

Interdisciplinary Peace Operations Professional Development: Investing in Long-Term Peace Operations Success

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INTRODUCTION

Thomas Jefferson once remarked that “as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered... institutions must advance to keep pace with the times”. This is clearly true in the converging arenas of peace and security operations. As peace operations have become a permanent feature of the international landscape since the demise of the Cold War, new and unusual challenges to international and national security have proliferated in frequency, scale and unpredictability. Such threats – e.g., ethnic and religious conflict, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, incidental and deliberate population migration and environmental instability, and sharpening competition for dwindling natural resources – are transforming orthodox notions of national security. Because these threats are borderless, multi-technological, and asymmetrical, they call for response mechanisms and instrumentalities which themselves integrate peace and security operations.

The events of 11 September 2001 have accelerated this process, as the forces of both globalization and fragmentation tear even further at the fabric of nation-states and their traditional mechanisms based on ideas of frontiers and inter-national order (Figure 1). While it is becoming more evident in both peace and security operations that, as a new generation of professionals is trained and educated, their professional development must also have an interdisciplinary dimension. For it is the coordination of these increasingly complex endeavors that presents the greatest emerging operational challenge. This presentation, therefore, is intended to offer a framework for discussion of interdisciplinary training and education needs, examine some present options and suggest a way ahead.

Strategic Developments

- ✓ **Proliferation of non-traditional threats to security, in quantity/frequency and scale**
 - ethnic/religious conflict – fragmentation vs. globalization
 - terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction
 - drug trafficking, black marketing and international organized crime
 - population migration – displaced persons, refugees, demographic shifts
 - environmental instability among diminishing natural resources (e.g., water)
- ✓ **Concept of national security has been transcended**
 - threats are increasingly, borderless/transnational, low-tech/asymmetrical
 - instrumentalities, too - growth of IOs, NGOs/PVOs and regional organizations
 - interrelationship of diplomatic, military, economic and information/cultural power
- ✓ **9-11 has accelerated this process, rooted in the Cold War**




Figure 1: Strategic developments have influenced peace and security operations.

EMERGING CIVIL-MILITARY TRUTHS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

New, overarching strategic truths are also playing out in the field of peace operations. Since international peace operations proliferated in the 1990s, they have involved an increasingly complex array of international and regional organizations, national and intergovernmental agencies, and both international and indigenous non-governmental and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), as well as national and multinational military commands. Meanwhile, as the civilian entities among them have become more numerous and better resourced and organized over the last few years, they have increasingly taken the lead in the implementation of peace operations (Figure 2).

However, because of the growing abundance of players with disparate organizational and sponsor/donor interests, these increasingly complex operations remain largely uncoordinated, particularly at the level where policy is translated into implementation at the theater joint task force (military) or the UN mission or other lead agency headquarters (civilian) level. This “operational” level is where resources can at once be most effectively identified and mobilized in appropriate economies of scale. It is also the level of decision-making authority centralized enough to have sufficient depth and breadth of impact in-theater and which can elicit appropriate political-diplomatic and institutional support to lend power and legitimacy to such decisions.

Thus, the operational level is where the challenges – and opportunities – for the success of an international peace intervention are the greatest. Among these are issues such as post-conflict peace building and compliance with agreements (particularly monitoring,

verification, and enforcement). These challenges and opportunities lie not only in the coordination of the myriad activities and resources of the expanding number of donor-funded IOs and NGOs/PVOs but, perhaps more importantly, in the flow and management of knowledge and information. Knowledge and information are not just valuable to inter-entity coordination and to efficient and effective mobilization and distribution of resources, but for perception management – at all levels, key to success or failure of an international intervention.




Figure 2: The evolution of peace and security operations.

Although civilian organizations have taken the lead in crisis response and “nation-building,” the military maintains certain comparative advantages that compliment the operational shortcomings of much of the civilian peace operations community. These advantages include, for example: decision-making; staff coordination; planning and organization; consequence, crisis and transition management, as well as other forms of problem-solving; logistics management; information operations; and above all, training. Beyond its primary role of securing the peace operations environment, the military can play a vital role in leveraging the success of the civilian peace operations community. This is particularly true in the early phases when civilian organizations are not as well-deployed and resourced in the field as the military, yet at the very time when certain actions, taken or not taken, can have long-lasting impact on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international presence.

This, paradoxically, is in the direct interests of the military and their sending states in order to minimize the military’s role – i.e., in supporting the “exit strategy” and reaching the “end-state.” In fact, civil-military operations (CMO), or CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) as known by most militaries, have come to encompass almost every aspect of military peace support operations (PSO), so that much of CMO/CIMIC is conducted by military personnel with little or no CMO/CIMIC training. Beyond the overall success of civilian-led peace

operations, certain aspects such as judicial, legal, judicial and law enforcement capacity-building, also have impact on areas of more direct interest to military security operations, e.g., anti-terrorism and anti-organized crime.

