

“Interagency Coordination” and the Search for a Practical Civil-Military Paradigm ¹

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Arthur “Gene” Dewey graduated from West Point in 1956 and has a Master’s Degree from Princeton University. His distinguished 25-year military career included two tours in Viet Nam, where he earned a DFC as a combat helicopter battalion commander. As a White House Fellow, his interest in humanitarian issues took him to Biafra and other points of friction in the Third World. Immediately after his retirement from the military in 1981, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Refugee Programs. From 1984-1988, he served as UN Assistant Secretary General and Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dewey was named director of the Office of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to the Newly Independent States. He was the founding director of the NGO successor to the House Select Committee on Hunger, The Congressional Hunger Center. Gene subsequently served for two years on the faculty of Army War College and the Peacekeeping Institute. As a consultant for Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Dewey worked in civil-military exercises in Latin America, Europe and Asia. In 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell asked him to return to the Department of State as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), where he

administered substantial US funding for refugees around the world. He left the State Department on 1 July 2005, and he continues his interests in civil-military relations and comprehensive planning. Dewey currently leads a US Army Science Board project related to global terrorism. He is also the US member of the International Independent Group of Eminent Persons dealing with human rights in Sri Lanka.

ABSTRACT

The authors have advised and written on matters of civil-military relations and interagency coordination since the mid-1990s. At Cornwallis XI in Boiling Springs, PA, we reviewed the development of what appeared to be encouraging new civil-military doctrine emerging from the Pentagon. Among various institutional reforms, Defense Directive 3000.05 set out significant challenges to the military community just as National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) provided specific parallel guidance for the civilian side of government, with the State Department as lead agency.

There are a number of reasons why the earnest efforts of good men and women on both sides of the civil-military barricades failed to achieve the exemplary levels of mutual understanding and cooperation called for in the evolving doctrine. In this presentation, we will review many of the current problems in civil-military relations, including problematic slogantry ("unity of effort"), the yawning resource gaps between civilian and military agencies, the significant cultural differences between organizations, and we will focus on certain individual agency problems.

In the current debate over civil-military relations, we feel that the focus is enormously distorted by the fascination with inter-agency politics in Washington. Why are we so concerned with stabilization and reconstruction? Because on the battlefields, there are real people involved: there are innocent victims of intervention and conflict. In our view, the only acceptable planning framework for stabilization and reconstruction is to adopt the "total force" concept that we have advocated for years. By "total force" we mean not just the totality of U.S. unilateral tools of statecraft; we mean especially the multilateral agency proxy tools that the U.S. must increasingly understand and use in future Muslim world interventions (where the U.S. unilateral tools have become either counterproductive or irrelevant). What are the consequences of intervention and which human and institutional needs that must be attended to in a humanitarian emergency? This systematic approach, of course, was not the route taken in planning the Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation.

Rather than be inclusive and comprehensive, the operating concepts for the Iraq war (2003-present) have been distorted by ideological bias, interagency rivalries and leadership focused on campaigning for domestic approval while improvising a kaleidoscope of tactics on the battlefield. Nevertheless, there may some hope. The increasing acceptance of social science tools by military commanders in the field is encouraging. As demonstrated by current military efforts to utilize insights facilitated by social scientists, the US has clearly followed incorrect paths in fighting jihadism on a worldwide basis; its military and public diplomacy tactics in Iraq have been largely counterproductive, and our enemies have so far been able to push the US Government behind barricades.

THE NEW CIVIL-MILITARY FRAMEWORK

“...Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agencies...”

[From the foreword to FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, and Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command) December 2006]

The original Afghan and Iraqi military interventions unveiled a dramatic new concept of warfighting which featured rapid tactical maneuver, intensive firepower and the production of virtual intelligence that permitted the commanders to see the evolution of combat on the battlefield. In the history of warfare, “shock and awe” seemed a relatively efficient way to overwhelm the enemy by focused firepower and intimidation.

Unfortunately, this great innovation in the use of combat arms was not a useful device in the immediate post-combat period of stabilization and reconstruction. The war planners evidently assumed that civilians would manage the post-combat phase. The war planners ignored the many warnings about the inevitable post-conflict political vacuum; no one among the military conflict planners anticipated the collapse of restraints against looting and pillage; “shock and awe” produced a hollow temporary victory.

There has been a great deal of confusion within the US population about the direction of the war; this is an administration that uses the words “strategy” and “tactics” interchangeably. The phase two forces (10th Cavalry) that went into Iraq immediately after the fall of Baghdad were trained and prepared for a peacekeeping mission. They were unprepared for the avalanche of looting and disorder that followed the fall of Saddam’s administration. The confusion over strategy and tactics was a problem for the war fighters from the very start. The US military responded to the new emergency as well as it could, applying force when needed, exercising energetic force protection measures and, incidentally, flooding Iraq with civil affairs officers and contractors to help to stabilize and reconstruct the country.

