

Iraq's Future: An Abstract of an Assessment of the Potential Impact of The Iraq Study Group (ISG) Recommendations on Future Societal Conditions in Iraq

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INTRODUCTION

Analysis of the impact of the potential implementation of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) recommendations reinforces the counterinsurgency principle of the primacy and decisiveness of the political process (and other non-military factors such as economic conditions) over military operations; but, more importantly, their relationship. Using historical examples, political power

concentration curve metrics and political landscape constructs can predict the relative success of different policy options based on models of political outcome and comparative evaluation of case studies, or courses of action, weighing Balance of Coercive Force (BCF) (i.e., military) values, political factors such as External Involvement (EXT) increases in government strength (IPS), and the strength of the opposition (OPS) (i.e., “the enemy always has a vote”).

The result of this evaluation not only points to an exit strategy involving a combination of “internal” and “external” approaches. Even more, it suggests a scientific - versus polemical - method to argue the case for greater political engagement and resources, as a matter of policy adjustment, to compliment a strategic window of opportunity being created by military operations in Iraq. This is essential to both justify continued Executive and Congressional support of Operation Iraq Freedom through this presently critical period and the forging of a consensus for a successful exit strategy to enable eventual draw-down of military forces under more favorable national security conditions.

The following document is an abstracted version of the report titled: *Iraq’s Future: Assessment of the Potential Impact of The Iraq Study Group (ISG) Recommendations on Future Societal Conditions in Iraq* by Woodcock (2007).

AN ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP (ISG) RECOMMENDATIONS

Assessments of the potential impact of all of the 79 recommendations of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) (Baker, Hamilton, *et al.*, 2006) have been undertaken by Woodcock. These activities have involved a detailed review of the ISG Report recommendations and development of an *Impact Assessment Framework (IAF)* to support the analysis. The IAF facilitates a coherent assessment of the impact of all ISG recommendations on four key influences or properties of the political environment. IAF outputs have been used to construct graphical displays illustrating the distribution of political power and the shape of the political landscape in Iraq.

Major findings of the analysis include the following:

- Increases in Iraq Government Stability Could be Achieved Based on Implementing all of the 79 ISG Recommendations: Analysis shows that significant increases in the stability of the current government could be achieved by at least a 30 percent implementation of all 79 ISG recommendations.
- The ISG Report May Identify an Entry rather than an Exit Strategy: Assessed impact of all 79 ISG recommendations appear to suggest an increased rather than a decreased level of United States and other forms of external involvement in Iraq, that is the recommendations may imply an Entry Strategy rather than an Exit Strategy for the United States in Iraq.

- A 'Surge' of U.S. Troops Should take place in Parallel with Political Changes: Analysis reveals that U.S. Surge Force effectiveness could be increased by parallel actions aimed at strengthening the Iraq government and undermining opposition entities.
- There May be Three Future Outcomes for Iraq: Analysis reveals the possibility of three outcomes for Iraq: Compromise, Counter-Revolution, and Revolution. Attempts at political compromise might lead to revolution and the emergence of a theocratic dictatorship in Iraq, for example.
- A Dual Sovereignty should be avoided in Iraq: Dual Sovereignty occurs where a government entity is openly challenged by other entities for the control and use of State Power within a country of interest. A New Exit Strategy for the United States that involves a coherent draw-down of force levels in Iraq without creating a Dual Sovereignty has been outlined (Woodcock, 2007).

IRAQ STUDY GROUP (ISG) ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN IRAQ

The Iraq Study Group Report calls for “new and enhanced diplomatic efforts in Iraq” and for “the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.” (ISG Report (ISGR), page xiii). The Report states that “there is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests.” (ISGR, page ix). The ISGR identifies:

- 1 Security issues in terms of the sources of violence and the nature and capabilities of U.S. Forces, Coalition Forces, Iraqi Forces, and Iraqi Police.
- 2 Political issues related to sectarian viewpoints and key issues.
- 3 Economic Support issues related to the condition of Iraq.
- 4 International Support concerns relating to Iraq.

The reader is referred to the ISGR for more detailed information. A detailed analysis of the impact of each of the 79 ISG Report recommendations has been undertaken (Woodcock, 2007).

