

Military Keynote: Analysing Civil Society and Counter-Insurgency: 'Comfortable with Chaos'

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Major General (Retired) Tim Cross CBE was commissioned into the British Army in 1971. He commanded at every level, from leading a small Bomb Disposal Team in Northern Ireland in the 1970's to commanding a Division of 30,000 in 2004/07.

He completed a tour with the UN in Cyprus in 1980/81 before attending the Army Staff Course in 1983, returning as a member of the teaching staff in 1987. After an operational deployment to Kuwait/Iraq in 1990/91, he attended the Higher Command and Staff Course in early 1995 before serving as a Colonel in Bosnia in 1995/96 and 1997. In 1999, as a Brigadier in command of 101 Logistic Brigade, he deployed to Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo and was appointed CBE in the subsequent operational awards for his work in leading the NATO response to the Humanitarian crisis. Handing over command in 2000 he attended the Royal College of Defence Studies and then, in 2002, he became involved in the planning for operations in Iraq; he subsequently deployed to Washington, Kuwait and Baghdad as the Deputy in the US-led Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, later re-titled the CPA (the Coalition Provisional Authority). He returned to the UK in 2003, took over a key staff appointment before assuming command of one of the three Divisions of the UK Field Army from October 2004, retiring in January 2007.

He is now a Director of two International Aid Agencies, a Visiting Professor at three Universities, a Defence Adviser to the UK House of Commons Defence Committee and a number of UK/International Companies, and a Trustee of a number of Charities.

It is wonderful to be with you this morning. Over the years I have been invited to speak at a number of events, both military and civil, and I very much enjoy doing so. But I have been particularly looking forward to this trip for any number of reasons – not least the location, the company, the atmosphere, the excellent food and the Austrian wine; so I didn't hesitate when Dr George Rose kindly invited me.

But I do have one concern. Having seen the rather impressive list of papers that were being prepared for the conference, and having examined the list of the equally impressive list of participants, I began to wonder if I had bitten off more than I could chew. So, in order to manage your expectations, I offer my favourite quote, reputedly from HG Wells:

“The professional military mind is, by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind. No man of high intellectual ability would willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling.”

However, I think it was Robert Louis Stevenson who once said: “GOD give me a man who has the brains to make a fool of himself” Which I am very happy to do - so here goes!!

I am billed to speak as a part of your discussions on analysing Civil Society and Counter-Insurgency under the heading 'Comfortable with Chaos.' The title is one that I would use if I

ever I got around to writing a book, because if I had not learned how to become comfortable with chaos I wouldn't have survived over the last 40 or so years. I tend to believe that the world is generally more chaos than conspiracy - and I will speak if I may for around 60 minutes on that issue - and we can then debate the matter. I have decided to set out my stall by dividing my talk into 4 parts, which together comprise my journey.

First, there are the early years, the years that laid the foundations – the 1970's and 80's, principally preparing to repel the Warsaw Pact but including N Ireland and Cyprus; secondly, the 1990's, a period which covered 4 operational deployments; the 1990/91 Gulf War and 3 tours in the Balkans.

Thirdly, the final seven years or so; this is the meat of my talk, covering the 2003 Iraq war and my time in Washington, Kuwait, and Baghdad. But finally, if I may, I will then just outline what this all tells me, offering some food for thought.

The Army was all I had ever wanted to do, and so at the tender age of around 13 I tried to join the Somerset and Cornwall Light Infantry. Sent packing by a large recruiting Sgt, I instead joined the Cadets. At 16 I joined the Army's 6th Form College before moving on to the Military Academy in 1969; 2 years there saw me commissioned.

In 1964 there were still large numbers of British troops around the globe – across the Middle and Far East as well as Africa and Europe. It was barely 20 years since D-Day, and even when I was commissioned the Army was still dominated by 2nd World War experiences and thinking. We were of course consolidating fast; economic and political pressures combined with operations against independence movements in Malaya and Kenya, Cyprus and Palestine, as well as wars in places like Korea and Suez had convinced the then Labour Government of the late 1960's to withdraw from East of Suez and to focus our defence effort on Europe, on deterring the WP from crossing the Inner German Border.

It was a sort of fighting withdrawal from Empire, and as I have often said to my American friends it took us around 40 years to get out of the various places that you've spent the last 20 or so dragging back into again. Nevertheless my service in the 70/80's was dominated by Germany. Four tours there saw me move from a 20 year old subaltern to, eventually, a 41 year old Lt Col – having been the Adjutant, Company Commander and Commanding Officer of the same Battalion. Serving in the BAOR as a part of the 100,000 strong 1st British Corps was exciting. Itself a part of the Northern Army Group, we were led by a British C-in-C who commanded 4 Corps – UK, NL, BE and GE. We exercised, rehearsed and prepared to fight a major industrial war with many similarities to earlier industrial wars – large forces fighting a clearly defined enemy; mass, Clausewitzian, attrition warfare. Even in 1990 NATO had 23000 MBT and 4884 Combat Aircraft, ready to engage with the 51714 MBT and 6206 Combat Aircraft of the Warsaw Pact.

Constantly practicing rapid deployment from our barracks to our nominated 'crash out' locations in woods nearby, we could mobilise and deploy a whole Battalion in around 2 hours. If it was for real we would then have moved to our deployment locations, from where we would fight a Covering Force Battle along the IGB, then a Main Defensive Battle, before conducting a Counter-Strike to either destroy or at least stop the WP forces. Falling back on our lines of communication, with large stocks of pre-positioned fuel and ammunition and other Materiel, we would hope to stem the tide. If we didn't succeed, then there would probably have been a tactical nuclear exchange, and then quite possibly MAD.

Looking back it was somewhat surreal, but it was also deadly serious.

N Ireland was of course not exactly a sideshow in the 70's or 80's. It was to fulfil my desire of becoming an ATO that I joined the Corps that I did; I had some good friends in the then Royal Army Ordnance Corps, and the emerging heroes in the so-called "troubles" in Northern Ireland were the Bomb Disposal Operators - and I rather fancied the idea of joining them. Like all of my contemporaries I thus found myself in the middle of two sides of a long standing conflict, dismantling devices set by both Protestants as well as Catholics. And I saw the reality behind the headlines – the gangsters, the protection rackets, the greed and power hiding behind a façade of religious divide.

In a very real sense I was involved in the war against terrorism for just about all of my military life. The troubles in Northern Ireland broke out again in 1969/70 just as I was entering the Military Academy – and that campaign didn't end officially until 2007, the year I retired; and it was of course only a couple of months ago that 2 young British soldiers were killed over there.

Northern Ireland was followed a couple of years later by a tour with the UN in Cyprus and these two tours laid the foundations for my education on what we now call 'Operations amongst the people'. For me it was an embryonic understanding that military force was but one instrument in bringing peace and stability to these situations; an important instrument, yes, but only there in order to create the secure environment necessary to allow the non-military actors to resolve the underlying issues.