Many very important decisions, such as the disbanding of Saddam’s military and sanctioning anyone who had been a member of the Baathist party, were based on unclear policies that now seem to have no author. Public security in Baghdad and in most of Iraq fell apart and, within weeks, disappeared in the capital and many other locations as former in- and out-groups fought to either maintain or reverse their new situations. For most Iraqis, the disappearance of the Saddamist state and all public institutions in what had been one of the most secular of Middle Eastern countries caused them to turn to their tribal affiliations and mullahs for whatever authority they could mobilize. The US military was ill-prepared to mediate the new Iraq civil war.

THE US MILITARY SEARCHES FOR ANSWERS

As the authors noted at some length in their discussion at Cornwallis Group XI, the professional US military saw problems with the Iraq War within a few short months of the outset of hostilities. The issue was referred to the Defense Science Board in the fall of 2003, was then thoroughly discussed in the summers of 2004 and 2005, and in November 2005, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld signed Defense Directive 3000.05. Most noteworthy was the declaration that "Stability Operations are a core US military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations..." (for broader discussion see Clarke-Dewey, 2006).

As one would expect from an organization with vast funding and over 1.2 million members, the US military includes many very bright people. Looking at the growing insurgency in Iraq, senior military commanders decided that the area that needed the greatest examination was counterinsurgency. Lieutenant General David Petraeus, a highly experienced senior officer with a Ph.D. from Princeton, took charge of developing new doctrine that would not only help the US to find its way in Iraq, but would prepare the military for the future. The major work for the new doctrine was performed at Fort Leavenworth, KS, by several dozens of writers with about 20 main editors. Adopted by both the US Army and the US Marine Corps, the new volume, *Counterinsurgency*, was published in December 2006. It is probably the most influential doctrinal document published in the past ten years.

Among the editors, two participants, one from Australia, and the other the wife of an Army officer, stand out for their contributions. Lt. Col. David J. Kilcullen (a Ph.D. now retired from the Australian Army) is a widely-recognized expert on insurgency based on his experience in various deployments with the Australian military and his extended research into Asian insurgencies. He believes that we are now on the "threshold of a new era of warfare," that requires western militaries to adapt "like dinosaurs out-competed by smaller, weaker, but more adaptive mammals...nation-states are more powerful but less agile and flexible than non-state opponents. As in all conflict, success will depend on our ability to adapt..." (Kilcullen, 2007). Although Kilcullen has held positions in both State and Defense and is now senior counterinsurgency advisor to the Commanding General, Multi-National Force (MNF) in Iraq, he speaks quite openly of the need to change the US approach to terrorism and the Arab World.

The genius of the Kilcullen approach is that he characterizes the conflict in Iraq as competition for influence. He discounts Islamic radicalism as the prime motivator for resistance to the US-dominated occupation force. In a recent presentation (Kilcullen, 2007a, slide 24), he observes that "people are not mobilized individually, by cold consideration of rational facts. They are mobilized in groups, by influencers and opinion leaders, through *cultural narratives*..." These narratives include seven basic elements, including "a simple story, words that resonate, the use of symbolic images, a basis for action, credibility built on consistency with what is seen or heard, and an image of the future that inspires people to mortgage current self-interest for future benefits." For Kilcullen, the war in Iraq is primarily political; he cites the 1964 classic by David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency/Warfare Theory and Practice* that states "a revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent is political," a proportion that he believes also holds true in Iraq. Kilcullen observes that US spending in Iraq, 2003-2006, was 1.4 percent civilian and 98.6 percent military.

The broad Kilcullen focus on the psychology of groups fits in very nicely with the work of Dr. Montgomery McFate who holds a Ph.D. in anthropology from Yale University and is the wife of a former Army officer. She has been working for several years to build cultural awareness within US force members. In her 2005 article in *Military Review* (McFate, 2005), she cites several cases in which “US forces frequently do not know who their friends are, and just as often they do not know who their enemies are.” She decries the tendency of Americans to assume that “adversaries will behave exactly as they would behave.” As a social science, anthropology offers insights into the behavior of foreign cultures. In the cited article, Dr. McFate analyses the utility of anthropologists throughout US military history, from the Huk rebellion to present. Dr. McFate approaches counterinsurgency with the goal of “attaining a holistic, total understanding of local culture.”

Dr. McFate is controversial within academic anthropology circles (Gonzalez, 2007). They have many objections, some of which reflect their abhorrence of the war and the current administration. Other views, more traditional to academic circles see the collaboration between the military and anthropologists as encouraging the notion that anthropologists are being used as spies by their governments. McFate’s favorite rejoinder to her critics is that she is not militarizing anthropology; she is “anthropologizing the military.”