POLITICAL LANDSCAPES PROVIDE FOUR DIMENSIONS FOR SOCIETAL MANEUVER

Analytic activities undertaken by Woodcock (2007) have assessed the potential impact of all 79 individual recommendations of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) on future societal conditions in Iraq

(Baker, Hamilton, *et al.*, 2006) are summarized in Figure 1. These activities involved a detailed review of the ISG Report recommendations and development of an Impact Assessment Framework (IAF) to support the analysis. The IAF facilitated a coherent assessment of the integrated impact of the ISG recommendations.




Figure 1: Iraq's Future: Assessment of the Potential Impact of the ISG Recommendations on Societal Conditions in Iraq has involved construction and use of an Impact Assessment Framework (IAF) facility.

Production of the IAF facility involved identifying four key variables or properties of the political environment. Assessments of the impact of each ISG recommendation were made in terms of their impact on each of these variables. The selected IAF variables are:

1. *The Strength of the In-Power Segment (IPS)*, assumed to represent the power of the internal government entity in Iraq.

2. *The Strength of the Out-of-Power Segment (OPS)*, assumed to represent the combined power of the opposition entities in Iraq.
3. *The Balance of Coercive Force (BCF)*, assumed to represent the relative sizes of the military forces under the control of the government compared with those controlled by the opposition in Iraq.
4. *The External Influences (EXT)*, assumed to represent the level of external factors acting on Iraq.

The overall impact of the complete set of 79 ISG recommendations is calculated in terms of their impact on these key variables. The combined assessments for all recommendation are input into a four-variable political model based on catastrophe theory (Thom, 1975; Zeeman, 1978, Poston and Stewart, 1978, Woodcock, 2003, 2000, 1987; Woodcock and Davis, 1978; Woodcock and Poston, 1974).

Entities called *Political Power Concentration Curves* (Figure 2) and *Political Landscapes* (Figure 3) based on earlier work in catastrophe theory modeling by Woodcock have been constructed using ISG assessment data to support the analyses. The theory provides mathematically-rigorous methods for assessing the impact of multiple societal influences on the overall political behavior in a country of interest such as Iraq, for example.




Figure 2: The Political Power Concentration Curve describes local conditions and identifies the possibility of political conflict. Two peaks indicate a Dual Sovereignty with two foci of political power representing the impact of conflicting political forces.

Values of the four key societal influences or variables (IPS, OPS, BCF, and EXT) calculated during the IAF process are inserted into the model and used to calculate the pattern of Political Power Concentration within Iraq. The influences are also used in the construction of a Political Landscape representations where IPS, OPS, BCF, and EXT serve the function of locating the position of an entity (called the State Point) on the political landscape much as latitude and longitude identify positions on a geographical landscape. Height on a Political Landscape is

expressed in terms of the level of political power concentration and reflects the direct impact of the estimated key societal influence values on the political environment.




Figure 3: The Political Landscape describes local conditions in a global context and identifies the likelihood that sudden or gradual political transformations could occur.

Political Power Concentration Curves can indicate the relative success of different policy options. Changes in the shape of Political Power Concentration curve can reflect the emergence of a Dual Sovereignty where government control of State Power is challenged by the opposition (see Figure 2). Changes that create Dual Sovereignty and undermine government control and should be avoided. Impact of implementation of the ISG recommendations are reflected in changes in power concentration values and by corresponding changes in position on the political landscape construct.. Movement can take place simultaneously in four directions rather than two in the case of a geographical landscape. Changes in societal influences lead to either gradual (or evolutionary) or sudden (or revolutionary or counter-revolutionary) changes in political behavior under appropriate conditions (see Figure 3, for example).

Analysis shows that leaders who don't use all four societal dimensions may be out-manuevered by their opposition, and could fail in their mission.

ASSUMED CONDITIONS BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISG REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

The potential impact of each of all of the 79 recommendations provided by the Iraq Study Group (ISG) have been assessed in terms of their assumed impact on the societal variables considered

to be at work in Iraq. These variables include the strength of the In- and Out-of-Power entities (IPS and OPS), the balance of coercive force (BCF), and the external influences acting on that country (EXT). Assessments have also been made of the current conditions assumed to exist in Iraq prior to the implementation of any of the ISG recommendations. These initial condition values have been combined with different proportions of the assumed ISG impacts to represent different levels of implementation of those recommended actions in Iraq.

