

The Doctrinal Implications of Presence in Crisis Response Operations

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“Generals have often been reproached with preparing for the last war instead of for the next – an easy gibe when their fellow-countrymen and their political leaders, too frequently, have prepared for no war at all.”

Field Marshal Sir William Slim

INTRODUCTION

Every Crisis Response Operation (CRO) is unique and mission specific; most are joint, multi-faceted and reflect the width of the spectrum of conflict. Increasingly they reflect a challenging amalgam of both symmetric and asymmetric characteristics and are founded on manoeuvre warfare theory in which the aim is to establish force dominance through overwhelming tempo and the willingness to take risks. There is also a common desire among most NATO members to leverage technology to the optimum extent. Digitization is enabling a battlespace that is dispersed, non-contiguous and non-linear; it is also a battlespace that is becoming increasingly transparent with the advent of Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) and the blurring of traditional boundaries and functions.

“Sensor to Shooter” links increasingly empower tactical units to cue strike assets that have a strategic effect and thus, in most NATO forces, there is a conscious drift towards smaller but more capable forces in the belief that the digital transparency of the battlespace will lead to the eclipse of close manoeuvre forces by those capable of deep reconnaissance and strike. CRO however still tend to demand an emphasis on traditional manoeuvre units as they best facilitate the management of the perceptions of enemy, parties to the conflict and the civil population caught up in the crisis. Hence the notion that presence and security might constitute the principal roles of ground forces in CRO. The mystery, however, is that presence does not appear in any doctrinal lexicon and though specified in some missions, remains something of an enigma. It embodies the difference between means and ends, a difference that is critical to the outcome of this study and its recommendations.

Although all CRO are unique in terms of environment, mission, history, mandate and threat, it is possible, through historical analysis to identify common threads and trends. It is also possible to identify lessons and to learn from them. This process lies at the heart of any evolution of a set of Force Allocation Rules (FAR), rules that are not merely a standard and rigid template but rather a credible set of well tested principles, the fidelity of which have been proved on successive CRO.

Peace Support Operations do not take place in a vacuum and tend to be a reaction to conflict. Indeed in most of the recent operations some degree of conflict has been an integral part of Peace Support Operations. The notion of “classic peacekeeping” involving forces precisely tailored for that function has almost disappeared and it is both proven and accepted that forces deployed on Peace Support Operations require an inherent flexibility that allows them to transition in and out of conflict if necessary. It requires a different approach to the predictable Chapter VI operations of the 1960’s and 1970’s. James Appathurai, of the NATO Political Affairs Division has described the position thus: “Having effective forces in the modern security environment also means structuring and equipping NATO’s forces for modern operations.

The days of planning for massive armoured clashes in the Fulda gap are long gone. Kosovo, however, revealed that too many of NATO’s armed forces have not yet made the adaptations necessary to meet modern peacekeeping requirements. Too many of NATO’s armed forces are still designed, structured and equipped for the past. Today, the Alliance needs forces that can move fast, adjust quickly to changing requirements, hit hard, and then stay in theatre for as long as it takes to get the job done. This means that NATO’s military forces must be mobile, flexible, effective at engagement, and sustainable in theatre.

Kosovo demonstrated, however, that only some of the Allies are making the necessary investments. Indeed, Kosovo showed the worrying first signs of a growing division of labour within NATO, whereby the high-tech Allies provide the logistics, the smart bombs and the intelligence, and the lower-tech Allies provide the soldiers – what a NATO official once called “a two-class NATO, with a precision class and bleeding class.” This two-class approach in NATO would be politically unsustainable. The burdens, the costs and the risks of military operations must be shared as equally as possible, if the political health of the Alliance is to be maintained.”¹

BACKGROUND

DOCTRINE

“The central idea of an army is known as its doctrine, which to be sound must be based on the principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of mutation in accordance with change in circumstance. In its ultimate relationship to the human understanding this central idea or

¹ “Peace Support Operations in the Balkans: the NATO experience” by James Appathurai (NATO Political Affairs Division). From “Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives” edited by Kurt R Spillman.

doctrine is nothing else than common sense – that is, action adapted to circumstance.”

Major General J.F.C. Fuller

Doctrine is derived from Concepts, thus this study will explore the relationship between the two and thus strive to articulate FAR that stem from dynamic modern doctrine reflecting emerging concepts. The study of doctrine in relation to concepts will ensure that any conclusions are relevant, up-to-date and not based on old-fashioned notions and procedures.

Doctrine should not be confused with dogma in that it describes not *what* to think but *how* to think. From a NATO perspective, it represents a collective understanding of how it will fight and conduct other operations including peacekeeping. There are those who consider that Peace Support Operations are entirely divorced from the business of war-fighting and that therefore they require a different set of norms and procedures. Nothing could be further from the truth; PSO constitute operations in an environment in which conflict is either imminent or recent and require a fluid approach that is geared to a well-understood strategic plan.

Doctrine should be forward-looking and not moribund. It should reflect not only how a force organises and trains but also how it modernises. This is important for the purposes of this study in that any evolution of credible Force Allocation Rules should reflect modernisation – what is now commonly described as *transformation*. This concept is well explained by General Gordon Sullivan in his book entitled “Hope is not a method”. “At the battle of Crecy in 1346, employment of the longbow helped the English under Edward III defeat a larger French force. This battle is sometimes cited as an example of how technology can revolutionise warfare. That explanation, however, is inadequate, because the longbow had been in use for approximately two centuries prior to Crecy. What proved decisive at Crecy was the use of longbows en masse, at long range, with the archers protected by simple field fortifications.