There may be something in that. According to Patrick Porter, a lecturer at the Defense Studies Department, Kings College London, we are informed that the new counterinsurgency field manual mentions the word “culture” 88 times and “cultural” 90 times in its 282 pages (Porter, 2007, p. 48). The remainder of his essay, which tends to be skeptical about the new doctrine, examines the new emphasis on anthropology in military tactics in the context of the longtime debate on “western” versus “eastern” military doctrine. In our view, this approach is interesting but it takes nothing away from the evident wisdom of putting aside our folk biases in order to get into the heads of enemies and friends.

A campaign has begun to encourage social scientists to boycott working with the military. In US universities in the northwest, there is a document entitled “Pledge of Non-Participation in Counter-Insurgency,” now circulating among the anthropologist community. There is no particular indication that the US government is making any effort to reassure the academic community that social science knowledge is not a tool of war but a means of finding what the military calls “non-kinetic” solutions.

In Afghanistan, an experimental unit, the first-ever Human Terrain Team (HTT), is working with Col. Martin Schweitzer, the commander of an 82nd Airborne unit, providing cultural advice and suggestions on ways to win community support without using military force (Rohde, 2007). According to this same article, Secretary of Defense Gates authorized a \$40 million expansion of the Human Terrain program in September 2007 and hopes to assign teams of anthropologists and social scientists to each of the 26 American combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan. Col. Schweitzer attributes the presence of social scientists to a 60 percent reduction in combat operations since their arrival in the spring of 2007.

It must be noted that the qualities of cultural empathy, sensitivity to traditional political values and knowledge of history and languages, usually combined with considerable practical field experience, are attributes that at least used to be found in the professional Foreign Service Officer. We will look into how this resource may be useful for the Pentagon in the growing HTT network.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT

The State Department, which had a great deal to bring to the table prior to the invasion of Iraq, was at the outset effectively excluded from the process by the Pentagon and the Vice President's office. Nearly all of the State Department Arabists whose names and backgrounds were submitted to General Garner before he left Washington to take charge of the original "nation-building" office in Baghdad were rejected elsewhere in the administration reportedly because the Vice President's office feared that that Arabic-speaking Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) would be too "pro-Arab." FSOs, of course, do more than just speak foreign languages to impress people at cocktail parties. They are expected to know about the history, ethnic and social issues, the economy and aspirations of the peoples in the countries to which they are assigned. It is probably the fault of the Department of State that the US military remains ignorant of this in-house resource.

Traditionally, there is a great deal of suspicion between the Pentagon and the State Department. We recall a comment made by a Defense negotiator during the mid-1990s process that led to the proclamation of President Clinton's PDD-56, the first document to lay out a framework ostensibly calling for better coordination between State and Defense. The real reason, our DoD source stated, was that PDD-56 was very important because it required State to fund its "bright ideas." Of course, at that time, "nation-building" was anathema to war fighters, and derided by our legislators.

Military concerns were very much a part of the original framework developed in 2003-2004 for the State Department Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction. The State Department was given an important, but nevertheless subsidiary role, to support Defense in joint peacekeeping operations. The goal of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), signed by President Bush on 7 December 2005, was to enhance the role of the State Department in interagency efforts to work with the Pentagon. There have been issues about NSPD-44 and the State Department's subsequent roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. The State Department immediately ran into budgetary constraints imposed by a Congress that was focused only on the military response to the "Global War on Terror" (GWOT). There is also a great deal of ambiguity in the relationship between DoD 3000.05 and NSPD-44. There is a lack of clarity of the exact roles of the two agencies in stability operations. Government agencies generally do not know how to implement NSPD-44 (PEP, p. 2).

In March 2007, a memorandum was sent from the Executive Secretary of the State Department to all undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and assistant administrators notifying them that the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) would be "aligned" under the leadership and direction of the Director of US Foreign Assistance. Although the State Department organizational chart still shows S/CRS with a direct line to the Secretary, the new designation does represent a significant diminution of the office's status. If, in fact, one of the original motives in the 1990s for closer coordination between State and Defense was to force diplomats to face up to the costs of their "bright ideas," placing S/CRS at USAID's front door may represent another DoD victory.

A significant casualty of the USAID affiliation with S/CRS may well be that of holding U.S. post-conflict operations hostage to USAID's unilateral *modus operandi*. To be effective in the war against Islamic extremism, multilateralism – not unilateralism – must be the center of gravity of the largely civilian character of post conflict stability operations. To be an

effective post-conflict player today, the U.S. must learn and implement the role of “best supporting actor” to the main multilateral effort.