Interwoven in those years were times at the Staff College, initially as a student then as a member of the Directing Staff. The foundations of doctrine, the discipline of writing operational and administrative orders, the challenges of thinking through and analysing Courses of Action were set, if not in concrete then at least in fairly solid ground. The Staff College taught me that disciplined thinking is necessary when chaos breaks out around you, and it gave me the tools to fall back on when I needed to bring some order out of the chaos.

But interestingly on a full years course there was barely a day spent analysing the United Nations, barely a glance at the relationship between the military and the non-military players on operations, and not even a passing glance at what I now call the Business Imperative alongside the Operational Imperative. Our focus was on industrial scale war-fighting, essentially in Germany, where operations would have effectively been conducted as part of a War of National Survival. So we concentrated on how best to deter and then fight the Communist hordes; we didn't really attempt to count the economic cost and didn't give an awful lot of thought to the issue of civil-society – as in rebuilding it – what we now call Phase 4 operations.

All this changed in 1989/90, which is Part 2 of my journey. The demise of the WP and the fall of Communism – at least in Eastern Europe - freed us from what I had sensed at the time and now see as the tyranny of blinkered and narrow thinking. There were exceptions, but the majority of our senior officers saw the world through the tainted glasses of BAOR – our practice, how we conducted operations in that one particular theatre at that particular time – had become our principles; we had lost sight, lost touch with previously hard fought for and hard won wider operational doctrine.

One of those exceptions was Rupert Smith. As my Director of Studies at the Staff College in 1988/89 I was challenged and educated by him; I learnt a new way of thinking, a new/fresh appreciation of the Principles of War. And as the 1990's emerged I found myself serving under him in the 1st Gulf War. Far from the relative certainties of Germany and BAOR we deployed over 35,000 troops to fight not a defensive battle, falling back on our lines of communication, but an offensive campaign against an unknown enemy. Logistically it was a completely different and very challenging ball game, and as the Commander Supply of Rupert's 1 Armoured Division I watched and learnt as he majestically manoeuvred the bulk of the British Armies Combat Power. When it was over I also saw the effect of large scale warfare, not just on the military but on the civilian population and non-military players and – notwithstanding my N Ireland and Cyprus experiences – began to sense the complexity of operations amongst the people; I also saw the absolute necessity for what we now call a Moral Component of Fighting Power. I realised that war is more than just numbers of equipment, and an ability to fight that equipment well. It is about the ability to get people to fight, about leadership and about justice and righteousness, both in the reasons for the war in the first place and in its conduct. I saw for the first time the Laws of Armed Conflict played out on a large scale, and the reality of the need for rules like the Geneva Convention.

These realities were to be reinforced in spades during the rest of the decade. Within and beyond Europe peace had existed only uneasily under the shadow of the bomb and the mutually destructive capacity of the two super-powers and their alliances. There was a short – very short – period of hope once the WP had collapsed, but this hope evaporated almost immediately as war and genocide beset Europe in the Balkans and of course elsewhere in Asian and Africa – Cambodia and Rwanda.

With the signing of the Dayton Accord in 1995 I found myself deploying with General Mike Jackson, my other great mentor, to the Balkans as part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), then returning again in 1997/98 with SFOR. As the Commander Logistic Support for the UK IFOR force and as a Brigade Commander with SFOR I quickly began to realise that this was a different business – a much more complicated business – which is why we now call these sorts of deployments 'Complex Emergencies'. Importantly for me I began too to meet and engage widely with many non-military players – International Organisation's like the UN Agencies – the UNHCR and WFP; bi-lateral agencies like USAID and DFID, and of course the mass of NGO's, ranging from the first XI – OXFAM, CARE, World Vision – down to the very small. These were complex operations amongst a web of actors that we needed to better understand. And not least amongst them were the media.

In 1996 I had attended the HCSC, perhaps the very best part of my formal education. An operational level course, it taught me about campaign planning, about sequencing operations and about the inter-relationships – joint, combined and multi-agency – of the various players in the theatre of operations, and about the importance of inter-departmental planning across-government. It prepared me well for Brigade Command.

Having returned from Bosnia in 1998, I found myself preparing to go back to the Balkans in late January 1999 as the Commander of 101 Logistic Brigade, to support and help implement a peace agreement that was, at the time, being negotiated at Rambouillet. The aim was to move quickly into Greece and Macedonia and then move on up into Kosovo itself. Events, as they so often do, were to overtake us. By mid-February we were settled into a number of locations around Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, and had begun the process of bringing in large elements of both my own brigade and 4 Armoured Brigade. As the

armoured vehicles of the first battle group were being off-loaded at the port of Thessaloniki in Greece, the talks began to falter. By the end of February, over 2000 military personnel and several hundred vehicles were in theatre, but with the situation deteriorating we realised that the operation was not going to be anything like as straightforward as we had originally thought. Ships and aircraft continued to flow into theatre, but by the end of March the bombing campaign had started, following the complete breakdown of the Rambouillet talks.

Reports indicated that the fighting inside Kosovo was escalating. By mid-March over 200,000 IDP's were reportedly on the move. Several thousand people had also crossed Kosovo's international borders into Albania and Macedonia; the refugee flows had started in earnest and the bombing campaign served only to exacerbate matters. There could be no doubt that the refugee crisis would get worse, so we produced contingency plans; as usual, of the 3 options we planned for it was the fourth that actually happened. On Thursday 1st April, I drove out to look at several sites that the Macedonian Government were intending to develop as refugee camps. They were small and in poor locations, very close to the border with Kosovo. The government-led reconnaissance was badly organised and chaotic, but I was able to meet with some UN officials, in particular the head of the UNHCR mission to Kosovo, a man called Jo Hegenauer, and a representative from the US State Department, David Scheffer, an Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues.

I outlined my thoughts on the situation. In essence, this was the need for someone to construct major refugee camps around a grass airfield and range complex that we had discovered alongside the main road running from Pristina to Skopje, 10 km south of the border crossing at Blace. The location was big enough to create manoeuvre space to deal with the refugees; it had a good river source for water and an excellent site for a logistics base. In the meantime, we agreed to help the Macedonian Government construct a small camp at Bojane, some 20 kilometres away.

The following day, 2nd April and Good Friday in the UK, I was contacted by the UNHCR (Jo Hegenauer). Large numbers of Kosovar Albanians had been arriving at Blace over the last few days, by road and now by train, and things were getting extremely serious; there was no shelter, food or medical cover and the tired and hungry people were in a bad way, indeed some were beginning to die. They didn't have the resources to do anything effective; could we help?

I rang my Chief of Staff (COS) and ordered him to establish our tactical headquarters (Tac HQ) at a location near the airfield and implement the initial elements of our contingency plans. The immediate task was to establish a focal point where we could work with the UNHCR, ferrying food, blankets and medical supplies up to the border. Tac HQ was up and running within 4 hours. Field kitchens were starting to prepare chicken and rice; I ordered the release of both fresh food and operational rations, and food was being moved forward by about 2300 hours, some 9 hours after Jo Hegenauer's call, on UNHCR vehicles loaded at our logistic base. The temperature was not much above freezing and it had been raining or sleeting for 36 hours. Images of the thousands of people crammed into the fields around the border crossing were beginning to be shown around the world; the scenes there were disturbingly chaotic, with no evidence of any co-ordinated response.