Before 11 September 2001, the Bush Administration's reluctant reconsideration of "nation-building," and the international intervention in Afghanistan, it was already clear that:

Whether they like it or not, the U.S. and European militaries have an important role to play and will be requested to participate in future peace support operations. The military is much better than civilian agencies at coordination and logistics, as well as their traditional tasks of enforcement and security. Significantly, there is a clear chain of command in the military, which is conspicuously lacking in many international organizations, and these are fundamental components for the smooth running of an operation. Additionally, in early stages, when the situation on the ground is too dangerous for most civilian agencies, the military can prepare the groundwork for political reconstruction, such as enforcing a curfew, demobilizing militias, de-mining, or providing security for elections, and in some cases, even running them.¹

In peace operations henceforth, this new reality means a well-informed senior command and staff must now work routinely in a multinational (or "coalition") as well as a joint command-and-control setting, more complex and with many non-military players involved. It also means insuring the types of forces deployed are best suited for these operations (i.e., relatively more combat support and service support versus combat troops), especially as operational focus evolves. Central to this is making sure there are enough of the types of soldiers deployed at the right places and levels, and who can work both sides of the civil-military cultural divide and broker unity of effort.

The CMO/CIMIC paradox is at the core of an emerging paradigm for civil-military peace operations. In addition to redefining the civil-military partnership, it means the knowledge, skills, training and personal qualities required for such civil-military enablers are different than those needed for past operations. In addition to more diverse operational skills and greater knowledge of various players, CMO/CIMIC officers need an understanding of policy-level issues in order to effectively conduct operational CMO/CIMIC as well as appropriately advise non-CMO/CIMIC military commanders and staff conducting CMO/CIMIC-intensive PSO. The demands of the new operational civil-military paradigm for international interventions require a new level of professionalism among U.S. Civil Affairs (CA) officers and an emerging class of professional CIMIC officers from other NATO, allied and international coalition countries, as they create CIMIC forces and eventually assume much of the burden for providing professional CA/CIMIC capabilities in peace operations.

As the author elaborated in a previous presentation:

Because much of PSO is led or conducted by civilians, especially in transitional administration situations, this radically alters skill set requirements for CA/CIMIC forces. The good news is that the requirement for CA/CIMIC specialists to perform "nation-building" is diminishing. The

¹ *Democracy by Force – U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*, Karin von Hippel, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2000, pp. 176-77.

not-so-good news is that the demands on CA/CIMIC generalists, particularly at the operational level, are increasing rapidly. The kind of people required to perform or coordinate operational-level CA/CIMIC must not only possess greater PSO and combined/joint staff experience, CMO-related training and skills, political and cultural sensitivity, and (English-language) oral and written communications skills. They must be good staff officers and know something about risk assessment and mission and course-of-action analyses. Beyond this, they must be knowledge and information managers and (at least amateur) public administrators, logisticians, engineers, legal and law enforcement specialists, and educators. (It also helps to be a superb networker and coordinator.) More than just being structured for success with appropriate doctrinal and operational guidelines and training, they must possess interpersonal skills and an openness and sensitivity to their mission that cannot be taught. They must be enablers as much, if not more, than technical experts. Between the military civilian worlds they simultaneously inhabit, they must be engines of synergy, fueled by knowledge and information.²

In any case, inasmuch as military community needs to better understand and accommodate the ways of the civilian community whose success in peace operations is essentially prerequisite, civilian organizations and their practitioners in peace operations – the majority of whom have no military experience – must likewise be prepared to work with the military, operating from its side of the Clausewitzian continuum, this time between politics and peace. Nevertheless, “the natural reluctance of governmental and nongovernmental agencies to be seen as working with the military in complex emergencies has diminished in recent years, and NGOs in particular are finding that a collaboration can benefit all parties.”³

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Len Hawley, at a symposium on best practices in conflict management training sponsored by the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), 25-26 June 2001, stressed that mission success in complex emergency operations requires regular and effective coordination among civilian agencies and the military. No one agency can bring success, and progress in one area depends on progress in another. Haiti, Bosnia, Honduras, and Kosovo, he suggested, have progressively presented more demanding challenges, outstripping capacity. Even before 11 September 2001, the trend in complex emergencies indicated ever more difficult and hostile operating environments, especially for civilians, greater damage to all aspects of civil society, and expanding requirements for an assertive and comprehensive international community response.

“Halfhearted, incremental efforts” by some agencies, Hawley argued, will not address the pervasive, multi-agency, multilevel challenge. A new approach is needed that accounts for ground realities in addressing the weakest link — genuine and deliberate civil-military cooperation, not left up to chance. Such cooperation comes only when both communities share dependable and realistic expectations of each other in successful facilitation of the peace process, both acting in concert to address common challenges using common

² From “The Operational Art of Civil-Military Operations: Promoting Unity of Effort,” soon to be published by the U.S. National Defense University as a chapter in a book on the lessons of Kosovo.

³ *Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations*, Robert M. Schoenhaus, United States Institute for Peace, Peaceworks No. 43, April 2002, p. 7.

operational guidelines, and both training together in a realistic environment to face challenges on the “battlefield” of the 21st Century:

With regard to realistic expectations, the military should expect civilian NGOs to:

- Protect their operational independence. NGOs normally do not accept any obligations other than those of their supporters.
- Adopt a neutral posture among the parties to the conflict, thereby securing a degree of protection in a “white hat” mode.
- Operate in dangerous areas assisting innocent civilians at risk.
- Possess limited capabilities compared to the military—security, transportation, communication, and so forth.
- Deploy early and stay longer than the military—these are not short-term missions for civilian organizations.

