
Session IV: Military Perspectives (2) From Peacekeeping to Peace Building

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FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACE BUILDING

The papers of this section describe ways in which operational analysts can support decision makers as a peace operation matures from one in which security is a major focus of intervention to one in which that focus shifts to reconstruction of a civil society. The underlying political crisis being a civil war. For the purposes of this introduction, this shift is termed from “peacekeeping to peace building”.

There are a number of definitions for the terms “peacekeeping” and “peace building,” but for the purposes of this discussion the following are used:

- *Peacekeeping* is the containment, moderation or termination of hostilities through the medium of an impartial third party.
- *Peace building* is the post-conflict action to strengthen or solidify a political settlement to avoid a return to conflict.

The former emphasises tasks such as security and deterrence, which are normally associated with military forces. The latter is less well defined, but is characterised by a wide variety of tasks ranging from reform of the military to societal reconstruction. While the military peacekeepers will have been engaged in supporting civilian activities from the start of their involvement in the operation, this civil engagement will intensify as the tasks of security and deterrence ease. It should be noted that the easing of peacekeeping tasks does not necessarily imply that the peacekeepers may be withdrawn. Simply put presence may be required, but presence does not necessarily not imply activity.

So the transition from “peacekeeping to peace building” seems to imply greater involvement by military peacekeepers in civil activities or in a “civil engagement.” This

provides a challenge for the military. There can be a bewildering number of civil agencies engaged in reconstruction or other humanitarian activities. Harmony in the activities of this multitude will be very unlikely. For the military peacekeepers the challenge will be one of identifying those which should be supported and the nature of the support. Their ultimate aim being one of stability that allows the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force.

Currently there is no definitive theory or doctrine that describes a desired state of civil-military affairs in the “peacekeeping to peace building” transition. This suggests that a periodic review process is necessary to develop both knowledge and doctrine. Furthermore the urgency of current operations in the world demands that this process should provide immediate value.

A suggested review process might involve:

1. Assessing the situation.
2. Identifying the potential tasks.
3. Identifying a strategy.
 - a. Reassess aims and goals.
 - b. Selecting tasks and setting priorities.
 - c. Identifying areas for concentration of effort.
4. Determining the implied resource requirements.
5. Repeat the process periodically.

Properly designed the above process could provide both the information for doctrinal development and the rationale for force withdrawals. While this process is offered for the benefit of the military, it may be equally applicable to others.

Analytical support can be provided for all steps of this process, but much depends upon an accurate assessment of the situation. This assessment provides critical information for both initial decisions and feedback for reassessment. A suggestion follows for a structured approach to assessing the situation from the view of the military.

A MEASUREMENT SYSTEM FOR SITUATION ASSESSMENT

OBJECTIVE

Many different measures or benchmarks can be used to assess a peace support operation (PSO) situation. However, when measures or benchmarks are needed to support decision making it is necessary to provide a structure that has traceable links between the measures and the decisions. The objective of this description is to suggest one possible structure.

TYPES OF DECISIONS

For the purpose of this paper four types decisions are considered. These are deciding on:

1. The sufficiency of military forces needed to achieve the main objective of the military force, which is assumed to be providing security within the crisis area and deterring violent acts.
2. The minimum military force to achieve the main military objective.
3. The sub-objectives of the military force with respect to its main purpose. These are called military “lines of operation.”
4. The sub-objectives of military support to civil activities which are to bring about stability. These are called civil “lines of operation.”

PROPOSED MEASUREMENT STRUCTURE

As the main military objective is concerned with security, the proposed structure is based upon the factors of the motive, means and opportunity of perpetrators of violent incidents. This is similar to how crimes are treated in a simple theory of police investigations. In keeping with the criminal analogy the focus is not the underlying societal sources, but the direct causes of incidents. While the underlying sources must eventually be addressed, the structure separates these from incidents and the direct causes of incidents. This proposed structure, with definitions of each category, is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 2 has specific examples of each category.




Figure 1: Proposed Structure for Measures.




Figure 2: Examples of Structure Classes.