There has been a lot of grumbling within the military about the State Department’s seeming reluctance to provide personnel for the Iraqi operation. John Naland, President of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), the union-like entity which represents Foreign Service Officers in negotiations with Department of State management, sent a message in mid-October 2007 to a journalist who had published yet another diatribe about the Department (AFSA, 2007). Naland noted that the State Department currently has 6,500 Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and 5000 technical personnel (security agents, communicators, secretaries, etc). Another 1500 FSOs are in USAID, the Foreign Commercial Service, and the Foreign Agricultural Service. Looking at the State Department component, the US active-duty military is 220 times larger than State. The Defense Department has more colonels and Navy captains than there are FSOs. The military has more band members than there are FSOs.

Naland further defended the Foreign Service, noting that more than 20 percent (1200) of FSOs have served in Iraq as volunteers since 2003. This admirable record appears likely to change for assignments beginning in the summer of 2008. On 26 October 2007, the State Department announced that as many as 50 Foreign Service positions in Iraq remained unfilled for the summer of 2008 (DeYoung, 27 October 2007). Using its authority to direct assignments when volunteers are unavailable, the State personnel office announced that it had notified over 200 FSOs that they were under consideration for a directed assignment to Iraq, including assignments to the Embassy and Provincial Rehabilitation Teams (PRTs). These officers were given ten days to offer a reason why they should not be assigned. Exceptions would only be made for health or other exceptional reasons. Under the terms of their original commissions, all FSOs are Foreign Service Officers of the United States of America (not just of the Department of State) and must be available for world-wide assignment. In principle, a refusal to accept an assignment to Iraq would place an officer at risk of dismissal from the service.

The Department has rarely used the directed assignment process; the last mass overseas directed assignment was to Viet Nam in 1969 when an entire entry training class (about 20 members) was designated to go to Saigon. Although assignments to Iraq qualify for about a 50 percent increase in base salary for hardship and danger, civilians are not accorded tax free status as is the military in Iraq and Afghanistan. They, of course, are provided arms training but are unarmed when on duty. The ability for FSOs to move around outside the Green Zone is subject to military security judgments and force mission priorities.

The lack of a domestic constituency for foreign affairs continues to plague the State Department, especially in the annual battle for Congressional funding (Naland, 2007). The result, according to a recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (see Argyros et al, 2007), is that the State Department is now short 1015 Foreign Service personnel to staff currently authorized positions and another 1079 Foreign Service positions to meet training and various recommended requirements. The maintenance of adequate personnel numbers in the State Department is a chronic problem for the Foreign Service.

Among the many adverse results of its relative poverty in personnel are truncated or absence of training opportunities, the inability to use earned vacation time to reconnect with families and the US culture in general, un-reimbursed overtime for long days and weekends

taken up with required work and a general feeling that they are unappreciated by Congress and the American people.

With the State Department chronically starved for human resources, Congress continues to be reluctant to permit the Department to modernize its pay structures. With pay rates higher in Washington, DC, through locality pay increases, most Foreign Service personnel now face the anomalous situation of facing significant reductions in their take-home pay (up to 18 percent) when they are assigned overseas in non-hardship postings. Although adjustments are made periodically to reimburse personnel for the loss in value of the dollar against foreign currencies, there are increasing significant incentives to stay home. In these days of the plummeting dollar, and increasing security threats, the glamour of diplomacy looks a little threadbare.

The State Department, as other federal agencies, has other reasons for being dispirited. According to some recent retirees, the Senior Foreign Service (SFS) is losing many positions that it has traditionally held in the past to political appointees. The Senior Executive Service (SES in other agencies) and the SFS are the bridges between the middle-level and junior staff and the top-level administration officials. The Senior Foreign Service performs critical training guidance to FSOs rising in their careers. The SFS also provides a dependable channel for constructive dissent that can be passed on to senior leaders. Senior Foreign Service Officers provide policy coherence, training expertise and experience in working with non-Americans ("foreigners") which many political appointees simply do not have the experience to provide. Some recent retirees report that Secretary Rice and the White House strongly discourage any sort of criticism of their policies. Some mourn this fact as further evidence that diplomacy consistently takes a back seat to military action in current US foreign policy.

THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

At the present time, the areas where the most intensive efforts are being made to demonstrate that civil-military cooperation is possible are in the PRTs. The Administration seized upon the PRT framework to be part of its "surge" policy in Iraq. At one level, these make a virtue of the disturbing fact that in wide areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, it remains too dangerous for civilians to travel or to work. State Department officers are commonly assigned to PRTs, often as co-directors, although junior FSOs are given lower-level responsibilities. For these officers, PRT assignments really entail on- the-job training.

In contrast with the Viet Nam experience in which FSOs received four to six months of training, officers going to Iraq and Afghanistan get less than two weeks of actual operational instruction. This was amply illustrated in a recent lengthy but not particularly enlightening interview with two newly-trained State Department PRT officers in August 2007. The interview was published as a State Department press release, probably to respond to charges that State was not cooperating in manning the PRTs (see Department of State, 2007). The two FSOs spoke of their training, which consisted of two weeks at the Foreign Service Institute in northern Virginia and at the State Department defensive driving school in West Virginia. One of the officers was bold enough to admit that he really didn't know what he was doing. They are going to have a tough time persuading their military colleagues and protectors to let them be in charge of anything.