Similarly, NGOs should expect the military to:

- Act under the direction of governments that exercise strong control over their armed forces’ operations.
- Stabilize the security situation within their limited capabilities.
- Protect their own personnel first, then those of the host country’s civilian organizations.
- Avoid over-commitments, because the military’s rules of engagement will not allow it to go too far.
- Terminate its operations and depart when the security situation appears stable.⁴

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONVERGENCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

Because of the necessity of a solid cross-cultural understanding between civilian and military organizations, as well as the increasing complexity of peace operations, peace operations managers in general and civil-military brokers in particular need to know each other better in order to maximize synergy and front-load the learning cycle – before the operation is underway. This is of mutual operational and strategic benefit to both communities – not, however, only for peace operations. Converging with the new civil-military realities of peace operations are similar developments in the civil-military and interdisciplinary aspects of security politics and operations:

⁴ Schoenhaus, pp. 23-24.

The attacks in the United States reinforce the call for an integrated approach involving diplomatic, military and economic elements. This holistic approach mirrors the nature and complexity of the problem, and other international security issues are not dissimilar.⁵

U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld likewise observes that "...wars in the twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national power: economic, diplomatic, financial law enforcement, intelligence..." and that "all the high-tech weapons in the world won't transform the U.S. armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, train, exercise and fight."⁶ Along with the continuation of the "Revolution in Military Affairs", begun long before 11 September 2002, a "revolution in military education," likewise technology-driven and posited on the predominance of information, has been underway:

The information age is characterized by the compression of time. This is already reflected in planning and decision-making. At one unified command, technology has cut the time needed to develop contingency plans from seven days in 1994 to two hours today. Leaders no longer have time to digest the nuances of rapid, widespread change. They must deal with the increasing complexity of change that is occurring now and that can be anticipated in the future.⁷

Beyond, however, the need for "warfighters" to improve their mental agility, it is becoming clear many of them must also "think outside the box," to use a current aphorism. In a critique of the Secretary of Defense in the same edition of *Foreign Affairs*, Eliot Cohen posits:

Above all, the twenty-first century U.S. military will require an officer corps of unprecedented versatility and intelligence. One great source of American strength in recent decades has been the excellence of its military training system. By and large, that strength remains... The practices and outlook of the military toward advanced civilian and military education, however, have not kept pace with the rest of the training system. Technical degrees are generally rewarded. Advanced work in the social sciences and humanities, however, is often regarded as a ticket to be punched rather than an opportunity to grow, and younger officers are often effectively punished rather than rewarded for pursuing their intellectual ambitions. And yet never more than today has there been a need for officers who can think more broadly and creatively, who can learn swiftly about unfamiliar regions of the world, and who will fall prey neither to clichés nor to comforting assumptions about societies, military organizations or war itself.⁸

⁵ "Rethinking Security", Robert Hall and Carl Fox, *NATO Review*, Winter 2001/2002, p. 9. www.nato.int/docu/review.htm

⁶ "Transforming the Military", Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2002, pp. 29-30. www.foreignaffairs.org

⁷ "The Revolution in Military Education", Richard A. Chilcoat, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1999, p. 60. www.dtic.mil/doctrine

⁸ "A Tale of Two Secretaries", Eliot A. Cohen, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2002, p. 44.

It is also important to point out that many international interventions, such as in Afghanistan, are occurring with peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding all happening simultaneously. While agencies like UNHCR and World Food Program are providing relief to Afghan locals, U.S. and other forces continue to conduct operations to root out the Taliban and al-Qaeda, as the UN and a number of agencies and NGOs are working on reconstruction.

RESPONSES TO NEW DEMANDS

Clearly, then, in both peace and security operations, the demand for operationally adept civilian and military managers who can work among institutional as well as time-sequential gray areas is growing. The question is, then, how to respond to this demand. The first step, however, in this examination is to gain an appreciation of the realities of the objective in mind:

In an ideal world, all the participants in any given humanitarian response effort would share a common understanding of one another's capabilities and limitations, as well as their roles and missions. Overlapping efforts would be kept to a minimum while cooperation in the pursuit of progress and solutions would be instinctive. In the real world, however, mission analysis is often ad hoc; training is spotty and tends to focus on individual agency goals, and coordination with other organizations is worked out on the fly.⁹

The intent, therefore, of any organizational approaches to meeting the demands of the emerging peace and security operations environment should be humble and measured – not everyone needs to know and be able to do everything. And before focusing further discussion on training and education as one solution, it is worth review organizational responses to such lacunas. Most organizations tend to deal with operational shortcomings through relatively standard approaches, among them: improvement of management tools such as operational doctrines, techniques and procedures; personnel management policies and practices; productivity-enhancing technologies in particularly the information management and corporate communications areas; and, of course, training and education.

The military and many government bureaucracies, particularly at the agency level, tend to be more doctrinal and programmatic than the UN or non-public groups, although the UN intends to promulgate a “Handbook for Multidimensional Peacekeeping” by the end of 2002. NGOs, on the other hand, are rarely large enough, consistently staffed enough, and have the overhead resources to develop and implement doctrine. In addition, “in an era when donors and the media are increasingly focused on the bottom line and tend to rate humanitarian organizations by what percentage of donations goes to the ultimate beneficiaries, the need to explain and justify administrative costs is a pressing concern.”¹⁰

Even for the military, the applicability of doctrine is limited at the practical level, particularly in as dynamic an operational environment as there has been since the end of the Cold War. Then there is human nature. Soldiers often forget or loosely apply doctrine as they adapt to the situation on the ground. Instead, their education and training more often

⁹ Schoenhaus, p. 5.

¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 5-6.

shapes their instincts in the field, as the Gulf War and small-team experiences in the Balkans have evinced – albeit much of this training is, in turn, a working translation of doctrine. And like many relief workers, soldiers are relying more on their experiences – or those of others – when in “small-scale contingencies” (SSCs) or “operations other than war” (OOTW) environments. In this regard, many soldiers are assuming more of the creativeness and flexibility of their civilian counterparts, many of whom in turn are becoming less resistant to the programmatic responses and applied management tools to improve staff effectiveness longer in use in the military or many government agencies.

There is a similar situation with regard to personnel management policies and practices. The major personnel management problem for many civilian organizations is turnover in the field. While this is true for the military, whose soldiers and officers rotate into and out of the operation often in six-month intervals, at least most of these personnel, when they leave the field, rarely leave their organization, as is more the case in most NGOs and with the UN and its agencies and civilian police forces. To illustrate, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), responsible for staffing its field missions, deploys most of its personnel to the field by hiring them in limited duration extendable contracts (by regulation at six-month increments) from outside the organization, making the UN in a sense one of the world’s largest temporary hiring agencies.

As many as 50 per cent of UN field mission have been at times vacant, particularly in the first six months of the mission, and there is a rate of turnover of about one-third every six months in many missions – a problem identified by the “Brahimi report.”¹¹ Civilian police officers are sent to missions from their contributing nations, based on quotas, with the UN often not knowing who these personnel are until a few weeks before they appear. This makes it difficult, as in the case of the military, for the UN to institute the kind of professional development programs of education and training found in the military.

As with private industry, the most expedient and cost-effective means for addressing operational and personnel shortcomings is through the application of productivity-enhancing technologies in particularly information management and corporate communications. In the peace operations world, it has been well recognized for some time that information transparency among sundry organizations has become essential to operational success. In response, various information-sharing initiatives have appeared in the past two to three years, among them the United States Institute for Peace’s (USIP) Virtual Diplomacy initiative. These initiatives have emphasized the need for improving civil-military, interagency and inter-organizational interoperability through predominantly technology-intensive vehicles.

The Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) for humanitarian coordination and the UN Joint Logistics Center websites are among the most recent and mature examples of such web-based applications in the field.¹² Little recognition, however, has been thus far given that “military and civilian organizations should cross-train in anticipation of finding themselves in the field,” and that “appropriate opportunities and sponsoring agencies for cross-training are few.”¹³ This is most likely because it is less costly

¹¹ UN Security Council Report S/2000/809, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, 21 August 2000. See esp. pp. 21-23.

¹² The AIMS website is available through www.reliefweb.int or directly at www.hic.org.pk. The UNJLC website is: www.unjlc.org.

¹³ From “Taking it to the Next Level, Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies,” a report on an April 2000 conference between USIP and the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, released 31 August 2000, p. 13. See also the report on the subsequent discussion at the 28-30 June 2001 Worldwide Civil Affairs

and more expedient than attempting to coordinate pre-deployment cross-training. But, while these information-sharing regimes are valuable toolboxes to closing information gaps under operational duress, they are not the whole answer to improving the kind of knowledge and perspective that can be gained through interpersonal contacts and exchanges in more academic settings. In addition, the relationship between these management tools and peace operations interdisciplinary training and education activities should be complementary rather than mutually exclusive.

As with all of the above-discussed means of improving operational effectiveness, training and education, to varying degrees, bring value-added. There is growing consensus in especially the civilian community that “regular participants in humanitarian and crisis intervention would benefit from increased peacetime interaction and communication, as well as from an ongoing synergistic process of building a common understanding of mutual strengths, weaknesses, and responsibilities in the field. In recent years, there has been some movement toward common training in joint exercises, seminars, and planning forums, but this effort has been largely hit-and-miss; what progress there has been must be institutionalized and the experience broadened to include more potential players in complex humanitarian relief interventions.”¹⁴

DISPARATE APPROACHES TO TRAINING AND EDUCATION

In spite of this consensus, as discussed in great detail at the referenced USIP seminar, there are institutional and practical constraints and peculiarities to training and education, for example, among NGOs, government agencies, international civilian police and the military.

To summarize:

The communities come at the problems from different directions, sharing good intentions and a general recognition that somehow their coordination needs to be better. The difficulty lies in the details of responsibility sharing and the general lack of common training and preparation. Although the military and the international civilian police operate in more structured and content-based training environments, the U.S. government and NGOs come to the task from a process of experience-based learning that is less formal and better suited to their personnel. The key to better collaboration in the future is not training uniformity, as some espouse and others fear, but rather developing a method for regularly blending these disparate groups into training environments that allow them to learn with and from one another. Yet to do so, there must be an acknowledgment of some existing constraints. The nongovernmental community faces some difficult challenges with regard to formalized training. Foremost among these is its members' need to raise funds to carry out their missions. This is a constant need, which sometimes shapes the scope and timing of their interventions... Training requires money, and training costs increase organizational overhead. In an era when donors

Conference, “Good Practices: Information Sharing in Complex Emergencies.” These reports and more on the Virtual Diplomacy Initiative can be found at: www.usip.org The AIMS website is at: www.hic.org.pk; while the UNJLC website is at: www.unjlc.org

¹⁴ Schoenhaus, p. 8.

and the media are increasingly focused on the bottom line and tend to rate humanitarian organizations by what percentage of donations goes to the ultimate beneficiaries, the need to explain and justify administrative costs is a pressing concern. The challenge for the near future is to promote an attitude within the NGO and the donor communities that the right kind of training increases organizational capacity for success in areas donors and major actors, such as the military, value.

