

Humanitarian Assistance and Network Governance: The ORHA Case

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INTRODUCTION

The use of network governance as an approach to providing domestic disaster response and international humanitarian assistance (HA) products and services is not a new concept or approach. It is seen frequently in the United States in the form of a network of intergovernmental and interagency responding to events such as Hurricane Katrina (Roberts, 2001; Wise, 2006). The use of network governance to provide various components of international HA operations has also been recently highlighted (Stockton, 2002; Eugenia Eng, 2003; Ricigliano, 2003; Stephenson, 2005; Stephenson, 2006).

Despite the recent trend to “rely less on public employees in traditional roles and more on a web of partnerships, contracts, and alliances to do the public’s work” (Goldsmith, 2004), HA network governance is still maturing as a mainstream governance model (O’Toole, 1997; Kettl, 2002; Herranz, 2006). This paper continues the dialogue on HA network governance, contributes to the works discussing military governance in HA and asks: how extensive was network governance used as a tool to prepare for and conduct humanitarian assistance (HA) operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)?

A gap analysis is used to determine the extent of ORHA network governance in HA. The gap analysis (comparing one “as is state” in time to another) adapts a network mapping framework (Holey, 2004) to examine the network of organizations used by ORHA to conduct HA operations. The ORHA network map is the centerpiece of the gap analysis.

A network map shows the nodes and links in the network. Nodes can be people, groups, or organizations. Links can show relationships, flows, or transactions. Links can be directional or non-directional. A network map is an excellent tool for visually tracking your ties and designing strategies to create new connections. (Holey, 2004).

The gap analysis compares the gap (Figure 1) between scattered clusters of HA networks prior to ORHA's formation, and the hub and spoke network seen during ORHA's governance of the HA operation. The left side of Figure 1 provides a representative model of existing scattered HA networks, while the right side of Figure 1 represents a hub and spoke network. Heavy lines connecting nodes indicate strong links; thin lines indicate weak links. Additionally, barriers and enablers, seen in the middle of Figure 1, are examined. Data supporting the analysis is derived from interviews of ORHA personnel and archived open source material.




Figure 1: ORHA HA Network Gap Analysis Approach.

DISCUSSION

Three major sections discuss the key question of this paper: how extensive was network governance used as a tool to prepare and conduct successful humanitarian assistance (HA) operations in OIF? The first section introduces ORHA's strategic setting. The second section discusses the concept of network governance and the application of the Krebs and Holley framework. The gap analysis in section three examines the barriers and enablers associated with a robust ORHA network governance tool.

ORHA'S STRATEGIC SETTING.

ORHA was established by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD #24) in January 2003, and placed within the Department of Defense (Woodward, 2004). Among its many

tasks, was to deliver effective humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq during OIF. Early humanitarian planning prior to ORHA’s formation in January 2003 was conducted by several organizations. US Central Command (USCENTCOM), an organization that maintains national security responsibility for the Middle East, began drafting invasion plans for Iraq in the spring of 2002 as seen in Figure 2. Typically this includes what is called “Phase IV Planning”, which addresses the post-conflict environment and the provision of HA. Planning for post-conflict governance was also conducted by other organizations, to include the Joint Staff, the National Security Council, and the Department of State. ORHA recognized the multiplicity of planning efforts and attempted to stitch them together at a planning session at the National Defense University (NDU) in February, 2003.

ORHA Timeline							
May '02	Aug '02	Nov '02	Feb '03	Mar '03	Ap '03	Ap '03	May '03
CENTCOM Drafts Invasion Plans for Iraq	Joint Staff Plans Post Conflict	Elliot Cleveland NSC Group Plans Post Conflict	NSPD #24 Signed	ORHA-NDU Planning Session	Major Combat Ops Complete	ORHA Deploys to Baghdad	ORHA Officially Dissolved

Figure 2: ORHA Timeline.