In a somewhat more open contemporaneous interview (the questioner is at least identified) on National Public Radio (NPR), the same two FSOs noted that security was the principal theme in the classroom course (see Keleman, 2007). Neither speaks Arabic or has served in the Middle East. They both spoke hopefully of their intent to help Iraqis to help themselves. They will each serve one year in Iraq, but these tours include five rest and rehabilitation trips out of Iraq, including three trips to the US and two trips to intermediate points. The interviews appeared simplistic, with the participants expressing sentiments that harken departing Peace Corps Volunteers in the mid-1960s (although the PCVs had much more preparation time, including language studies). Neither FSO said anything about their relationship with the US military members on the PRT. One can only hope that the FSI trainers spent a reasonable amount of time describing the realities of the critical civil-military relationship.

In Iraq, the first ten PRTs are military led, and the 15 being developed since the President ordered their establishment in early 2007 are either led or co-led by a State Department officer. The types of projects being selected are short-term; the faster that they can be completed, the better.

PRTs suffer from lack of competent interagency-sensitive leadership. This will continue until the USG sets up a school for joint civil-military leadership training to develop leaders for such civil-military postings as PRT Chiefs. The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), which has responsibility for developing the doctrine for civil-military cooperation, knows how to develop a school, but lacks the vital political component of the PRT mission that such a school needs to inculcate in its students. Unfortunately, State is unlikely to develop the necessary comprehensive training - in its FSI curriculum, or anywhere else.

A way forward would be for the National Security Council (NSC) to be mandated to establish such training, and second a military leader like General Petraeus to develop the school and curriculum. (This could be another utilization of his Leavenworth experience). With rare exceptions, State doesn't produce interagency-competent leaders such as General Petraeus. More incentive needs to be given to this latent kind of leadership that exists - albeit in small quantities - only in the military (and largely in the Army). Such a launch of an interagency school-house by Petraeus/MacArthur type military leaders has far wider implications for getting the U.S. interagency community to work, and for establishing the blueprint for disciplined UN, and other multilateral agency, reform.

The PRTs must be internationalized, and they must also be "multilateralized." The Iraq experience means to us that the U.S. is unlikely to be able to play the occupying power role anywhere in the world for a long time to come. This means that U.S.-branded PRTs are similarly limited. As they are in Iraq, US PRTs will continue to be largely islands of strategic irrelevance. This situation begs a new component to UN reform efforts, i.e., to develop UN PRTs that include the best capacities of DPKO, DPA, and the UN development agencies such as UNICEF, UNDP, and WHO. A competent UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) needs to be part of this multilateral interagency lash-up. There is now no locus for post-conflict nation-building in the UN system (the new UN Peacebuilding Commission is another useless pipe-dream, and doesn't count). Prototype UN PRTs could be a place to start.

The new PRT Playbook (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2007) makes it clear that while individual PRTs are to develop long-term plans, experience shows that American PRTs

are not developmental. The focus is on short-term projects with immediate payoff whenever possible. They are designed to demonstrate US interest in the local people, they do good deeds, and we can feel certain that the civilian and military participants derive a lot of satisfaction in helping local people. In our experience, many US military persons excel in personal diplomacy, and in benign situations they can represent all that is best in the US culture. Within the US military information system, these efforts receive heavy coverage as evidence of the good hearts of US service personnel, and if there is much participation by local people, it is pretty hard to see. Unfortunately for local people in Iraq, PRT projects provide visible evidence of collaboration by local people with the occupying force and can lead to death or mutilation by belligerents after the US military forces leave the area.

The PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq have several generational differences. The first PRTs in Afghanistan were established with a central organizing office so that people would see that the government was producing something for the people. Each is embedded in a military group although there are some variations depending upon the state sponsor. The first ten PRTs in Iraq are commanded by US military officers. The last ten PRTs called for by President Bush in early 2007 are supposed to be led by State Department officers.

It is hard to escape the notion that these projects seem a little inspired by the kinds of projects performed by the Peace Corps back in the 1960s. The Peace Corps Volunteers took enormous pleasure in being able to build things and make them work in usually rugged places. The American participants in modern PRTs similarly enjoy the psychic pleasure of facilitating things that will in one way or another allay the daily miseries of Iraqi life. On the other hand, the US experience in Haiti and most 1990 peacekeeping operations is that projects done quickly to US standard frequently languish unused if local people have not invested their own work and sweat in building them. Many Iraqis must nonetheless ask themselves why the Americans want to paint the walls of a schoolhouse when they themselves have little electricity and the water is undrinkable.