The situation is similar within the myriad organizations of the U.S. government that routinely or occasionally become involved in “complex emergencies”—humanitarian relief operations that become more hazardous when warlords or competing factions try to capitalize on the chaos of a natural or man-made disaster and on the supplies the international community brings to the host country in an intervention. These organizations share with the NGO community a preference for experience-based training, and, lacking a systematic training curriculum on the management of complex emergencies, they tend to fall back on their personal skills and general knowledge of statecraft, development assistance, or interagency processes when such emergencies arise.

One segment of the international community engaged in peace operations that is steadily gaining acknowledgment and moving toward an improved training posture is international civilian police (CivPol). With the increased recognition that public security (that is, the maintenance of law and order in the broad sweep of social institutions) is a critical element in postconflict reconstruction, the scope of CivPol engagement is broadening, and organizations—particularly the United Nations—are paying more attention to harmonizing international CivPol training. CivPol contingents typically include volunteers and seconded law enforcement officers from more than seventy countries who come together in a variety of complex operations, so it is easy to see the need for common policing standards and practices.

The military is the only community that is imbued with a training culture and is given the resources to conduct significant, if not always adequate, training. Its primary mission and focus are combat training to fight and win the nation’s wars; proficiency training for this primary mission leaves little room for collateral training in other areas.¹⁵

While the military enjoys the advantage of a more intrinsic understanding of the value of training and education (more than a third of an officer’s career is spent in school), civilian organizations like the UN, whose capacity for multifaceted training and education is improving, offer a perspective on complex peace operations that the military has greater difficulty grasping. Peace operations, varied themselves, require different types of training and education, depending on institutional, political and operational needs, as well as timing. And training and education themselves are different but related. Training, which can be more situational, is designed to teach practitioners specific skills that are hands-on, technical in nature, and involve the achievement of a tangible result. Education, a longer and more deliberate process on the other hand, provides knowledge. Knowledge-intensive tasks are

¹⁵ Schoenhaus, pp. 5-8. For a more detailed discussion of these comparisons, see the remainder of the report.

cognitive and require understanding, dealing with abstract concepts, analyses, and decision-making. Many jobs require a combination of knowledge and skills, at different levels, and thus a combination of education and training, again at different levels. Political and transitional administration staff or CA/CIMIC officers working at higher levels of interdisciplinary coordination, for example, can benefit from a greater concentration on education than, say, humanitarian relief and military logisticians, who foremost need to be well-trained. But in operational environments where the interrelationships among the various components of an international intervention are becoming increasingly important, a combination of training and education for many is important.

Likewise, approaches to providing training and education also vary, with respective advantages and disadvantages. In the world of training, for example:

In providing instruction, trainers today must be cognizant of the technological advances that have increased training opportunities. In this regard, it is instructive to divide training into two categories: face-to-face and distance learning. In planning their approach to individual training sessions, professional trainers should understand the advantages and disadvantages inherent in both live classroom lecturing and pre-structured distance training.

Live classroom training provides an opportunity for questions and for interaction between trainer and student, and in many cases between students and professional colleagues they might not otherwise meet. One primary benefit of classroom-type training is that it permits the building of practitioner networks and the breaking down of cultural and organizational barriers. The disadvantages include travel distances, costs, limited capacity, and students' inability to depart from the pace or direction of the rest of the group. Classroom instruction is preferred when it is important that a small group of students have face-to-face interaction with the teacher and with each other, when the purpose is not only to teach established concepts but to develop new ideas or solutions, when updates are frequent, and when there is space or funding available to support the expenses of a classroom course. This form of instruction is also preferred when hands-on skills are being taught, so that practice can take place under the direct supervision of the teacher/trainer.

Distance learning, on the other hand, has the advantage of being able to be delivered to students in situ with no need for travel, housing, meals, or classroom space. The cost per student is low and there is more flexibility in pacing the training to meet particular students' special needs. However, distance learning limits student-teacher interaction and the exchange of views among students and provides less ability to tailor the course of instruction along the way to meet the emerging needs of the participants. Distance learning is preferred when (1) there is an existing and agreed-upon body of knowledge to be presented, (2) there is a large population of geographically dispersed students to teach, (3) the content of the material remains fairly constant over time, (4) the material must be presented in a standardized format under centralized control (that is, with no need to account for

regional/local conditions or circumstances), and (5) there is less need for a classroom instructor to guide the discussion.¹⁶

Although present military and civilian institutional training and educational programs address parochial aspects of the peace and security operations archetypes discussed earlier, hardly any approach it in an integrated fashion or focus on the operational level of peace operations. Even though these institutional programs can cover many of their own training and educational needs, the NGOs in particular cannot, again largely because of the overhead. An interdisciplinary, international and civil-military training and educational center of excellence program would not only offer the appropriate economy of scale to amortize overhead and draw the participation of less capital-rich players nonetheless important to the overall process (e.g., NGOs), it would also help bridge the vertical gap between policy and implementation simultaneously with the horizontal gaps of interdisciplinary and international coordination and cooperation.