Pressure was mounting on the Macedonian Government and on the UNHCR, whose small team was self-evidently going to be overwhelmed. Various government officials visited my Tac HQ during the following day, Saturday 3rd April; most importantly, in retrospect, Julia

Taft from the US State Department. The US was putting real pressure on the Macedonian government, who clearly needed convincing that the situation at Blace could not be allowed to continue. There was inevitably a great deal of uncertainty but I was convinced that the dam at the border would break at short notice, and when it did we had to be able to deal with the torrent of refugees that would be released. No other organisation was in a position to help and we could not stand idle; in my mind there were 2 imperatives. First the moral imperative – the clear human need; I was not prepared to sit idly by. Second there was a military and political strategic imperative. It was clear to me that the Macedonian Government needed KFOR's strength, otherwise it would fall, and we needed them to maintain their resolve if we were not to find ourselves in the midst of a civil war. After a night of detailed planning I ordered construction work to start.

The brigade engineers pulled aside a crop-spraying Antonov 1 aircraft, built a bridge across the fast flowing stream which ran alongside the airfield, opened up access tracks from our logistic base out onto the range and airfield, and began to dig deep trench latrines. Elsewhere, amongst a myriad of other tasks, the logistic regiment, working with the UNHCR, continued to move supplies forward to the border; the medics began to prepare their reception centres, and the first tents were set up. All of this was being done in a vacuum, as I had received no orders. Finally, and thankfully, at 0800 hours on UK's Easter Sunday morning the Macedonian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Boris Trajkovski, rang me to ask that we should indeed implement our plan. International pressure, particularly from the US, had clearly worked. The tempo of work increased. Water purifying and pumping systems were set up, reception and registration areas were established. General Mike Jackson, the KFOR Commander, visited and authorised some assistance from other KFOR nations and at 1700 hours Macedonian police informed me that the first refugees would be allowed across the border at 1900 hours. One of the sites, eventually known as Stenkovic 1, was ready to accept some, and overnight several hundred arrived; around 30,000 were, however, estimated to be crammed into no-man's land at Blace and the situation there continued to deteriorate.

On Monday, 5th April – exactly 10 years ago yesterday - the dam broke. The UK Secretary of State for International Development, Claire Short, arrived with the UK's Ambassador and a number of other officials; a large media presence was also gathering. Authorising DFID support she asked to look around. As we were approaching the main airfield site, Stenkovic 2, a number of buses arrived crammed to bursting point with refugees. The pictures of Claire Short helping them off the buses became worldwide prime-time news. Work continued but no more refugees arrived. Then darkness fell. Suddenly buses by the dozen poured in. Arriving five at a time, with 80 - 100 refugees per bus, they disgorged their human loads and were replaced 15 minutes later by another 5 buses – and on it went, hour after hour. As dawn broke the flow stopped, but by then around 20,000 refugees had arrived. All through the night soldiers from the brigade put up tents, helped families into them, issued food and blankets and provided medical support; I watched as a tiny baby died, but many other refugees, both young and old, were successfully treated by our medical facility. It was a gruelling night but it was just the first of many. Day after day the brigade erected more tents, and provided more water, food and other supplies. Night after night the buses arrived. It was only later that we realised that during the day these buses were being used to ferry children in Skopje to and from school, and adults to and from work; as soon as it got dark they moved to the border to play a different trade. By 9th April, there were around 40,000 refugees in the 2 major camps; whilst some were being flown out there was little space left.

Over 2,800 tents had been erected, 1600 meters of water pipeline had been laid, tens of thousands of meals had been cooked and distributed, along with over 103,000 jars of baby food, 11,000 loaves of bread, 264,000 litres of bottled water and 430,000 bars of chocolate; 400 deep trench latrines had been dug and thousands of refugees had been treated in our medical facilities – 5 had died, but 24 babies had been born, our proudest statistic!

In one sense the worst was over. Initially the NGO presence on the ground had been minimal. OXFAM arrived first and quickly became effective, playing a key role in the development of the water and sanitation systems. Other organisations began to arrive, but slowly. The UN became more effective as the weeks progressed. Various senior officials arrived and were briefed and the UNHCR and WFP teams were strengthened. For a few days the flow of refugees slowed and the various NGOs began to get organised. On Sunday 11th April, we were able to hand over most of the medical support to MSF and the Red Cross. Although we began to plan the hand-over of all aspects of the camps, the following week was still a demanding one. The camps had to be extended as more refugees arrived, policing and security became a problem, and the temperatures began to soar. Rubbish clearance, sanitation and the threat of disease became key issues; once again our military resources had to lead the way. Further influxes of refugees continued and thunder storms flooded the camps. The ability of the various agencies to cope remained suspect and we were asked, by the UNHCR, to stay on for a few more days. Finally, we withdrew over the period of the 17th – 19th April, leaving behind a military liaison team.

After a gap of about 8 days, during which time my brigade was immersed in the RSOI of the 2nd Battlegroup and the training programme of 4 Armoured Brigade, our attention was directed back to the humanitarian aspects of the situation once again. Inside Kosovo, further waves of Kosovar Albanians were being rounded up and moved to the borders. The camps in Macedonia were full and the ones in Northern Albania, where NATO AFOR was operating, were overflowing. The Macedonian government was adamant that it would not allow additional camps to be built in their central and southern regions and so attention focused on southern Albania. Numerous meetings were held and reconnaissance trips conducted. Finally, UNHCR and HQ KFOR agreed that we should use brigade assets to establish a series of camps in the Korce region of Albania, around 40 km south of Lake Ochrid. Dividing the brigade, and the HQ, over such a distance – we would now have elements of the brigade in 3 countries, Greece, Macedonia and Albania – was far from ideal. My main HQ was heavily involved with military support to KFOR, particularly 4 Armoured Brigade, and our primary mission was to support the UK move into Kosovo; nonetheless there seemed little likelihood of any such move in the short term – indeed we were beginning to plan forced entry – war fighting - options, which would inevitably take weeks to prepare and implement. The lead elements of my Tac HQ thus deployed to Albania on 8 May, and I joined my COS there the next day.

The problems were very different to those we had encountered in Macedonia over Easter. The emphasis was on developing sustainable camps, suitable for refugees to live in throughout the winter if necessary. It was, however, a demanding few weeks. Local politics was riven with corruption and there was criminality in abundance - rival gangs in Korce began open warfare and anti-corruption officials, appointed from Tirana, began to stir things up. Nonetheless, by 6th June and in very close concert with DFID, UNHCR and the NGOs, four substantial camps were constructed, and other locations surveyed and planned; in all we created capacity for well over 60,000 refugees. As it turned out only 12-15,000 spaces were used as, once again, events were to turn; this time they turned for the better.