ORHA’s staff began to organize at the end of January 2003 for the humanitarian mission using a mix of US government agency personnel, contractors, and retired military. ORHA left to deploy to Kuwait in March of 2003 with approximately 200 personnel to support three major pillars: reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and civil administration (Figure 3). ORHA established operational headquarters in Baghdad in April of 2003, and was officially disbanded as an organization in June 2003.




Figure 3: ORHA Organizational Structure.

Former Ambassador George Ward was asked to take the lead for the Humanitarian pillar (Figure 3) by ORHA's director, retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner.

To accomplish these tasks, Ambassador Ward broke the staff down into sectors, matching those used by the relief community—water and sanitation, health, food, shelter, refugees, and internally displaced personnel, de-mining, and human rights. (Oliver, 2004).

Ambassador Ward recognized that Iraq, a country approximately the size of California with approximately 25 million people, would challenge the limited resources of ORHA. “ORHA simply didn't have the time, resources, or expertise in early 2003”(Rieff, 2003). The classic public administration challenge emerged. How were Ambassador Ward and his staff to effectively manage HA efforts with limited preparation and resources? Network governance, while not cognitively recognized, was the answer. The network governance strategy chosen by Ambassador Ward is reflected in the mission goals seen in Table 1.

These unique ways and means (coordination, facilitating, arranging, pre-positioning, use existing support systems) are characteristic traits of network governance approaches. Network governance is commonly understood as initiatives deliberately undertaken by government to accomplish public goals with assigned responsibilities to each partner (Goldsmith, 2004). The network governance approach worked. ORHA, Ambassador Ward, his staff and a network of organizations achieved the HA goals, avoided humanitarian disasters, and transitioned many of the recovery responsibilities to local Iraqi ministries.

Much to the surprise of many commentators, a humanitarian emergency did not materialize. There were no massive populations displacements, no widespread food availability crises, chronic epidemic or bouts of inter-ethnic violence. (Gordon, 2004).

Six Main Goals

- **Minimize displacement, damage to infrastructure, and disruption of services**
- **Rely primarily on civilian relief agencies**
- **Promote effective civil-military coordination**
- **Facilitate the operations of international and non-government organizations**
- **Pre-position relief supplies in the region for rapid distribution**
- **Support the resumption of rations from the “Oil-for-Food ration distribution system**

Source: USIP (2003)

Table 1: ORHA Humanitarian Assistance Goals.

ORHA'S HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE NETWORK GOVERNANCE

Ambassador Ward formulated the “ways” to achieve a successful HA operation, but what were the “means” or resources to execute that strategy? Ambassador Ward and his resource-constrained staff weaved a network of scattered clusters of organizations and associations to execute the humanitarian effort.

SCATTERED NETWORKS.

The HA network (pre-ORHA) in the winter of 2002 typified the scattered network found in the left side of Figure 1. These clustered organizations and individuals shared a common interest—humanitarian operations, yet were not united in purpose. The twenty clusters found in Table 2 represent the “as is state” of scattered HA networks in the winter of 2002. Table 2 provides a glimpse into the wide array of resources available to ORHA, not only in HA planning, but in the response effort as well. Many of the entities in Table 2 exhibit a wide range of maturity, size, capability, organization, and interest. This table is representative of the wide array of organizations needed by administrator George Ward to weave an effective HA operation.