Unfortunately, most military and civilian peace operations related training and education programs are institutionally oriented and focus either on the strategic level through “leadership” seminars which give executives a general orientation to mostly policy aspects of peace operations for decision-making purposes, or on specific implementation issues for junior or middle managers. Yet, civil-military brokers have little advanced training opportunities beyond basic orientation courses and training, such as provided by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) through the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. USACAPOC training programs for CA and PSYOP personnel, who are increasingly being called upon in crisis response and peace building operations, are essentially introductory training for development of basic CA/PSYOP skills for mainly junior grade officers. There is the Joint Special Operations University at Hurlburt Airbase, FL or the NATO CIMIC School at Oberammergau, Germany.

However, the courses offered at these places have a decidedly military point of view and provide little intermediate, operational-level skill development necessary for civil-military coordination of complex international interdisciplinary peace operations. Rather, any such skills obtained are often a by-product of a combination of deployment experience, command or unit training activities under serious time constraints (considering the overwhelming majority of CA/PSYOP personnel are Reservists), and personal initiative. (Incidentally, USACAPOC and USAJFKSWCS are considering an overhaul to its civilian intermediate-level education [ILE] options for CA/PSYOP personnel, with more education opportunities for its PSYOP personnel in marketing and mass media communications and peace operations graduate degrees such as at George Mason University for CA personnel.)

GOVERNMENT AGENCY PROGRAMS

Government agencies like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provide internal staff training on, for example, humanitarian assessment and survey techniques, but there is really no robust interagency training and education program in the U.S. Government. A potential candidate is the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute; otherwise, the most promising are within the military community, including the following.

¹⁶ Schoenhaus, pp. 13-14.

- NATO's George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, with its College of International and Security Studies for military and diplomatic staff from middle management to senior levels (www.marshallcenter.org).
- The National Defense University, which provides education for senior military and civilian staff in joint, multinational, interagency and private sector issues involved in complex national security strategy decision-making – of particular note is the War Gaming and Simulation Center and NDU's announced intent to create an Interagency Education, Training, and After-Action Review Program to provide the interagency community with a focal point for innovation in education, research, and simulation exercises (www.ndu.edu).
- The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), with its Center for Civil-Military Relations (www.ccmr.org) and Center for Executive Education (www.cee.nps.navy.mil). The NPS recently introduced a Master of Arts in Security Building in Post-Conflict Environments, currently open to international military staff and government civilians and seeking to offer the program to IO/NGO personnel (www.peaceops.org).
- The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, located at the Center for Strategic Leadership of the War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. (Under the Army Transition Plan, however, the Department of the Army decided in late May to close down the Institute by the end of Fiscal Year 2003. The current plan is to transfer remaining functions to the Center for Army Lessons learned at Ft Leavenworth, Kansas) (carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pki).

Unique among international peace operations institutes is Canada's Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center. Established in 1994 by the Canadian government, the mission of the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC), as it is commonly known, is to support and enhance the Canadian contribution to international peace, security, and stability through research, education and training in various aspects of peace operations. The PPC has recently revised its well-established array of courses, roundtables, seminars, exercises, research activities, and external education and training to upgrade its singular ability to provide operational skills development for peace operations practitioners.¹⁷

The other singular semi-governmental entity that provides training and education in peace operations, more at the policy level, is the U.S. Institute for Peace. USIP's Training Program develops and presents programs, mostly in seminar or workshops, to assist government officials, military and police, international organization representatives, and NGOs to acquire skills to deal with all phases of conflict through interactive, experienced-based training offered through USIP or its network of training partnerships with diplomatic, military and research institutions worldwide. Particular attention is being paid to rule of law programs. Another interesting learning and management tool is the Virtual Diplomacy Initiative, mentioned earlier.¹⁸

¹⁷ For more information on the PPC, go to: www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca.

¹⁸ More information on USIP programs can be found at: www.usip.org.

UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMS

Besides the military and some government agencies, the other major institution which is striving to offer a more interdisciplinary approach to training and education is the United Nations. For the past few years and largely because of the absence of UNHQ-provided modular training, UN missions have been providing orientation training to new staff, generally with success. Induction training has been the preferred and predominant method of training mission staff. At the same time, the primary proponent for training in the UN, the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), began to develop distance-learning correspondence courses on peace operations through its Program of Correspondence Instruction (POCI), while the agencies – e.g., UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, etc. – developed their own customized training activities to support staff needs.

Meanwhile, DPKO's Military Division has established its own training unit, recently named the Training and Evaluation Service (TES), with the responsibility to coordinate and standardize training among member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations. In addition, in response to the Brahimi report's recommendations on civilian staff professional development, DPKO's Office of Mission Support is creating its own training unit for civilian mission staff, to include some outsourced training and education, with the goal to be fully staffed and funded, offering a range of courses and instruction, by the beginning of 2003.