Although many humanitarian agencies are working in safer zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, there is an increasing tendency on the part of military leaders to either use their own resources or contract those responsibilities with private companies. This is dysfunctional to the concept of "total force" planning for humanitarian emergencies.

The PRT concept to date has also largely missed the opportunity to engage and provide on-the-job training to indigenous civilian and military players. U.S. Army Civil Affairs officers provide little if any sustainable contributions, absent developing an indigenous civil affairs capability in the host country military. U.S. foreign service officers and other U.S. civilians in PRTs similarly attenuate their effectiveness if they are not twinned with host country counterparts.

THE DISTORTIONS OF GWOT

There are still a few people who believe that there is a straight-line relationship between Saddam Hussein and the 11 September 2001 destructions of New York's twin world towers and a wing of the Pentagon. The basic illogic of characterizing the March 2003 Iraq intervention as a part of the "global war on terror" has vastly distorted any useful analysis of the principal contenders for power in Iraq. If we had focused initially on the Sunni minority

as disappointed and worried by their loss of power, rather than as Bin Ladin's newest converts, it would have been possible to develop a more coherent framework for negotiation between the two groups.

The adoption and use of more reasonable culturally-aware analyses in the development of national tactics and strategy after the shock of 9/11 would almost certainly not have led to the conclusions which took us into Iraq. Al-Qaeda seems to have a fairly world-wide reach, but in numerical terms it represents a tiny fraction of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims. There are also many groups that commit terrorist acts that are not Islamic and have nothing to do with al-Qaeda. By any analysis, committing oneself to a "Global War on Terror" is a nonsense proposition. First of all, it does not define the enemy. Without a clear understanding of what constitutes the enemy, how does one define victory in the GWOT? The Bush administration decided that the main confrontation with the "enemy" would require military action. This was obvious, given the need to root out the al-Qaeda infestation in Afghanistan and eliminate the Taliban government that supported al-Qaeda's presence.

Despite the fact that the administration decided that the US military was the appropriate weapon to use against "global terrorism," there is no conceivable way that military force can defeat ideas. In a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, Brookings scholar Philip Gordon explores the logic of GWOT and concludes that "the war on terror will end with the collapse of the violent ideology that caused it—when bin Laden's cause come to be seen by its potential adherents as a failure..." (Gordon, 2007, p. 60) He compares the war on terror to the Cold War; neither fits the definition of a war and they appeared monolithic and dangerous. Communism was certainly seen as a threat, but in the end, it was seen as a failure.

The next US administration must place the restoration of US status as a responsible and just society as one of its highest priorities. It is only in such a world environment that violent ideologies can be rejected.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Over the past 4-6 years, the nature of public affairs in the Pentagon has changed considerably. It now has its own propaganda network in the US; its public information programs at home and overseas are focused on boosting the President and blowing smoke over Iraq. It has helped created the impression that any criticism of the President is a criticism of our great military.

It seems evident from reading press conference and news materials produced by the State and Defense Departments that the information is presented as a means of influencing US public opinion to favor administration policies and to vote for the President's political party in the next elections. For a corporate entity that is larger than any single company in the world, the Armed Forces News Service (AFNS) seems hopelessly parochial in its concerns.

If it could conceive that it also serves a world constituency and has many stories to tell that might interest that constituency, the AFNS would be a better molder of opinion.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The US military goes where the political upper atmosphere winds blow, and the current administration disdains the UN and actively works to place it in disrepute. We can only hope that the next administration will take a more progressive view of the multiple roles that the UN can play. There always seems to be some confusion about UN "neutrality" under the view held by a few narrow nationalists that no office or agency of the UN should be permitted to take positions that run counter to what the US wants.

We seriously question the decision during a conflict to name as national representative to the United Nations someone who based his career on maligning the United Nations. What can possibly be gained by arrogant dismissal of an international resource – one for which we are the major contributor and principal benefactors? John Bolton is gone now. Everyone got the joke.

The role of the United Nations may be critical in negotiating secure borders and international cooperation for true independence for Iraq. This probably should have part of an original plan for Iraq after the completion of the "shock and awe" phase of the operation. However, with the negotiated presence of all states in the region with an interest in a stable Iraq, as well as principal states that may help finance Iraq's recovery, it should be possible to find a balance of interests: those countries that want the US out of Iraq, balanced by the countries that are willing to pay a price to have friendly relations with the oil-rich state. All of these countries are recognized by the United Nations that is an ideal forum for mediating between states. The US would obviously be involved in the process, but it would do well to step back and let the UN play the leading role. Increasingly, the future U.S. role is that of "best supporting actor".

Developing an international peace conference scenario for Iraq must be one of the highest priorities for the next US administration. The Bush Administration has recently indicated that it wants the UN to return to Iraq, but it is certainly more interested in the participation of the multilateral specialized agencies. The administration is unlikely to surrender any of its current hegemony over Iraq's future.

