
Bridging the Lacuna: Development and Systematisation of a Mission Task Analysis Using the NATO Estimate Process

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BACKGROUND

Every two years NATO undertakes a strategic analysis of the missions, tasks and force levels that are required to conduct a number of given planning situations. This is essentially an analytical process carried out by the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A). It is a process that risks being addressed in a doctrinal vacuum, and thus this paper describes a methodology, devised in partnership with NC3A Staff whereby the doctrinal and analytical tools enjoy total coherence.

There is a potential lacuna between military judgement and the application of clinical analysis; the evolution of a Military Task Analysis (MTA) based on the NATO endorsed “estimate process” represents a sustainable bridge between the two disciplines and offers analytical data that is doctrinally sound. SCS has developed five scenarios in which this process has been applied; they include Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, Evacuation, Conflict Prevention and Enforcement.

This paper addresses a scenario in Algeria; it has been developed exclusively by SCS and therefore should not be interpreted as a NATO/NC3A production; it is not. SCS has merely applied the NC3A methodology independently in order to test it against a real and extraordinarily complex situation that offers the potential for a multi-disciplinary approach.

The Operations Research and Functional Services Division (ORES) of NC3A has the responsibility to support the Strategic Commands for both defence and operational planning. This includes support for planning related to both Article 5 operations and Crisis Response Operations, the latter including the full set of Peace Support Operations (PSO). NC3A has developed an analytical method for determining force requirements/force structure that involved the identification of mission tasks and their associated force allocation rules. This

method has been successfully applied to three Defence Requirement Reviews (DRR) in 1997, 1999 and 2001 for PSO. For the 2003 DRR this process is being reviewed and adjusted in order to become more joint in nature. This method is even being extended to other mission types including traditional Article 5 missions for defence of alliance territory and a new class of Enforcement mission such as those witnessed in Kosovo and Afghanistan. This paper does not reflect a product of these processes; it represents an independent attempt to prove the validity and worth of the processes.

FORGING THE CONNECTION

Any analysis for such operations outlined above, that does not reflect emerging concepts and current doctrine is likely to lack authority and thus the essence of this project has been to blend the two elements. With the advent of transformation, Networked Enabled Capability (NEC), Effects based operations and other associated concepts, approaches to operations are changing. Digitization offers a more transparent battlespace and the notion of a tactical internet introduces a linkage of sensors and shooters that transcends traditional boundaries and formations. Conceptually, national forces are being structured for expeditionary operations rather than for continental manoeuvre and thus the very foundation for analysis is shifting. This has been acknowledged by the NATO Secretary General within a key note speech on 20 June 2002 in which he stated:

“NATO should focus on four critical military capabilities: secure, modern communications and information systems; the ability to move forces quickly to where they are needed, and to stay there as long as necessary; the means to work together seamlessly, and to win in combat; and last, but certainly not least, defences against chemical, biological radiological and nuclear attacks.”¹

All the scenarios that have been developed by SCS are set in the future and thus they all reflect the critical importance of strategic and tactical agility as well as a degree of digital connectivity to which all nations currently aspire. Thus conceptually all scenarios are oriented to the future; they reflect tomorrow’s challenges with tomorrow’s concepts. The application of doctrine, however, reflects current and endorsed NATO processes – intellectual thought processes that are unlikely to change to any marked degree and that represent the foundation for the process described within this paper. NATO AJP-01(A)² has been taken as the doctrinal authority and thus the challenge has been to link the NC3A analytical techniques to the Estimate Process described in that capstone publication.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL ART

Any military contribution within any category of Peace Support Operation depends on the successful application of operational art; indeed it could be argued that without an understanding of operational art, any form of PSO is doomed. Operational Art is well

¹ “Tackling Terror: NATO’s new mission” Lord Robertson 20 June 2002.

² Application of the Estimate Process (NATO AJP-01(A)).

described as: “... *the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns and major operations.*”³ In essence, operational art requires a commander, any commander, to identify the conditions, or “end-state”, that constitute success and that will thus mirror the strategic objective. Field Marshal Viscount William Slim referred to this as the necessity to “think big,” that is, to consider all dimensions and not be tempted to muddle through. Field Marshal Viscount Bernard Montgomery addressed the problem in typical succinct style:

*“It is essential to relate what is strategically desirable to what is tactically possible with the forces at your disposal. To this end it is necessary to decide the development of operations before the initial blow is delivered.”*⁴

Though “blows” are hardly likely to be appropriate in PSO, the principle of decisiveness remains valid but has rarely been applied in an PSO since 1988. Muddling through has only too often been the order of the day.

Successful application of operational art assumes a clear understanding of the various levels of command. At the strategic end of the spectrum, most national doctrine differentiates between the grand strategic and military strategic levels. British doctrine describes grand strategy as:

*“the application of national resources to achieve policy objectives which will invariably include diplomatic and economic resources.”*⁵

Military strategy, on the other hand, is the application of military resources to achieve grand strategic objectives. But it is the operational level that determines success or failure and that provides the focus for the MTA process described and illustrated within this paper. It provides the gearing between the strategic and tactical levels and should preclude planning in a vacuum and any failure to link any NATO activity to a strategic design. US doctrine has described the process as:

*“pivotal to the planning, conduct and sustainment of campaigns. It provides the context for tactical planning and decision making...it is this level that the sequence of activities occurs that produces military actions that link the tactical employment of forces to the strategic objectives of the campaign.”*⁶

The multi-functional nature of PSO is such that the operational commander may not necessarily be a military officer for the duration of the campaign. Nevertheless, whether in uniform or safari suit, the operational commander, properly advised by experts, is charged with designing a campaign within a delegated theatre of operations and subsequently with directing the major operations within that campaign. The commander has five main tasks that are reflected within the illustrative MTA that follows. They are:

- To decide what tactical objectives (civil as well as military) are necessary to achieve the campaign objectives.

³ UK Army Doctrine Publication, *Operations*.

⁴ Slim, William R., *Defeat into Victory*

⁵ UK Army Doctrine Publication, *Operations*.

⁶ US Joint Publication 5-00.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Campaign Planning*.

- To decide the sequence of these activities.
- To allocate the necessary resources to subordinate executives so that the activities may be accomplished.
- To identify priorities for logistic and administrative support.
- To direct all those activities not devolved to subordinate commanders.⁷

“Muddling through” is not an option and the NATO estimate process provides the ideal vehicle for ensuring that the techniques of operational art are rigorously applied and that no dimension is overlooked. It provides a tool for crafting a complex plan at the operational level that is doctrinally pure and militarily possible.

THE ESTIMATE PROCESS

The multi-functional nature of PSO notwithstanding, the utility of the estimate process is as convincing as it is for warfighting. It not only provides a logical intellectual process whereby every factor is subjected to analysis but also, and perhaps more importantly, a foundation against which to intellectually “audit” every component of the eventual plan. The development of a computer-based information tool by which tasks may be “linked” to the catalyst within the body of the estimate has proven utility.

“The estimate process is central to the formulation of the Commander Allied Joint Forces’ campaign plan and subsequent updating of plans in an Allied joint operation. However, the process has an application at all levels of command. The framework of an estimate is standard, comprising: a mission analysis, the mission statement, a situation analysis, analysis of opposition and friendly courses of action (CoA), a comparison of opposition and friendly CoA, selection and refinement of the best friendly CoA. The estimate must lead to a CoA that is suitable, feasible and acceptable, leading to the commander’s decision and his concept of operations. The weighting given to each aspect during the process will depend on the overall mission, the intelligence assessments and the prevailing circumstances.”⁸

MISSION ANALYSIS

“The mission analysis is a logical process for extracting and deducing, from a superior’s order, the tasks necessary to fulfil a mission. It places in context what effect is to be achieved in the overall design for operations. The commander would establish what constraints apply and determine, as the campaign progresses, whether further decisions are required. As such it is a

⁷ Cousens, Richard P., *Providing Military Security in Peace Maintenance*. In: *The politics of Peace Maintenance*, edited by Jarat Chopra 1998.