At the beginning of June planning for a forced entry into Kosovo had begun in earnest and additional elements of the brigade, still based in UK, were deployed. At short notice, 5 Airborne Brigade and a large RAF Support Helicopter force were in-loaded and configured to go north into Kosovo. In the end Milosovic allowed us in; D-Day 12th June and by 18th June my Tac HQ had moved up into Pristina, along with literally hundreds of journalists and NGOs, of every acronym imaginable. In addition to providing military engineering, logistic and medical support to the UK Forces, the brigade repaired and ran a large part of the Kosovo railway system, established a fire-fighting capability in Pristina and a civilian criminal detention centre in Lipljan; in addition a temporary, emergency refugee camp was constructed just outside Pristina to enable several thousand Romany gypsies to be relocated. In all of these areas we attempted, with lesser or greater success, to work with the various non-military organisations and agencies, who by then were pouring into Kosovo. Individual relationships were excellent, but tensions between KFOR and the UNHCR at the operational level meant that the brigade's assets were under-utilised, particularly our rail capability. By the beginning of August the situation was settling and we began to prepare to hand over our responsibilities. We finally withdrew and returned to the UK in late August.

This deployment was, without doubt, a further turning point in my understanding of the changing nature of conflict. In some respects there is nothing new in any operation, but I came away convinced that we needed to seriously think through how effective action could best be orchestrated and executed, particularly the issue of how best to work alongside the various so-called humanitarian players and other Governmental - the major non-military - players. We needed a collective doctrine – a more comprehensive approach.

These things take time to develop - time, as it turned out, we didn't have; for, as we move into the 3rd phase of my journey, I was to find myself at the centre of an even greater maelstrom.

In October 2002, having attended the RCDS in London for a year where we had addressed the political – military strategic level of war and I gained further insight into the diplomatic and political imperatives, I was stood up to be the 2-star JF Log C Commander and Commander British Forces in Turkey. The intent was to establish, alongside the US Forces in their European Command, an 800 km Line of Communication from the Eastern Mediterranean, through Turkey to an area around Silopi. Should events dictate, the British 1st Armoured Division would then move down that L of C in order to move into Northern Iraq and then, together with the US 4th Division, seize the northern oilfields.

This appointment took me, along with the Joint Task Force Commander and the other component commanders, to Tampa in Florida and CENTCOM, to take part in the various coalition planning conferences/'rock drills'! Several things would strike me over those initial weeks.

- The political debate was clearly confused. The situation in the UN, the intent of Turkey – would they or would they not let us pass through – and the uncertainty of Saddam Hussein's response to US/UK pressure kept us all guessing.
- As the JF Log C Commander – and carrying the baggage of my previous deployments – I certainly tried to think through the immediate implications of the proposed operations. Not just the military logistic implications, but the

issues of refugees, humanitarian support and immediate reconstruction. As the Logistic Component Commander at least some of these problems were sure to come my way.

- That said I gave no immediate thought to the longer term reconstruction – physical or political – of Iraq. Nor perhaps, as an operational level military commander, should I have done. But, importantly, I got no sense of anyone else doing so, either here in the UK or in the US. Indeed I saw no evidence of a clear Strategic Level End State for what we were about – the omens were not good!

In Tampa itself General Franks and his staff at CENTCOM were keen to go. They were – and indeed are – an impressive headquarters. They had been incredibly busy for the previous 18 months, particularly since Sept 11 2001. They had planned and then executed operations in Afghanistan, and had been planning options for Iraq for some time; some were even debating what was likely beyond Iraq, with Syria and Iran being seen as likely suspects.

They were tired – 18 hour days over many months – but they had a good, robust military plan. They held the usual planning ‘rock-drills’ and it was pretty clear to me anyway that the military phases 1-3 would not fail. That said:

- General Franks was due to hand over in the summer of 2003, and he wanted to crack on. Future hero, victory parades and book sales reminiscent of General Swartzkopf and 1991 beckoned.
- There was a strong sense that the military were therefore leading the charge. Diplomacy was being left behind. I have no doubt that given half a chance General Franks would have begun operations by the turn of 2002/03.
- There was scant evidence of any serious Phase IV planning. These were war-fighters, and any attempts to introduce Phase IV reconstruction planners – of which there were a few led by a 1-star Engineer – into the inner circle were rebuffed.

By Christmas the UK end were pretty convinced that Turkey was not going to play ball. I for one was pleased when the decision was made to pull plugs on the Northern Option and go for the Southern approach – via Kuwait. We probably could have made the North work, but logistically life would have been tough – very tough – and sticking to some of the proposed timelines would have been extremely demanding.

So with some regrets but overall relief I handed over the logistic lead to a 1-star led HQ; and I returned to my day job. But barely 2 weeks later I was asked (told!) to go to Washington. Working to DCDS(C) I was initially to act as an LO to a new organisation being established in Washington.

On Jan 20th the President had signed a Presidential Directive (No 24) which authorised the creation of an office of Post-War Planning (the OPWP). Whilst this was undoubtedly a good move it was, to put it mildly, a bit late! Certainly compared to the detailed planning for the reconstruction of Germany, which began months before D-Day in 1944 with a team several 100, if not 1000, strong.

I am unclear as to how the decision came about, but it was clear that Rumsfeldt had seized control of the team. A core member of the neo-conservative clique, along with Wolfowitz and Doug Feith and, I sense, led by Cheney rather than Bush himself, Rumsfeldt set up the OPWP right in the heart of the Pentagon itself. I arrived in the very early stages, under instruction to discover if this was genuinely a pan-Washington bureau, with authority to drive the overall planning effort, or simply a side-show. I arrived to find Jay Garner and a small team setting up in about half-a-dozen offices. Jay was a man I immediately warmed to. A retired US Army 3-star General he had met Rumsfeldt in 2000 when, as I understand it, the company that he had established were doing some work on the Space programme. Rumsfeldt clearly liked and remembered him. Perhaps more importantly Jay had commanded what we called Operation Haven, the deployment in Northern Iraq to bring relief to the Kurdish IDPs in the mountains post the 1991 Gulf War. We had put a good part of our Commando Brigade under his command, which had worked well – so he was at least pleased to see me!

Jay had responded immediately to the call from Rumsfeldt and, at very little notice, had given up leading his company and effectively became a civil servant – at a substantial material cost. He then did exactly what I had done when I was told to form the 2-star Headquarters for Turkey; he rang his mates and old comrades. He quickly gathered a crop of retired 1, 2 and 3-star generals and, via contacts in the Pentagon, got a hold of some young blood to support them. I brought with me just my MA – a RN Lt Cdr called Louis Notley – and we settled in.

I had a number of contacts in Washington. Some in the UN as a result of my earlier work with the various Agencies, but crucially I knew the then boss of the UNDP – Mark M-B, subsequently COS to the UN Secretary General and now Minister in the UK FCO. Mark is actually a relative but more importantly a long standing family friend; he lived in Georgetown and I was to spend just about every week-end with them. Through Claire Short – who I had got to know well as a result of the operations in Macedonia/Albania/Kosovo and who had come to dinner just before I deployed to discuss how events were unfurling - through Claire I received introductions into the USAID, including an opportunity to meet with Nastios the head of the agency. I also had links to the Embassy and to other parts of the Pentagon via military contacts.