Initial IPS and OPS strengths in Iraq before implementation of the ISG Report recommendations were assumed to be $IPS = OPS = 1.0$ units. The Balance of Coercive Force ($BCF = -0.1$ units) was assumed to be slightly in favor of the IPS entity. Iraq was assumed to be under significant external influences ($EXT = -2.0$ units). These assessments of initial conditions were used as inputs to the Catastrophe Theory-based model (see: Woodcock, 2003, for example). That model was used to calculate the pattern of political power distribution within Iraq and to draw the corresponding Political Landscape diagram. Results of these calculations are displayed in Figure 4




Figure 4: Assumed initial conditions in Iraq before implementation of the ISG Report recommendations. In this case, the IPS and OPS values were assumed to be $IPS = OPS = 1.0$ units. The Balance of Coercive Force ($BCF = -0.1$ units) was assumed to be slightly in favor of the IPS entity. Iraq was assumed to be affected by significant external influences ($EXT = -2.0$ units). These values generate a political power concentration curve with three peaks (upper panel). Implementation of some 5% of the ISG recommendations (with $IPS = 1.10$ units, $OPS = 0.91$ units, $BCF = -0.18$ units, and $EXT = -2.05$ units) generates a power concentration curve with at least two distinct peaks that is characteristic of a dual sovereignty (lower panel).

The assumed initial values of the IPS, OPS, BCF, and EXT variables generate a political power concentration curve with three peaks (upper panel, Figure 4). Those three peaks reflect the existence of three distinct foci of political power and therefore some form of Triple Sovereignty in Iraq. Those conditions can be associated with the activities of at least three distinct political entities. Each of those entities would be in competition with others for the control of State Power. The challenge for the United States and its allies in Iraq and elsewhere is to change the political environment in that country to conditions represented by a political power concentration curve with a single peak. Such conditions could reflect the domination of the government (IPS) entity and the absence of significant political challenges from opposition (OPS) entities both inside and outside of Iraq, for example.

Political power concentration curves with two or three peaks reflect conditions of significant challenges and opposition to the government entity. In fact, the emergence of conditions of Dual (or even Triple) Sovereignty shown by the shape of the power concentration curve based on assessment of possible future policy impacts, suggested by the ISG and perhaps by others, can serve as a warning of potential danger ahead for the government (IPS) entity. The assumed initial values of the IPS, OPS, BCF, and EXT variables were also used to determine the position of an entity (referred to as the State Point) on the Political Landscape representing those initial conditions. For simplicity, the State Point has been drawn as a small disk on the projected shadow of the Political Landscape (Figure 4). The Political Landscape drawn with the assumed initial conditions as input has a complicated winged structure that is responsible for the name ‘Butterfly’ given to the underlying catastrophe model.

Observation reveals that the State Point is located in a region of the Landscape close to the three-layered or ‘winged’ structures. Those conditions are reflected in the three separate peaks of the power concentration graph (upper panel, Figure 4). Each of those peaks can represent the contribution of a focus of political power associated with conditions illustrated by one of the three layers of the Landscape. The shape of the Political Landscape under these conditions suggests the possibility of at least three outcomes or ways forward for Iraq, something that will be explored in more detail below. The catastrophe model has been used for analysis of the impact of all of the 79 recommendations of the ISG Report on the notional situation in Iraq. Figure 4 (lower panel) shows the impact of implementation of those recommendations at a 5% level on the concentration of political power in Iraq. In this case the input values were: IPS = 1.10 units, OPS = 0.91 units, BCF = -0.18 units, and EXT = -2.05 units. Those values generate a power concentration curve with at least two, and possibly three, distinct peaks. As mentioned above, two distinct foci of political power are characteristic of a Dual Sovereignty where a government entity is challenged for the control of State Power by its opposition.

IMPACT OF A THIRTY PERCENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 79 ISG REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

The political consequences of implementing the ISG recommendations at the 30% level combined with assumed pre-ISG conditions are illustrated in Figure 5. The assumed values of the societal variables combined with the initial assessments are now: IPS = 1.62 units, OPS =

0.49 units, BCF = -0.6 units, and EXT = -2.31 units. The assumed changes in societal variable values produce a further increase in the size of the peak at the high power concentration portion of the curve and that peak is clearly dominant (upper panel, Figure 5). This reflects the creation of a much more dominant IPS or government entity within Iraq. These changes are also illustrated by the changes in the shape of the political landscape and by the relative movement of the State Point away from the multi-layered region of the political landscape and further into a region representing political domination by the IPS entity over its opposition.