⁸ AJP-01(A) Annex 3A.

dynamic process that ‘triggers’ and then regulates the remainder of the estimate. It is continued thereafter as the situation and the mission are reviewed. The mission analysis is the first step in the process; it includes the determination of the higher command authority’s purpose, and the analysis of national or allied security and military-strategic direction, including short and long-term objectives to achieve the end-state. End-state objectives should include the military objectives that will provide the basis for realising the strategic objectives regardless of whether an imposed or negotiated termination is sought. The mission analysis should also include the specified and implied tasks, and determine priorities where appropriate. Completion of the mission analysis enables the commander to establish the criteria for suitability of the possible Course of Action (CoA). The mission analysis, having confirmed an understanding of the operation/mission directive issued by higher authority, and the capability of achieving the mission, leads to a reiteration of the commander’s mission statement.”⁹

In short, the Mission Analysis should expose the relationship between the strategic goals and the operational level; it should begin to define the nature of the relationship between the military line of operations and the other lines such as diplomatic, economic and humanitarian. Within any PSO this is a difficult and complex task in which the mandate itself plays a pivotal role. The Mission Analysis is followed by an analysis of the situation, the opposition or “parties to the conflict,” the friendly or impartial component and finally development of a series of CoA from which one is selected. It is from this that the plan stems.

THE PLAN (OPLAN)

The OPLAN developed using the Estimate Process and the Commander’s Intent synthesizes various options for deployment, employment, sustainment and other relevant sub-plans into a coherent whole. This becomes the Campaign Plan which should:

- a. Define clearly what conditions constitute success.
- b. Focus on the centre(s) of gravity of the opposing and friendly forces.
- c. Achieve unity of effort for maritime, land, air and special operations forces.
- d. Serve as the basis for subordinate planning.

There is only one “campaign plan;” it embodies the whole plan at the operational level and reflects the various roles of each component. The notion of a separate land or air “campaign” is therefore technically flawed.

⁹ AJP-01(A) Annex 3A

NATO PSO DOCTRINE

Not only does the NATO capstone publication (AJP-01(A)) provide the conceptual bedrock for the estimate process but endorsed NATO doctrine for PSO articulates the doctrinal approach for these very complicated operations. The Peace Enforcement example that follows is founded on the principles articulated within AJP 3.4.1.

DEFINING SUCCESS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

“In PSO, success will generally be related to the achievement of a number of pre-determined strategic objectives which form elements of the overall political end state and should be defined in the overall political mandate and the NAC Initiating Directive. The nature of PSO is such that these objectives will normally relate to the establishment of a secure, stable and self-sustaining environment for the local population. The achievement of the political end-state will be the defining criteria for the success of the entire operation, including the military mission. The achievement of security related military objectives will usually be a precursor, or milestone on the way to attaining the political end-state.

The achievement of military goals is relatively easy to state. However, the real or actual success of the operation is related to the daily circumstances of the local populace in the former conflict area and the realisation of a situation in which ‘conflicts are no longer solved using force’. In PSO, overall success may be measured by the achievement of benchmarks (for example increased compliance, demobilisation and retraining of former combatants, and the ability of local authorities to guarantee security). A clearly defined set of criteria and associated operational guidelines enunciated by the senior political authority is thus critical to the success of the operation. The achievement of such milestones and the other strategic objectives related to the political end-state requires perseverance and the efforts of a wide range of civilian organisations and local agencies. The actual success of an operation will therefore be measured against the overall result and not just on the achievement of the military objectives.

The achievement of the military objectives and the creation of a secure environment do not guarantee the establishment of a self-sustaining peace. But without security (and justice), the reconciliation, reconstruction and development programmes necessary to create a self-sustaining peace are unlikely to be effective. However, once the security related military objectives have been achieved, the attainment of the political end-state will require the mission’s main effort to be switched from the PSF to the peace building activities of the civilian components of the mission. Without such a switch of main effort and a commensurate switch of funding and resources, the operation is unlikely to progress beyond that of a military stalemate.”¹⁰

¹⁰ NATO AJP 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations

THE ANALYTICAL TOOLS

As explained in the introduction, NC3A analytical staff have developed a number of tools and notions that support the task of determining force requirement and force structures; the process involves the precise identification of mission tasks and a number of associated Force Allocation Rules (FAR). This task decomposition approach attempts to identify all required and implied joint tasks for an operation so that environmental constraints are identified but that service-specific assumptions are eliminated. The NC3A structure is a hierarchy with a number of components that all stem from the mandate – the same base as the Estimate.

- Mission Essential Components (MECs): MECs are derived from the mandate or mission and represent those elements which, if not achieved, would result in the probably failure of the mission. Their relationship with concepts of operational design such as Centres of Gravity and lines of operation is obvious and thus the utility of the MECs requires to be proven via the estimate process. They cannot be invented “on the hoof.” Any set of MECs should provide the highest level complete description of military requirements for the mission. The information tool enables any MEC to be “proved” by linking it to related elements within the estimate.
- Operational Objectives (OOs): OOs are at the next level to the MECs and represent temporal decomposition of the MECs into high-level operational-level tasks. They are dependent on a selected Course of Action (CoA) and, together, with the inevitable phases of an operation, represent the highest level description of the CoA. OO may support more than one MEC and may transcend a number of phases.
- Operational Objective Specifications (OOSs): While the OOs are a complete “operational” description of requirements, they tend to be at the “high end” of the operational level and are therefore somewhat abstract in their description. A given OO may be valid for several phases but the implementation of that objective in a given phase may differ from other phases. Hence, within the NC3A process, a further decomposition is undertaken into OOS that proved an enhanced understanding such as any specialization of an OO within a given phase.
- Key Tasks (KTs): KT represent the tactical level of the decomposition – the physical means by which the force can successfully accomplish the OO and the OOS. They are therefore precise rather than abstract. However they are *environment* specific rather than *service* specific. Thus the KT represent another level of specification beyond the OOS; they become a visualization of how the OO can be carried out – a separate tactical problem invoking the notion of capability though still being non-service specific. The MECs, OO, OOS, and KT are all reflected within the example that follows.
- Joint Activity Trees (JATs): JATs represent final level of decomposition but are not reflected within the Algerian example. They are integrated sets of joint military activities for achieving Key Tasks. They therefore represent

tactical solutions to the “problems” posed by the KT and are capability oriented.

CREATING THE BRIDGE

The analytical tools that are described above, were created by NATO NC3A over the last 2 years. They were loosely related to the notion of mission analysis in order to prove their utility but they required to be subjected to a much more rigorous test against the whole of the NATO-endorsed estimate process. The example that follows is one of a set of 5 scenarios through which the process has been refined and tested. All the material is drawn from open sources and the “Future History” section represents but one of many possible vehicles for creating the conditions for a Peace Enforcement Operation within Algeria.

The scenario was developed by SCS Ltd. and not by NATO. It should therefore not be interpreted as an authoritative geo-political forecast regarding the future of Algeria but merely as a vehicle for blending the techniques of the operational planner and the analyst. Peace Enforcement is one of the most challenging of all PSO involving a multitude of inter-related strands. It is for this reason that a real rather than fictitious country has been selected. Algeria offers the historical, cultural and geo-strategic ingredients for a deliciously complex attempt to bridge the potential lacuna between the analyst and military planner. It is a scenario selected by SCS Ltd in order to prove the process; it is not a scenario that has been endorsed by NATO and should not be interpreted as such.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT – ALGERIA – AN EXAMPLE

OVERVIEW

After a century of rule by France, Algeria became independent in 1962. The surprising first round success of the Fundamentalist FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) party in December 1991 balloting caused the army to intervene, crack down on the FIS and postpone the subsequent elections. The FIS response has resulted in a continuous low-grade civil conflict with the secular state apparatus, which nonetheless has allowed elections featuring pro-government and moderate religious-based parties. The FIS armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded itself in January 2000 and many armed militants surrendered under an amnesty programme designed to promote national reconciliation. Nevertheless, residual fighting continues. The situation is further exacerbated by large-scale unemployment and the need to diversify the petroleum-based economy.