In essence, it took an employment concept for the new weapon – in other words, new doctrine – to realise the potential of a weapon whose characteristics had been understood for years. This new doctrine influenced the outcome of English battles on the Continent for the next century.”² This is a most significant principle for this study in which the equivalent of the longbow might be the infantry. The infantry have been at the forefront of PSO and Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) for decades but the doctrine for their employment is on the threshold of extraordinary change due to the impact of emerging technology. Combined Arms groups based on capability are now the norm and effects, previously generated by a high density of troops, can now be achieved with a less linear approach and, above all, ISTAR that has already been transformed by modern technology.

The purpose of doctrine is “to establish the framework of understanding of the approach to warfare in order to provide the foundation for its practical application”.³ The formulation of doctrine should ideally follow three evolutionary stages: debate, decision and execution. Concepts fall within the debate stage in that they are unendorsed “think-pieces” designed as a catalyst for debate; indeed without well-articulated concepts, worthwhile debate tends not to

² “Hope is not a method” by Gordon R Sullivan and Michael V Harper. Random House.

³ NATO AJP-01(A).

take place at all. There is also an important and unbreakable link between doctrine and training in that commanders are expected to train their units and formations in accordance with current doctrine. This ensures a commonality of approach and favours interoperability both of which can be fundamentally undermined by a more maverick approach.

The evolution of Peacekeeping doctrine has been a most intriguing process in that it tends to reflect the culture and history of the country concerned. Arguably the reason that the British and French approaches to low level conflict, including Peacekeeping, are so very different from that of the United States is embedded in the European experience in counter-insurgency operations (“imperial policing”) whereas the Americans have not had that experience. Such subtle concepts as consent and the proportionate use of force are a direct consequence of counter insurgency operations and translate easily to Peace Support Operations. “Given these different origins of doctrine, it is not unreasonable to assume that the culture, traditions and methods of operations of the military components of these states will conspire to create some difficulties in the maintenance of consensus, cohesion and cooperation within a coalition.”⁴

Notwithstanding the pivotal importance of NATO doctrine as an intellectual “bridge” to connect national approaches, this review does highlight the approaches of “core” members. This reflects reality and was certainly the experience both in Bosnia and then in Kosovo where: “the decisions to take military action were made by the “core” members of the alliance (i.e., the United States, Britain, Germany and France). Although decisions continue to be made by consensus, it is clear that especially in the case of Kosovo, the Alliance was far from united on what, if any, action should be taken and when.”⁵

PRESENCE AND SECURITY

The notion of *presence* does not exist in doctrinal terms in either NATO nor national doctrines indeed it is not even included in AAP 6 the NATO Glossary of Terms. That said, it is a term that is widely used but may not be fully understood. In fact it represents a significant element of the current SFOR mission which is described thus: “SFOR will deter hostilities and stabilise the peace, contribute to a secure environment by providing a continued military *presence* in the AOR, target and co-ordinate SFOR support to key areas including primary civil implementation organisations, and progress towards a lasting consolidation of peace, without further need for NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”⁶ The doctrinal purist might agree that in this case the inclusion of *presence* within the mission represents an attempt to describe how to operate and not what the required effect actually is. In the SFOR case this is better described under the category of Role and mandate in which 3 specific tasks are identified. They are:

- To deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace.
- To promote a climate in which the peace process can continue to move forward

⁴ “Military Intervention and Peacekeeping: The Reality” by Richard Connaughton. Ashgate Publishing.

⁵ “NATO and the Former Yugoslavia” by Joyce P Kaufman. Rowman & Littlefield, Inc.

⁶ SFOR web page dated 14 Jan 2003 – www.nato.int/sfor/organisation/mission.htm.

- To provide selective support to civilian organisations within its capabilities.

The SFOR case is a good example of the “means and ends” argument in that the end is described as “a lasting consolidation of peace” whereas the means are the three tasks described above. It could be argued that it is inappropriate to include *presence* within the body of the mission in that it represents a means by which the tasks might be achieved but presence is not an end in itself. The effect of *presence*, combined with other activities, is the “end.”

The context of presence notwithstanding, it is significant from a Force Allocation perspective in that successful PSO or COIN is about managing the perceptions of both the neutral population and the parties to the conflict. A military presence tends to reassure the vulnerable, deter those considering violence and demonstrates the ability to exercise effective attrition on those who breach the law. Again, presence is but one of the means by which Reassurance, Deterrence and Attrition is achieved and thus this study will focus on the characteristics of effective presence and identify those of ineffective presence. In short, presence must have an effect. If it does not, it is pointless and merely places the NATO forces themselves at risk.

UNPROFOR provides a good example of the relationship between *presence* and *effect*. General Rose described it thus within his book “Fighting for Peace:”

“The second element of the UN mission in Bosnia, to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful settlement of the war, was also largely obtained through the pacifying presence of UN peacekeepers on the ground. Following the deployment of the UN into Bosnia in 1992, the civilian casualty rate from the war dropped from 130,000 killed that year to around 3,000 killed in the next....the effect of UNPROFOR’s presence on the ground was to halt genocide in its tracks.”⁷

Security affects both the Joint Force itself and the population affected by the crisis. Security works both ways; on the one hand it is necessary, through appropriate force protection measures, to protect the force and, on the other, to ensure that the population at large is safe, that property and life are not at risk and that the rule of law is imposed on an even-handed basis. The security of the force stems from operating from secure bases, sensible tactical protection measures and, above all, from good intelligence. But the balance is delicate. An over-zealous emphasis on force protecting may serve to isolate the force from the population whose security it is designed to enhance.

A fortress mentality and an inappropriate use of armoured vehicles, for example, is likely to have an adverse effect. Whereas the deployment of a more intimate force, probably on foot and with lighter weapons, is a more risky enterprise. Security involves both risk assessment and risk management and will influence the profile and structure of any force. In general, the greater the consent, the lighter the force. Thus the identification of Force Allocation norms or patterns will probably include the provision of light manoeuvre forces as a norm but with heavier forces in reserve and for enforcement. However security stems from human interaction and is not imposed or maintained by tanks or Fighting Vehicles. For example, infantry soldiers in a Bradley IFV have no effect whatsoever until they dismount.