Figure 5: Impact of ISG recommendations at the 30% level with IPS = 1.62 units, OPS = 0.49 units, BCF = -0.60 units, and EXT = -2.31 units (upper panel) compared with the impact of the pre-ISG values of IPS = OPS = 1.0 units, BCF = -0.1 units, and EXT = -2.0 units (lower panel).

The assessment, analytic, and model-building activities described above have provided an estimation of the potential impact of the Iraq Study Group recommendations on the overall political conditions in Iraq. Given that the notional assessments generated by the author are related in some way to the impact of the ISG recommendations should they actually be implemented in Iraq then these activities have provided a basis for estimating the impact of those recommendations in the political situation in Iraq. With these comments as a caveat, it is possible to determine that implementation of the ISG recommendations at at least the 20% or 30% level could create a situation with a political environment in which a significant, and perhaps dominant concentration of political power would exist in the hands of the IPS entity.

While implementation of the ISG recommendations may produce political and other benefits in the short- to medium-term, the assessed and modeled conditions do not seem to provide the

basis for an exit strategy for the U.S. and other Coalition forces. In fact, the level of external influences are assumed to increase rather than decrease after implementation of the ISG recommendations, for example. It is clear that the analysis and recommendations of the ISG should be continued in order to develop concepts that could be used for the development of such a strategy. The impact of selected exit strategy-related actions could be assessed with the aid of the models described above. The following sections of the paper address the problems associated with what might happen in Iraq in the future, and how may the level of external influence be reduced in a manner that reflects the operation of some form of exit strategy for U.S. and other Coalition forces.

THREE DIFFERENT TYPES OF OUTCOME ARE POSSIBLE FOR IRAQ

Following the concepts of “Three Outcomes” described by Trotsky in his *History of the Russian Revolution*, Trotsky (1980, for example), analysis suggests the possibility of three similar types of future for Iraq in 2007. These outcomes include the following. (1). *Compromise* between the warring political factions within a country. (2). *Counter-Revolution* where a sub-group within the government seizes power and excludes others. (3). *Revolution* where opposition forces overthrow and replace the government.

- 1 A Possible Iraq Future 1 — Compromise: Analysis suggests that adoption of some form of compromise arrangement between IPS and OPS entities in Iraq might stabilize conditions involving a moderate level of political power concentration in Iraq.
- 2 A Possible Iraq Future 2 — Counter-Revolution: A Second Political Outcome for Iraq might involve some form of counter-revolution in which the existing democratic conditions currently assumed to exist are overthrown through the action of an elite sub-group possibly formed from within the ruling elite or government (the IPS entity) itself.
- 3 A Possible Iraq Future 3 — Revolution: Analysis suggests that the relative weakening of the IPS entity compared with the opposition OPS entity and a change in BCF conditions in favor of that opposition could generate some form of revolution with the ruling elite being overthrown and replaced by another ruling entity or structure. Such an event might set the scene for further changes in the *de facto* governing entities within Iraq.

Discussion and analysis of the application of possible approaches linked to the Three Outcomes concept described by Trotsky has provided some insight into what might happen to the political environment within Iraq.

NOTIONAL IMPACT OF A SURGE IN U.S. FORCE LEVELS IN IRAQ

In an address to the Nation on January 10 2007, President Bush announced the deployment of an additional 20,000 American troops to Iraq. Case Study Analyses have explored the notional impact of relatively small, medium, and large changes in Balance of Coercive Force (BCF) values caused by an increase in U.S. Force levels in Iraq, as well as accompanying increases in the level of External Involvement (EXT).

Analysis suggests that a medium-level Surge of U.S. troops coupled with an increase in the strength of the government (IPS) and a decrease in opposition strength appears to be more effective than a simple increase in force strength (OPS) in isolation. Supported by political changes, the government (IPS) could control State Power with relatively minor competition from its opposition (OPS) under such circumstances.