NETWORK CLUSTER	TYPICAL CLUSTER REPRESENTATIVES *
US Government (USG) Studies & Analysis Groups (USGS&A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US Institute for Peace • Congressional Research Service • Rand Corporation
US Government Agencies (USGAgc)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Department of Treasury (eg. Office of Foreign Assets Control) • Department of Agriculture (eg. .Foreign Agricultural Service)
Private Studies and Analysis Entities (PvtS&A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Center for Strategic and International Studies • International Crisis Group • Brookings Institute
Academic Organizations, Consortiums, Associations (AcdmAsn)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feinstein Intl. Famine Center @ Tufts University • The Mershon Center @ Ohio State University • Institute for Study of International Migration @ Georgetown University
Information Sharing Groups (InfoShrGrp)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relief Web • Humanitarian Practice Network
Intergovernmental Organizations (IO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United Nations Agencies (UNICEF, WHO, WFP, OHCA, IOM, etc.) • European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)
International Loan Institutions (ILL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • World Bank/ International Monetary Fund • Regional Development Banks (eg. Islamic Development Bank)
Expatriate Community (ExpatCmty)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political • Social
Regional Partners (RegPtr)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jordan • Kuwait
Professional Associations & Societies (PrfAssn)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • American Psychological Association • American Society of Civil Engineers
*Note: Entities represented in table are representative but grounded in literature.; not a comprehensive listing; as-is state (12/02)	

Table 2: HA Network Scattered Clusters (Part 1).

NETWORK CLUSTER	TYPICAL CLUSTER REPRESENTATIVES *
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) • International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) • OXFAM
Coalition Military; Coalition Partners (CMil/CPtnr)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UK MOD/DIFD • Japan SDF/MOFA
Host Nation Civil Society (HNCivScty)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Red Crescent Society • Care
Military/Security Forces (MilSecFrc)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO • ASEAN
Host Nation Ministries (HNMin)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Health • Ministry of Trade
HGO Networks (HGONet)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) • Interaction
Bi-lateral Partners (BiLat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Norway • Czech Republic
Individual/Initiative Groups (Indv/IGrp)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unassociated individuals either by themselves or banding together to establish an initiative to support humanitarian assistance efforts
Local Councils (LocCncl)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tribal Groups • Town Councils/Elders Council
Contractors (CT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research Triangle Institute (RTI) • Creative Associates International Inc (CAII)
*Note: Entities represented in table are representative but grounded in literature.; not a comprehensive listing; as-is state (12/02)	

Table 2: HA Network Scattered Clusters (Part 2).

HUB AND SPOKE NETWORK

While not cognitively recognized by ORHA, staff members were establishing HA governance by network as outlined by Goldsmith and Eggers.

Thus government by network bears less resemblance to a traditional organizational chart, than it does to a more dynamic web of computer networks, that can organize or reorganize, expand or contract, depending on the problems at hand.. (Goldsmith, 2004).

ORHA leadership established a dynamic web of linkages to many of the existing scattered networks seen in Table 2, which could facilitate a responsive humanitarian action. ORHA established relationships and acted as a hub to three key humanitarian operations communities: international, US, and local.

ORHA focused on establishing linkages to the international HA networks that are often critical to successful HA operations. Many of the linkages to these networks were not chartered agreements. These linkages were existing informal relationships between ORHA staff members and their counterparts in international HA organizations. One such case is seen in a courtesy call by Ambassador Ward and Henrik Oelesen, a long time UN and Danish diplomat and member of ORHA. Ward and Oelesen, visited the UN pre-war headquarters in Larnaka, Cyprus to develop informal working relationships (Oliver, 2004). Thus, the ORHA leadership recognized the value of connecting to the “extensive network of partnerships, or

what many consider a form of sub-contracting” (Humanitarian Studies Unit, 2001) that have formed over the past decade between their UN agencies and associated implementing NGOs. These NGOs were implementing agents for the “flash appeal” issued by the UN for humanitarian assistance funds issued in March of 2003.

Another key network strategy needed for success was the linkage to existing UN systems and programs already in place in Iraq. Of particular importance focus for ORHA as seen in table 1 was the continued operation of the oil-for-food (OFF) program. Robin Raphael and Nick Harvey (Oliver, 2004), ORHA food sector staff members, worked to insure that the 55,000 food distribution points continued to function in Iraq.