Ambassador Carlos Pascual was the first Director of the State Department Office for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS). Since retiring from the Service to become a vice president at the Brookings Institution in 2005, he has come around to be a strong advocate for bringing the United Nations into the Iraqi political equation (see Pascual and Pollack, 2007). No matter where we think we are in the problems we have wrought in Iraq, it must be recognized that Iraq is a failed state that cannot heal itself. Noting that most of the lessons of Iraqi have been learned (and forgotten), Pascual and Pollack review the most significant lessons that can be applied:

- Civil War generally require political solutions;
- Political solutions tend to be more likely when the parties in a civil war are exhausted by the fighting;
- Political agreements begin when the antagonists agree on core grievances;

- Adequate security forces are required to facilitate governance and economic activity;
- The US or international community must be prepared to provide external military and economic support;
- Stabilization and reconstruction efforts must be multilateral, preferably under a UN mandate, to achieve legitimacy and to sustain international support.

It must be noted that this embrace of multilateralism is a recent and terribly belated development for Pascual. While at State, co-author Dewey labored vigorously at the creation of S/CRS to avoid creating in that office a U.S. unilateral capacity for the full range of post-conflict operations. Dewey advised Pascual that he could never get enough unilateral funding or talent to meet the requirements. A sensible beginning for S/CRS would have been to canvass those competencies already existing in the UN and other international agencies – then identify the gaps and work out specific unilateral or coalition means to fill them. This advice was never taken seriously.

These are good proposals, but come woefully late to have much relevance for what happens next in Iraq.

MULTILATERALISM

Therefore, what? The U.S Government must overcome its reluctance to work with the United Nations. It's not just the military. We know the US military goes where the political upper atmosphere wind blows, even if they privately hold their nose while doing it. But it's the upper atmosphere climate of this administration (and those likely to follow it) that disdains the UN and works to place it in disrepute.

The White House, NSC, State, Defense, and most of the cabinet departments are riddled and rotted with unilateralism. There is no sense of the vital role today of the multilateral component in what must now constitute the "Total Force" in advancing the U.S. agenda in world affairs. We have only ourselves to blame for our blotted unilateral copybook; there is no sensible alternative now to learning and using the multilateral system to advance our national interests.

We also need to change the national interest and national purpose. It must no longer be that of creating freedom in the Middle East, or enlarging it around the world. We simply cannot do it, and no one has asked us to do it. And in trying to do it, we have clearly made the U.S. more hated around the world, our clout and influence at historic lows, and the security of the American people at home and abroad in greater peril.

What we must do is to get back to the fundamental Principle of War - the Objective. This is the immediate priority. The principal enemy is the Al Qaeda/Taliban lash-up in Afghanistan and the Afghan/Pak border area. Our homeland will be safer only as we shift the instruments of power back to this main event, while economizing our forces and efforts in the disastrous, less than secondary, front in Iraq.

ACHIEVING CIVIL-MILITARY SYMMETRY

We continue to believe that unity of effort is illusory while civilian partners have only a tiny fraction of the resources available to the military. We have argued for years that civilian partners more importantly have only a tiny fraction of the commitment, discipline, culture, structure and resolve that constitute the very sinews of military effectiveness. It's not just an asymmetrical war; it's a hugely asymmetrical array of "friendly forces" available to wage this war.

How do we do it? A new Goldwater-Nichols mandating civil-military jointness? We should make the effort. We can develop civil-military education and training in the U.S. Within the civilian and military career structure, we can foster self-interest in learning and using the multilateral components of comprehensive power. Can we foster a UN reform agenda that tracks with the principles of our multilateral self-interest? Absolutely. Developing a US mentality for calculating the total human, materiel, and national influence costs of any contingency intervention - especially the humanitarian and human rights impacts is long overdue. Can the US develop and pilot structured, disciplined, and symmetrical civil-military teams able to extract productivity from the full array of unilateral and multilateral components of pre- and post-conflict nation-salvaging and nation-building? It is essential to resurrecting our relevance in this age of global risk from non-state actors.

A RETURN TO COMPASSION IN FOREIGN POLICY?

Some members of Congress are now attacking the Iraqi people because they allegedly have not chosen to support the occupying forces. This is really turning logic on its head. The Iraqis may not have enjoyed living under Saddam's arbitrary dictatorship, but they now live more precariously under US occupation. The administration has repeatedly commiserated with the plight of the Iraqi people since 2003, but no one in high position has ever apologized or expressed any sorrow or shame at the results of the US invasion. A little bit of humility on the part of current US leadership just might help turn around the decline in US standing in the world.

Why do we keep pushing on the need to cooperate with and boost the actions of the international humanitarian community? Because they have human and material resources which can be brought into a troubled country at much lower cost and are more likely to meet the immediate needs of the people.