The early days were inevitably a bit of a blur but we quickly got stuck in, and several issues emerged by mid-late February i.e. within 2/3 weeks.

- After a while I began to really grasp the enormous effect of September 11 on the psyche of the Washington Beltway. I had understood it intellectually, but now I began to understand it emotionally.
- Pan-Beltway there had been and was a great deal of serious thought going on about Iraq. But it was not being brought together anywhere else. Garner was it. Having confirmed that with UK I was reinforced, but only with 2 mid-level FCO guys, albeit very capable, and support from the British Embassy in Washington. I did have contact with a DFID official who was based in New York, but Claire would not allow him to work with us on a full-time because of her well known concerns. This was unhelpful, but I have to say that the man himself was not particularly dynamic anyway.

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- By putting the OPWP deep in the Pentagon Rumsfeldt alienated the rest of the Beltway Bandits. It took me quite a while to secure the necessary pass so that I could get in and move around unescorted, but civilians – even US government officials – were either reluctant to come into the Pentagon or couldn't get in anyway. There were a few, but very few, non-military folk who joined the team – of which more later on.
 - By spending my weekends with Mark I met a very wide range of UN and US officials, and I was able to build-up a picture of the inevitably varied views and opinions. Apart from anything else, through these contacts I was struck by the deep animosities between the various Washington departments – it was clear for example that many in the State Department deeply resented the DOD and Rumsfeldt, almost to the point of wishing strategic failure.
 - We held various meetings and study periods, (Rock-Drill 20-22 Feb) from which it became clear that there was no clear plan; there was a huge disparity/diversity of views/opinions but there seemed to be virtually no political direction as to what Post War Iraq was to look like. No declared End-State; no Campaign Plan.
 - Garner was being pulled any number of ways, and he found himself in an almost impossible position. At one point we managed to find someone who had clearly given much thought to post-war Iraq. Jay got him into the team, only to be told a week or so later that he had to “let him go” – this direction came either from or via Rumsfeldt, maybe from Cheney himself, and was almost certainly because the man concerned, Tom Warwick, was not a neo-conservative and worked in/for the State Department. Put simply, he was not ‘one of the team’ – even though he was clearly a man with clear views and great knowledge. The clear message was that Jay was not at liberty to build a genuinely pan-Beltway team and that he was subject to veto – if people's views would not reinforce the neo-con paradigm then they would not be allowed to interfere.
 - Whilst Jay had indeed been given the task of Post-War Planning he certainly had no authority over any-one working elsewhere across the Beltway; and crucially there were significant gaps in his team. No media plan being developed, indeed no embedded professional media staff; no political advisors in the widest sense; no-one focussed on the WMD issue; no-one from the Treasury, Health, Education etc. And as far as those departments who did provide people, it was clear from people like Nastios that they were on attachment; the majority would report back to State or USAID for their direction; they were not truly under Jay's command.
 - It was not certain at this stage if Jay and the team would actually deploy. What became clear was that he was getting fed up with Washington and his personal solution was to get out and deploy to Kuwait where he believed he would find greater freedom to operate. At this stage I was – I stress – still a Liaison Officer but Jay and I were at least beginning to get to know one another. My sense was that this move away was a mistake. Hard though it was, this office had to be genuinely pan-Beltway or it was nothing, and I told

Jay that I believed he shouldn't leave Washington until we had a properly constructed team; if he didn't get one, we shouldn't go anywhere.

- The situation is perhaps best summed up using the telephone directory from these Washington days; at its starkest it shows:
 - A Command Team of Jay and a Deputy and a COS and 3 outer office staff
 - An immediate support team of
 - 4 in sort of think tank – his “brain trust” who took on so-called special initiatives
 - 3 in the legal team
 - 1 in Public Affairs – a mid-West Newspaper Naval Reservist
 - A Humanitarian Co-ordinator, George Ward, who had a Deputy and just 6 slots in the telephone directory, but 4 were still vacant.
 - A Reconstruction Co-ordinator, Lew Lucke, a deputy and 30, 9 of whom were focussed on getting the oil business up and running; 4 of his slots were vacant.
 - A Civil Administrative Co-ordinator, Mike Mobbs, his deputy plus 10 – 6 still vacant.
 - 3 Regional Teams, two led by retired 1-stars; the third, focussed on Baghdad, was to be led by a lady from the State Department called Barbara Bodine, who joined us in early Mar. These regional teams were to be capable of getting out onto the ground, to act as Jay's eyes and ears and to co-ordinate the overall effort. Each, at this stage, was barely a handful strong.
 - Supporting the whole structure was a retired 3-star, Jerry Bates, who was to co-ordinate the communications and life support infrastructure. His team - according to the telephone list – was to be 85 strong, but as we prepared to leave Washington some 63 of those slots were vacant.

In all there were 165 line serials on the directory, 77 were vacant. This for the office that was going to be responsible for the initial humanitarian support and reconstruction of Iraq and, in theory anyway, was to be the focus for longer term reconstruction planning. It was all woefully thin.

- Throughout February/March I worked from early morning until late evening trying to get my mind around how this was all coming together; I then retreated to the Embassy to construct a summary of what was happening to send back to the UK, before flopping into bed for a few hours in a flat we had rented in Arlington. Initially I tried to be positive and suspected that there were lots that I hadn't yet seen; there must be more than this! Pretty quickly I began to realise that there wasn't. To be fair, back in the UK things weren't much better. Whitehall finally formed an Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), but not

until mid-late Feb and then with a very small team; embedded within the FCO (quite rightly) they too were quickly overwhelmed and suffered like Jay from the chaos, lack of coherent planning and chorus of competing voices.

- I returned to the UK on a couple of occasions, mainly to brief the IPU and the Chiefs of Staff. Looking back I wonder if I was as blunt as I needed to be about where we were. I am told I was but I wonder if that is really true. Of note I briefed what I saw as Jay's plan. I stress that there was nothing written down at this stage but this was my understanding.
- As we prepared to leave Washington we were joined by an Australian LO, a Major General Ford. If I had it tough he was in an impossible position, trying to fathom everything out as everyone was focussed on personal administration and the move to Kuwait. I spent as much time as I could with him and briefed the Australian Embassy Staff.
- One final Washington Cameo. At a lunch with Rumsfeldt and about a dozen others in early March 2003 I was asked for my opinion on how things were going. I responded that I had two principle concerns. First, troop levels. I reminded them that in N Ireland in the 1970's we had up to 23,000 troops deployed to deal with security. In Kosovo in 2000 the International Force was around 60,000 strong for a province the size of a couple of UK counties. For a country the size of Iraq the coalition had about 150,000 and I knew the explicit desire was that within 6 months the US would reduce to around 50,000. This to me was ambitious, to put it mildly. Secondly, we needed to broaden Jay's team and internationalise the post-war rebuilding of Iraq. I understood the political difficulties but if we were to build democracy and rebuild the physical infrastructure then in my view we needed a much stronger team, the international community, and we needed the UN and its expertise in a wide range of areas.