The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria is the second largest country in Africa (after Sudan) and the 10th largest in the world. The country has an area of 2,381,740 sq km and borders the Mediterranean between Morocco and Tunisia. Algeria borders Libya (982 km), Mali (1,376 km), Mauritania (463 km), Morocco (1,559 km), Niger (956 km), Tunisia (965 km) and Western Sahara (42 km). It was originally inhabited by the Berbers, an ethnic minority native to the region. The population is 32 million, 3 million of which live in the capital, Algiers. The official language is Arabic but French is also widely spoken. The official religion is Islam. The climate is arid to semiarid with mild, wet winters and hot dry

summers along the coast. The climate is more extreme inland and the *sirocco*, a hot and dust or sand-laden wind is particularly common in the summer. The terrain consists mainly of high plateau and desert.



Figure 1: Algeria in geographical context.

The government model is a republic with the centre of government in Algiers. Significantly, there are 49 provinces known as *wilayas*. The parliament is bicameral with 389 seats in the National People's Assembly and 144 seats in the Council of Nations which is a form of Senate.

The hydrocarbons sector is the backbone of the economy, accounting for roughly 60% of revenue, 30% of GDP and over 95% of export earnings. Algeria has the fifth largest reserves of natural gas in the world and is the second largest gas exporter. It ranks fourteenth for oil reserves. Efforts to reform one of the most centrally controlled economies in the Arab World stalled in 1992 as the country became embroiled in political turmoil.

There are 4,820 km of Railway in Algeria together with 104,000 km of highway of which 72,000 is paved. The main ports and harbours include: Algiers, Annaba, Arzew, Bejaia, Beni Saf, Dellys, Djendjene, Ghazaouet, Jijel, Mostaganem, Oran, Skikda and Tenes. There are 51 airports throughout the country with paved runways and 84 which are more like airstrips.

HISTORY

President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in April 1999 to a 5-year term. Bouteflika had served as Foreign Minister in a previous government. The President is the constitutional head of state, appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister, and may dissolve the legislature.

According to the Constitution, the Prime Minister appoints the cabinet ministers; however, in practice the President has taken a key role in designating the members of the Cabinet. The military establishment strongly influences defense and foreign policy. Abdelaziz Bouteflika was regarded throughout the 1999 election campaign as the candidate most favored by the dominant security establishment and the most likely winner. At the end of the campaign, the other six candidates withdrew, credibly charging massive fraud by the military, and Bouteflika was elected easily, although with a turnout as low as 30 percent. The presidential election campaign was marked by increased openness; however, international observers and political parties pointed out numerous problems with the conduct of the elections. President Bouteflika is not affiliated formally with any political party, but he has the parliamentary support of a six-party coalition. In June 1997, Algeria held its first parliamentary elections since January 1992 and elected the first multiparty parliament in the country's history. The Government's cancellation of the 1992 elections, which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win, suspended the democratization process and a transition to a pluralistic republic, and escalated fighting, which still continues, between the security forces and armed insurgent groups seeking to overthrow the Government and impose an Islamic state. The Government does not always respect the independence of the judiciary.

The Government's security apparatus is composed of the army, air force, navy, the national gendarmerie, the national police, communal guards, and local self-defense forces. All of these elements are involved in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations and are under the control of the Government. The security forces are alleged to have committed serious human rights abuses, although allegations of such abuses continued to decline.

Despite continued improvements, particularly in addressing problems of torture and arbitrary detention, the human rights situation is generally poor, and serious problems have persisted, including the excessive use of force, increased restrictions on freedom of expression, and failure to account for past disappearances. The massacre of civilians by armed terrorist groups has also continued. There are significant limitations on citizens' right to change their government.

The security forces are alleged to have committed extra-judicial killings, tortured, beat or otherwise abused detainees, and arbitrarily arrested and detained, or held incommunicado, individuals; however, in general such abuses continue to decline. Most such cases have been committed against suspected members of armed groups in the context of the Government's continued battle with terrorism. Security forces also committed serious abuses in connection with riots and demonstrations in the Kabylie region during the spring and summer of 2001. Security forces killed more than 50 civilians and injured hundreds while attempting to suppress the disturbances, during which many demonstrators burned and looted government buildings, political party offices, and public and private property.

There has been no overt censorship of information. The print media is relatively free and the independent press has commented regularly and openly and expressed a wide range of views on significant issues such as terrorist violence and surrenders under the amnesty program. However, some elements of the news media tend to practice self-censorship.

Unlike in the past when electronic media expressed only government policy, government-controlled radio and television stations have recently presented a variety of views, including those critical of the Government, especially during the violence that took place in the Kabylie region of the country in the spring and summer of 2001. However, the Government has

continued to restrict freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and movement in varying degrees. The government also places some restrictions on freedom of religion and these have been investigated by international agencies including ICRC.

Armed groups have committed numerous serious abuses and killed hundreds of civilians, including infants. However there was a significant decrease in such violence in 2001 compared with 2000. Armed terrorists have continued their widespread campaign of insurgency, targeting government officials, families of security-force members, and civilians. The killing of civilians has often been the result of rivalry between terrorist groups and attempts to facilitate the theft of goods needed by the armed groups. Violence by terrorist groups is also used to extort money.

Armed groups have left small bombs in cars, cafes, and markets, which killed and maimed indiscriminately. Some killings, including massacres, also were attributed to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. Press reports estimated that approximately 1,980 civilians, terrorists, and security force members died during 2001 alone in the ongoing domestic turmoil. The violence appears to have occurred primarily in the countryside, as the security forces largely forced the insurgents out of the cities. There have been numerous instances in which armed groups kidnapped women and girls, raped them, and forced them into servitude.

After his 1999 election, President Bouteflika stated that a total of about 100,000 persons had been killed during the previous 8 years in acts of political violence involving both armed Islamists and the security forces.

In summary, Algeria has descended steadily into a state of chaos since the assassination of President Boudiaf in 1992. A military regime that lacked legitimacy has battled ferociously against radical Islamists who had taken up arms. Both sides committed atrocities against civilians who were caught up in the middle. To date the position of western powers has been one of ambivalence although some in the legal Algerian opposition, such as Hocine Ait Ahmed (leader of the Socialist Forces Front), have repeatedly called for Western pressure to force a democratic solution. As at December 2002, both Europe and the United States have been disinclined to heed such calls. This has been for two main reasons: firstly, and as explained above, Algeria provides a large proportion of the natural gas consumed by Europe and it has benefited from the protection of France, the formal colonial power, whenever its human rights record is questioned. In essence Europe has been maintaining a "blind eye" on Algeria. Secondly, Algeria's senior generals have managed to remain the real powerbrokers behind a façade of apparently respectable institutions created via carefully controlled elections. It was they who installed the current president (Bouteflika).

The President offered an amnesty to Islamic militants who offered to lay down their arms. The amnesty was eventually accepted by the armed wing of the FIS, but significantly, the offer was rejected by two militant groups. The Salafist Group for Predication and Combat (GSPC) is led by Hassan Hattab and operates mainly in eastern Algeria. It tends to focus on military targets and is not believed to be implicated in the killing of civilians. The second faction to reject the offer is the armed Islamic Group of GIA, a shadowy group accused of most of the atrocities against civilians.

Controversial parliamentary elections were held in late May 2002 and the ruling party of Prime Minister Ali Benflis won a clear victory. The National Liberation front won a majority of seat in the 389 seat National People's Assembly. The party, one of 23

participating in the election, won 199 seats. Two leading opposition parties, the Socialist Forces Front and the Rally for Culture and Democracy, called for a boycott of the vote declaring that they suspected fraud. Only 47% of the electorate voted, the lowest level of participation since 1962. The apathy is deemed to stem from a combination of economic malaise and the ongoing Islamic Insurgency.