⁷ “Fighting for Peace” by General Sir Michael Rose. Harvill Press.

They cannot interact with people and affect their perceptions until they physically engage with the population. Thus security is arguably an effect and not a function and this study will identify those aspects of Force Allocation that contribute to the perception of security. It lies at the heart of any Peace Support Operation.

THE URBAN CHALLENGE

Operations of any sort, whether war-fighting or some form of PSO, are extraordinary challenging. Whereas most the components of western armed forces are configured for bold continental manoeuvre, urban areas preclude such an aspiration. They represent very difficult terrain in which to operate and demand an “intimacy” of modus operandi that is simply not present in more conventional terrain. However, many would now argue that increased levels of urbanisation across the globe should now render the urban environment conventional rather than exceptional. Hence the significance of this area within this study. Urban areas are often synonymous with centres of gravity; they are where most of the people live and where power and influence is held. Thus, within most CRO, the generation of both presence and security within an urban area is inevitable and the challenge is therefore, through historical analysis, to identify what sort of presence has the optimum effect and then to reflect that within revised FAR.

Considerable research into the nature of urban operations has been carried out by the Rand Corporation in the USA and a recent report describes the unique characteristics of the environment well.

“What distinguishes the urban area is the count of elements per unit of space and the quantity of activities per unit of time. The number of structures, firing positions, avenues of approach, enemy, non-combatants, friendly force units, key terrain, and obstacles per cubic kilometre ,or the number of small-unit engagements, troop movements, and the interaction with non-combatants per minute within that space are far greater in cities than in any other environment.”⁸

Rand also explore the implications of density within the urban environment and conclude that it has a dramatic effect on the nature of operations. There is an intimacy of operation that is not present elsewhere: “The high density in urban space leads directly to a similar magnified density in time. More infrastructure, people, and activity in less space mean that situations can change more rapidly. A greater number of events can occur in a given period. More decisions per unit of time are demanded of military leaders. As a result, the time available for a decision is dramatically reduced. Plans and alternative course of action can be far shorter lived. The effect is one of time and space compression. Whether at the operational or tactical levels, there is less time to analyse situations and alternatives, less time to properly position logistic support, and less time for forces to act to maintain the initiative.”⁹

⁸ “Heavy Matter: Urban Operations’ density of challenges” by Russell W Glenn. Rand Corporation 2000.

⁹ *Ibid.*

The impact of density on the nature of urban operation is acknowledged within most national doctrine publications and the UK publication puts it well: “In essence, fighting in urban areas is primordial combat. It is clearly distinct from the elegant manoeuvrist approach to operations that characterised the conduct of the Gulf War. The enemy is at close range; snipers are almost always present; stress is extremely high, and the opposing force is frequently indistinguishable from the civilian population.”¹⁰

Period, all terrain types	Antiquity	Napoleonic Wars	US Civil War	World War II	Post 1945
<i>Urban terrain examples</i>	<i>Plataea, New Tyre, New Carthage</i>	<i>Junginen, Aspern-Essling</i>	<i>Moterrey, Rorkes Drift</i>	<i>Stalingrad Aachen, Nuremberg, Berlin</i>	<i>Beirut 1982 Hue, Grozny, Suez City</i>
Man per square km	100,000	4,970	3,883	32	25
<i>Urban examples</i>	<i>16,300</i>	<i>46,400</i>	<i>11,600</i>	<i>1,300</i>	<i>1,100</i>
Square m per man	10	201	258	31,000	40,000
<i>Urban examples</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>86</i>	<i>769</i>	<i>909</i>

*Table 1: Battlefield Density through the ages*¹¹ Note: Values for battlefield densities across all types of terrain are shown in Roman type; comparative urban examples and respective battlefield densities are in italics.

The significance of the data in Table 1 lies in the steady increase in area coverage by a given force in most terrain with the exception of urban areas in which the coverage is more constant. The urban environment requires an extraordinary level of commitment when compared to other environments and, arguably, the impact of emerging technology has yet to have a real effect on this relationship. Hence the implications for this study are that the application of force within urban areas does need to be considered separately from rural environments in which density is not an issue.

THE RURAL DIMENSION

The prosecution of effective PSO in rural operations owes more to Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) than conventional warfare. Given that such operations centre on the management of perceptions, the parallel is intriguing and the Force Allocation patterns that govern effective COIN operations may merit further study but is beyond the scope of this project. It is the “effect” and purpose of rural operations that requires study and, like the urban model, will usually reflect a blend of reassurance, deterrence and a demonstrable ability to carry out effective attrition where necessary. This is no different from the urban model but the Force allocation priorities will be different.

¹⁰ United Kingdom Army Field Manual Part 5 “Urban Operations” November 1999 Preface Para 2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Rural operations are, by nature, dispersed and are unlikely to reflect Centres of Gravity, hence dispersion will be the norm combined with an ability to react quickly. There is likely to be a premium on air manoeuvre rather than ground manoeuvre. Tactical mobility will also stem from vehicle mounted units but it is unlikely that tracked vehicles will be appropriate other than for a potent reserve. Armoured units often have an adverse effect on perceptions and may indicate a mix of aggression and insecurity. Wheeled vehicles for the transport of light infantry that operates primarily on foot should be the norm. However these vehicles should possess a mix of protection, mobility and firepower – in that order. Whereas the value of tracked vehicles tends to lie in firepower rather than mobility.