The next US administration of whatever political flavor is going to be obliged to develop and quickly implement policies to persuade the Islamic world that the US accepts Muslim countries as diplomatic equals and that we are prepared to help them improve the lives of their citizens. We should stop responding with indignation every time an *al-Qaeda* personality expresses something outrageous such as the restoration of the *Caliphate*. No one thinks that is going to happen and it just provides an extra bit of free publicity for desperados who hide in caves.

THE INTERAGENCY MYTH

Would Iraq have worked out better for us if we had a fully-implemented interagency planning system? Probably. But it is a certainty that we would be better off today if we had worked in a truly multilateral environment, with all the built-in restraints that would have come with that. We must stretch our minds and muscles to be better world community citizens. During the past decade, despite a wide variety of experiences in regional warfare, man-made and natural disasters and in thousands of joint studies and exercises, civilians and military personnel in the US Government have still not found a smooth and efficient way of working together. There are many reasons for this chronically debilitating problem, including the following:

1. Imbalance in resources (the “800 pound gorilla” phenomenon is not a myth)
2. The playing field is not level (There is no comparable civilian position in the US Government with the bureaucratic level, power or resources of the geographic combatant commander). The average COCOM commander oversees an area in which 15 to 30 US Ambassadors operate. DoD operates regionally; State’s traditional focus is on bilateral relations. How does one achieve unity of purpose and unity of action under such circumstances?
3. State and Defense have very different perspectives of time and space. The Secretary of Defense and his commanders dispose of fleets of ships, planes, and thousands of personnel to ensure that its policy-makers never have to worry about getting around. The State Department tends to reflect a little about the cost before jumping on a plane; we fly commercially.
4. In the current Administration, the President has demonstrated very little interest in multilateral diplomacy. All significant initiatives have been left to the Defense Department. The State Department was specifically excluded from any significant role in developing the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns.
5. Many of our (Dewey-Clarke) ideas precipitated and were integrated into the PDD-56. This initiative did not find fertile ground in either State or Defense. NSPD-44 does not go much further in laying out comprehensive planning than PDD-56, and may have even less chance of being effectively implemented.
6. The shock of Iraq led DoD to attempt to find a means to bring diplomacy into the same room as war fighting. DoD Directive 3000.05 lays out a sensible list of objectives to force the military to include State (and other agencies) in its planning.
7. The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization received a substantial subsidy from Defense in January 2006. JFCOM developed a training program for State; this does not seem to be working out; rumors now at large indicate that DoD is growing impatient and might decide to shift its working relationship entirely to USAID.

8. "Interagency planning" to the military seems to include multilateral and regional planning. The military does not even think of working with the UN. Among the hundreds of documents and papers produced by the staff and students at the General Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in 2005, a review of titles indicates that not a single document is directed at the interface between the US military and UN agencies, international humanitarian groups or international nongovernmental organizations. It would help if the military education system could develop open-minded programs to show its officers and men that the UN and its agencies are organizations largely created by the US and that they has credibility and impressive track records of multilateral diplomacy and humanitarian response that are universally admired (other than in certain parts of the US political system).
9. The US has developed a military of startling power and ingenuity. The US military culture stimulates hard-driving and powerful leadership at all levels. One could not ask for a more proficient war-fighting machine. The prices that are paid to maintain this powerful structure are several: (a) US military personnel expect always to be in charge of any operation in which they are involved; (b) Civilians are viewed as somewhat unreliable, less focused and probably incompetent; (c) Cultural differences are immaterial and of lesser consequence than any military consideration; (d) Diplomacy is believed to have some value, but it is too slow to be appreciated; and (e) When diplomats are brought into an operation they must be carefully watched to ensure that they do not make a tactical error which might expose the military to danger. It is critical that the State Department educate its personnel in how the US military functions. Given the invention of HTT, the State Department must collaborate with the military in ensuring that there is close cooperation with Embassy political, economic and cultural officers. Political anthropology is a fascinating discipline that will supplement any FSOs skill set.
10. The current operational tempo of the US regular military and reserves caused by Iraq and Afghanistan (not to speak of the Global War on Terror – GWOT) causes our military to be always on its toes and in a hurry to complete missions. This is not a good environment to teach our military and reserves how to think more comprehensively, how to be more sensitive to cultural issues, or how to plan comprehensively.

How do we get out of this mess? We must be prepared to accept that State and Defense are unlikely to be ideal partners at the field operational level. "Unity of effort" is only possible at the strategic level; otherwise, it is just a military slogan that worries civilian counterparts. The GWOT is an unrealistic flag to follow at the diplomatic level. It is not a concept that has any particular use in nation-building. At some point or another, handling terrorists really must become a policing and intelligence issue. When terrorism (which, we must recall, is a tactic, not an entity) is "global" all the time, it erases all considerations of end-state planning and makes it difficult to recognize potential allies.

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