In late November 2002 reports were received that Algerian security forces had killed a Yemeni man who is thought to be a member of al-Qaeda. He was reported to be Emad Abdelwahid Ahmed Alwan who was allegedly al-Qaeda's top official in North Africa. He had been killed in September in an ambush in Batna province. This is the first time that Algeria has admitted an al-Qaeda presence in the country and it is reported that this official had been liaising with the SGPC Islamic insurgent group. SGPC is on the United States list of terrorist organisations.

In December 2002 the US Assistant Secretary of State, Mr William Burns, visited Algeria and announced that the US was drafting a proposal to Congress on increasing military aid to assist Algeria's counter-terrorism capability. This is something of a watershed in US/Algerian relations in which the US has grappled with balancing the fight against terrorism and real concerns over democracy in Algeria.

Algeria is poised to accelerate down a spiral of chaos with the momentum being generated by an amalgam of economic stagnation, disregard for the rule of law and the relentless level of killings by both the security forces and the Islamic Insurgents.

FUTURE HISTORY

The unrest that was precipitated by the elections in May 2002 continued to simmer into 2003. Algerian Security forces appeared impotent under the increased threat by radical Islamic groups and gross abuses of human rights continued including a series of extra-judicial killings in the eastern *wilayas* of Batna, Constantine and Annaba. These attracted international condemnation and served as prime indicators that the rule of law was on the verge of evaporating. US interest in Algeria continued to develop but within the context of global anti-terrorism measures rather than a specific Algerian context. Following the atrocities in the eastern *wilayas* by the Algerian Security forces, the US faced a difficult dilemma. They were perceived by European countries to be granting aid to a discredited government and to security forces who operated outside the law. On the other hand, the link of the SGPC to al-Qaeda placed a strategic imperative on deterring any further global terrorist presence within Algeria.

European engagement in Algeria continued to be lukewarm in early 2003 and the deteriorating situation attracted little attention in the press. European attention was focused on the Middle east rather than the Magreb which was not perceived to threaten the vital interests of Europe. This view changed dramatically in June 2003 when terrorists attacked the heart of the Algerian economy – the hydrocarbons sector. 5 of the 10 LNG ships were destroyed in a coordinated attack which also included damage to both LNG and oil pipelines. The government introduced draconian security measures which including curfews in eight of the eastern *wilayas*. Security of the oil and LNG infrastructure was increased but with over 7000 kms of pipeline in the country, this was a hopeless task and attacks continued. What

little confidence there was in the economy began to ebb and when a series of banks were rumoured to be in difficulty there were riots in Algiers as the middle classes attempted to withdraw their savings.

The threat to oil and gas supplies affected France more than any other European country and she began to press for international action to stabilise the situation in Algeria. Suddenly the country became a focus of western interest and the French and US interests began to converge. Both agreed that the vital interests of Europe were threatened by an Algeria that was spiraling out of control, that a descent into chaos and lawlessness would provide a breeding ground for global terrorism and that the abuse of human rights within Algeria was unacceptable. It was this latter factor, the sudden global exposure of appalling atrocities on both sides, that provided the final catalyst for concerted international action under the aegis of the United Nations. There was an extraordinary degree of unanimity within the P5 of the Security Council as both Russia and China felt that their interests were threatened. (In 2002 Algeria awarded a Chinese petroleum company a major contract for the exploitation of a new oil field.)

Following a debate in the UNSC it was agreed that a Peacekeeping operation would not be appropriate as there was no peace to be kept and that the consent of the various parties to the conflict would not be initially forthcoming. Accordingly, France proposed that a Peace Enforcement operation, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, be considered and that NATO, under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, be given the responsibility for the mission as an appropriate regional organisation. This proposal was endorsed by all members of the P5; Russia wished to be involved in the mission and China agreed on the understanding that she could attach observers to the force. It was agreed that a solution could flow from new UN-observed elections and that an interim regime under a SRSF could be acceptable to both parties.

NATO already enjoyed a mature doctrine for Peace Support Operations in which the subtle nuances of Peace Enforcement were well articulated within AJP-3.4.1. The key extracts affecting any NATO approach to the Algerian problem were deemed to be as follows:

*“0217. **Peace Enforcement.** PE operations normally take place under the principles of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all Parties to the conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate. In the conduct of PE, the link between military and political objectives must be extremely close. It is important to emphasise that the aim of the PE operation will not be the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to compel, coerce and persuade the parties to comply with a particular course of action. The provision of adequate military forces to establish a coercive combat capability is critical to any decision to deploy Alliance forces on a PSO.*

*0218. **Conduct.** The long term demands of peace require that coercive techniques be used with restraint and in conjunction with other techniques designed to promote co-operation and consent, and persuade the parties and local population to commit themselves to the peace building process. The approach that the PSF intends to adopt should be communicated clearly and*

by every means practical to the parties in conflict in order to persuade them to comply with the mandate, desist from the use of force and revert to peaceful means to achieve their objectives. Therefore, a PE force must be organised, equipped, trained and deployed to enforce compliance whilst also supporting the longer-term peace building process. In the case of PK, a PSF should utilise all other techniques available, other than the proactive use of force, to gain and maintain the initiative. Those techniques are generally defined in terms of consent promotion or more traditionally as ‘hearts and minds’ techniques.

0219. The Selection of Peace Support Force Profile.

a. Assessment. In determining whether a mission should be undertaken as a PK or a PE operation, a thorough estimate should be made of the operational conditions. This should include the likely level of compliance of the parties in conflict based on their attitudes both to each other and to any peace process. If a peace process has been agreed by the parties in conflict and it is considered that there is a genuine will and intention to abide by that process, a PK force only capable of using force in self-defence may be adequate. If the parties are disinclined to agree on a peace process, or to respect a peace agreement once negotiated, then a combat capable PE force will be needed to ensure compliance with the operation’s mandate.”¹¹

In the Algerian case it was agreed that Peace Enforcement was the most appropriate course of action but within a clearly articulated strategic design for the future of Algeria. It was also accepted that if compliance of the parties could be achieved in the coastal *wilayas* north of the Atlas Mountains, then the rest of the country in the Saharan region would follow. It was likely that centres of gravity lay in the population centres rather than the desert wastes. This highlights the probable focus on urban areas and the requirement for troops specifically trained for such operations.

The Algerian Security Forces constituted a real challenge. Commanded by a collection of maverick and independent generals, they represented a real threat and their coercion and persuasion, rather than confrontation, provided the key to success.

The situation in Algeria has also alarmed neighboring countries, notably Tunisia, Libya and Morocco. Tunisia is threatening to close the border with Algeria in order to stem the tide of refugees in the coastal region. Libya overtly supports the Islamic SGPC and threatens to provide direct military aid to that faction. The Libyan profile offers the requirement to consider Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). The Moroccan concerns mirror those of Tunisia and border closure to avoid “spillover” is a real possibility.

Thus on 22 July 2003 the UNSC under UNSCR 7777 endorsed a mandate for a Military Peace Enforcement Mission as follows:

The UN, under UNSCR 7777 has authorised a NATO-led mission to compel, coerce and persuade the parties to the conflict in Algeria to cease all acts of

¹¹ AJP 3.4.1 Peace Support Operations

violence, to act within the law, to demonstrate respect for human rights in order to foster the conditions for a return to stable and proper government under which the economy might flourish. In addition the force should deter any external intervention, provide security for specified humanitarian relief agencies and assist in the provision of essential services. This infers the support for a transitional authority.