The dispersed nature of rural operations is best addressed by combined arms groupings in which capabilities are grouped under a single command. This is traditionally at Brigade level although the sufficiency of independent Brigades varies from nation to nation. Multi-nationality below Brigade level tends to inhibit tempo thus national Brigades tend to be more effective than those of an *ad hoc* mix. Within rural operations, the span of command is an important issue and Brigades should not be responsible for more than about 4 major units; this leads to an intimacy of command whereby the intent and spirit of the commander can be successfully imposed upon the force.

Patrolling constitutes the core skill within rural operations and, given this requirement, should govern the approach to Force Allocation. Patrolling is not a pedestrian skill that can be performed by any unit; effective patrolling can reap success whereas ineffective patrolling can antagonise the population and shift the initiative to the opposition. Field Marshal Slim addressed it thus:

“All commanders directed their attention to patrolling. It is the basis of success. It not only gives eyes to the side that excels at it, and blinds its opponent, but through it the soldier learns to move confidently in the element in which he works.”¹²

Rural Operations places a premium on mobile light infantry, potent air and ground reserves, RISTA assets, combat engineering and focussed logistics. These are the primary elements, combined with appropriate Headquarters that require to be reflected within any Force Allocation norms and that should be proved through historical analysis.

CONSENT AND PROPORTIONALITY

British doctrine for peacekeeping is typical in that it identifies consent as the key determinant for the conduct of operations. The presence of consent, however patchy. Distinguishes peacekeeping from the more high-risk and resource-intensive activity of Peace Enforcement. Consent is supported by the key peacekeeping principles of impartiality, legitimacy, minimum force, credibility and transparency. Actions that may prejudice consent and thus push a peacekeeping operation into one of peace enforcement should not be undertaken lightly. In practice, modern peacekeeping operations are likely to represent a continual struggle to preserve and sustain whatever consensual framework might exist.

¹² “Defeat into Victory” Field Marshal William Slim.

The vital requirement for impartiality is often difficult to achieve and maintain in such operations as it is dependent on an even-handed approach. Thus military activities that have the greatest utility and that contribute most to the strategic design are likely to be those that promote and foster consent. That is not to say that the need to preserve consent forecloses any use of force. Nevertheless the use of force is only acceptable as long as peacekeepers preserve the overall non-combatant status and do not become a party to the conflict.

Consent is a complex notion that exists in the minds and perceptions of the population, from apathetic onlooker, through sympathisers to activists. It is influenced to a marked degree by the actions of any Peacekeeping force and thus there is extraordinary potential for a tactical event to have strategic effect. Any failure by a tactical commander to take action that matches the operational level intent is likely to have an adverse effect. It follows that any action by a Peacekeeping force that is heavy-handed or perceived to be disproportionate is likely to erode consent.

Proportionality is a complex idea and exists largely in the minds of those affected and, just as importantly, is reflected by the media. As the Israeli Army has discovered to its cost, any action that is perceived by the press to be over-zealous, poorly co-ordinated or unnecessarily violent can be extraordinarily counter-productive. Proportionality involves not over reacting, taking risks and acting within the law. British doctrine describes the principle as follows:

“the measured application of violence or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific end, demonstrably reasonable, proportionate and appropriate; and confined in effect to the specific and legitimate target intended.”¹³

Given that both consent and proportionality are about perceptions, this has important implications for force design, structure and allocation. What may have been appropriate in one operation may not be so in another. The challenge is to identify the “norms” rather than the “rules” and to identify tested formulae that generally work.

NATO DOCTRINE

AJP-01(A)

The successful planning, execution and support of military operations, any military operations, naturally require a clearly understood and accepted doctrine. AJP-01(A) constitutes the “capstone” document in this regard and it establishes the fundamental assumptions for this study. It describes the principles of Allied Joint Operations in general and the planning and execution of land operations in particular. Above all, it describes the nature of operations at the operational level and the concept of “Operational Art” which is so applicable to any generation of FAR. AJP-01(A) exhorts the commander to consider four aspects in relation to operational art: the end state which will achieve the strategic objective, the sequencing of activities that will lead to success, the application or resources to sustain

¹³ British Army Doctrine Publication Volume 1 “Operations) Annex A to Chapter 7. June 1994.

that sequence and the risks involved.¹⁴ Thus forces are allocated to achieve a sequence of effects and hence it is the effect (end) rather than the means that merit the main consideration.

Any effect is generated by the formation of a Combined and Joint Force in which synergy is the norm. The concept is entitled the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) and is described thus:

Should a crisis occur, the NAC might consider the formation of a CJTF composed of forces drawn from member states. The definition of a CJTF HQ is 'a deployable, multinational, multi-Service Alliance HQ of variable size, formed to command and control a CJTF for contingency operations including peace support operations. It could be employed for Alliance and, when agreed by the NAC, for Western European Union (WEU) operations. Provision should be made for possible involvement of non-NATO nations. A CJTF HQ will include both personnel and equipment, together with the communications and logistics capabilities required by the HQ'. While a CJTF must be able to execute the whole spectrum of missions both within and outside the NATO area, the CJTF concept primarily aims at operations deemed necessary by NATO nations for non-Article 5 contingencies outside Alliance territory. Thus for a mission other than Alliance collective defence, the CJTF might comprise exclusively units of Allied nations or a coalition of Allied and other non-NATO nations on an ad hoc basis.

The activation, formation and deployment of a CJTF would be directed and approved by the NAC as advised by the MC. The NAC would nominate the SC who would have overall responsibility for: all military-strategic matters, coordinating communications and the co-ordination of logistics support, rotation of units and personnel for extended deployments and for providing the military operational interface with the International Staff and the International Military Staff in NATO HQ.¹⁵

The means and ends argument is strongly articulated within AJP-01(A). It points to all operations being crafted within the context of the “end-state.” This is important for the terms of this study in that it forces the placing of the notions of *presence* and *security* within the context of purpose. Neither, therefore, should be viewed as constituting the rationale for a mission in themselves; they are mechanisms through which a deeper purpose might be achieved. Thus from a doctrinal perspective, both should be examined having answered the four questions below.