Unfortunately, very few of these activities are coordinated or integrated. In one attempt, POCI and TES have developed the comprehensive Cooperative Training Program, which combines classroom training, correspondence courses, and individual student research, the completion of which leads to a certificate of training in UN peace support operations. And although the UN University system has existed for years in various locations worldwide, there is really no overall center of excellence for UN training and education, despite recent considerations in DPKO. The potential is there, nonetheless, for a sophisticated integrated system of training and education which could go far to address many of the staff capability shortfalls identified in the Brahimi report.¹⁹

GROWTH AND PROMISE IN ACADEMIA

Beyond public institutions, the greatest amount of growth and promise for interdisciplinary peace operations training and education can be found in academia. With greater political and fiscal flexibility and commitment to open and unbiased dialogue, many academic institutions are in a unique position to strengthening the relationship not only among institutions and organizations, but also between the policy-makers and practitioners. Academic institutions currently engaged in or developing relevant peace operations curricula include the following.

- Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which offers a Global Master of Arts program and a course for professionals entitled "Humanitarianism and War" (www.fletcher.tufts.edu).

¹⁹ The UNITAR website is: www.unitar.org. TES can be found at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training. The UN University home page is: www.unu.edu.

- Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, which offers an executive program in civil-military cooperation, “Initiatives in Conflict Management: Planning for Civil-Military Cooperation”, for high-level civilian, diplomatic, and military officials who have field or headquarters experience in international conflict (www.execprog.org/programs).
- The Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna in Pisa, Italy, which created the International Training Program for conflict Management in 1995, largely for UN, OSCE and EU personnel. This post-graduate program is intended to provide operations skills development in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, democracy-building, elections assistance and observation, and human rights education, promotion and monitoring (www.itp.sssup.it).
- George Mason University, whose School of Public Policy offers a singularly robust suite of programs, courses and activities under the Program on Peacekeeping Policy (POPP). The flagship educational program is the Master of Science in New Professional Studies – Peace Operations (MNPS-PO). An outgrowth of the earlier Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies, MNPS-PO is a multi-tiered graduate study program under a comprehensive concept for multinational peace operations.

Students include government agency officials, IO and NGO members, and military, from both the policy and operational levels. POPP and the MNPS-PO also support Ph.D. studies in peace operations. Further, GMU has a teaming agreement with both the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna and the PPC to round out its curriculum with operational skills development as well as help provide short courses, for example, in peace operations pre-deployment training and management analysis. This includes the recently launched short interdisciplinary orientation and skills development course on “Preparing for the Rehabilitation Effort in Afghanistan” targeted at mid- to senior-level humanitarian relief workers likely to be deployed to Afghanistan.

POPP’s peace operations research and development activities include: the Conceptual Model of Peace Operations, an automated management database depicting the architecture and interrelationships of functions and tasks in peace operations; a NATO peace operations force structuring model; SENSE – a program to foster cross-faction cooperation in newly decentralize economies using computer simulations; information campaign studies; a facilitated decision-making project to assist West African states in conflict management; and provision of conflict management and mediation services in Northern Ireland.

GMU also co-hosts an annual meeting of scholars, analysts and other subject matter experts to discuss selected topics in peace operations at the annual Cornwallis Group workshop at the PPC. (<http://popp.gmu.edu>).

**NO SINGLE ANSWER — BUT THERE ARE
COMMON ATTRIBUTES**

The George Mason University POPP would seem to come closest to having the attributes of being a true center of excellence for interdisciplinary international peace operations training and education. Yet none of the institutions reviewed above combine a vision of training with a full range of disciplines, resources, and the institutional mandate needed to train jointly. No single institution has – or should have – a corner in the market in good ideas about what needs to be done. This would be anathema to the whole purpose of interdisciplinary training and education. Fortunately, there is no paucity of good training and educational institutions. Although an overarching philosophy of civil-military and interdisciplinary peace and security operations training and education is clearly needed, there is no consensus on how to move forward. Perhaps what can be reasonably expected is a consortium of training and education providers, specialized and interdisciplinary, of some kind which can at least offer a full range of options to an increasingly expansive peace and security operations community at large. For at least interdisciplinary institutions, such attributes might include the following.

- Cross-exposure to bolster and understanding of the relationship between the vertical gaps between policy and implementation and the horizontal gaps among players and interests (e.g., civil-military), in order to develop the interdisciplinary skill sets needed to cultivate peace operations professionals.
- A balance of core skills training and curriculum versatility for tailoring to specific organizational/personal needs, which may be done through a consortium approach or a network of teaming agreements, to take advantage of an escalating number of programs and resources already within reach, including short and long-term solutions such as induction training vs. degree/certificate programs and core skills development vs. mission-oriented needs.
- Venue flexibility, a combination of brick and mortar vs. distance learning.
- Political and operational relevance and currency – having the classroom in the field and the field in the classroom, both physical and virtual, not only in order to keep practitioners current on the latest theoretical or doctrinal developments, but to promote “live lesson-learning” – i.e., the application of improvements within rather than after current operational cycles.
- The incorporation of deliverables for applying the training and, again, linking the classroom with the field – including information-sharing and other management tools, as well as take-away products (e.g., CD-Roms with doctrinal libraries and web/data maps).