APPLICATION OF THE ESTIMATE PROCESS (NATO AJP-01(A))

MISSION ANALYSIS

- Mission. To conduct a Peace Enforcement Operation in Algeria to compel the parties to the conflict to cease acts of violence, to deter external interference, support specified humanitarian relief efforts in order to foster the conditions for a return to stable and proper government.
- Higher Commander's Intent. The higher commander is represented by SACEUR, who is acting on the instruction and mandate of the UN Security Council. The decision to mount a PE operation has been precipitated by events that threaten both Algeria itself and the security of Europe. The degree of unanimity within the UNSC is unusual and indicates the depth of global support for the mission. That said, although the UNSC does include an Arab nation, any operation in Algeria will need to include a diplomatic offensive in order to secure the support of responsible Arab nations. Libya remains a potential maverick and Egypt will be a key influence on the Libyan stance. The conduct of a NATO operation in North Africa, in a country in which consent is not yet present, is a challenge of extraordinary proportions. The credibility of both the UN and NATO are at stake. The requirement is for a "NATO-led" operation which implies that there is scope for including non-NATO contingents within the force. The situation in Algeria is grave and the risk of "meltdown" has led to the UNSC decision. It follows that time is of the essence and that deployment should take place as soon as possible.

The key element within the mission is that of compulsion; it is this that sets the mission apart from a PKO and demands a force profile that can be adjusted for warfighting. The intent, as in any other sort of PSO, is to blend the military line of activity with others including the diplomatic and humanitarian. The military line is likely to dictate the tempo during the early phases. NATO has been selected because, as a regional organisation, it offers the UN a tailor-made structure for mounting the operation. The strategic considerations indicate that this mission will be measured in years rather than months for its purpose is to foster conditions for a return to proper government and a vibrant economy. This can only be achieved over time with a demonstrable degree of stability. It follows that an initial PE operation will have to transition into a "Chapter VI" PKO once conditions allow; it is this aspect of the mission that will enjoy a long duration. The quicker that PE is achieved the easier will be the transition, thus there is a requirement to

overwhelm the various parties in the initial stages. PE is a high-risk venture and one that requires unity of effort, a very appropriate force mix and highly trained troops. The fact that this is a non-Article 5 mission for which contributors may volunteer forces will complicate the planning process.

- Constraints. Time is the main constraint. The decision to mount a PE operation has been taken to prevent Algeria sliding further into chaos. The risk of this happening increases with time and points towards the utility of existing NATO high-readiness forces. The attitudes of adjacent Arab states also represents a major constraint as their acquiescence is vital; this points to early diplomatic initiatives with Morocco and Libya in particular and the Arab world in general. The centre of gravity is likely to be Algiers, an urban environment unlike any western model. It would be tempting to use French troops in this environment but the history of Algeria might preclude this. The sensitivities governing the use of French troops represents a major constraint and points to the importance of absorbing Arab troop contributors such as Egypt within the force. In summary, the need to deploy an appropriate force in a timely manner constitutes the main constraint. The complexity of the mission is likely to increase in direct proportion to the time that passes before deployment.
- Military Strategic Direction. Military Strategic Direction stems from the NAC and from National Governments including those of contributing nations. The national “string” threatens to undermine unity of effort as this is a mission that requires taut military direction rather than by committee. This again points towards the utility of existing high-readiness forces that enjoy a tested command relationship with SHAPE rather than an ad-hoc force which would take time to establish. There is a diplomatic imperative to minimise national involvement in military minutiae once the force has been deployed. Though there is a strong element of compulsion within the mission NATO forces will be directed to remain impartial and not to take sides in order to win the support and consent of both parties. Only by so-doing will a transition to PK be possible. Hence force will be directed to avoid conflict where possible but to respond with force when appropriate but within the terms of legally-admissible ROE.
- Objectives. The strategic end state is the regeneration of a vibrant economy in Algeria under a stable and proper government that shows a real respect for human rights. It follows that the operational level objective should provide the gearing between the attainment of strategic success and the tactical level. The Operational level objective is therefore to obtain the compliance of both parties to the UN-endorsed design, through a delicate blend of compulsion, coercion and persuasion, to generate consent and thus enable a transition from PK to PE in order to achieve strategic success. Hence the operational objective is limited and will require seamless links with those involved in other lines of operation. The military objectives for the force will include:
 - > Rapid and simultaneous deployment in order to overwhelm, confuse, and deter opposition.

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- > Provide a secure environment by establishing military dominance of the force.
 - > Deter, and if necessary, prevent external interference with the mission.
 - > Assist in the provision of essential services.
 - > Gain the consent of the parties to the conflict.
 - > Transition from PE to PK as soon as possible.
 - Specified Tasks.
 - > Compel, coerce and persuade the parties to the conflict to cease all acts of violence.
 - > Ensure that all parties act within the law.
 - > Engender respect for human rights.
 - > Deter external interference.
 - > Support specified relief efforts.
 - Implied Tasks.
 - > Secure Operating Bases.
 - > Dominate centres of gravity (urban areas).
 - > Win the support of the people.
 - > Obtain HNS.
 - > Plan a transition to PK.
 - Priorities. The priority is the timely and simultaneous deployment of the force throughout the country in order to overwhelm potential opposition. The second priority is to create the conditions for a transition to PK as soon as possible. Prolonged confrontation and conflict risks the entrenchment and alienation of the parties that, in turn, will lengthen the PE mission. This risks an acrimonious “stalemate” in from which an honourable extraction will be difficult. PE operations will need to be directed with subtle cleverness and an indirect approach by a commander who is experienced in this field.
 - Mission Statement. To conduct a Peace Enforcement Operation in Algeria to compel the parties to the conflict to cease acts of violence, to deter external interference, support specified humanitarian relief efforts in order to foster the conditions for a return to stable and proper government.

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Geo-strategic context

- > The proposed NATO-led operation is most unusual and, although adjacent to the southern flanks, Algeria represents an Islamic nation more aligned to the Middle east than to Europe. The notion of a predominantly Christian alliance deploying into Algeria is potentially inflammatory.
- > The French connection with Algeria is a complicating factor that might preclude France from certain roles. PSO are all about obtaining consent and are based on perceptions of impartiality. The likelihood of France being viewed as impartial within Algeria is remote. The fact that the French Army is one of the best in Europe for PSO tends to exacerbate this dilemma.
- > The involvement of Russia and China in the operation may be an advantage; both nations have a stake in the Algerian economy and this increases the chances of unanimity within the UNSC. The Russian connection to NATO may also serve to “lock” her into the venture.
- > The posture of the USA is more opaque. Clearly it was the al Qaeda connection that was the catalyst for sudden US interest in the country and hence US interests tend to be linked to the battle against global terrorism rather than any altruistic ideals for Algeria. The US stance in relation to SGPC may undermine perceptions of impartiality, particularly within the more fundamental elements.
- > The gross abuse of human rights to date may provide the ethical “glue” for the operation and thus the improvement to the quality of life of the average Algerian might be a profitable “main effort.”
- > Libya and Morocco are poised to interfere and meddle with the mission. Though Morocco is traditionally amenable to diplomatic initiatives, Libya remains an unpredictable maverick and will merit much effort. The chances of Morocco and Libya intervening increase with time.
- > Algeria is a very large country and the situation requires a nation-wide deployment albeit mainly north of the Atlas Mountains.
- > Key deductions include:
 1. Religious and cultural sensitivities preclude deployment of a mainly Christian force. Turkey might be invited to be a major force contributor and to assume command at certain significant levels. Other Muslim nations such as Egypt should be invited to participate, even in the smallest manner.