Principles for Joint and Multinational Operations. *An understanding and knowledge of key principles for joint and multinational operations, which have proved successful in past conflicts, is the start point in doctrine development. These principles are not absolute and nations may place greater emphasis on some rather than others, but there is common agreement on their importance and relevance. Aspects of command are covered in Chapter 4.*

¹⁴ AJP-01(A) Page 2-8 Para 0211.

¹⁵ Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(A) Section 5 Paras 0119 & 0120.

***Objective.** Joint multinational operations must be directed towards a clearly defined and commonly understood objective that contributes to the achievement of the desired end-state. The objective, missions and tasks must be defined with absolute clarity before operations begin. Once an objective has been decided upon, all joint efforts must be directed towards its achievement. Four key questions must be considered in the process of defining the objectives and the end-state:*

What is the mission purpose?

What criteria constitute mission accomplishment?

What are the exit criteria?

Who declares success or victory?¹⁶

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

NATO peacekeeping doctrine is reflected in AJP-3.4.1 “Peace Support Operations”. It is a key reference for this study. Peace Support Operations are about achieving operational success in line with strategic objectives and the process of “defining success” is well articulated within this core volume of NATO doctrine. In short, success goes far beyond the more provision of “presence” and “security”. AJP-3.4.1 is unequivocal on this point as follows:

“A clearly defined set of criteria and associated guidelines enunciated by the senior political authority is thus critical to the success of the operation.... The actual success of an operation will be measured against the overall result and not just on the achievement of military activities.”¹⁷

It follows that mission success is dependent on a force that is well led, trained, organised and equipped. An appropriate structure will foster its abilities to achieve operational objectives whereas an inappropriate structure is likely to jeopardise chances of success. Hence the challenge of this study is to identify, through historical analysis, those components that are generally appropriate and those that are not for operations in both urban and rural environments.

“The aim should never be a spectacular but possibly isolated success for one arm of the government. Rather it should be a sequence of successes that combine to work in complementary ways toward a single strategic goal. There will be multiple lines of operation (economic, legal, and military), working through a series of decisive points, but they should all complement the campaign's main effort, the primary line of operation of which must be political. The military commander will identify his decisive military points, which are then arranged onto lines of operation to achieve the desired military aim. The military plan should be based upon a number of operational objectives, understood and refined at each level, which help to destroy the insurgency by marginalisation and focused selective strikes, and also provide

¹⁶ Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(A) Section 2 Para 0206.

¹⁷ AJP-3.4.1 “Peace Support Operations” Chapter 2 Para 0206.

assistance to the work of other agencies. Decisive points might include restoring public order, controlling routes, or clearing “no go” areas. Resources (the means to achieve the specified ends) should be allocated accordingly.”¹⁸

AJP-3.4.1 highlights, in particular, the principle of credibility that has a very direct bearing on any structure or principle of Force Allocation. In short any force must, not only be credible, but also and more importantly, be perceived as such.

“The force must respond with professional bearing and swift, effective, impartial actions to incidents. All personnel must consistently demonstrate the highest standards of disciplined, controlled and professional behaviour, both on and off duty.”

There is no formula for the structure and composition of a force. In practice, following the political direction to develop a plan, the Strategic Commander will first develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) which can include an initial Statement of Requirement (SOR). After NAC approval of the CONOPS the SC’s will develop the OPLAN which will contain a detailed Statement of Requirement (SOR). As PSO are non-Article 5 operations, this process is iterative and complicated in order to match the force provided by nations with the actual requirements of the CONOPS. It is therefore the function of this study to identify those “norms” that have proved effective in the past and to highlight those so that they may help to refine the Defence Requirements process.

It is during the commander’s concept development stage that identification of the required military capabilities, numbers, generic grouping and command structure is completed. This becomes the Joint Force Commander’s SOR and it is the SOR that is used as the basis of the NATO force generation process through which contributions are sought from individual nations.

“As in other military operations, the final force structure depends on a number of factors, including the size of the operational area, the nature and expected duration of the mission, lines of communication, terrain, weather, threat and logistical requirements. The force must be a task-organised, multinational organisation.”¹⁹

The balance of light and heavy forces is a critical consideration, as is the span of command and the profile of the force is likely to reflect the Chapter of the UN Charter under which the mandate for the force has been crafted. Chapter VI operations will generally require a light force whose emphasis is on dialogue and monitoring whereas a Chapter VII operation infers that the level of consent is, at best, patchy and that the force will need the ability to enforce compliance and to protect its own members. It is a difficult balance.

“A heavily armed and aggressive force may be perceived in certain cultures as a provocation demanding a violent response. Similarly, a force that places undue emphasis on overt force protection measures is less likely to command

¹⁸ “Military Doctrine and Counter Insurgency – a British perspective” by Gavin Bulloch. *US Parameters* Spring 1996 pp 4-16.

¹⁹ *Ibid* Para 0436.

respect, establish sufficient liaison with the local population, or inspire confidence in the security environment.”²⁰

UNITED KINGDOM DOCTRINE

British doctrine for Peace Support Operations in general and urban and rural operations in particular, stems from lessons learned in the post-colonial era in which UK forces were heavily engaged on Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN). The guiding principles of consent and the proportionate use of force are common to both COIN and PSO.

In both rural and urban operations the importance of joint operations cannot be overstated. In this case “joint” means operating in tandem with indigenous forces, sharing headquarters, having common boundaries and, above all, sharing intelligence and information. Where joint operations have not been the norm, failure has often been the norm. Joint operations with the RUC in Northern Ireland provide the best example of this principle, operations in which mutual trust is engendered and mutual risk taken.