LINKING THE STRUCTURE TO THE DECISION TYPES

Each type of decisions listed above can be linked to specific parts of the measurement structure. This provides can provide a priority for issues when considering each type of decision. Following are proposed linkages for each decision type:

- *Sufficient Force*: If the main objective of the military force is to provide security, then the effectiveness of the force can directly be linked to the incidents themselves. If the level (i.e. the number and severity) of incidents is unacceptable then the force is not sufficient. On the other hand, if the level of incidents is acceptable then the force is sufficient. However, this does not allow identification of any excess capability of the force.
- *Minimum Force*: In order to determine the minimum level of force, it is proposed that the middle part of the structure, the direct causes, be assessed and not the sources. The reason for this is due to the difficulty in tracing the impact of changes in the factors found in sources to incidents. For example, there are examples of peaceful countries with a high level of corruption; while some experiencing civil disturbances have fairly low levels of corruption. This makes it difficult to predict how changes in the level of corruption will impact on violent incidents. However, if one considers the direct causes of incidents as the output of the sources of stability or instability; then assessing these direct causes will provide an indication of stability. Further, it should be possible, if not necessarily easy, to assess the impact of force withdrawals on these direct causes. As this assumes that the force is being effectively employed, the decision on minimum force is also linked to the military lines of operation.

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- *Military Lines of Operation:* As the main military objective is to provide a secure environment, the focus for the military lines of operation will also be the middle component of the structure, the direct causes. As examples, deterrence is an overall affect that reduces the motive to engage in incidents; arms reductions reduce the means to conduct incidents; and monitoring and patrolling denies the opportunity to engage in incidents before the intervention force can react. Military doctrine is likely adequate to address the military lines of operation in a PSO.
 - *Civil Lines of Operation:* Achieving stability for a country or region that has suffered a crisis can be difficult and lengthy. This is due to the fact that the sources of stability are not completely known and nor are their relationships. For example, it is commonly held that democratisation will lead to stability. This has not been proven, but is rather an assertion. Regardless of whether or not initiatives, such as democratisation, have proven effects, it is commonly accepted that external intervention is often an essential component in the evolution of a region's stability. As the many civil activities focus on sources and a long-term solution to stability, a military intervention force must choose which activities to support in order to encourage the evolution towards stability. The decision on the selection of the initiatives will be based upon a number of subjective criteria. Due to the complex and multifaceted nature of this area, much research remains to be done in this area before any suggestion will be adequate.

TYPES OF MEASURES

With the structure described above there is a corresponding categorisation of measures as described below.

- *Incidents:* As these relate to the main objective of the military force, measurements of incidents are “measures of effectiveness” for the military. If the level of incidents is acceptable, the force is effective (Figure 3). Otherwise it is ineffective; and either more forces are required, the force needs to change its military lines of operation or both are needed.
- *Direct Causes:* Once a force is effective, it is possible to address the next decision level and determine the minimum force or the timing of force withdrawals (Figure 3). As described above this ultimately depends upon the underlying stability. However, the direct causes of incidents can be assessed or measured to determine if there is a reduced likelihood of incidents. While these measures are not direct measures of stability they are indications of improving or deteriorating stability. These measures are termed “stability trend indicators”.
- *Sources:* While there are many factors that can be selected to determine specific conditions related to stability, it will not be possible to determine an overall level of stability (Figure 3). Nor can one be sure that a list of factors covers all of the relevant sources. However, if it has been decided to support

specific civil lines of operation, then the military should assess factors related to those lines of operation. These assessment measures can be termed “measures of normalcy,” where normalcy relates to a desired end state of each line of operation and not a perception of what is normal for the region.




Figure 3: Types of Measurements.

This suggestion assessing the situation is only one of a number of possibilities. Proposals such as this need to be implemented in the field and evaluated for their utility in the overall context of a periodic decision review process like the one described earlier. In addition to the development of a useful assessment method, analytical support can enhance the effectiveness of other steps in the decision review process. The papers of this section illustrate examples of work in this area. The first paper describes a method for assisting in setting the task priorities of a group of different agencies or organisations. The benefit in harmonising efforts in a peace operation is obvious. The second paper addresses a number of issues related to the identification of resource requirements. In this case these are military force requirements. As military forces are costly and have a high visibility, minimising the size of this force is desirable.