2. France should not take a dominant role in the ground force element of the PE operation although there is scope for major French involvement in the Maritime and Air dimensions.
 3. Russia and China should participate within the operation to the optimum degree in order to indicate a unanimous transparency and unity of effort within the UNSC.
 4. The success of the operation will inevitably hinge on extensive US participation. In theatre command, however, might be better exercised by an existing High Readiness formation (ARRC?) than by a US HQ.
 5. The Human Rights situation should be exposed in the global media to the optimum degree in order to foster acceptance and support for the mission.
 6. Libya will require to be deterred from interference; this does not require impartiality and might be carried out by France and the USA. Morocco is less of a threat and should succumb to diplomatic pressure.
 7. Time is of the essence. Deployment should occur as soon as possible. This again points to the use of an existing High-Readiness formation.
 8. A piecemeal deployment would be inappropriate and fraught with risk. A very large and simultaneous deployment will be necessary – by sea and air. The situation of most of the population on the littoral facilitates a maritime deployment – from Spain, France and Italy. It follows that these countries might lead the maritime contribution.
- Opposition Situation Analysis
 - > Algerian armed forces have been discredited and the leadership is deemed to be corrupt. They pose the most potent threat to the operation but are still a “party to the conflict” rather than an “enemy.” Any attrition of the Algerian Armed Forces will serve to entrench their position, whereas clever coercion may ensure their support. The manner in which these forces are isolated and rendered impotent constitutes a critical element within the campaign.
 - > The Islamic groups are an equal challenge but probably more vulnerable to an indirect rather than direct approach. They are likely to be receptive to incentives and any approach will need to be culturally appropriate.

- > The threat to the Force is more asymmetric than symmetric and thus the force protection measures perhaps be more akin to Counter Insurgency (COIN) than conventional PSO.
- > The use of propaganda by opposition elements will be inevitable and will need to be countered. Both sides might benefit from a perception of “meltdown” and lawlessness indicating the impotence of the NATO force.
- > The two parties to the conflict currently hold the initiative. The NATO force will need to seize and retain it.
- > Opposition COA include:
 1. Attacks on each other.
 2. Attacks on the force.
 3. Mining and disruption of key routes.
 4. Attacks on Key Points (KP) and Vital Points (VP).
 5. The employment of extreme violence on the civil population.
 6. Attempts to embarrass and humiliate NATO and UN.
- > Key deductions include:
 1. The need avoid unnecessary alienation of the parties.
 2. The scope for Special Operations.
 3. The requirement for Force Protection.
 4. The need for imaginative and proactive Information Operations.
 5. The necessity for bold and decisive operations at the outset.
- Friendly Situation Analysis
 - > Wide array of NATO forces at disposal but only limited elements available at high readiness.
 - > Regional expertise lies with US and France.
 - > Turkey represents a significant potential force contributor due to the number of forces at her disposal and the fact that she is a Muslim country.

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- > Algeria is on the North African littoral and thus the maritime dimension is significant. There is considerable scope for amphibious landings in order to surprise and outflank the parties to the conflict. Spain, France and Italy are key players within the maritime dimension.
 - > Intelligence on the situation is good but the scope for insertion of European/US special forces into the urban areas is limited. Turks and even Egyptians would blend more easily.
 - > The logistic infrastructure in Algeria is good and there are developed port facilities. Logistic support for this operation should not present any great difficulty due to the proximity of the AO to Europe.
 - > Once FOB's are secured, it should not be necessary to use HNS within neighbouring countries.
 - > COA include:
 1. A concurrent maritime and air-mounted operation to gain control of Algiers and of key cities and ports within the coastal region.
 2. An exclusively maritime/amphibious deployment from southern Europe, establishing secure "beach-heads" from which to break out.
 3. An air-mounted operation with all its associated advantages of speed and surprise.
 4. A limited operation into the Algiers area on the assumption that the capital represents the centre of gravity and that once Algiers is controlled, the rest of the country will follow.
 - Restrictions Analysis
 - > Legitimacy of the operation stems from International Law and the UN.
 - > ROE will need to be crafted and promulgated to reflect the Mandate.
 - > Access to Algeria is restricted to via the coast or direct by air from Southern Europe. Overflight rights present no problems.
 - > International support for the operations remains dependent upon international legitimacy and tangible evidence of success. A stalemate in which there is an unacceptable level of violence is likely to erode international support quickly.
 - > The mission could involve war-fighting and the force will need to be postured for such an eventuality. Warfighting is best carried out by national contingents rather than by a multi-national mix at the tactical

level. This points to the deployment of national divisions within a multi-national Corps or number of Corps.

- Comparison and Selection of Course of Action

- > An exclusively maritime deployment, although convenient and tempting, will lack the tempo and surprise necessary for this operation. Similarly, an air operation will lack the weight of effort that may be required. The solution lies in a mix. Surprise and unpredictability should be the hallmarks of the early stages and both strategic and tactical deception measures will be essential. *Operation Just Cause* provides a possible model for this operation as it was one in which the initiative was retained throughout by the US Forces. Therefore COA 1 is selected as it provides the greatest scope for flexibility and surprise as well as enabling a very rapid build up of forces in theatre.

DECISION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- Commander's Intent. To conduct a rapid and synchronised deployment throughout the northern plain of Algeria in order to disrupt, deter and overwhelm both the Algerian Armed Forces and the Islamic groups as a precursor to compelling both to support the new interim regime. There are firm indications that support for the UN plan is widespread throughout both parties to the conflict but that it is being resisted by a number of key Generals and faction leaders. Thus the situation is delicate and the challenge is to win the support of the parties without undue violence or attrition. The aim of the PE operation is to gain consent through overwhelming strength and initiative.

The operation will hinge on Algiers which constitutes the main effort and thus it will be an amalgam of an air-delivered operation to seize and hold Key Points and to isolate the parties together with follow-up operations by sea. Speed is of the essence and the force should make an initial entry within 30 days of ACTORD, seizing Key Points (KP's) and securing entry ports and airfields. The maritime element of the force should follow up immediately so that there is a seamless transition from one to the other. These early stages of the operation are designed to compel all components of the Algerian Armed Forces to comply through overwhelming strength and pressure. Psychological Operations will play a key part in the conditioning of the parties to the conflict so that they show little or no resistance.

Force will be met with force but ROE will be crafted to prevent unprovoked aggression by the UN/NATO force. The force will expand to every *wilaya* in Algeria so that the force demonstrates respect for existing local government structures. In summary there will be five distinct but seamless phases to the operation:

1. Phase 1 – Preparatory Operations.

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2. Phase 2 – Rapid Deployment to seize Centres of Gravity.
 3. Phase 3 – Full Deployment and consolidation.
 4. Phase 4 – Peace Enforcement.
 5. Phase 5 – Transition to Peacekeeping
- Phase 1 – Preparatory Operations
 - > Intent. The intent for this phase is to evaluate the crisis, select the appropriate military response and to generate the force for the operation. This phase begins with the issue of a NAC Initiating Directive to the SC reflecting the strategic direction from the UNSC and mandate. Early fact-finding and reconnaissance support, including the provision of satellite imagery, will be required and will continue throughout the operation. The blending of military effort with diplomatic initiatives will be vital throughout this phase together with setting the scene for both strategic and tactical deception. The phase includes all aspects of force generation and preparation for deployment. It will also include the generation of special, psychological and information operations. This phase will be complete once air-deployment of the main force has started.
 - > Objectives. Objectives of these preparatory operations will be:
 1. Analysis and evaluation of the mission.
 2. Planning of the operations.
 3. Co-ordination and liaison with other contributors.
 4. Initiation of Information Operations.
 5. Preservation of Security and Surprise.
 6. Foster International support
 - > Tasks. These will include:
 1. Develop plans (operational, deployment and supporting).
 2. Establish the C2 structure.
 3. Articulate CCIR.
 4. Agree and promulgate ROE.
 5. Collect initial intelligence.
 6. Establish operational liaison.

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7. Conduct Information Operations.
 8. Initiate Psychological Operations.
 9. Initiate Special Operations,
 10. Poise the force
- Phase 2 – Rapid Deployment to seize centres of gravity
 - > Intent. The intent of this force is to outwit, out-manoeuvre, out-flank and out-think the parties to the conflict in order to seize the initiative in theatre through the application of the potential to deliver extraordinary violence at extraordinary speed. The phase is designed to neutralise both parties to the conflict by a combination of tempo, overwhelming force and deterrence. The intent therefore is not only to establish the force in theatre but to generate strategic effect through operational manoeuvre. Phase 2 is the pivotal phase of the mission; success will breed more success whereas failure will lead to drift, prolonged attrition and more failure.