Light Infantry, properly trained and appropriately configured, provides the foundation for operations in both environments. Responsibility tends to be devolved to the low tactical level thus companies are often almost autonomous. Tactical action can often, in itself, be more important than in conventional operations and this has implications on the span of command. The British experience is that a Battalion with more than 4 companies or a Brigade with more than 4 major units is over-faced. Thus the traditional model of a Divisional Headquarter with a maximum of 4 Brigades works well. This produces 1 Brigade Headquarter for every 4 major units and a Divisional Headquarters for every 12. The span of command is stretched further if the Divisional Commander is also the Joint Force Commander.

Success also often stems from a high degree of modularity in which Battalions are genuinely self-sufficient for the generation of key capabilities. The result is that resources tend to be held forward than back with units “packaged” within their AO for effective and agile operations across the spectrum. Key capabilities that are held back induce delay and a slow response.

The foot patrol is the bedrock of successful urban operations in that it provides the best means to interact with the population at large and to gain intelligence. Vehicles provide good initial mobility and support but tend to be ineffective other than as a demonstration of potency to deter aggression. Vehicles provide quick reaction capability and heavy firepower when required. Tracked vehicles are seldom appropriate in either urban or rural operations; they appear aggressive, are slow and cause damage. Light, wheeled vehicles are more agile, less intimidating and often have a larger capacity. Helicopters constitute a premium asset for both environments.

Above all, Peace Support Operations in either a rural or urban environment call for supremely well-trained troops that are capable of independent action with an element of risk. Ad hoc groupings in which soldiers are suddenly required to perform a role for which they have not been trained often leads to disaster.

²⁰ Ibid Para 0437.

THE LEGACY OF AMRITSAR

Terrorism and general unrest constituted a potent threat to British rule in India in 1918. Extreme nationalists attracted considerable support and, even after the reunification of Bengal, tension between Hindu and Muslim continued to simmer. It fell to Mr Justice Rowlatt to investigate the nature of the growing revolutionary conspiracy and to suggest remedial action. The result was two “Rowlatt” bills that would authorise judges to try political cases without juries and allow provincial governments, as well as the Indian government, to intern people without trial. The bills were never actually used nevertheless the effect on public opinion was dramatic.

Disturbances occurred all over India but it was the Punjab that presented the greatest threat to civil order. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Michael O’Dwyer opted for a muscular approach to the problem and decided to use what he called “fist force” to counter the “soul force” of the nationalists who had called a 24 hour general strike for the end of March 1919. This strike, or “hartal” was observed in most cities of the Punjab including Amritsar which was not only a major trading centre but also a holy place in the eyes of Sikhs whose Golden Temple sheltered the Granth Sahib, a particularly sacred book.

The strike passed peacefully but on 10 April riots took place and a number of people were killed including 3 Britons. Sir Michael O’Dwyer summoned reinforcements by train from the local garrison in Jullundur and a new officer was appointed to take up the Amritsar military command. His name was Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer. “Dyer was an ailing old sweat, suffering from arteriosclerosis and the bronchial effects of chain-smoking. Ill health had kept him out of the First World War, but he had distinguished himself as a young officer up on the Frontier, though even then he had been known as a man with a short temper who was likely to over-react under pressure. He was to do so again in Amritsar with the most dreadful consequences.”²¹

Dyer received orders from the Viceroy himself that indicated that if troops were to be used an example should be set. Meanwhile the Deputy Commissioner had issued a proclamation that assemblies of more than four Indians would be fired upon. This infuriated the people and a meeting was called in the Jallianwala Bagh, an open space surrounded by houses and walls. “The British response was furious, even hysterical. One British surgeon suggested bombing the crowd from the air.”²² What followed became a watershed in both British military history and doctrine for imperial policing and peacekeeping. Dyer ordered his men to fire on the crowd. Over 1,500 rounds were fired and 379 people were killed including women and children. Over 1000 people were wounded. To compound his actions, which were endorsed by the Lieutenant Governor, Dyer initiated a number of extraordinary actions against the Indians. Anyone failing to greet Europeans with respect was flogged on the spot, bicycles were confiscated and intellectuals were forced to work as coolies. However the reaction in England was one of shock and Dyer was censured in the House of Commons and the Hunter Committee was established to investigate what had occurred. Dyer was relieved of his command and summoned back to England.

²¹ “India Britannica” by Geoffrey Moorhouse. William Collins 1983.

²² The Amritsar Massacre (1919) – “The Guinness Book of Military Blunders” by Geoffrey Regan. Guinness Publishing 1991.

Actions within the rule of law, the importance of consent and the application of a proportionate use of force all now constitute the bedrock of the British approach to Peacekeeping and is even reflected in NATO doctrine. Similarly every young officer is imbued with the knowledge that, in Peace Support Operations, his tactical action can have a strategic effect. The Amritsar massacre is still studied in British defence academies today as it not only embodies the antithesis of current philosophy but also points to the fact that the current British approach is not a modern invention by a talented group of intellectual staff officers but rather the result of a range of experience in both Imperial Policing and Counter Insurgency operations throughout the 20th Century but particularly post 1945. The British approach is arguably unique and whereas Amritsar may represent the nadir of British Peacekeeping, operations in Oman, Borneo and, more recently in Sierra Leone, may constitute models for success. The fact that some of these are termed “Counter Insurgency” and others “Peacekeeping” is no accident and this chapter will explore this relationship further. The legacy of Amritsar is a powerful one and has influenced the British approach ever since.

UNITED STATES DOCTRINE

“In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees – providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring factions apart – conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All in the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be called the three-block war.”