As yet there are various means of aid delivery at work (or in the planning stages), operating with varying levels of coordination and effectiveness. These can be divided roughly into 1) the Red Cross/Red Crescent system 2) Oil-for-food agent system for food distributions 3) the system of international non-governmental (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations acting in coordination with UN humanitarian agencies and/or the Occupying powers; and 4) ad-hoc bilateral aid from governments. (Subcommittee on National Security, 2003).

Three United States government (USG) HA networks were essential nodes needed by ORHA to address the six goals set by the Chief of the Humanitarian Operations pillar. One key network cluster critical to ORHA success was AID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) network. OFDA’s maintains its own network of links to the NGO community. OFDA’s network maintains close relationships and linkages with not only the American humanitarian NGO community, but the international NGO community as well. “ECHO commits itself to ‘maintaining a series of informal, consultative session with the USAID” (Humanitarian Studies Unit, 2001). ORHA needed OFDA’s network as a HA key success factor.

In addition to links to HA networks, OFDA provides operational assets in the form of Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) teams. ORHA used the personal relationship between ORHA HA staff member Michael Hess, who was a US State Dept/AID loaner to the ORHA staff, to insure the presence of DART teams in the HA effort in Iraq. In fact, the DART staff assembled in Kuwait was “the largest in US history, were place under DOD jurisdiction” (Mack, 2004).

The second USG HA network cluster that ORHA linked with to provide HA products and services was the contractor community. The use of contractors to provide HA products and services is a recent trend seen in the Humanitarian enterprise. This growing trend was used by ORHA to widen the network of implementing partners that are not considered as traditional in nature.

The tendency to use a wider range of implementing partners (in particular the use of military civil-affairs officers and commercial organizations such as Bechtel and Research Triangle Initiatives) to provide services such as health, education, water, electricity basic infrastructure. (Gordon, 2004).

It is noteworthy to highlight that several key ORHA personnel were working as contract hires, or were recently hired from the ranks of the contractor community. For example, Jay

Garner, head of ORHA, worked as the head of his own private firm, before being asked by Secretary Rumsfeld to form and lead ORHA. ORHA also used the Army's LOGCAP contractor Halliburton, to obtain logistical support, such as vehicles and other life-support services (food, laundry, etc.). Not only were contracting tools used to provide staff personnel and support, HA contractor support was used to deliver HA services; mine-clearing is one example. "RONCO deployed four QRDF teams to Iraq on May 3, 2003, to provide de-mining and battle area clearance (BAC) assistance to ORHA" (Roberts, 2004).

A third USG HA network that ORHA established linkages with was the US led coalition of military forces. These military forces supplied various types of units suitable to the HA mission. Usually, these forces include medical or engineer units that can provide health care, shelter, or other types of HA support. ORHA linked to these networks by incorporating a number of liaison officers from the US Civil-Affairs community, as well as other coalition countries (UK, Japan, etc.) within the ORHA Humanitarian Assistance pillar. This not only provided linkages to coalition military, but facilitated linkages to coalition foreign aid offices which contributed to HA resources. For example, Japan provided self-defense forces to help in the HA mission, as well as financial contributions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the HA appeal conducted by the UN.

ORHA staff members did not neglect the importance of linking into local civil society/humanitarian networks in Iraq during 2003. However, it was recognized that the local humanitarian networks were sparse at best due the tyrannical control of Sad'am Hussein regime. Additionally in 2002, a very limited network of local NGOs or IOs was available due to economic and political embargos imposed by the UN. The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) was present and linked to Iraqi local communities on a limited basis. However, it was not a prominent node in ORHA's network.

Other international organizations (IO) did maintain a limited relationship with local Iraqi society, yet ORHA was not able to directly establish a strong link with these IOs. Illustratively, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) coordinated some efforts with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); however no compacts existed with ORHA. Where no strong ties, agreements, MOUs, or compacts existed with various IOs or local organizations, ORHA used Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs) to facilitate the coordination of the scattered HA networks. These HOCs existed in Kuwait, Jordan, and in Baghdad. The Kuwait HOC, sponsored by the Kuwaiti government, and staffed by Kuwaiti and coalition military, functioned as a particularly successful ORHA networking location for establishing informal ties to the NGO network assembled in Kuwait.