1. Case Study 1: Impact of a Relatively Small Surge of U.S. Troops Coupled with a Small increase in External Influences acting on Iraq: Relatively minor increases in the BCF and EXT properties are assumed to occur for Iraq. Analysis shows that the Iraqi government (IPS) would remain in conflict with its opposition (OPS) for control of State Power.
2. Case Study 2: Impact of a Medium-level Surge of U.S. Troops Coupled with a Medium-level increase in External Influences acting on Iraq: Analysis shows that an assumed medium-level Surge of U.S. troops doesn't appear to create unchallenged security for the government of Iraq.
3. Case Study 3: Impact of a Relatively High-level Surge of U.S. Troops Coupled with a Relatively High-level increase in External Influences acting on Iraq: Analysis shows that relatively high-level Surge of troops does not remove the challenge to the IPS by the OPS entity.
4. Case Study 4: Impact of a Medium-level Surge of U.S. Troops Coupled with changes in the relative strengths of the IPS and OPS entities as well as a Medium-level increase in External Influences acting on Iraq. In this study, changes in the relative strength of the IPS and OPS entities are assumed to occur against the background of the same medium-level changes in BCF and EXT values used during Case Study 2. Analysis shows that changes in BCF- and EXT-related conditions could be much more effective in securing the dominance of the government when such changes take place in concert with actions that increase the strength of the government (IPS) and reduce that of the opposition (OPS).

These four Case Studies examined the potential impact of small, medium, and large Surges in U.S. troop strength in Iraq. The studies examined corresponding changes in External Influence levels (EXT) in Iraq and the possible enhancement to such impact of changes in the relative strength of the Iraqi government (IPS) and its opposition (OPS). These studies suggest that

changes in BCF- and EXT-related conditions could be much more effective in securing the dominance of the government when such changes take place in concert with actions that increase the strength of the government (IPS) and reduce that of the opposition (OPS). Without such changes in the political, economic, and other societal conditions in Iraq, the analysis shows that even relatively large deployments of new U.S. military units in Iraq might not have the impact needed to further secure the position of the Iraq government.

A FUTURE U.S. EXIT STRATEGY FOR IRAQ?

A Notional Exit Strategy from Iraq for United States forces has been produced by the author (Woodcock, 2007). The major component of the strategy involves progressive reduction in the level of External Influences (EXT) acting on Iraq coupled directly with increases in the Balance of Coercive Force in favor of the government (BCF) as well as increases in government (IPS) and decreases in opposition (OPS) strength. The major problem to be overcome during an initial phase of implementation of an Exit Strategy is the need to avoid the (perhaps unwitting) creation of a Dual Sovereignty.

OIL AND OWNERSHIP OF THE IRAQI POLITICAL PROBLEM

A new Way Forward outlined in the Iraq Study Group Report is needed to stop disintegration and to begin to restore Iraqi society. If Iraq is to survive as a unified country, a way has to be found for different ethnic and religious groups to realize that significant benefits will be obtained if they work together for the common wealth. If many people grow to realize that they are owners of the problem of Iraqi national survival then they could develop those approaches needed to create some form of societal integration. Initial steps in such a process would necessarily be rudimentary and ineffectual, but some initial success (or at least a lack of complete failure) could encourage further actions to unify the country. This may result in the identification of some form of national purpose where greater benefit could be derived from collaboration rather than from conflict and violence.

One way to achieve a pattern of common ownership could involve widespread ownership of Iraqi oil assets. A future national partnership involving the distribution of profits from the Iraq oil industry as envisioned by the Iraq Study Group and mentioned in the President's Address to the Nation on January 10 2007 might form a basis for a more extensive program of societal revival and renewal within Iraq. Permitting each citizen to have ownership in that major national asset could create an environment where many citizens would provide the basis for energizing active involvement in protecting those, as well as other, significant assets from insurgent attacks and other forms of conflict.