Phase 2 is about initiative, speed and risk-taking in order to compel the compliance of the parties with the minimum violence. It requires unity of effort, taut command and a manoeuvrist rather than attritional approach. After deployment has been directed by the strategic authority (UN), the Operational Commander will order the deployment of air and naval forces in tandem rather than in sequence. The force will gain access to the theatre of operations, seize key ports, cities and KP's before triggering the follow-on deployment of the remainder of the force by sea. Phase 2 will also include a major deception element – perhaps an amphibious landing east of Algiers in order to draw the Algerian Armed Forces. Phase 2 will focus on Algiers and key ports and airfields whereas Phase 3 will reflect a nationwide deployment. Success depends on the maxim “clout don't dribble!” – the simultaneous and not consecutive application of overwhelming force in every dimension.
 - > Objectives. Objectives for this pivotal phase will be:
 1. Domination of Algiers and KP's.
 2. Coercion of Algerian Armed Forces.
 3. Deter incidents that might interfere with the mission.
 4. Ensure the safe and timely arrival of forces.
 5. Guarantee freedom of movement.
 6. Provide force security and protection.

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7. Secure operating bases.
 8. Exercise effective C2.
 9. Establish early liaison with parties to the conflict.
 10. Sustain Information and Psychological operations.
- > Tasks. These will include:
1. Gain control of entry points.
 2. Liaise early with parties to the conflict.
 3. Establish security of LOC's between entry points.
 4. Seize and hold KPs including ports, airfields, oil installations, broadcast stations and government buildings.
 5. Isolate and quarantine Algerian Armed Forces.
 6. Transport forces to theatre.
 7. Provide extended air defence.
 8. Protect the force from asymmetric attack.
 9. Establish secure operating bases.
 10. Support the force.
- Phase 3 – Full Deployment and Consolidation
 - > Intent. There should be a seamless transition from Phase 2 to 3. In operational terms, they are one and the same. The hall mark of Phase 3 is that it is delivered by sea and aimed to consolidate deployment throughout Algeria but predominantly in the coastal plain. From an observer's perspective, there should be no discernible gap between the 2 phases. The balance of the force will be delivered via a minimum of 4 sea ports of entry in order to follow up the air delivered elements in Phase 1. It is likely that each entry point will cater for at least one national Division. Some limited elements will be deployed further to the Saharan region – south of the Atlas Region. As in Phase 1, all force elements will be configured for warfighting rather than PKO in order to demonstrate the ability to compel the parties to the conflict to comply with the UN design. It must be assumed that some fighting will take place in both phases. Forces will be configured for urban operations in particular.
 - > Objectives. Objectives of this phase will be:

1. Establish control of designated areas nation-wide.
 2. Establish a very conspicuous and visible presence.
 3. Protect the Force.
 4. Expand liaison network with parties to the conflict.
 5. Guarantee freedom of movement.
 6. Conform with local government (*wilaya*) boundaries.
 7. Deter external and internal interference with the mission.
- > Tasks. These will include:
1. Deploy throughout the country.
 2. Provide extended air defence.
 3. Secure LOC.
 4. Establish logistic bases.
 5. Establish effective C2 throughout the theatre.
 6. Seize and hold KP's and government centres in all *wilayas*.
 7. Maintain intelligence collection.
 8. Establish liaison with relief agencies.
 9. Conduct aggressive Psychological operations
- Phase 4 – Peace Enforcement.
- > Intent. Phase 4 represents the core of the mission in which the parties to the conflict are compelled to conform with the UN-endorsed design. The parties will have no option and hence tactics will reflect a blend of compulsion, coercion and persuasion. It will be necessary to overwhelm and out-think the parties in all environments. It will be necessary to blockade naval ports thus preventing the Algerian navy from operating in the littoral at all. The air force will be grounded and warned that any aircraft in the air will be destroyed. Similarly, the army will be confined to barracks. There will be no attempt to destroy military infrastructure as that would serve to alienate the Algerian Armed Forces. Similarly, the Islamic groups will be confined to precise areas the safety of which will be guaranteed by NATO forces. Thus the quarantine of all parties will lay the foundation for liaison,

conciliation and partnership leading to their support for new elections and the PKO that will precede that process.

> Objectives. Objectives of this phase will be:

1. Prevent the parties to the conflict from deployment and operation.
2. Attack and compel those who do not conform.
3. Facilitate the arrival of the interim regime.
4. Dominate centres of population.
5. Uphold the law.
6. Win the support of the people.

> Tasks. These will include:

1. Escort all Algerian Navy Ships back to port.
2. Confine Algerian navy to ports.
3. Dominate Algerian airspace.
4. Confine the Algerian Army to Barracks.
5. Secure safe areas for Islamic groups.
6. Deploy liaison teams to all parties.
7. Commence limited joint operations with parties.
8. Protect the force.
9. Sustain information Operations.
10. Expand Psychological Operations.
11. Support relief agencies.

- Phase 5 – Transition to Peacekeeping

> Intent. Peace Enforcement (PE) is not an end in itself. The strategic design for Algeria is one in which proper government is restored and in which the economy flourishes. PE involves the selective application of violence and will inevitably result in tensions, loss of life and disruption to normality. Nevertheless it should lay the foundations for stability – a stability that can only be sustained by

some form of PKO. The transition to a situation in which the parties support the interim regime and the holding of fair elections will be a slow one requiring a reduction in tension, a return of public confidence and respect for the law. This will only be achieved via a PKO along the Chapter VI model and the sooner the operation transitions to PK from PE, the better. This should be accomplished as soon as possible following full deployment and will require a dramatic reconfiguration of the force.

> Objectives. Objectives of this phase will be:

1. Empower and involve the parties to the former conflict.
2. Obtain universal consent.
3. Confine NATO heavy weapons to reserve locations.
4. Permit joint operations with Algerian Armed Forces.
5. Withdraw a portion of the force.
6. Support provision of incentives to *wilayas* with fewest human rights abuses.
7. Support Humanitarian relief agencies.

> Tasks. These will include:

1. Redeploy the force.
2. Withdraw heavy elements.
3. Reinforce with light elements.
4. Maintain strong reserves.
5. Provide support for local population.
6. Separate parties to the conflict.
7. Monitor sensitive interfaces.
8. Facilitate and protect the election process.
9. Plan the withdrawal of the force.

MISSION TASK ANALYSIS

MANDATE FOR THE MISSION

The UN, under UNSCR 7777, has authorised a NATO-led mission to compel, coerce and persuade the parties to the conflict in Algeria to cease all acts of violence, to act within the law, to demonstrate respect for human rights in order to foster the conditions for a return to stable and proper government under which the economy might flourish. In addition, the force should deter any external intervention, provide security for specified humanitarian relief agencies and assist in the provision of essential services.

MISSION ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS (MEC)

The MEC are mission components that need to be achieved for the successful completion of the mission. (They are not time dependent, nor dependent on a course of action.)

- Compel, coerce and persuade the parties to the conflict to conform to the UN mandate.
- Generate consent for a transition to PK.
- Deter external intervention.
- Provide a secure environment through military dominance.
- Provide security for relief agencies
- Project, Protect, and Sustain the force

RISKS TO THE MISSION

Risks to the mission include:

- Erosion of alliance cohesion.
- Failure to gain and maintain consent.
- Asymmetric attack on NATO assets and infrastructure

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES (OO)

Operational Objectives are the operational descriptions of the requirements or high level courses of action. They may support more than one MEC and they also introduce temporal considerations relating to or leading to the defined phases of the operation. The 9 OO are derived from a systematic analysis of the scenario within the context of a clearly articulated strategic design and following the NATO Estimate Process (AJP-01(A)). The OO are as follows:

- Plan the Operation.
- Exercise effective C2.
- Dominate the operational area,
- Conduct enabling operations.
- Gain consent of parties.
- Support essential humanitarian initiatives.
- Co-ordinate with others.
- Conduct an information campaign.
- Support the force

The applicability of the OO across each Phase (as defined in the foregoing section) is shown in the tabular spreadsheet at Annex A. The table lists operational objectives (OO), operational specifications (OOS), and key tasks (KT). The relationships between the MEC and the OO are given in Table 1, where the large XX represents a primary, and the small x a secondary linkage. Logically, the OO follow from the MEC, but because of the many-to-one relationship, the MEC and the OO were separately derived, cross-validated and then linked.