The HOC opened informal lines of communication with UN agencies in late January 2003—initially with UNDP, UNHCR, OCHA, UN Security Coordination (UNSECOORD), the World Food Program (WFP) and the UN Mines Advisory Service—and individuals maintained close, if discreet dialogue thereafter. (Mack, 2004).

The ORHA hub and spoke network (Table 3) that emerged in the spring of 2003 is one that is characterized by many weak links to HA networks, and a few strong ties to traditional HA networks. This network characterized efforts by ORHA staff to weave the scattered network of international, US, and local HA entities into an organization that facilitated a functioning HA response effort.

The information seen in Table 3 is used as a basis for constructing a ORHA network graphic. This graphic (Figure 4), is an image of the linkages between the ORHA, which functioned as the hub of the OIF HA network, and the scattered networks. Strong ties (thick lines, Figure 4) are characterized by chartered networks. “Such networks can be chartered (organized by some formal mechanism as an intergovernmental agreement or by statutory action) or non-chartered (informal in legal status but equally permanent, organized, and mission oriented)” (Agranoff, 2006). Weak ties (thin lines, Figure 4) indicate non-chartered linkages. Interviews with ORHA personnel revealed that few contracts and no existing memorandums of understanding (MOUs) existed between ORHA and the scattered clusters of existing networks responding to the OIF HA. A network of weak links (non-chartered) governed the humanitarian enterprise, vice strong links (chartered). The strength (thick lines, figure 4) or weakness (thin lines, Figure 4) of these network links is due to network barriers and enablers.

NETWORK CLUSTER	TYPICAL CLUSTER REPRESENTATIVES *	TYPICAL CLUSTER REPRESENTATIVES *
US Government (USG) Studies & Analysis Groups (USGS&A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US Institute for Peace 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Congressional Research Service
US Government Agencies (USGAgc)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AID-(OFDA, FFP, OTI, Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART)) • Department of State (PRM) • Department of Defense (DSCA-HA and Mine Action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Department of Justice (Office Foreign Assets Control) • Department of Agriculture (.Foreign Agricultural Service, International Food Aid Program)
Private Studies and Analysis Entities (PvtS&A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cuny Center • International Crisis Group • Brookings Institute 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Center for Strategic and International Studies • Overseas Development Institute
Academic Organizations, Consortiums, Associations (AcdmAsn)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Defense University • James Madison University Mine Action Info Center 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institute for Study of International Migration @ Georgetown University • Center on International Cooperation @ New York University
Information Sharing Groups (InfoShrGrp)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relief WeB • Humanitarian Practice Network • Refugees International 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PACOM CXDMHA • NGO Coordination Committee In Iraq (NCCI) • Action By Churches Together (ACT)
Intergovernmental Organizations (IO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United Nations’ (UNICEF, WHO, WFP, OHCA, IOM, UNRWA, UNHCR, UNDP, UNEP, Mine Action Program) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)
International Loan Institutions (ILI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • World Bank and World Bank Iraq Trust Fund (IRRFI) • Thematic Banks (eg. International Fund for Agricultural Development) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Bank for Reconstruction and Development • Regional Development Banks (eg. Islamic Development Bank)
Expatriate Community (ExpatCmty)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iraqi National Congress 	

*Note: Entities represented in table are representative but grounded in literature; not a comprehensive listing ; as-is state (05/03)

Table 3: ORHA HA Hub and Spoke Network (Part 1).