Implementation of such a national-level plan for ownership of the Iraqi oil industry would demand aggressive actions be taken against corruption and theft of oil which is rampant and may involve losses of billions of dollars of oil from one oil field alone. Adoption of transparent, and

perhaps internationally-audited, accounting procedures would play a key role in the processes needed to establish nation-wide ownership of the oil assets. Security of the oil assets would also require the training and deployment of well-trained and well-paid security forces. With most of the Iraqi population expecting to receive at least some benefit from profits derived from the sale of oil, significant pressure would exist to insure that those profits were as large as possible. Some form of common partnership of effort is envisioned between such a re-vamped security force and the citizenry of Iraq each individually empowered by ownership of the Iraq national oil assets. The citizens could become the 'eyes and ears' of a potentially nation-wide intelligence network that could identify, report on, and work with the new security forces to suppress threats oil production, transport, and storage assets.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Assessments of the possible impact of implementation of *all* of the 79 recommendations of the ISG has been supported by the development of an Impact Analysis Framework (IAF). The IAF permits assessment of the impact of the recommendations on the strength of the government (or In-Power Segment, IPS), the strength of the opposition (or Out-of-Power Segment, OPS), the relative control of military and security forces (the Balance of Coercive Force, BCF), and the level of External Influences acting on Iraq (EXT).

A major contribution of the work described in this paper is the development of *Political Power Concentration Curve* and *Political Landscape* constructs based on earlier work by the author. The Political Power Concentration Curves represent the political conditions within a country of interest such as Iraq and can identify conditions where the government entity (IPS) is not subjected to significant challenges and others (characterized as some form of Dual Sovereignty) where the government is challenged for control of State Power by the opposition (OPS). The Political Landscape construct provides a representation of the overall political conditions in a country of interest and the likelihood that gradual (evolutionary) or sudden (revolutionary or counter-revolutionary) political transitions might take place.

IAF-based assessments provide an ability to study the impact of all of the 79 ISG recommendations on the government and opposition entities, the military and security forces, and external actors influencing Iraq. Implementation of even relatively minor (5%) levels of the ISG recommendations appear to increase rather than decrease the level of United States external involvement in Iraq. This points to the ISG Report suggesting an overall *Entry Strategy* rather than an *Exit Strategy* for the United States in Iraq.

Analysis shows that an Exit Strategy involving a coherent draw-down of United States force levels in Iraq might be achieved without creating a Dual Sovereignty. That Exit Strategy calls for a coherent increase in the political strength of the Iraqi government (IPS), undermining the strength of the opposition (OPS) entities, an increase in the relative capability of the Iraqi military and security forces compared with insurgent and other hostile forces (BCF), coupled with a progressive withdrawal of external influences (both United States and other nations) acting on Iraq (EXT).

OTHER REPORTS ON CONDITIONS IN IRAQ

The Initial Benchmark Assessment Report on Iraq released by the White House in July 2007 recognizes that fulfillment of the commitments by the U.S. and Iraqi governments are necessary to achieve a democratic Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself. The Report calls for further actions in providing advances in the provision of security, in political reconciliation, in diplomatic engagement, and in economics and essential services. These factors can be related to the Balance of Coercive Force (BCF), In- and Out-of-Power Strength (IPS and OPS), External Influences (EXT), and IPS and OPS, respectively as described above.

Abdollahian, Baranick, Efird, and Kugler (2006) have used the Senturion model to assess conditions in Iraq associated with Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and the Iraqi elections. The model uses "stakeholder analysis" that is supportive of concept of "IPS" and "internal" influences described above. Furthermore the distributions of stakeholder data and anticipated dynamics and outcomes provides distributions that could be related to the concept of Political Power Concentration curves described above.

Cordesman (2007) makes a tenuous case for strategic patience in Iraq. This concept can be related to the IPS, OPS, BCF, and EXT framework described in the above paper since military dynamics can take place with faster time constants than internal political and international changes. While it may be possible to achieve military goals relatively rapidly, sustainable political changes can take much longer to accomplish. His discussion of risks may be especially relevant with respect to the need for greater efforts to grow governance as well as police- and justice-related capabilities that would affect changes in the IPS and OPS factors defined by Woodcock. Cordesman discusses the status of Iraq as a wealthy nation and the possibility of providing funds from profits of the oil industry to Iraqi citizens. Woodcock has suggested how the provision of oil industry-generated funds (initially at possibly low levels) could provide the basis for long-term development of increasingly integrated social groupings aimed at protecting the oil assets that could provide funds to all citizens. He also discusses the increased capabilities of the US in Iraq compared with the external capabilities in Washington (thereby influencing the EXT factor, described above) and how the government (IPS) could benefit by co-option of Sunnis into the government (IPS) and security forces (BCF), for example.

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