative leadership—former Baathist generals. With aggressive military options off the table, the U.S. empowered its enemies and eventually sacrificed every negotiating point to extricate itself from an impossible position in Fallujah. At the same time, while the focus was on Fallujah, the insurgents gained the initiative in the surrounding Al Anbar Province and “Sunni Triangle.”

The paper titled *Analysing Stabilisation Operations* by Body describes the origins and development of the UK MOD sponsored Peace Support Operations (PSO). Study and the associated PSO model as it existed in March 2006 and which was demonstrated at Cornwallis XI. PSOM is a multi-sided, turn based, stochastic, computer-aided war game that was intended to support the analysis of PSO and to provide guidance about the appropriate military force structures for a Peace Support Force (PSF).

The paper by Body discusses the development of PSOM from initial aim into a model encompassing a comprehensive representation of all aspects of a post Intervention PSO; the problems of developing robust definitions of intervention, stability and instability that dominated the initial stages of the study; the key academic and doctrinal foundations for our understanding of PSO and the nature of a Comprehensive Approach; the key insights that emerged that define our perception of the PSO mission.

These range from the need to understand the nation and the opposition, to recognition of the fundamental importance of the Rule of Law; the key concepts that form the pillars underlying the PSOM - Consent, Security and Stability (national functionality); the principal actors that are represented, namely Blue (coalition), Green (indigenous), Red (Spoiler, and White (agency) and their broad strategic aims; how ‘Victory’ in a PSO is a progression from intervention (imposed stability), through viable peace to self- sustaining peace; and the assumptions, which are not exhaustive, on which PSOM has been built with reference to the supporting historical and academic data.

SESSION VI: SESSION CHAIR — GENE VISCO

Session VI was chaired by Gene Visco and consisted of papers by: David Luke Huxtable; Ian M. Mitchell; Michael J. Baranick and Samuel Schwabe; and Michael J. Baranick, Dennis Shorts, and Samuel Schwabe

In his paper titled *PRT Transformation: To Measure or Not To Measure? An analyst's experience of measuring transformation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) from military operations to civilian functions in Afghanistan*. Huxtable observes that NATO's presence and mission in Afghanistan was in the process of expansion throughout the whole of the country during the ISAF VIII rotation. This expansion involved NATO taking responsibility for coordination of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that were spread throughout Afghanistan to provide security and support to allow development work to take place and extend the influence of the Government of Afghanistan beyond Kabul.

Huxtable points out that the international community set up a Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee, consisting of the major players from the IC in PRTs.

Part of the work of this committee was to look at the progress of security, governance and development across the country, and to develop situational awareness of the status of the PRTs and province. ISAF OA helped the development of provincial indicators to look at the progress within the provinces both in the long-term and short-term. In particular there was a need to measure the progress of the PRTs towards the transformation from a predominantly military organisation, to a civilian lead team. This paper provides an analyst's experiences in trying to develop such indicators and the difficulties that arose from a seemingly straightforward task.

In his paper titled: *Stakes in the Ground: Taxonomy for Analysis of Civil-Military Transitions*, Mitchell points out that seeks to inform decision-makers by abstracting the key drivers from a situation. With the increasing complexity of the conflict environment such abstraction is essential to develop understanding. Recent UK experience suggests that the development of a usable comprehensive and understood framework is essential to coherent discussion and analysis of military operations and military capability development.

Mitchell further observes that this environment is now recognised to cover a range of situations and interactions from peace to conflict. Implicit in these views is the role of international military intervention, aimed at recovery back to sustainable peace and stability via civilian intervention. Within the environment a spectrum of activities are undertaken by many agents, some against one another and often ignorant of each other. These bodies have diverse capabilities, objectives and interests. Understanding how they interact is challenging but essential to those decisions seeking to improve the environment overall. Development of a scheme to define the processes on a system basis is essential to such analysis.

The paper by Mitchell considers the definition of the environment for the transitions, their implied nature as crises, and proposes taxonomy describing these. It refers to UK MoD experience of capability development and outputs from the Cornwallis Group. It offers taxonomy for discussion by participants at Cornwallis XI, which may be developed further if it is felt to offer utility.

In their paper titled: *In Pursuit of Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh*, Baranick and Schwabe observe that conflict continues to exist in the Caucasus between the pre-dominantly Christian Armenia and pre-dominantly Muslim Azerbaijan over rights to the highly contentious Nagorno-Karabakh and the seven surrounding territories that provide a buffer zone. For the Armenians in control of Nagorno-Karabakh the fundamental concern is security, while the leaders in Azerbaijan understand the main issue to be their territorial integrity. As Azerbaijan continues to raise its defense spending, Armenians increasingly fear a violent campaign. Over the past 17 years, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been stuck in a never-ending quagmire of negotiations that have produced no results.

Baranick and Schwabe also point out that the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has hindered economic growth between the two countries and poses security issues for the entire region. In 2006, there have been four high-level meetings without notable progress. The United States had no representative in attendance at the latest round of mediation, leading some to believe that Washington is losing hope for a near-term Armenian-Azerbaijani peace accord. For a year that began with high hopes of a settlement, the results to date have proven disappointing. The leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan may meet again later this year in a last-ditch attempt to use what the mediators have described as a "golden opportunity" to end

the Karabakh conflict. Whether or not this occurs may well determine the future of the Nagorno Karabakh region and the surrounding areas.

In their paper titled *How will integration into the Euro-Atlantic community help create security, stability, and economic development?* Baranick, Shorts, and Schwabe observe that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion into the “three seas” region would not only help mitigate instability arising from regional rivalries and frozen conflicts, but would give NATO increased capacity for security and peacekeeping missions in Eurasia, Central Asia, and elsewhere. Although major obstacles to integration exist, fomenting wide-ranging cooperation in the “three seas” within the framework of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance is worth pursuing.

Baranick, Shorts, and Schwabe discuss whether “the three seas” region (the area between the Black Sea, Caspian Sea, and Mediterranean Sea) be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security and economic structure? The need for an affirmative answer is becoming increasingly clear. The region between the seas has assumed greater strategic importance due to the presence of huge reserves of natural resources as well as major strategic transport corridors, the control of which will determine the geopolitical future of Eurasia. Both of these reasons have caused this region to become a focus of attention for security, economic, and stability interests of the primary global and regional powers.

**SESSION VII: SESSION CHAIR — PROFESSOR
ALEXANDER WOODCOCK, Ph.D.**

Session VII was the final session of the meeting. It was chaired by Woodcock and consisted of a round table discussion of likes and dislikes for Cornwallis XI and where and on what topic Cornwallis XII should be based. As mentioned elsewhere, it has been decided that Cornwallis XII will discuss Analysis for Multi-Agency Support and be held at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Nova Scotia in Canada.