NETWORK CLUSTER	TYPICAL CLUSTER REPRESENTATIVES *	TYPICAL CLUSTER REPRESENTATIVES *
Regional Partners (RegPtr)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turkey • United Arab Emirates • Saudi Arabia • Iran 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Syria • Jordan • Kuwait • Qatar
Professional Associations & Societies (PrfAssn)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Dispensary Association 	
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OXFAM • Care • Air Serve • Mercy Corps • Salvation Army • GOAL • Action By Churches Together (ACT) • Middle East Council of Churches (MECC) • Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) • Catholic Relief Service/CARITAS • Development Alternatives International • Lutheran World Relief • Physicians for Human Rights • World Resources Institute • Direct Relief International • MedAir 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) • International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) • International Red Crescent Society (IRCS) • International Rescue Committee (IRC) • International Medical Corps • Save the Children • World Vision • Ockenden International • Human Rights Watch • American Friends Service Committee • Church World Service • Medicin San Frontiers • Help Age International • Merlin
Coalition Military; Coalition Partners (CMil/CPtr)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Japan/MOFA • Canada/CIDA • Australia • Italy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UK/DIFD/HMN Ship Sir Galahad • Spain • Finland • Norway
Host Nation Civil Society (HNCivScty)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General Federation of Iraqi Women 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Family Planning Association
Military/Security Forces (MilSecFrc)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • US Army 352nd Civil Affairs Command 	
Host Nation Ministries (HNMin)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Health • Ministry of Trade • Ministry of Agriculture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Housing & Construction • Ministry of Public Works • Ministry of Water Resources
HGO Networks (HGONet)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interaction • International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) • Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR)
Bi-lateral Partners/Bi-lateral Contributors (BiLat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Austria • Bangladesh • China • Croatia • France • Germany • Iceland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • India • Kuwait • Netherlands • Sweden • Switzerland • Taiwan • Czech Republic
Individual/Initiative Groups (Indv/IGrp)	Unknown	Unknown
Local Councils (LocCncl)	Unknown	Unknown
Contractors (CT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bechtel • Research Triangle Initiatives (RTI) • Development Associates Intl. (DAI) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stevedoring Services of America • Creative Associates International Inc (CAII) • LOGCAP (Haliburton)

*Note: Entities represented in table are representative but grounded in literature; not a comprehensive listing ; as-is state (05/03)

Table 3: ORHA HA Hub and Spoke Network (Part 2).




Figure 4: ORHA HA Hub and Spoke Network.

ORHA NETWORK GOVERNANCE GAP ANALYSIS.

What prevented or enhanced ORHA from establishing strong ties with the network of HA organizations delivering HA products and services? The basis for the analysis of the factors that prevented a transition from an inefficient scattered network to a strong and linked hub-and-spoke networks can be determined by an examination of the barriers and enablers encountered by ORHA. These barriers and enablers directly affected the existence and strength of links between clusters of nodes.

BARRIERS

Policy and operational barriers posed the most significant barriers to establishing an optimal hub and spoke network governance model. The most significant policy barrier was the decision not to establish the Department of State/AID team or the United Nations as the lead agent for facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Instead, US policy in the form of NSPD #24 placed ORHA and DOD as the lead agent for HA operations in Iraq.

The decision to place responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction within the Department of Defense has been a particular source of concern to the humanitarian community. While DART workers are supposed to act de facto as intermediaries between the US military and relief organizations, thereby minimizing the need for the two to negotiate directly, there still is lingering

concern about the military role, fuelled in large part by ORHA's assumed pre-eminence ((ICG), 2003)

A second policy barrier was the indecisiveness of the UN in the early stages of the war to not act as the primary HA provider of choice. The UN did not want to be seen as compliant or in complete agreement with US invasion actions. Thus an official policy declaration that the UN would function as the HA coordination organization was not seen during the spring of 2003.

UN New York response to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq dictated that the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOCHI) be located in Cyprus. To undertake OCHA's traditional role in theatre could have given the impression that the UN was enabling or at least facilitating the conflict. The lack of a UN Resolution authorizing the war did not permit such a role. (Mack, 2004)

Similar policy stances were also taken by several of the NGO community.