This did not go down well, again to put it mildly – my views were not welcomed! To be fair to Jay and I did actually go up to New York and meet with the Deputy Secretary General, and we were even offered an UNLO. The meeting was not easy, with Louise Frechette and her team constantly reminding Jay, and indirectly me as the UK's man, that we would be legally accountable for Iraq once the fighting was over. They recognised the offer of an LO but could not accept it. Whilst there we met with Jeremy Greenstock and John Negroponti amongst others, but it was a short visit, up and down in a day, and I reluctantly came to the conclusion that it was not a really serious attempt to engage – the UN was seen virtually unanimously as a side-issue.

I should add that at this stage the UK Ambassadorial post in Washington is empty. The Deputy Head of Mission was excellent and could not have been more helpful to me personally, but it did seem incredible that the principal appointment was not filled – although with all the rumpus over Christopher Meyers book maybe the PM thought it was better that way!

We finally left Washington in early-mid March. I deployed via the UK, briefing various people and having a couple of days at home on the way. In Kuwait, we were established in a hotel complex by the sea, South of Kuwait city, and very comfortable it was too. As we

deployed the name changed from the OPWP to ORHA, not an insignificant change and one that we didn't fully exploit as it turned out. During the weeks from the war starting and then finishing to our move up into Iraq there was the inevitable chaos and whirl of events unfurling. Some highlights for me.

- The Washington politics continued to be enormously frustrating. Numbers began to increase but slowly; the names of people to head up and to be a part of the various Ministry teams constantly changed as first the State Department and then the DOD would veto one name or another. In order to deploy, the civilians had to attend some military-style training at one or other of the military bases (Forts) in the US, so if the DOD didn't like the cut of the jib of a state department nominated persons, they simply ensured that they couldn't get trained, and hence they were not able to deploy.
- Another important dimension emerged alongside this. Back in Washington we had seen a number of exiled Iraqis who occasionally came in to brief Jay; their role was not apparent to me at the time but here in Kuwait it became obvious that they were pretty vocal and Jay spent a fair bit of time meeting or avoiding any number of Iraqi's, all of whom lobbied for one thing or another. Taken together this whole business made it very difficult for Jay to build his Ministry teams and every attempt to construct a plan for an Interim Iraq Authority (IIA) was frustrated. The lead for this 'future of Iraq' work stayed very firmly in Washington, where Chalabi's influence was obviously strong, with Jay kept out of the loop.
- The COS, Jerry Bates, began to gather his support team; many serving US military but strengthened by Private and Contracted personnel. A Gurkha guard force – many of whom had served in the UK army – and a bunch of South African heavies, Jay's personal guard. We also had some heavy discussions about how well armed everyone should be – nearly every American wanted to be fully "tooled-up"; I was dead against the idea! Not quite a lone voice but nearly so.
- I now spent increasing amounts of time meeting with and briefing just about every Embassy in Kuwait. Jay had made it clear that he wanted me to be his "Coalition" Deputy; notwithstanding the fact that the UK had still not confirmed publicly that we had anyone in Jay's team, and that I kept being told by Whitehall not to commit the UK to anything; I was still a LO with a very small team, and I was not receiving any clear direction. Nonetheless, I accepted that Jay needed my full support and I tried to provide it; I agreed that I would be his "International" Deputy, and that I would take the lead on our interface with the outside world; I therefore actively set about meeting with all those other nationals who approached us. Many of the state department folk asked to work with me on the attaché briefings, which I welcomed; and with their support we did manage to draw in several other national representatives. We also met with many of the UN/IO/NGO representatives in Kuwait, attempting again to strengthen our links and keep them aware of our plans.
- My UK team was strengthened a little but it was only a couple of weeks before our move into Baghdad that my appointment as the Deputy to Garner

was formally approved and announced. This happened when the Foreign Secretary visited, spending quite a while with us; I briefed him, he met Jay and some of the team and then we had a longer session at the Embassy over dinner. I presented him with what I termed the 'must,' 'should,' 'could' paper – essentially a list of skill sets that I felt were needed if we, the UK, were going to play a full part in the post-war business, and if we wanted to ensure influence with the US. These skills sets covered everything from health, education and treasury experts to senior diplomatic and, in particular, media teams – both to deal with the outside world but also to work internally as our mouthpiece to the Iraqi people. The list was well received, but I sensed even then that Jack Straw was still hopeful that there would not be a war; there was certainly no quick response to my requests.

- The dialogue with DFID continued to frustrate. I had several telephone conversations, with Claire Short. Although she felt unable to formally support the team, we did have DFID representation, but it was no-where near what we needed. Considering the expected scale of human suffering, IDPs, civilian casualties etc this was more than a little disappointing.
- We did establish reasonably strong links with the Military Land Component HQ, and we did begin to conduct some joint planning. But Jay had no authority over the US military and I felt that he was reluctant to force the issue over who would work for you. My view was clear; he would be the 'Viceroy' of Iraq, and the military must work for him once he arrived in Iraq. The timing of that arrival was quite a bone of contention. The military campaign was expected to be fairly short and sharp, and as it turned out it was. My view was that Jay should wait until the military combat phases (1-3) were fairly obviously over, and then he should fly in, in a civilian plane, and be presented as the 'Viceroy' – a sort of Templar figure. He would then be clearly seen as separate from the military, with authority over them. This view was not shared by the US military, nor really by Jay, and it was one of the few times that I publicly spoke out against him.
- Linked to this were our attempts to work with the UK Division. Jay wanted to establish an ORHA office/footprint in or around Basrah as soon as events allowed, and he wanted it to be UK led – initially by me. Whitehall refused to countenance the idea, frightened that this would lead to UK having to bear the brunt of reconstruction costs in the South/South West area. I was given clear direction not to agree to this – just about the only direction I received!
- The tension between the US ex-military and military team members and the civilians grew. At the highest level there was a serious breakdown, and I found myself acting as a bridge-builder on numerous occasions. The retired 1/2/3-stars would spend a lot of time together – often in the evening sitting around a pool drinking whisky and smoking cigars. The civilians – particularly Barbara Bodine who was to lead the Baghdad team – found it very hard to break into this "club." Tears literally flowed with frustration; and there were some serious rows – Bodine was eventually to leave Baghdad in tears of frustration and anger.

- One other important cameo of my time in Kuwait was my various telephone conversations with Alistair Campbell, my visit to No 10 and our collective attempts to strengthen the media team. I found Alistair actually very helpful, and he did provide, at the 11th hour, a useful and pretty capable media team effectively from No 10. I briefed him there, and had a time with the PM, trying to put across the reality of post-war planning – or lack of it. I was pretty blunt, arguing that we should not start the war until we were clear what we wanted from it and how we would deal with the aftermath. This lack of clarity was of course to prove to be a crucial failure.