THE WAY AHEAD

This illustrative scenario is currently one of a set of 5 developed by SCS Ltd. Not surprisingly the techniques and linkages have been refined over the course of the process and, given time and resources, the earlier scenarios could now be revisited and refined. All parties involved are now confident that the mechanism described does provide a solid intellectual bridge between the techniques and tools used by both the analyst and military planner.

There are a number of options and opportunities for the future and the first concerns the Mission Task Analysis Tool (MTAT) that has been developed in tandem with this project. Already two scenarios have been uplifted on to the tool which now provides a user-friendly vehicle by which to confirm the links, factors and deductions within the tool and to prove the

validity or otherwise of the analytical categories of MEC, OO, OOS and KT. In short it provides a device with which to “audit” the intellectual value of each categories and to probe the origin or provenance of deductions. It exposes errors and allows the user to identify the links and to revise analytical deductions where no plausible link can be shown. It is naturally assumed that the “Right Hand Side” of the tool, the analytical deductions, should be subordinate to the “Left Hand Side,” the description and analysis of the strategic and operational pictures.

<u>MEC</u>	Compel, Coerce & Persuade	Generate consent	Deter Intervention	Provide security	Protect relief agencies	Project, Protect, Sustain
<u>OO</u>						
Plan the operation	x			x		XX
Exercise command and control			x	x		x
Dominate operational area	XX	x	XX	x		x
Conduct enabling operations			x	x		XX
Gain consent of parties	x	XX		x		
Support humanitarian operations		x		x	XX	
Co-ordinate with others	XX	x	x		x	
Conduct Info campaign	XX	x	x			
Support the force	x				x	XX

Table 1: The relationship between mission essential components (MEC) and operational objectives (OO).

As for the application of such a tool – perhaps the next phase might be to “game” a scenario in order to prove its utility or to test such a device in staff colleges where the techniques of high-level mission analysis are taught. The value of the whole process has been to bring the analyst and military perspectives together within a corporate endeavour and to identify and resolve areas of potential friction. That value has already been fully realised. Any lacuna has been well and truly bridged.

ANNEX A: OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES, SPECIFICATIONS, AND KEY TASKS

OO	Op. Objective	OOS	Op. Objective Spec.	KT	Key Task Name
1	Plan the operation	1.1	Establish C2 structure	1.1.1	Establish the C2 structure
		1.2	Collect initial intelligence	1.2.1	Collect initial intelligence
		1.3	Develop plans	1.3.1	Develop the operational plan

				1.3.2	Develop the deployment plan
				1.3.3	Develop supporting plans
2	Exercise C2	2.1	Provide headquarters	2.1.1	Provide headquarters
		2.2	Maintain intelligence collection	2.2.1	Maintain intelligence collection
		2.3	Execute plans	2.3.1	Execute the operational plan
				2.3.2	Execute deployment plan
				2.3.3	Execute supporting plans
3	Dominate the op area	3.1	Establish force presence	3.1.1	Establish a conspicuous and visible presence
		3.2	Maintain force presence	3.2.1	Maintain a conspicuous and visible presence
		3.3	Establish control of areas	3.3.1	Establish control of designated borders
				3.3.2	Establish control of zones of separation
				3.3.3	Establish control of designated urban areas
				3.3.4	Establish control of designated rural areas
		3.4	Maintain control of areas	3.4.1	Maintain control of designated borders
				3.4.2	Maintain control of zones of separation
				3.4.3	Maintain control of designated urban areas
				3.4.4	Maintain control of designated rural areas
		3.5	Deter incidents / interference	3.5.1	Provide a deterrent force for internal threats
				3.5.2	Provide a deterrent force for external threats
				3.5.3	Conduct show of force operations
4	Conduct enabling ops	4.1	Ensure safe and timely arrival	4.1.1	Transport forces to theatre
				4.1.2	Gain control of theatre reception / transit centres
				4.1.3	Extend theatre reception / transit centre capacities
				4.1.4	Operate theatre reception / transit centres
				4.1.5	Ensure security of theatre reception / transit centres
		4.2	Extend control for follow-on forces	4.2.1	Extend control for the build-up of follow-on forces
				4.2.2	Extend presence for the build-up of follow-on forces
		4.3	Ensure freedom of movement	4.3.1	Establish secure routes for own force use
				4.3.2	Monitor routes for own force use
				4.3.3	Maintain secure routes for own force use
		4.4	Protect vital assets	4.4.1	Monitor assets vital to the Alliance
				4.4.2	Protect assets vital to the Alliance
		4.5	Provide force protection	4.5.1	Provide extended air defence
				4.5.2	Protect the force from terrorist threats
				4.5.3	Provide protection of operational forces
				4.5.4	Provide basic force security
		4.6	Provide bases to support ops	4.6.1	Establish bases
				4.6.2	Extend base capacities
				4.6.3	Maintain bases
5	Gain consent	5.1	Demonstrate impartiality	5.1.1	Establish liaison with parties
				5.1.2	Support demobilisation operations
				5.1.3	Support the development of a competent civil

					authority
		5.2	Support war recovery operations	5.2.1	Support DPRE operations
				5.2.2	Support the reconstruction of infrastructure
				5.2.3	Support humanitarian de-mining operations
				5.2.4	Support operations with respect to war criminals
		5.3	Support stabilising operations	5.3.1	Support restructuring of the military
				5.3.2	Support restructuring of civilian security agencies
				5.3.3	Support societal rehabilitation activities
6	Support essential HA	6.1	Provide sp to int agencies	6.1.1	Provide logistical support for international agencies
				6.1.2	Provide security for international agencies
				6.1.3	Evacuate international workers at risk
		6.2	Provide spt to local population	6.2.1	Support the delivery of essential humanitarian aid
				6.2.2	Evacuate local population at risk
7	Co-ordinate with others	7.1	Provide CIMC	7.1.1	Provide civil military co-ordination
		7.2	Establish operational liaison	7.2.1	Establish operational liaison with international agencies
				7.2.2	Establish operational liaison with factions
		7.3	Maintain operational liaison	7.3.1	Maintain operational liaison with international agencies
				7.3.2	Maintain operational liaison with factions
		7.4	Establish local liaison	7.4.1	Establish local liaison with international agencies
				7.4.2	Establish liaison with local authorities
				7.4.3	Establish liaison with local population
		7.5	Maintain local liaison	7.5.1	Maintain local liaison with international agencies
				7.5.2	Maintain liaison with local authorities
				7.5.3	Maintain liaison with local population
8	Conduct info campaign	8.1	Manage info campaign	8.1.1	Provide procedures for public information
				8.1.2	Co-ordinate information management
		8.2	Execute info campaign	8.2.1	Provide public information
				8.2.2	Conduct PSYOPS
9	Support force	9.1	Provide logistical support	9.1.1	Provide logistical admin. support
				9.1.2	Provide personnel service support
				9.1.3	Provide supplies
				9.1.4	Provide maintenance support
				9.1.5	Provide transportation support
		9.2	Provide engineering support	9.2.1	Provide construction engineering support
				9.2.2	Provide military engineering support
		9.3	Provide medical support	9.3.1	Provide field medical evacuation support
				9.3.2	Provide theatre medical evacuation support
				9.3.3	Provide medical treatment support
		9.4	Provide communications support	9.4.1	Provide communications support
		9.5	Provide law and order support	9.5.1	Provide law and order support