There were a large number of operational barriers that detracted from efficacy of ORHA's HA hub and spoke operations. One of these included the continued existence of Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) restrictions that created bureaucratic barriers to the NGO community pre-positioning supplies, and establishing linkages with local Iraqi communities. Another operational barrier was the lack of local civil society organizations, and corresponding linkages to the international NGO community. Mentioned previously, this was due to the nature of the Saddam Hussein's totalitarian state. "One of the lessons was they could not rely on NGO to serve a channels in areas where they did not have a well established presence" (Borton, 1993). One of the largest barriers that continually challenges the establishment of strong ties (Holey, 2004) among and between the NGO community and others is that of culture. This is an ever-present hurdle to overcome to any organization attempting to weave a network of effective and efficient humanitarian assistance operators. Such was the case of ORHA.

The main barriers to more effective coordination have long been identified to be the related problems of: the substantial degree of autonomy of the principle agencies; the substantial overlap in their mandates; and the reliance of the agencies upon voluntary contributions to resource their relief operations which has served to increase competition between agencies. (Borton, 1993)

ENABLERS

Three key enablers contributed to the establishment of effective network ties that enabled ORHA to prevent HA crises. These three key enablers were: integrating *networked* personnel into the ORHA staff, plugging into functioning HA systems, and facilitating the success of de-facto networks.

Many of the linkages in the ORHA HA networks were based on personal or professional relationships. These relationships existed before USG personnel were *borrowed* and integrated as ORHA staff members. These borrowed ORHA staff members maintained

strong ties and relationships in the State/AID and military civil-affairs community. In essence, ORHA senior leadership integrated what Krebs and Holley term the “good ole boy” HA networks, by importing staff with strong ties to existing USG HA networks. Holley and Krebs characterize this by stating that “strong ties are usually found within a network cluster, while weak ties are found between clusters” (Holey, 2004). By way of illustration, retired Ambassador Ward, a former state department veteran himself, and several of the ORHA HA staff members were on loan from AID and other Federal agencies to ORHA. These USG employees working in the ORHA humanitarian pillar were part of the USG interagency network brought to bear on the HA challenges in Iraq. For example,

ORHA would be employing a network of disaster assistance response teams (DARTs) to assess needs around the country and assist in the implementation of projects through rapid reaction grants. However, Ward also stressed that the DARTs would be just one part of the US government’s response efforts and that the DARTs will work in tandem with efforts by IGOs and NGOs to provide basic humanitarian assistance—including food, water, health care, sanitation, and shelter ((USIP), 2003)

Contributing to the value of incorporating AID/state personnel with their inherent relationships is their access to in-place governmental systems. For example, ORHA recognized the positive benefit of access to AID’s registry of pre-qualified NGOs data base that is maintained in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance within AID.

The second enabler that allowed a hub-and-spoke network governance model to emerge as an effective governance approach was the use of/linkage to existing functioning network systems—particularly UN systems. The UN Humanitarian Assistance HQ in Larnaca Cyprus, while not explicitly linked to ORHA by a memorandum of agreement (MOA) or other contractual agreement, cooperated with ORHA, and enabled UN resources to be directed towards the resolution of common HA challenges.

After a visit in April 2003 to Larnaka, Cyprus, where the UN established its pre-war headquarters, Ambassador Ward and Henrik Olesen, a long-time UN and Danish diplomatic and member of ORHA, developed a comprehensive plan of action integrating UN agencies into the overall plan. (Oliver, 2004)

Cooperation in the food relief sector is illustrative. ORHA personnel were able to facilitate the continuance of the UN oil-for-food program, and supplement it with continued World Food Program (WFP) contributions. ORHA, as a weak link to the UN system, facilitated the sustainment of the existing food distribution points system established by the UN to avoid a food shortage. Corollary to linking to UN existing functioning systems is the ability to count on de-facto UN network. More simply put, when the UN arrives, so do the NGOs and IOs associated with the UN.