As the war began the atmosphere within ORHA changed noticeably. Amongst the retired senior military there was an air of excitement and anticipation. For many this was a chance to return to “Operations”, which I somewhat reluctantly put down to a failure to realise that what we were about was not military operations but humanitarian support and reconstruction – it also rather reflected the Presidential encouragement to Jay when he had an audience at the White House back in Washington to “Kick Arse” – not exactly a recognition of what was required. Amongst the non-military the atmosphere was different. The senior amongst them realised that we were far from ready to get anywhere near what was going to be required of us, and for all of them there was an understandable air of uncertainty and trepidation – especially when the odd missile sailed past our HQ and explosions rocked Kuwait.

Fulfilling my worst fears we finally left Kuwait to fly into Baghdad in the dead of night in the back of a military Hercules C130 aircraft. There were barely a dozen of us, with a media pack of around the same size. It was a chaotic start; we spent the first few hours in one of Saddam’s old palaces near Baghdad airport and then had a frantic day visiting amongst other things a power station and a hospital in the city. We then moved north to visit the Kurdish area. Here the response was quite different to that we had experienced in Baghdad city. We were literally welcomed as conquering heroes’; streets full of people, we visited a number of places over about 2/3 days and met with both Barzani and Talabani. Jay was in his element. He remembered them all, and their wives and children, even though he had not seen them for some 12 years. He was personally hugely popular. I was very pleasantly surprised by what we saw; the Kurds had survived reasonably well under the umbrella of the Northern Fly Zone, - their schools, hospitals, parliament etc were all easily the best I would see in the whole of Iraq.

We then returned to Baghdad and set up the HQ in what became the Palace in the Green Zone. From there we travelled around and about, visiting the South and attending a myriad of meetings and press conferences. What we found is best summed up as:

- Fear
 - Long Years of Neglect
 - Very high expectations
 - US Military wanted out
-
- From a day-to-day survival point of view, life was far from easy. The so-called Palace was very grand but there was no running water or electricity, sanitation, air conditioning etc. and the food was pretty basic – mostly cold MRE’s and bottled water. The main party of the HQ came up by road from Kuwait and eventually there was some hot food but the contracted support was not good. The Life Support, the Communications Vehicles and so on

failed on a regular basis – indeed in order to talk to anyone one had to stand out in the heat with a Thuraya phone – which don't work indoors – hoping that the person you wanted to speak to was doing the same! The non-military staff immediately began to struggle – simply existing in those conditions was not easy for anyone not used to being away from home.

- Garner's lack of authority now became brutally exposed. The Ministry teams fanned out and each reported back initially quite positively – most found Iraqis prepared to work with us, buildings standing and files etc available – many having been secured at the homes of various officials. But as the security situation began to deteriorate the US military commanders refused to provide sufficient escort vehicles, and yet stopped anyone moving around without an escort; meetings were disrupted and, most crucially, the Ministry buildings began to be targeted and burnt and looted – Garner repeatedly asked for crucial key points to be guarded but his pleas met with little response.
- Linked to this the contractual support from the USAID reconstruction effort failed to materialise. There was little money and few resources to work with, and a vacuum of inactivity was created. To give you a feel for the key issues here are the top '10.'
- Jay also initiated a series of meetings with the key Iraqi players – essentially the London 7 plus the Iraqi leadership who had not gone into exile. He worked hard to encourage them to work together in order to form an Interim Iraq Authority, which Jay wanted up and running by the summer. Jay realised that we couldn't possibly run the country – we had no where near enough people to do that – we had to enable them to do it themselves. But his efforts were undermined and he got little support from Washington.
- As the security situation worsened the US military response was poor and fragmented. There were not enough troops to tie Baghdad down, never mind the rest of the country, and those troops that were there only managed to inflame things – their posture was aggressive and they only succeeded in alienating Iraqis who, whilst not pleased to see them in Baghdad, were relatively pleased elsewhere and were largely prepared to work to improve things.
- The good news was that there was no humanitarian crisis, no initial reconstruction crisis. The war had indeed been hugely successful, no chemical weapons had been used, no burning oilfields, no mass movement of people, no immediate need for massive aid. There was a serious window of opportunity here, but it slipped quickly away. The high expectations were not met, the media were their usual self and the atmosphere changed for the worse within 2/3 weeks. We did fly up to Qatar to meet with John Abizaid and others, attempting to influence things, but all to little avail.
- For me personally the UK were even less helpful. To be fair communications were difficult, but I was given little support – still no idea what our UK strategic intent was, no response to my "must-should-could" paper. If it had not been for my personal contacts within the UK military I would have had no

vehicle, no protection, and no communications. When General Mike Jackson, now CGS, visited I briefed him as bluntly as I could – luckily I knew him well, but my briefing entitled ‘Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory’ did not go down well. By then I did have a senior FCO man alongside me; John Sawes, previously our man in Cairo had just arrived and was bringing in an FCO team. It was then that the US announced their decision to remove Garner and bring in Bremer. This was in my view very badly handled. Jay was effectively hung out to dry by Rumsfeldt and the US Administration in general. He was pilloried in the US press and treated disgracefully. There is no bigger critic of Jay than me in some regard, but he was given an impossible task with no resources or support. He operated at the operational military level, in some respects because he had to, but he should never have allowed himself to be forced there – as I alluded to earlier he should never have actually left Washington. But he did, and when he left Baghdad there was genuine sadness and much anger.

- Bremer arrived in early June. I flew up to Qatar to meet him and briefed him on the flight back. He could have been presented to the world in a number of ways; his arrival certainly established a fully civilian authority and that was good – Bremer was effectively the Viceroy, the Civilian Provisional Authority – hence the CPA – and he was indeed empowered by Washington. He immediately summoned the senior US Military Commander and ordered him to move his HQ to co-locate, and made it clear that he expected full co-operation. More resources – particularly people, - began to arrive and there was a genuine air of expectancy. Until he dropped his bombshells. Against all UK advice – from myself and John Sawes (I think) – Bremer announced:
 - we were to de-mobilise the Iraqi army.
 - we were to de-Baathatise the Ministries and all other Iraqi government structures.
 - he would be slowing down the political process – there would be no IIA.

These were serious errors of judgement – and they were not his – or just his. He clearly came armed with these decisions from Washington; the result was that the CPA would now have to run the country, and it was self-evident to anyone with a modicum of a sense of history that they would fail.

- For me the last couple of weeks were framed by the arrival of Sergio de Mello and the UN team. I knew some of them and spent quite a lot of time briefing and visiting – including trying to prepare Sergio for Bremer who, whilst he had reluctantly accepted that he had to establish a personal relationship with Sergio, was not prepared to allow the UN any freedom of action. This work, together with time spent trying to convince Bremer to establish an International Council, were my last rolls of the dice. I left in late June, frankly dog tired and glad to be away.

So, what does all this tell me? I offer a couple of points of reflection.