Until universal peace and security training and education goals and objectives are established, if they ever are, training possibilities will remain limited to basic skills development. Going beyond a basic curriculum will require disparate civilian and military organizations worldwide working together to develop common operational guidelines and common essential task lists. These items, in turn, would drive a much more sophisticated and thorough process of training for peace and security operations. There has been some movement toward this, but it remains a slow and complicated process, pushed somewhat by the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001.²⁰ The other good news is that, for the

²⁰ On 16-17 October 2001, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) hosted a workshop on common operational guidelines on a plethora of issues among civilian and military organizations. To obtain further

majority of practitioners and more technical personnel at the lower levels of implementation, interdisciplinary knowledge and skills are not as essential. However, for the burgeoning number of operators who work more and more with varying points of contact at the increasingly important operational level, these capabilities are critical. In other words, “training for peace and humanitarian-relief operations needs to focus on the management of relationships, not only among the different organizations in the field but also within the organizations themselves.”²¹

Considering the convergence of peace and security operations and the emerging new truths affecting each, it would follow that the ideal approach to interdisciplinary civil-military professional development would be to have educational and training forums which feature interaction among policymakers, planners and practitioners among these disciplines, for operational as well as professional development reasons. Cross-cutting areas of interest could include, for example:

- Interagency/interdisciplinary coordination.
- Complex emergency operations/targeted humanitarian relief.
- Consequence management (emergency services).
- Multi-component transitional administration.
- Rule of law and law enforcement mechanisms.
- Transition management (relief to reconstruction).
- Joint/combined civil-military operations.
- Integrated information/influence operations and perception management.
- Multinational logistics support operations.

There is a potential enabling role for the military in helping to bring some sort of unity of effort to interdisciplinary training and education, in order to have that unity effort reflected in the field, as suggested in the following.

More than any other organization ... the military has the training structure, resources, and experience needed to adapt its personnel to a new operating environment. The process of developing a METL [mission-essential task list] forces senior leaders to take a hard look at a proposed mission and break it down into its essential parts, to evaluate the ability of their soldiers to accomplish those parts successfully, and to plan and execute the training necessary to raise current capabilities to the necessary levels. Something similar to this process, adapted for individual agency needs, could be employed successfully by federal agencies and NGOs seeking to establish the core competencies necessary for their success in complex-emergency situations.

information, contact IDA at its website, www.ida.org

²¹ Schoenhaus, p. 41.

The focus of military training must remain on fighting and winning the nation's wars. However, analysis increasingly suggests that the battlefields of the twenty-first century will not be isolated, and that understanding how to interact with and manage civilians and civilian agencies in the area of operations is a critical skill set necessary to maintaining military credibility and validity of presence.

Consequently, peacetime military training is slowly evolving to incorporate features of civil interaction, accompanied by the development of a generation of future leaders that has experienced firsthand the complexities of the new "battlespace." Lessons learned are being relearned and gradually incorporated into new doctrine. The military is reaching out to other agencies—governmental and private—in an effort to bring them together for common training, but it needs to do a better job of "selling" the combined training opportunities and explaining the value added to the agencies for them to overcome what is, in some cases, a training-averse culture. The synergy achieved when diverse organizations understand one another and train together toward a common effectiveness is undeniable. Civilian and military roles in a complex emergency are not the same, but they are interdependent, and the training challenge in the near future is to establish a training system that is mutually supportive without blurring the important differences among organizations. A system of military exercises that are designed for nonmilitary participation already exists and could serve as the near-term bridge to similar integrating events under civilian sponsorship. While conceptually inviting, the question of who would take ownership of such an endeavor, fund it, staff it with trained and experienced personnel, and coordinate the coming together is real and profound, particularly in light of the fact that "interagency" is a somewhat amorphous concept and not a place or a thing with structure.

Difficulty aside, there is a clear need for a common training environment for the many practitioners who have been or will be engaged in responding to and interacting in a complex humanitarian environment, be it a war or something other than war. How we react to this need will determine how effective we will be in the future.²²

The most important value-added of such a center of excellence and its activities, which if set up appropriately, would come simply through the exposure between the civilian and military communities who could have the most profound and longest-lasting impacts on international interventions are executed in the field and thus how the international mandates and agreements for peace and security operations are implemented. Especially because of the "peace support operation" aspect of the military's training and development relationship with the participating civilian organizations, operational benefits would be derived through improved mutual understanding of respective missions, capabilities, limitations, and concerns. It helps address, for example, the key issue of managing mutual expectations. This could significantly lower the civil-military and interagency coordination learning curves in the most critical, early phases of an operation.

²² Schoenhaus, pp. 38-39.

While it is easier to admit collectively the new discoveries and truths in peace and security operations that have been made, getting institutions to likewise advance to keep pace with the times, adapt to strategic realities, and meet resulting emerging operational needs is a different challenge altogether, the devil of course always being in the details. Yet, beyond the exigencies of current operations and the idea that it would be an investment in long-term, collective success, it would be wise to adapt in order to grow the current generation of operational leaders for future strategic leadership. These arguments alone would suggest the subject of finding ways to bring about true interdisciplinary education and training should be the chief topic on the next Cornwallis Group. And if recent experiences and the events of 11 September 2002 should be teaching us anything, it should be teaching us that the kind of complex efforts to foster peace and security will force us as well to go to new levels, willy-nilly, as paradigms evolve and re-evolve. What we refuse to experience positively, we will most assuredly experience negatively.