General Charles C Krulak, USMC²³

US Doctrine for Urban Operations reinforces the notion that urban operations span all levels of war and that therefore the doctrine for urban operations is entirely applicable to Peace Support Operations, so many of which take place within an urban environment. Urban operations are often strategic centres of gravity and therefore tend to assume both a strategic and tactical significance.

US forces possess a technological edge that surpasses that of any other national force and it is interesting to note that this edge might be degraded in urban operations. It points out that activities such as Information Operations and civil-military operations might have greater leverage than the application of advanced technology. In short, urban operations require a cerebral approach based on effect rather than tactical activity for its own sake. It is achieved by a series of activities: “understand,” “shape,” “engage,” “consolidate,” and “transition.”

FRENCH DOCTRINE

French doctrine divides peace operations into three types – peacekeeping, “peace restoration” and peace enforcement. The linkage of PSO to conflict is implicit within the French

²³ US Joint Doctrine Publication 3-06 “Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations” 16 Sep 2002.

approach in that the second category of *restauration de la paix* is defined as being conducted in an ongoing conflict. France has a muscular approach to peacekeeping and views it within the context of “Chapter VI and a half” whereas peace enforcement is viewed as an activity “conducted against an aggressor.” French doctrine has been coloured by experience in Somalia and Rwanda where there was “the need for units capable of carrying out violent action in high intensity engagements with composure, comportment and the fire mastery necessary to bring about a cessation of hostilities”.²⁴

France is entirely at ease with using force in Peace Operations and is less concerned with the loss of impartiality than the UK. In this respect the French approach is somewhat maverick and at odds with the more conventional approach. Interestingly the French have developed a concept of “active partiality” for peace restoration operations in which there is little or no consent. “This involves being impartial in applying the rules equally to all parties, but being willing to use force to punish those who transgress the rules, regardless of whether this results in accusations of partiality (which it invariably does).”²⁵

France also places a strong emphasis on the humanitarian strand of operations and will conduct operations to protect civilians even if this risks consent. France is a string advocate of safe areas within which civilians can be shielded and aid effectively distributed. France therefore tends to allocate forces with the ability to conduct muscular peacekeeping operations. This places a premium on a capability configured on conflict rather than peace with the inherent ability to switch from one to the other with speed and without reconfiguration. In principle this matches current thinking in NATO and any differences tend to be in approach rather than force structure.

THE NATO DIMENSION

In any international crisis there is a predictable “ladder” of escalation including diplomatic pressure, sanctions and an array of measures under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The last stage is the decision to take enforcement measures and the process by which such measures are agreed by the Security Council who produce an appropriate mandate. Once a decision to act, speed is of the essence and this represents a paradox for the foundation of this study in that individual nations usually press for an outcome that stems from early and decisive intervention but individually they are often slow or reluctant to join the operation. Many have consistently advocated the advantages of early and decisive action and none more so than Sir Brian Urquart who has observed that: “*the possibility of the UN intervening convincingly at an early stage in a crisis would almost certainly provide, in the longer term, for a large reduction in the complexity and expense that belated intervention almost invariably entails. The delay in intervening in Somalis, for example, certainly created a much larger disaster, which in turn necessitated a much larger international response.*”²⁶

The requirement for rapid reaction is well understood but so often not put into practice. Nevertheless it underpins any policy for Force Allocation in that a Crisis Response Operation calls for a speedy and agile deployment rather than a slow and ponderous build-up of forces.

²⁴ “Contemporary French Peacekeeping” by P M Belbutowski. National Defense University 1994.

²⁵ “The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations” by Trevor Findlay. Oxford University Press 2002.

²⁶ “For a UN Volunteer Force” by Sir Brian Urquart.

The success of a CRO depends on the effective generation of effect through capability thus it is useful to address the precise functions that are required and that need to be reflected in any Force Allocation Process. There are arguably 6 primary functions that require to be reflected within any Force and Allocation process:

- Command. Command is the exercise of military authority by a designated commander for the planning, directions, co-ordination and control of a designated force. Whereas control is the means by which command is exercised. Without potent and empowered command, any force will flounder.
- Manoeuvre. Manoeuvre is the ability of adopt a position of advantage over an enemy or party to a conflict from which force can either be threatened or actually applied. Within CRO, manoeuvre is the primary tool for success and thus the Force Allocation mechanisms that apply to manoeuvre units are exceedingly important. Manoeuvre is more than just *presence*; “it is the means of concentrating the threat of force at decisive points to achieve surprise, shock action, physical momentum and moral dominance.”²⁷ Manoeuvre tends to take place in tandem with firepower however the effect of manoeuvre tends to be enduring whereas that of firepower is not.
- Firepower. In short firepower is designed to destroy, neutralise, suppress and demoralise. Thus the application of firepower should be judged solely by the *effect* required. Within CRO firepower tends to be less decisive than manoeuvre in that, within a PSO, it is unlikely to generate success. It is a last resort, a form of deterrence and even force protection.
- Protection. Protection serves to preserve the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied with precision. *Security* is arguably a sub-set of protection but though effort is always necessary to protect the force, it does not contribute directly to the mission. Specific protection measures will include: air and missile defence, counter-air, counter-mobility, NBC measures, hardening of essential facilities, protective intelligence and defensive EW. Deception, OPSEC and dispersion also contribute to protection.
- Information and Intelligence. Accurate and timely intelligence is fundamental to the success of any operation. RISTA will serve to link sensors, acquisition systems and reconnaissance directly to strike assets which should be cued by the sensors if necessary. This function should enjoy a high priority in any Force Allocation Process.
- Logistics. Effective logistic support sustains the force. It is all about the sustenance and moral well bring of the men and women of the force, the maintenance of materiel, the provision of expendable commodities and the replacement of casualties.

These primary functions provide a useful foundation for this study and help to explain the rationale of the force and the relationship of both *presence* and *security* to the mission.