The third enabler that worked to ORHA’s advantage was the use of the phenomena called convergence. “Sociologists have described a process of convergence in which those wishing to help converge on disaster areas” (Streib, 2006). This is partially due to their independent nature, their HA principles, and market competition. This independent nature is seen in the uncoordinated actions of Caritas Iraq which “announced today plans to send a four-vehicle convoy of vitally needed relief items into Iraq” (Carney, 2003).

Further evidence of the utility of convergence is that pre-planning and coordination for OIF by ORHA was very limited with NGOs and IOs. Yet, their presence at the Humanitarian Operations Centers in Kuwait and Jordan indicates a robust scattered network of NGOs that are prepared to respond, despite the lack of pre-planning. However, to the dismay or pleasure of a coordinating organization such as ORHA, the efforts of these scattered clusters of organizations are not organized, directed, or coordinated in nature. A system of coordinating by default takes place “where in the absence of a formal coordination entity, only the most basic exchange of information and division of labor takes place among the actors” ((OCHA), 2004).

SUMMARY

This brief paper takes an introductory look at some of the network governance approaches used by ORHA in providing humanitarian assistance during the early period of OIF. Additionally, many typical issues that arise in a complex undertaking such as a humanitarian operation are re-discovered in this paper. A gap analysis, adapted from Krebs’ and Holley’s network mapping model is used as a technique for highlighting the challenges of establishing an effective humanitarian assistance network. The discussion and gap analysis portions of this paper provide four significant insights.

First, network governance approaches can work to accomplish humanitarian assistance goals given a conducive environment. ORHA, facing significant time and resource constraints, used a weakly linked network of HA providers to avoid humanitarian crises. Three weak links, characterized by the lack of a charter or compacts between organizations in the network, were critical. These links were to UN systems, AID networks, and the NGO community.

The second significant insight is that establishing linkages through relationships, informal (un-chartered) or formal (chartered), to existing in-place networks is a key ingredient to HA governance success. George Ward, ORHA’s HA director, hired and integrated ORHA staff members that possessed USG and IO working relationships. These relationships helped to achieve HA mission goals by incorporating their existing “good ole boy” networks. ORHA HA sector personnel such as Michael Hess (AID), Henrik Olesen (Denmark), Dan Layton (State Dept.) brought long standing relationship links to the AID, UN, and the Department of State network of HA providers. Few ORHA linkages were chartered.

The third insight from this brief examination of ORHA’s HA network governance is that de-facto network effects are a factor in calculating HA response. More specifically, experienced HA veterans, such as George Ward, recognized that scattered clusters of HA organizations participate without contractual agreements. Moreover due to policy limitations many HA organizations limited their formal association with a DOD coordinating organization such as ORHA, yet participated on an informal basis. Furthermore, common techniques and practices, such as the partnering of NGOs with funding agencies (ECHO, AID, UN, etc), and the response culture of independent NGO are de-facto practices that worked to the benefit of ORHA. Leveraging this “convergence” phenomenon was a contributing factor to ORHA’s success in preventing HA crises.

our approach aims to leverage the capacity of these skilled experienced, and internationally mandated humanitarian assistance organization by establishing formal civilian military coordination operations center. We set up one in Kuwait, set up one in Jordan, and as General Garner said, about to set up one in Baghdad (Subcommittee on National Security, 2003)

Finally, this brief paper points to the need for further research and analysis. Three areas emerge. This paper uses PowerPoint graphic software to fashion a crude map representative state of the ORHA hub and spoke network. A follow-on effort is needed, that uses a more accurate network mapping approach, using a comprehensive set of node and links data, with detailed inputs, to map the ORHA spoke and hub network. A second area for pursuit is to address the strength of ties between and within network clusters. The third area for further research is also the next step in the Krebs and Holley network mapping framework. This is a construction of a standing multi-hub small world network. This small world network would work during peace, to establish a standing HA operational framework that is used during the next man-made or natural humanitarian operations.

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