First, we need to understand the context of to-days events – the impact/effect of Globalisation, the reality that the biggest growth industry to-day around the world is poverty, and that alongside this poverty throughout the world there are growing – indeed enormous - expectations of a better life. Around the Globe there are millions who are also asking themselves – ‘Who am I’? What is my ethnicity, my culture, my place? And interestingly these tensions are present in the so called Developed World as well as the Developing World; hence the tensions between devolved government here in the UK – parliaments/assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – and attempts by many to establish a European Identity within multi-cultural national societies.

To declare a War on Terror is like declaring a War on Evil. It may be a laudable idea, but the bottom line is that evil is ever present. Evil may be contained to some degree or other, it may be resisted, it may even be countered – but I for one would contend that it will not be destroyed, at least until the 2nd coming of the Lord. And trying to win such a war using primarily military combat power is just not doable. Attempting to deal with Malaria by swatting the mosquitoes is doomed to failure – we have to get to the root of the issue. Collectively we need to move on from Agincourt, from battles where two sides slug it out with howitzers or from trenches, to winning the battle of ideas against an amorphous enemy, using the weapons of the information age – gaining an understanding of their networks and separating the terrorist from the people. This will not be decided by the side with the biggest weapons, the greatest number of warships, airplanes or even infantry battalions. We, the British military, learnt that in any number of campaigns around the globe over the last 160 years or so, often painfully. Delivery of Kinetic Effect is certainly a part, but it is equally certainly far from the whole.

We have collectively forgotten that there was, and now is again, a different sort of war – the sort of war that both established Empires and dominated the retreats from those Empires. We used to call them ‘Operations other than War’ – and expressions like ‘Low Intensity Conflict’, ‘Counter-Insurgency’ and ‘Counter-Revolutionary Warfare’, have now been joined by phrases like Peace-Keeping, Peace-Support or Peace Enforcements operations; and this new lexicon of ‘Complex Emergencies’ also encompass humanitarian and disaster relief operations. And from these types of conflict – these types of war – we have learned once again that the enemy is not all the people of one state or another. That not all Serbs, Afghans or Iraqi’s are the enemy; that not all Muslims should be targeted. We have re-learnt that the ‘enemy’ lives amongst the people, and that he – and indeed she - needs to be separated from the people. So the simple application of military power – what we now call ‘Kinetic Effect’ – is not usually the answer; indeed such sweeping simplicity is almost always counter-productive.

Underlying the issue, this is a battle of ideas, of deep-seated beliefs and expectations. This is not the same as dealing with a Nazi Germany bent on taking over the geographical landmass of Europe, or a Japan taking over the islands of the Pacific or Burma. It is, on the one hand, about resistance – principally, and ironically, their resistance against us; our materialism, secularism, our value system, or lack of value system. And we need to understand why that is so; people don’t just become suicide bombers on a whim.

There is of course an understandable and laudable desire to see the end of tyrannical and despotic regimes around the world, and there are still plenty of those. Fukuyama and Huntingdon may or may not be right – that the end of history is a free, democratic and capitalist world but that there may need to be a ‘clash of civilisations’ along the way if the

end is to be achieved; but to attempt to win the fight, that clash, primarily through military power is in my view flawed. We cannot impose our way of life, our value system, by bombing people into submission – any more than they can impose theirs on us using the weapons of terrorism. Indeed when we attempt to destroy terrorists or their havens mistakes will often be made that make matters worse, not better, as the coalition has found to its cost repeatedly in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and we found to our cost in London.

And, finally, and in addition to better understanding what the military of the 21st Century is for, we must fully understand the role of the other, non-military players. They include the other US/UK Departments of State – the Home and Foreign Offices, and DFID/USAID – but there are many others too, including International Organisations like the World Bank and the myriad of NGOs. How do these relate to each other? Who has the lead in these complex situations? I have to tell you that in my personal experience these relationships are not, to put it politely, well understood or played out – they rely too heavily on personalities who just happen to have got to know one another.

We need to look afresh at our structures, our Doctrine and training, so that when we are called upon to act we can do so together with great professionalism and accuracy, helping to shape the environment and to establish the security that enables other, mostly non-military players to operate safely.

So there is much to be done if we are to both contain the violence and bring about a more secure world. Can we do that? Yes we can. Counter-terrorist/insurgency campaigns in the past have been successful, and this one can be too. But it won't be easy, and I for one am not confident that we have really thought all this through. And the bottom line is that we need to – and quickly.

I have, as all good military speakers should do, mentioned Clausewitz. Let me close with an inevitable quote from Sun Tzu and the Art of War – written some 2,500 years ago. “War”, he said, “is not merely a question of emergency, but rather of knowledge and encompassing strategy”. As usual he puts it rather well.

So what options do we have? I recommend you read Patrick Sookhdeo's book 'Understanding Islamic Terrorism' (ISBN 0-9547835-0-6). Patrick assesses several options, including:

- Elimination of the terrorists – kill them all! Is this possible, or permanently effective? No!
- Military Defeat – Campaigns in Iraq/Afghanistan may help, but cannot be the whole answer.
- Re-Colonise? Interesting but probably not!
- Brutal Repression? Many nations try it – it rarely (if ever) works long term.
- Deny Human Rights – detention w/o trial etc. Needs national/international support – which Guantanamo certainly does not have.
- Financial Restrictions? Stem the flow of funds. Certainly a key aspect.

- Economic Uplift? Compare Turkish approach to PKK/Kurdish region to the Russians in Chechnya. Allow cultural freedom etc.
- Bring down a 'Muslim' Curtain? (equivalent to the 'Iron Curtain') and allow/encourage internal collapse. Interesting idea, but
- Help to reform Islam/undermine the radicals – like the Christian Reformation in the 15/16th Century. Help re-interpret Islam in terms of/in relation to democracy, freedom, human rights etc. A sound but difficult approach.

What is the right mix? Not easy to answer, but we certainly need to understand the 'enemy' better and secure (not alienate) a wide range of allies, especially the non-violent muslim communities around the world. (Palestinian problem is a key issue). This is a long term business.

SPECTRUM OF POST – WAR EFFORT

- Humanitarian Aid – meet immediate needs; relatively short term and relatively easy.
- Reconstruction – immediate needs, but reconstruct to what?
- Civil Admin – restore or build from scratch?

The Post Conflict Response starts from the bottom up and the top down, and it all leads to Development Aid. The aim is to improve the standard of living – especially of the poor – but when applied externally the evidence is that generally it fails; it must be done internally. The core is to establish the Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Democracy linked to economic and physical reconstruction. It is very – very – hard and we are not good at it. You can never do as much as you think you can and what you do is never done at the speed that you hoped for. **Ultimately – It's all about Logistics**, and there are 5 lessons that have been learnt and then re-learnt.

1. This is all about security – nothing can be done without it and security does not equal military. It is about everything that allows individual people to live their lives as **they** wish – mil/police plus energy/utilities plus getting the milk delivered.
2. Planning matters. Need to understand the culture and prepare our people.
3. Manage expectations – it takes time to change.
4. Organisations do matter.
5. Money is important, but it doesn't solve anything on its own – it takes Time, Treasure, and Talent.