²⁷ UK Army Doctrine Publication “Operations” para 0504.

Interestingly this is not a new process the Commonwealth Institute sponsored a project on Defence Alternatives in 1995.²⁸ In it, the authors offered a *Vital Force* proposal and suggested that: “*the tactical units of the field force should closely resemble typical “middleweight” military units in their equipment and capabilities..*”²⁹ Hence there is an emphasis on wheeled over tracked mobility and a particular emphasis on air mobility of artillery. The structure of their proposed force merits serious study in that all of the key capabilities are addressed. One interesting feature is that the force has 4 Brigade Headquarters that might be considered to be over-generous.

“Vital Force” Structure

- 4 Brigade Headquarters.
- 5 Motorised Infantry Battalions.
- 4 Light Mechanised Infantry Battalions.
- 3 Light Cavalry Squadrons.
- 2 Light Armoured Cavalry Squadrons.
- 6 Self-propelled Mortar batteries.
- 3 Light 155mm Artillery batteries (towed).
- 4 Light Mechanised Anti-tank companies.
- 6 Combat Engineer companies.
- 6 Air Defence batteries.
- 2 Armed Scout Helicopter squadrons (18 ac each).
- 1 Troop Transport Helicopter Squadron (24 aircraft).
- 4 Signal companies.
- 4 Field Intelligence companies.
- 4 Military Police companies.
- 6 Reconnaissance and Surveillance platoons (3 RPV’s each).
- 12 Field Security sections.
- # multi-national Field Communication and Liaison teams.

From a Force Allocation perspective there are some significant ingredients to this model. They include the prime requirement for light infantry, the importance for intimate indirect fire assets, the significance of engineers and a substantial aviation component. It should be noted that there is no mention of a specific amphibious capability within the model.

CONCLUSIONS

Crisis Response Operations are unique and mission specific thus there is a limit to the application of “rules” to such operations. Rules suggest rigidity and hint at the application of templated solutions to crises that are extraordinarily complex but that require an allocation of force that is precisely tailored to the mission. However the value of historical analysis lies in the ability to identify a number of enduring “norms” that can be safely applied to the Defence Requirements planning process, these will reflect a number of enduring constants associated

²⁸ “The Applicability of the “NATO Model” to UN Peace Support Operations under the Security Council” by Gwyn Prins. UN Association of USA July 1996.

²⁹ “Vital Force” by C Conetta and C Knight October 1995.

with CRO and that provide a firm conceptual foundation for safe and successful Force Allocation.

Any Force Allocation Process should reflect both emerging concepts and the potential of new technology. “Norms” should be founded on modern and futuristic thinking rather than simply the evidence of the past. “Transformation” theory should colour a process that acknowledges the quest for the digital transparency of the battlespace.

The relationship of PSO to Conflict should be acknowledged. PSO do not take place in comfortable isolation but rather in an uncomfortable partnership with conflict operations. Both are often concurrent within the same Area of Operations and a modern force is required to be able to transition easily from one to the other. This has important implications for the refinement of Force Allocation principles and guidelines.

Too many of NATO forces are configured for the operations of the past and lack agility. Modern Force Allocation principles should be founded on the requirement for both strategic and tactical agility with an emphasis on mobility, modularity and flexibility.

NATO has a mature and well-understood doctrine that should underpin Force Allocation principles. Should any principles not reflect current doctrine, they risk credibility. Doctrine stresses the importance of effect and capability rather than the old attritional deployment for deployment’s sake.

There are subtle differences in national doctrines that stem from history, culture and ethos. Nevertheless NATO doctrine provides an effective blending mechanism whereby these can be overcome.

The concept of *presence* is not a doctrinally endorsed idea and thus presence needs to be expressed in terms of effect rather than a mission in its own right. Presence is a means to an end and should be analysed in terms of the effect required by the presence rather than the provision of presence itself.

Security also should be examined in the context of effect and the impact on the perceptions of the target audience. It should also be expressed in tandem with the notion of consent that is so crucial to success in PSO.

Urban operations are inevitable as they often match centres of gravity. They require considerable expertise from a force that is precisely trained and tailored for such operations. The density of operations is such that they will require a more generous allocation of forces than that required for rural operations.

There is a premium on mobile light infantry rather than armoured forces though the latter is required in reserve and for high-end enforcement. The greater the consent, the lighter the force.

The generation and sustainment of consent is a prime purpose to most CRO. Without consent any CRO is probably doomed to failure. Force Allocation principles should be coloured by this important factor.

Success of an operation is measured in terms of result and not on the achievement of military activities. It follows that force packaging and force requirements should reflect the

training, organisation and equipment necessary to induce a positive result. It should also reflect credibility.

National doctrines for PSO differ markedly. Only some nations have produced doctrine for modern urban operations. Urban operations are so complex and difficult that Force Allocation needs to be conducted with great care.

There are 6 primary functions that should govern the Force Allocation Process. They are: Command, Manoeuvre, Firepower, Protection, Information/Intelligence and Logistics.

Headquarters should only be identified and allocated with a clear understanding of the ideal span of command and of the dangers associated with exceeding it.

“However, to ensure a more peaceful future NATO, as an alliance, must continue to remain aware of and concerned about other crises or potential crisis areas on its borders, in the Balkans, and possibly beyond. It must be able to anticipate problems and have a policy and long-term strategy in place that will allow it to address problems as they arise, rather than waiting and then having to react to situations, as was the case in the Balkans. It must be able to define the principles that would lead to NATO military involvement and have a mechanism in place for interaction with other relevant organisations, such as the UN, as well as for internal discussion that would enable the Alliance to act more quickly should it become necessary to do so.”³⁰

³⁰ “NATO and the Former Yugoslavia” by Joyce P Kaufman.